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were in 1958: the natural and built environment, politics and policy,
crime, intergroup relations, and access to housing and medical services. In
addition to making hard-to-find material readily available, it examines an
area shaped by resource booms and busts over the course of six decades.
As a result, it provides unprecedented insight into the patterns of development and the roots of the challenges the region has faced.
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In the 1950s, North Dakota experienced its first oil boom in the Williston
Basin, on the western side of the state. The region experienced unprecedented social and economic changes, which were carefully documented in
a 1958 report by four researchers at the University of North Dakota. Since
then, western North Dakota has undergone two more booms, the most
recent from 2008 to 2014. Sixty Years of Boom and Bust republishes the
1958 report and updates its analysis by describing the impact of the latest
boom on the region’s physical geography, politics, economics, and social
structure.
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Preface
How to Read this Book
Kyle Conway
In 1958, the University of North Dakota published The Williston Report: The
Impact of Oil on the Williston Area of North Dakota. Written by four UND professors, Robert Campbell, Samuel Kelley, Ross Talbot, and Bernt Wills, the book
described the dramatic changes brought about by the discovery of oil on the
western side of the state in 1951. They wrote about the impact of oil, from
its discovery until 1954, on the region’s physical geography, politics, economy,
and social structure, providing a methodologically rigorous analysis, rich with
statistics, maps, and photographs.
Sixty Years of Boom and Bust: The Impact of Oil in North Dakota, 1958–2018
reproduces the five chapters and two appendices of The Williston Report, which
have now entered the public domain. It also adds chapters about the same
themes as they relate to the boom that the region underwent from 2008 to
2014. The book has two goals: first, to provide a historical perspective for citizens and policy makers in the state, and second, to provide a longitudinal study
useful to others wishing to understand resource booms. No study of resource
booms, it should be noted, has looked at as wide a range of impacts over as long
a period of time.
There are at least two ways to read this book, from beginning to end or selectively and strategically. Readers who take the first approach will discover that
the first chapters on physical geography, politics, and economics are data-rich
and provide a solid contextual foundation for the final chapters on social
change. Those who read strategically might start with the final chapters about
social change, the topic most discussed in accounts of the boom in newspapers such as the New York Times or on websites such as Buzzfeed or HuffPost.
These chapters are more focused on narrative, in contrast to the more technical examinations offered in the first chapters. Rick Ruddell and Heather Ray’s
chapter “Social Impacts of Oil Development” (chapter 10) would be an especially propitious starting point, as it provides an even-handed overview of the
effects of the boom, in contrast to the sensationalism of many of the articles
in the popular press.
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Figure 0.1. The cover of The Williston Report (source: author’s personal
collection)
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Figure 0.2. Clarence Iverson No. 1, the first successful commercial well in
North Dakota (source: James N. Holter, Williston, North Dakota)
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A couple of explanatory notes are necessary here. First, with respect to the
beginning and end points of the most recent boom, for the sake of consistency and readability, I decided in my capacity as the volume’s editor to treat
the boom as beginning in 2008 and ending in 2014, despite the changes (all
minor) that this decision necessitated in certain chapters. These years are heuristically useful bookends: the contrast between North Dakota’s prosperity
and the recession in the rest of the United States began to be felt in 2008 (the
country having officially entered a recession in December 2007), and the price
of crude oil dropped below the threshold necessary to make drilling new wells
profitable in 2014. But the dates are somewhat arbitrary. As certain chapters
show (for example, the 2018 introduction and David Flynn’s chapter, “The Economic Consequences of Oil Development”), oil production was growing before
2008, and both the number of active wells and the number of barrels produced
continued to climb for several years after 2014. The number of barrels of oil
produced even rebounded in 2018.
Second, although the 2018 chapters all update the 1958 chapters, some also
consider the older report as an object of historical concern. This is especially
true of the narrative-oriented chapters at the end of the book. Whereas the
1958 chapters about the physical geography of the region, its politics, and
its economy each have only one 2018 counterpart, Campbell’s 1958 chapter
“Social Change in the Basin” has four, and they, more than those that precede
them, are critical in their historiographic approach. This fact, I think, is due at
least in part to the attention paid by the popular press to the social changes
in western North Dakota during the most recent boom. It reminds us that we
should ask how we know what we think we know, both as we read the 1958
chapters, whose unacknowledged biases the 2018 chapters work to reveal, and
as we read those from 2018, whose unacknowledged biases we as contemporary readers might be inclined to share.
Sources and Acknowledgments
The task of recreating the 1958 Report involved quite a few people whom I wish
to thank here. First, I would not have discovered the book if the HathiTrust
Digital Library (https://www.hathitrust.org/Record/001313629), working
with Google Books, had not made a scanned version available and discoverable.
Second, although HathiTrust’s e-book included a text version derived from an
optical character recognition (OCR) scan, it was only one source—and not
even the primary one—for the reconstructed text. Instead, I worked with an
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international team of researchers to recreate the book manually. I focused on
the text, the first draft of which Dave Haeselin gave to his students to proofread and copyedit during a course on digital publishing at the University of
North Dakota. My research assistant Raphaela Nehme, a master’s student in
the Department of Communication at the University of Ottawa, painstakingly
entered—by hand, and with exceptional accuracy—all of the data from the report’s charts, of which there were more than one hundred. Roxanne Lafleur, a
media librarian at the University of Ottawa, scanned all of the images from my
paper copy of The Williston Report, demonstrating an unrivaled level of technological wizardry and aesthetic judgment. Finally, Shane Gomes copyedited the
final, revised manuscript and fixed the details that I, having read it too many
times, could no longer see.
Beyond the technical aspects of recreating the book, there were administrative tasks that made its production possible. Kelly-Anne Maddox in the Faculty
of Arts at the University of Ottawa helped me prepare an application for a
publishing grant, which I received from the University of Ottawa. Finally, Bill
Caraher, my former colleague at the University of North Dakota and founder
and director of the Digital Press at the University of North Dakota, championed this book from the very beginning.
A sincere thank you to every one of these collaborators. A sincere thank you,
also, to all of the contributors, whose goodwill and attention to detail made
this book possible.
A Few Final Technical Notes
First, the book is being published in 2020, meaning the “2018” in the updated
chapter titles is a symptom of wishful thinking. (I began work on the book in
2017.) During the revision process, the authors and I updated certain statistics
past 2018, leading to a slight incongruence between the title and the chapter
content. Second, I have made a few minor changes to the text of the 1958
Report, largely to correct typos, add missing information, or standardize the
presentation and layout from one chapter to the next. None of these affect the
content of the report. Likewise, the 1958 Report numbered all of its figures and
tables consecutively, from one chapter to the next. I maintained this system
in the 1958 chapters, but used a different system restarting the count at the
beginning of each of the 2018 chapters.
K.C., Ottawa, December 2019

Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
Bernt L. Wills, Ross B. Talbot, Samuel C. Kelley,
Jr., and Robert B. Campbell1
From the time of its earliest permanent occupance until 1951 the area of
this study had been an agricultural area. Directly or indirectly, almost
every resident had relied primarily upon the thin cover of soil, upon
the vagaries of a capricious weather and upon the biological rhythm of
plant and animal life for his livelihood and for his welfare.
The people there were products of this land. Several generations in
that place had brought about a pattern of living, an adjustment of man
to land which was established and mature. It was a way of life based
upon neighborhoods and communities where major problems were
common problems, where not only rancher and farmer, but banker,
lawyer, doctor, school man, storekeeper—almost everyone there—knew
this way of life, understood it and was a part of it. By most standards
these people were well off, and evidence is lacking that they were less
content with their lot in life than were those in other areas.
That this area was a possible source of oil had been known to geologists and oilmen since the 1920’s. The people of the area were quite
familiar with the sight of oil derricks and drilling rigs, for numerous
unsuccessful attempts to find oil had been made.2 Most of the people
had become quite inured to talk of oil by the winter of 1950–51 and few
really expected that anything so unusual as the discovery of oil in their
area would upset the even tenor of their lives.
In January, 1951, Amerada Petroleum Corporation reported the recovery of a single pint of oil on a test of its Clarence Iverson wildcat well
on the Nesson Anticline of the Williston Basin. That recovery, small
The first section of this chapter is by Bernt L. Wills. The summaries are by the
authors of the chapters which follow.
1

It was in 1920 that the Pioneer Oil and Gas Company drilled North Dakota’s
first dry hole, township location 154 N, R 100 W. The Amerada successful effort
of 1951 was at nearby T155 N, R 95 W. So near but yet so far!
2
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though it was, stirred oilmen throughout the United States. To them
it indicated the probable opening of a new oil province, the Williston
Basin.
On April 4, 1951, Amerada Petroleum Corporation brought in its
discovery well, Clarence Iverson No. 1, with an initial production of
over 300 barrels in 17 hours, and the oil boom was on.
The onslaught of the boom activity disturbed the established patterns in the impact area. What seemed to be multitudes of strangers
invaded and over-ran the town and rural areas alike. The influx included not only members of the oil fraternity—the oil operators, oil
scouts, oil well promoters, the geologists, drillers, lease buyers, royalty
buyers, brokers, etc., but also many people whose coming was related
only in a secondary way to the oil activity itself. These ranged from unskilled workers willing to work at anything to an instructor in aesthetic
dancing, and from persons who would cheerfully work outside the law
to professional welfare and religious workers.
Demand for housing far outran supply. All available space was
pressed into service. Garages, granaries, and sheds were converted into
living quarters and business places. Improvised shacks, as well as substantial structures, were constructed and utilized. Hundreds of house
trailers were brought into the area.
Community services were jammed; schools were clogged and put
on a shift basis, transportation and communication systems were
strained, roads suffered damage from the heavy truck traffic. Repair
work could hardly keep up with the rapid wear. Thus the permanent
residents of the area found that costs of public services rose sharply
while the services declined.
Business activity in the towns soared. The newcomers brought both
capital and demand for goods. Dozens of new establishments came
into being, from small lunch counters and service stations to large oilfield equipment supply houses. In some instances these establishments
extended well beyond the towns, as along the three-mile highway from
U.S. Highway 10 into the town of Tioga.
In the oil producing area itself the cultural landscape changed as
steel derricks rose in ever increasing numbers, as drillers and geophysical crews sought and found the limits of the pools. Pipe lines were laid
to sidings. Loading racks were erected. Storage tanks went up at wells
and at local terminal points. Warehouses, company offices, and “camps”
were built at desired locations. As gas pressure weakened at producing
wells, the wells were put on pumps and the enormous jacks (for these
are deep wells) became distinctive features of the landscape. At night
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OIL WELLS AND PIPELINE NEAR TIOGA, N.D., SUMMER, 1954 —

This is a representative scene of the major North Dakota oil producing area. The
pipe line is the 24-inch line being laid to the Tioga refinery. Note that farming
operations generally continue throughout the field. COURTESY GNDA

the oil fields literally sparkled with the lights of the burning gas flares
which dotted the area like so many torches.
To these landowners on whose property oil was found, or who received high payment for mineral rights, the oil development meant
increased wealth and opportunity for “the more abundant life.” To many
of the others it yielded little more than bitterness. Often the original
residents found themselves in the position of a minority group. The
newcomers often had markedly different backgrounds from the older
residents; often they were of different political or religious persuasion.
When the earlier residents sought employment in the oil development
program they found only the lower paid, less skilled jobs open to them,
for the big oil concerns commonly brought their own trained labor
supply into the area.
The almost frenzied activity of the boom gradually subsided and by
1955 conditions could be described as quite well stabilized or settled.
The conditions, however, were not those of 1950, for the effects of oil
development are long-lasting. To all, new or old, the oil development
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meant readjustment and change. To the state it meant increased wealth
and a partial check on the declining trend of the state’s population. To
the oil producing area it also meant release from almost complete dependence upon an agricultural economy.

AMERADA’S FIELD CAMP AND TIOGA, N.D, SUMMER, 1954 — In
the foreground is the Amerada Camp, first its supply dump (largely pipe, or
casing); in the center of the camp are warehouses and offices followed by 30
company houses. About a mile to the north of the field camp is the town of Tioga.
COURTESY GNDA

Summary
The effects of the oil development have invaded every aspect of life in
the “Basin.” They have influenced the demographic structure, the political balance, the social organization, employment and standards of
living, and the physical attributes of the area.
These impacts are considered in summary form in the following
paragraphs. The chapters which follow treat of them in greater detail.
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Physical Impacts
The area of this study, the “impact area,” consists of much of eastern
Williams County and western Mountrail County in northwestern
North Dakota. The principal oil fields comprise an area about 35 miles
long (north-south) by 5 miles wide, located about 40 miles east of the
city of Williston, North Dakota. (FIGURE 1)
Geologically, this is a portion of a filled basin—the Williston Basin.
The most important oil trap is the Nesson Anticline, and at the time
of this study most of the producing wells are located on that structure.
Topographically this is a plains area, largely overlain by glacial drift.
This region has a semi-arid continental type of climate, with relatively cold winters and hot summers. The average annual rainfall at
Williston is slightly less than 15 inches.

FIG. 1—Oil Fields of Williston and Mountrail Counties

Transportation Network Impacts
The major routes of supply of this area are the main line of the Great
Northern Railway, Federal Highway No. 2, and State Highway No.
40. (FIGURE 1) Very little change in the pattern of the major routes
of supply occurred outside of the oil fields as a result of oil development, but within the oil producing areas the changes were marked. In
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those areas approximately 200 miles of all-weather roads were added
between April, 1951 and July, 1954. This added mileage consisted of
township and county roads and of “well-access” roads. The latter type
were built by the petroleum companies, of which the most active was
the Amerada Petroleum Corporation.
A direct consequence of the oil development activity was the additional wear and damage done to road surfaces by the increase in
vehicular traffic (this increase was in both number and weights of
vehicles), and by the attendant increases in maintenance costs. The
exact amount of the road wear and cost which can be attributed to oil
development is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, but that it was
considerable is certain.
Demographic Impacts
The impact of the oil industry on population numbers and characteristics in Williams and Mountrail counties was of varying significance. In
general, notable effects were experienced in the rural non-farm centers
(Ray, Tioga, and Tioga Environs) and in the urban center (Williston)
which were ideally located to serve as residential, service, and focal
points in the oil field and associated developments. The remainder of
the two counties, including the rural impact townships and Stanley,
was noticeably less affected.
The following basic changes in population characteristics seem to
be especially significant.
1. Williams County had a percentage population increase of 26.8%
between 1950 and 1954, whereas Mountrail County had a decrease
of 5.5%. Rural non-farm settlements and urban Williston showed
marked increases due to the direct influence of the oil industry;
the remainder of both counties maintained the downward trend
characteristic of purely rural North Dakota counties.
2. There were changes in the proportion of younger persons relative
to other age groups in those significantly affected centers, with a
trend towards a generally younger population.
3. A relatively large number of people in Ray, Tioga, and Tioga Environs occupied trailers, illustrating the migratory nature of a fairly
large sector of the labor force.
4. Large numbers of workers and families were attracted to the area
from considerable distances. In each of the rural non-farm and
urban centers a rather large proportion of the population has
been drawn from noncontiguous states.
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5. The great increase in workers engaged in the mining and construction, service, and trade classifications reflects the nature of
the development and the increased requirements for various services and facilities.
6. The fluid nature of the population and frequent population fluctuations have resulted in a trend towards a lower but more stable
population level. This trend became evident in late 1954.
Social Impacts
The large increase in population, particularly as it represented an
influx of “alien” people to the Basin, was expected to create social problems, situations for which there would be feelings of dissatisfaction and
around which would develop conflicts in attitudes. It was anticipated
that these attitudes would be readily observable in the opinions of the
inhabitants of the area and in the actions of their organizations and
agencies. Only to a limited extent were these expectations borne out by
the observations.
It was true in Williston that the already existing organizations did
not make general efforts to embrace the newcomers into their memberships; but it was also true that there were no overt antipathies toward
the newcomers on the part of organization leaders. There were conflicts in Ray and Tioga about specific issues, but the participants in the
conflicts were not identified by background and length of residence as
much as by “conservatism” or “backwardness” and their opposites. The
most general negative attitude about the people involved probably was
that held by the rural residents toward the town merchants, who were
considered to have “sold out” to the oil people. The nearly complete
absence of negative categorical attitudes of “natives” and “newcomers”
regarding each other in Williston is indicated by the latters’ opinions
about the former and the opinions of both groups as to whether or not
the newcomers had been accepted. Both attitudes were positive to the
extent of 99% and 96% respectively.
There was a surprising absence of social problems arising out
of the changed situations. The housing situation was the one most
clearly considered problematic, although it appeared that housing in
general (rather than specific residences) was most often the situation
opined about. There were very few comments about small, dilapidated,
dirty residences in the area, despite the general awareness of a “tight”
housing situation. (Apparently no plans for low-rental housing were
being made either by public agencies or private building firms; all
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construction appeared to be aimed at high-rental levels, thus creating
what turned out to be a new problem rather than a solution.)
Criminal and immoral behavior did not develop to the level of general problem conditions, and there was a virtual absence of comment
regarding it. There were a few expressions of negative attitudes about
the oil people, but they were limited primarily to rural residents’ comments about the bad-check writing of oil field workers.
The really apparent changes, some of which took on the nature of
social problems, were to be found in public agency requirements. The
school systems and the post office (in Williston, at least) were seriously
taxed to keep abreast of the changes. Building could not be accomplished at sufficient speed, thus a series of makeshift arrangements
had to suffice; schools had to operate on a split day in the small towns
and the Williston post office had to reorganize its operations and to
remodel its working space. (Other agencies encountered less startling
and less pressing changes with the possible exception of government
road construction and maintenance agencies).
In general, the change was widespread in the circumstances of the
Williston Basin residents, but the definition of these circumstances
as problematic was not sufficient to bring about even more sweeping
changes. Conflicts appeared to be local and confined to specific issues,
which were resolved with so little lasting prejudice that negative attitudes about the “alien” inhabitants were not apparent to a noteworthy
degree.
Political Impacts
The discovery and development of an important natural resource is almost certain to involve the phenomenon of political power. In Bertrand
Russell’s words, “power may be defined as the production of intended
effects.”3 When a new oil field is opened there is tremendous activity by
those who desire to produce certain “intended effects.” Such was the
case in the Williston area. First, some of the major oil producers moved
into the new boom area to secure legal authority to develop the oil field.
Then it became necessary to protect investments through the passage of
favorable legislation and the creation of a sympathetic public opinion.
This strategy was not novel on the part of the oil companies but constituted what has been called the utilization of “anticipated reactions.”
The large oil producers formed an association called the North Dakota
Bertrand Russell, Power—A New Social Analysis (London: George Allen and
Unwin, Ltd., 1938), p. 35.
3
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Oil and Gas Association; some landowners and businessmen organized
the Williams County Landowner’s and Royalty Owner’s Association
and other like interest groups. At the state level, the State Legislative
Research Committee delved into the problem of proposing oil legislation that would be in the interests of the State of North Dakota. Out of
the crucible of the legislative process came oil legislation which was a
mixture of the efforts of pressure groups, legislative committees, lawyers, research directors, prominent politicians, and influential citizens.
The unstable power situation in the North Dakota legislature meant
that compromise was a necessity but the oil companies were successful,
for the most part, in securing tax and conservation features in oil and
gas legislation that were compatible with their best interests.
In the administration of the oil laws new frictions and contentions
arose. The issue of well-spacing was threshed out but the decisions
reached did not always meet with the concurrence of some of the land
owners. The role of the State Geologist became more complex and
confusing as scientific judgments and political and economic interests
became intertwined. The importance of the North Dakota Industrial
Commission in the field of oil policy was soon apparent and, more
recently, the role of the Public Service Commission became increasingly important due to the construction of pipe lines and the wholesale
price of natural gas products. The value of state-owned land in the oil
areas assumed a new significance as its revenue-producing capacity increased very considerably with the discovery of oil.
The public’s role in this new venture was interesting and perplexing.
The results of a questionnaire survey, which was conducted by the authors of this study, strongly indicated that most people in the Williston
area actually did not understand even the main features of the legislation pertaining to oil. Also, in an effort to create a favorable climate
of opinion for their activities, the oilmen created a local unit of the Oil
Industry Information Committee in order to “educate” the youth and,
to a lesser extent, the adults about the production and distribution of
oil. Their efforts were well-planned and intelligently executed but there
is some question as to whether the techniques constituted education or
propaganda. This study attempts to analyze that issue.
What might be termed the “power elite” has not changed notably
since the advent of oil. The executives of the major oil producers have
been added to the existing power structure in the Williston area composed primarily of prominent bankers, lawyers, and businessmen.
Thus a new and dynamic element was grafted onto the already existing
power structure within the local communities and principally within
the city of Williston.
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As one would expect, the rapid influx of population caused some
disruption and overburdening of the local governmental and non-governmental facilities in the Williston area. The public schools were
particularly hard pressed; the cities had to increase their municipal
services for considerable numbers of new customers. The changes in
the “old way of life” and the increases in taxes caused the demand for a
different form of city government in Williston, the election of a new city
council in Ray, and some intra-community conflicts in Tioga.
Neither politics nor public administration, of course, stand alone.
The economic basis of politics in the Williston area was quickly apparent. Much of the political controversy centered around the ancient
question of who was going to get what, and how. Social changes in
terms of in-migration, the interaction of different cultures, the increased public welfare burdens, etc., were not as vast as expected,
but these changes may have a rather substantial long-run effect upon
voting patterns and habits. The geography of the area is certain to have
an impact upon future political events. If the oil fields are considerably
extended and increasingly productive the changes in voting patterns of
the electorate may again be modified.
As of the end of this study (1955), it appeared that oil had not caused
any political revolution in North Dakota. The picture should be somewhat clearer after the counting of the ballots that will be cast in the
November election in 1956.
Economic Impacts
The economy of the Williston Basin is characterized by agriculture.
The peculiarities of climate and rainfall limit the agriculture of the
area to dry-farming and grazing. Nearly 80 percent of the value of farm
products sold in 1954 were derived from field crops, mainly cash grains
and the remainder from livestock and livestock products.
This type of agriculture, which is characteristic of the Great Plains,
requires extensive farming on a very large scale. Average farm size in
Williams County is over 830 acres, yet the typical farm is operated on a
family basis with a large capital outlay for mechanical equipment and
little outlay for hired labor. Nearly 90 percent of all farms in Williams
County were operated by full or part owners. Only 60 percent of all
farms employed any hired labor in 1954 and only 15 percent spent more
than $500 for farm wages.
The non-agricultural sector of the area’s economy is engaged exclusively in the distribution of goods and services to the farm sector. It
produces, locally, almost nothing that is consumed by the area. Prior
to the development of petroleum extraction, manufactures and mining
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were limited to printing and publishing, domestic food processing and
the extraction of lignite on a limited scale. Nearly all private employment and income was derived from occupation in trade, service, and
transportation.
In this type of economic situation, extensive agriculture tends to
evict people from farms in an area where the number of other employment opportunities is dependent upon the size of the farm population
and farm income. The out-migration that results produces a population decline and a consequent reduction in income and employment.
The discovery of oil in this area has had two primary effects upon
the economy of the area. First, it has created supplemental income to
farm families through the sale of mineral leases and mineral rights,
and to a smaller number of persons through royalty payments on land
with producing wells. This supplementary income has permitted the
repayment of mortgage obligations on farm land, the purchase of new
farm equipment, and general farm improvements. In many cases it
has provided the capital outlay necessary to eliminate the farm from
sub-marginal status.
Second, it has provided additional job opportunities directly and
indirectly as it has employed individuals in well drilling activity, in the
servicing of oil extraction, and in the impact of an expanding population upon the trade and service industries. Between 1947 and 1954,
manufacturing employment in Williams County increased by nearly 90
percent and value added by manufacture nearly 300 percent. Employment in retail and wholesale trade increased by 30 percent and sales
by 70 percent. The major expansion in indirect employment was in the
service industries. In this industrial sector, employment increased by
more than 60 percent and service receipts had a gain of 226 percent
over 1947.
As these values suggest, the oil development has stimulated the
local economy to levels of activity in excess of that expected under the
economic condition existing prior to 1951. However, it is apparent that
the initial impact of the development has acted as an autonomous
factor inducing change that is not warranted by the long-term potential of petroleum extraction in the area. The local economy is beginning
to feel the effects of the induced over-investment in business inventories, in land, and in extended credit. A favorable combination of factors
such as winter climate had, however, acted to reduce the rate of growth
induced by the discovery and thus to decrease the magnitude of the
adjustment below that which has been observed in other “boom” areas.
It appears quite likely that oil will provide a sustaining factor in this
economy in the future and that much of the adjustment to the altered
economic structure is already accomplished.

Chapter 2
Introduction: Sixty Years of Boom
and Bust
Kyle Conway
It is a disorienting experience, in light of the western North Dakota’s 2008–14
boom, to read the 1958 Williston Report six decades later. In many ways it is
unexpectedly current. “Community services were jammed,” the authors wrote,
“schools were clogged and put on a shift basis, transportation and communication systems were strained, roads suffered damage from the heavy truck
traffic” (p. 8, as reprinted in this volume). Their observation is not too different from one made by the New York Times Magazine in 2013 when it wrote,
“[The boom] has minted millionaires, paid off mortgages, created businesses;
it has raised rents, stressed roads, vexed planners and overwhelmed schools”
(Brown 2013).
In other ways, the report is surprisingly different. For instance, during the
recent boom, human trafficking and drug use both increased (Ruddell 2017;
Berg Burin, current volume). In contrast, the authors of the 1958 report wrote,
“There were no indications available to the researchers that there had been a
notable increase in, or even the presence of, organized criminal or immoral
activity—gambling houses, theft rings, ‘protection’ or houses of prostitution”
(Campbell, p. 262). Where drugs were concerned, they wrote only about alcohol, saying, “drunkenness was prevented from developing to the problem
proportions it might have reached by a combination of already existing circumstances” and strategies, including “a system of quick pick-ups in the ‘skidrow’
section” near the bars in downtown Williston and the tendency by judges to
“[penalize] to the maximum offenders of the drinking laws” (p. 261).
Perhaps the key difference between the two booms is the way people relate to historical events. People affected by the 1951 boom (which lasted until
1954) did not have other boom experiences to refer back to—they had to
figure things out as they went along. In contrast, many people affected by the
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2008–14 boom still remembered the region’s boom from the 1980s, and some
even remembered the one from the 1950s. In the 1950s, most people did not
feel that history was repeating itself. In the 2000s, many did. Thus, reading the
1958 Report feels uncanny because it is simultaneously familiar and foreign.
We have been down this path before, even if it looks a bit different this time.
Sixty Years of Boom and Bust explores the similarities and differences between the booms from 1951–4 and 2008–14 and asks what sixty years of
history can teach us about North Dakota today, where the vicissitudes of the
oil market keep the region constantly on the edge of a new boom—or a new
bust. The biggest difference, as these chapters show, is scale, in two senses.
First, the 1950s boom affected only two counties, but the most recent boom
affected the entire state and surrounding region. Second, hydraulic fracturing
(or “fracking”) made it possible to extract an ever-greater amount of oil from
the ground: 6 million barrels in 1954 compared to about 400 million in 2014
(North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016, xiv). Of course, these factors are
related: improved extraction tools increased output and allowed oil companies
to expand the geographic reach of their operations.
After an overview of the history of oil in North Dakota, this introductory
chapter examines the question of scale, describing both the rates of oil production and the industrial logic behind them, which can be characterized as
high-risk, high-reward. It also describes, in broad strokes, the social impact of
this industrial logic, or the way it influenced interactions between newcomers
and longtime residents. It shows how both production and its social impacts
are shaped by contradictory forces. With respect to production, these forces
are observable in the logic of the built-in contraction: one driver of the need
for new wells was the technology of the wells themselves, which quickly lost
capacity. With respect to social interactions, they are observable in forces related to class and to how long residents have lived in the region. This chapter
ends with a consideration of what it means to read The Williston Report sixty
years after it was published through the lens of twenty-first century concerns,
a theme that the book’s conclusion will develop more fully. As the preface mentions, no study of resource booms has looked at as wide a range of impacts over
as long a period of time, and in this respect, the 1958 chapters and their 2018
counterparts hold up a useful mirror for North Dakotans (and others) today
who wish to examine the situation in which they find themselves.

21

History of Oil in North Dakota
Western North Dakota sits atop the vast Bakken oil formation or play (as
people in the industry call a group of oil fields), which stretches across two
states, North Dakota and Montana, and into two Canadian provinces, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. The oil—more than 7 billion barrels of it (USGS
2013)—is contained within layers of shale, which workers frack by injecting
a slurry of water, chemicals, and sand at high pressure to open cracks through
which oil and natural gas flow more freely.1
Although the first boom began in the 1950s, geologists and “oilmen,” as the
vocabulary of the era would have it, had known there was oil to extract since
the 1910s. The Pioneer Oil and Gas Company drilled the first well—which
was dry—in 1916, an effort that was reproduced many times over the next
four decades (Robinson [1966] 2017, 457). It was only in 1951 that a well
was finally successful, on a farm near Tioga that belonged to Clarence Iverson.
A few months later, a number of successful wells were drilled on the farm of
Henry O. Bakken (Dalrymple 2012). The formation was named after him, but
not immediately. In fact, the name Bakken does not appear at all in the 1958
Report. Instead, the area was referred to simply as the Williston Basin, as it
had “the general shape of a basin or dish. The bottom of the ‘dish’ [lay] under
western North Dakota for the most part” (Wills, p. 36). (As Brad Rundquist
and Greg Vandeberg show in their chapter in this volume, the Williston Basin
and the Bakken Formation are not identical, although they do overlap quite a
bit. See their map on p. 69.)
The 1950s boom was followed by another in the 1980s. Rundquist and Vandeberg attribute the first to the discovery of oil itself, and the second to the
spike in oil prices due to the embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s (p. 82). Both were hampered by
technological problems that fracking would eventually solve. Oil companies
had to drill vertical wells and hope to hit an already fractured vein in the shale.
If their guess was off, they might miss the vein and the well would be dry.
Technologies developed in the early 2000s, such as steerable rotary bits, multipad drilling (where “multiple descending wells from a single surface location
eliminate the need for rig transfers between locations”), and zipper fracking
(where “two or more parallel wells are drilled by perforating each at alternating
intervals”) made it possible to drill wells faster and extract more oil from them
Russell Gold’s (2015) The Boom is perhaps the best description of the history and
technology of fracking.
1
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(Maugeri 2013, 8), leading to the 2008–14 boom. Oil companies could direct
their drills toward oil-rich shale and create fissures within it to release the different forms of petroleum.
As a result, the differences between the 2008–14 boom, which Rundquist
and Vandeberg describe as the “technology boom” (p. 83), and those of
the 1950s and 1980s were dramatic. Rick Ruddell and Heather Ray, in their
chapter in this volume, characterize the first two as “minor” (p. 272): the
1950s boom lasted forty-eight months and affected two counties, while the
1980s boom lasted sixty months and affected four counties. In contrast, they
describe the most recent boom as “major.” By their estimation, it began in 2007
and had not ended as of 2019, lasting 152 months and affecting seventeen
counties. The relative scale of the two booms is clear: the most recent one was
of an entirely different magnitude, so much so that “the findings of research
about rapid growth communities prior to 2000 provide limited insight about
contemporary booms” (Ruddell and Ray, p. 272).
Scale of Change: Geography
The difference in scale is observable in at least two places: the area in which
drilling took place and the amount of oil produced. The 1958 Williston Report
focused on just two counties—Williams and Mountrail—and within those,
just four towns or regions—Williston, Ray, Tioga, and what the authors called
the “Tioga environs,” an area near Tioga that had been undeveloped until the
boom (Wills, p. 52). Of these towns, Williston was by far the largest. It was
the commercial center to which people would travel from the other towns, even
if they could buy what they needed closer to home (Kelley, p. 192). In 1950,
before the boom, it had about 7,400 residents, a population that grew to 9,700
by 1954 (Wills, p. 56). About 30 percent of its new residents came from
outside Williams and Mountrail counties, and about 10 percent from farther
away than North Dakota’s neighboring states (Wills, p. 61; Kelley, p. 214)
Ray and Tioga, in contrast, were much smaller, although they grew at faster
rates. By the end of the boom in 1954, Ray had about 1,500 residents, twice its
population in 1950, while Tioga had about 1,600, more than three times its
population in 1950 (Campbell, p. 246; Williston Report, Appendix B, p. 371).
Whereas many of the new residents in Williston worked as managers (the
town became a center of operations, according to Campbell, p. 250), those
who came to Ray and Tioga were more likely to work in the oilfields, and they
were more likely to come from farther away. Tioga attracted “the more nearly
permanent oil field workers—the better paid, supervisory field personnel”; 20
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percent of its new residents were from farther away than a contiguous state.
Ray attracted “the transient and temporary employees” who worked the rigs;
45 percent of its new residents were from farther away than a contiguous state
(Wills, p. 60; Campbell, p. 250).
Direct comparisons with the 2008–14 boom are difficult because people
studying the affected areas have measured different things, but demographic
estimates and analysis of the geographic distribution of jobs still reveal the
magnitude of change, both between booms and in the years of the most recent
boom. Williston, where most of the oil-related jobs were (63 percent near the
height of the boom in 2011), grew dramatically. Before the boom, it had about
13,000 residents. In 2013, its population was between 30,000 and 38,000,
depending on which demographic model researchers used and whether they
counted the surrounding townships. Before the price of oil began to fall in 2014,
demographers were even predicting a population of 42,000 (or 54,000 with
the surrounding townships), although only about two thirds were permanent
residents (Hodur and Bangsund 2013). People came from farther away than
during the 1951–54 boom, as a number of indirect measures show. Between
the 2011–12 and 2013–14 school years, for instance, the Williston Public
School District #1 had students transfer in from almost all fifty U.S. states, in
addition to Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, the Philippines, Honduras, Turkey,
Nigeria, Taiwan, China, Russia, Mexico, Canada, and islands in the south Pacific Ocean (Conway 2016, 38–9). Similarly, the North Dakota Department
of Transportation registered 255 prequalified contractors from twenty-eight
states: ninety-seven from North Dakota, fifty-eight from Minnesota, eighteen
from South Dakota, and between one and seven from most of the western U.S.
states (Nowatzki 2014).
Also in contrast to the 1950s boom, oil jobs were distributed more widely
across the state. About 20 percent were in Dickinson, two hours south of Williston, and 15 percent in Minot, two hours east (Hodur and Bangsund 2013,
9). Similarly, the economic effects were also distributed more broadly, in something of a ripple effect. Within one hundred miles of the Bakken, there was
an increase in wages, although not as large as within the Bakken itself, and
within two hundred miles, there was a decrease in unemployment (Batbold
and Grunewald 2013, 14). As a result, Williston’s role was different than in
the 1950s. Although its importance grew during the boom (it generated more
sales tax revenue than Fargo, the state’s biggest city), it was not as economically central to the Bakken because the effects of the boom stretched so far into
the rest of the state (see Flynn, current volume).
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Scale of Change: Oil Production
The difference in levels of production can be explained in large part by the different technologies oil companies had at their disposal during the two booms.
“Throughout the area of this study the oil producing formations are relatively
deep,” explain the authors of The Williston Report (p. 36); “most of the wells
find ‘pay depths’ at below 8,000 feet and some at below 11,000 feet. This factor
of depth is very important, for it constitutes a critical cost factor in the production of oil.” The problem was that the technology was such that there was
“no way to prove the presence of an oil reserve except to drill for it” (Kelley, p.
195). Still, despite the risks, the potential rewards were enough to attract a
large number of speculators:
Well drilling is an expensive operation, in particular when drilling depths
are great. The cost of an exploratory well may range from 50,000 dollars to
twice or three times that amount.2 The probability of success for a wildcat
well is probably about 10 percent for the nation as a whole. On the other
hand, the potential rewards are sufficient to induce many gamblers, large
and small, to join the game. (Kelley, p. 195)
The rates of oil production from 1951 to 1954 reflect the limits that technology and risk placed on exploration. Williams County, of which Williston
is the seat, produced 25,000 barrels of oil in 1951 and 6,025,000 in 1954, as
shown in Table 2.1 (adapted from Kelley, p. 200).
TABLE 2.1.
PRODUCTION OF CRUDE PETROLEUM, NORTH DAKOTA AND SELECTED AREAS, 1951–4 (THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
			
1951
Williams County		
25
Mountrail County		
0
Other			0
North Dakota (TOTAL) 25

1952
1,481
91
26
1,598

1953
4,248
900
218
5,466

1954
4,135
1,253
637
6,025

By the time of the 2008–14 boom, technology such as steerable bits (which
could be directed toward oil-rich shale) and fracking (which could force the oil
Roughly $430,000–$1,200,000 in 2018 dollars, assuming an annual inflation rate
of between 2 and 2.5 percent. As a point of comparison, in 2012, individual wells
cost about $8–11 million to drill (Reddall 2012). The success rates made possible by
fracking have also made it possible for oil companies to take greater financial risks.
2
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out once the drill had cleared a path to it) had advanced in ways that diminished some of the earlier risk. As a result, the state produced more than fifty
times as much oil as during the 1951–4 boom. In 2012, it produced a little
more than 240 million barrels of oil. In 2013, that number rose to about 314
million. In 2014: 397 million. In 2015: 432 million (North Dakota Industrial
Commission 2016). (See Figure 2.1.) Production declined in 2016, but by 2018,
it had increased again, breaking records for monthly production in August of
that year (Dalrymple 2018; Brady 2018).

Figure 2.1. Total annual oil production in North Dakota, 1951–2016 (source:
North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016)

These numbers bear further scrutiny, however. For production to increase at
this rate, companies needed to drill wells at a furious pace because they quickly
became inefficient. In a sense, the bust that started in 2014 was built into the
boom from the very beginning: it had merely been hidden by the accelerated
rates of drilling. In other words, the boom was premised on a contraction.
What exactly does this observation mean? Fracked wells produce oil most
quickly during the first month after they come on-line. After a year, their production drops as much as 50 percent, and after two years, as much as 70 percent.
As a result, during the height of the Bakken boom, oil companies had to drill
about ninety new wells a month just to hold production steady (Maugeri 2013,
1–3), and the number of active wells ballooned from about 4,200 in 2008 to
more than 13,700 in 2015 (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016, xiv).
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Figure 2.2. Total number of active wells per year in North Dakota, 1951–2016
(source: North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016)

Figure 2.3. Average annual oil production per well in North Dakota, 1951–
2016 (source: North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016)
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(See Figure 2.2. For a useful point of comparison, note that there were about
three and a half times as many wells in 2015 as there were at the height of
the 1980s boom, and nearly thirty times as many as during the 1950s boom.)
In other words, many of the jobs created during the most recent boom were
those of the people who worked the drilling rigs. Their work was in demand
because oil companies knew the wells they drilled would slow down in a relatively short time.
At the same time, however, the technology for extracting oil from shale was
becoming more efficient, making it possible to drill wells faster and extract
more oil from them (Maugeri 2013, 8). In the Bakken, these improvements
translated into wells that produced twice as much oil annually as those from
the 1980s boom (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2016, xiv). (See Figure
2.3. Note that the statistics from the 1950s are thrown off by the fact that
there were very few wells, which has the effect of inflating the annual average
production per well.)
Although new technologies helped mitigate the risk oil companies incurred,
the rates and tendencies of employment remained relatively volatile. Because
production in shale-based fracked wells declines so quickly, oil companies feel
drops in the price of oil acutely. As Maugeri explains, “starting production
when the market is down means selling the bulk of a [well’s] total production
for cheap without possibility of recovery” (2013, 11). At the same time, drilling
new wells can be done quickly: “it takes only a few months from obtaining a
drilling license to bringing a well online” (Maugeri 2013, 11). Thus, companies
stop and start as oil prices fluctuate, the break-even point during the 2008–14
boom being about $85 a barrel (Maugeri 2013, 14).
It was during the drilling stages that the fastest population growth occurred in the Bakken “as a greater number of workers were required to drill the
wells and to construct the infrastructure, such as plant structures, railways,
and pipelines that move these commodities” (Ruddell and Ray, p. 276). To
hedge against the volatility of oil prices, companies relied on “fly-in, fly-out”
(or “FIFO”) workers, who could quickly start wells when called upon to do so
but go elsewhere when production slowed. In this way, the new technologies
for fracking shale made it possible for companies to treat their workforce as
flexible. In effect, they could hedge against risk while maximizing gain by transferring the burden of the risk onto their workers, whose fortunes rose and fell
with the price of oil.
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Social Impacts
As both the 1951–4 and 2008–14 booms showed, this high-risk, high-reward
logic had impacts on the communities within whose bounds oil was found.
During the most recent boom, the reliance on FIFO workers, for instance,
which solved problems for oil companies while creating them for workers, had
destabilizing effects on the boomtown communities “by reducing informal social controls, which in turn [increased] disorder and crime” (Ruddell and Ray,
p. 276).
But the booms also revealed the complex, sometimes ambiguous nature of
social integration. To give an example, on the one hand, respondents to the
surveys administered for the 1958 Report thought that newcomers had been
welcomed: “a total of 96% of the old residents and 95% of the new residents
thought that newcomers had been accepted” (Campbell, p. 252). In a similar
vein, the perception that booms were places characterized “a general laxity of
law enforcement or, at least, of a greater incidence of loose spending for illegal
and barely legal pleasures” proved to be wrong, as Williston increased its police
budget during the boom (Campbell, p. 259).
On the other hand, according to the 1958 Report:
Conflicts on the personal level in Ray and Tioga were more apparent than
in Williston not only in … political issues but also in general attitudes
about people of one sort or another. One woman, whose son was a leader
in the fight for the water system,3 reported that her neighbor had not
spoken to her for a year as the consequence of the fight. Others referred to
the “backwardness” of the native residents, to the “riff-raff” who came in
to work the oil fields, and to the destruction of the close friendly relations
between town and country since the business had begun to cater to oil
workers, such statements reflecting an outspoken but numerically small
group of people. (Campbell, p. 250)
Studies of the 2008–14 boom reveal similar contradictions. On the one
hand, a recent, survey-based study showed that a range of demographic characteristics, including gender, race, and years of residency, were not statistically
significant predictors of longtime residents’ attitudes toward newcomers
The dispute in question took place in Tioga and concerned whether the town
needed a municipal water and sewer system and, if so, who should pay for it. See
Talbot, p. 133.
3
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(Huynh, Robinson, Mrozla, Dahle, Archbold, and Marcel 2019). Instead, significant predictors included longtime residents’ perceptions of crime: those
who thought it had increased were less likely to perceive newcomers positively.
Conversely, longtime residents who “viewed their community as a friendly
place, believed that most people in their community can be trusted, and … [attempted] to interact with new residents in their community were also more
likely to have positive perceptions of new residents” (Huynh et al. 2019, 1003).
On the other hand, there is ample evidence to suggest that the boom
produced anxiety for longtime residents in the region (see Ruddell and Ray,
current volume). Frequently that anxiety focused on specific places, such as
the Walmart on the north end of Williston. When the boom began, the store’s
“parking lot became an informal campground” and then grew “increasingly
crowded and rowdy, which resulted in safety concerns” (Caraher and Weber
2017, 75; see also Caraher, Weber, and Rothaus, current volume). Many
women felt they could not go there without men following them around (Eligon 2013). Whether the perception resulted from a statistically significant
increase in crime is difficult to determine, for reasons related to challenges in
measuring the region’s population and the scant records of crime before the
boom. Still, as Rick Ruddell (2017, 48) writes, “a 20% increase in crime may
not be statistically significant, but that change has a substantial impact on the
operations of the police, courts, and corrections.”
How to interpret these apparent contradictions? For one thing, it is likely
that longtime residents felt—and feel—anxiety in some situations, but not
all, and that the way researchers asked questions influenced what they said. It
is entirely possible that respondents thought outsiders were welcome in a general sense but still felt anxious when they walked through the Walmart parking
lot. For another, these contradictions hint at the complexity of the impact of
oil on the region, as companies and governments have hedged against the risk
of the bust that is always on the horizon. The Williston Report and the follow-up
chapters in this volume have only just begun to unravel this complexity. Consider the points where the 2018 chapters go beyond those from 1958. Andrea
Olive, for instance, describes how new technologies have meant more exploration and, consequently, more environmental impact and more agencies
involved. The 1958 Report describes the role of the Industrial Commission,
which formulated conservation regulations, the North Dakota state geologist,
who directed the State Geological Survey, and the Public Service Commission,
which regulated public utilities. Also involved, but to lesser degrees, were the
Tax Commission, the Board of University and School Lands, and the Bank of
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North Dakota, the latter two having lands under lease (Talbot, p. 120–3).
Olive expands this list to include the Water Commission, the Department of
Health, the Department of Labor, the Game and Fish Department, and the
Parks and Recreation Department (p. 164). The addition of these agencies
attests to the boom’s reach and the need North Dakotans felt to address the
impact of oil extraction on their lived and natural environments. Consider, too,
the healthcare-related needs in the Bakken in the 2000s. While The Williston
Report mentions hospitals only once (to discuss their economic impact [Kelley,
p. 213]), Karin Becker, in her chapter, provides a clear picture of the workforce
shortages and need for mental health services at seven sites across the state.
Finally, consider the increase in human trafficking that occurred during the
2008–14 boom. As noted above, the 1958 Report claimed that prostitution
was not a problem in the Williston Basin. As Nikki Berg Burin argues in her
chapter, not only was it a problem during the most recent boom, but there is
reason to think it was also a problem six decades prior, the claims of the 1958
authors notwithstanding.
Reading the 1958 Report Sixty Years Later
The Williston Report reveals as much about its time in what it does not say as in
what it does. Contemporary readers bring a set of expectations to the text that
its authors did not share, as the final chapters of this book demonstrate. For
instance, the authors of the 1958 Report defined social problems as “any situation which is reported by people involved in it as undesirable and, therefore,
about which they express a negative opinion” (Campbell, p. 254). Not wanting
to impose their own sense of what constituted a problem, they relied instead
on their informants. This choice had the effect, as Bill Caraher, Bret Weber,
and Richard Rothaus (current volume) point out, of reproducing the basic assumptions underpinning the region’s broader social structure, for instance by
ignoring structural issues affecting the scarcity of adequate housing, which the
authors treated as an individual, rather than social, problem. Similarly, as Nikki
Berg Burin argues, there is reason to be skeptical about the authors’ claims that
prostitution was not a problem. Although contemporary scholars do not have
the same direct access to the situation as the authors of the original report, the
laws passed in Bismarck about prostitution suggest that there was a problem
to which lawmakers were reacting. Thus “we have to be careful consumers of
[this] research” in reading the 1958 Report now, as Ruddell and Ray write (p.
272).
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Hence the value of the updated chapters, which reveal a number of patterns
that remained latent in 1958. Such patterns relate to the logics that support
the oil industry, in particular the way it has shifted the burden of risk onto
workers (who fly in and out, contingent on companies’ needs) and onto the
communities where they operate (which have to invest in infrastructure and
housing in ways that obligate them well beyond the likely end of the boom)
(see also Conway 2018). The concluding chapter examines these things left
unsaid, related to social problems and risk. It also examines two of the most
conspicuous absences from the original report, Native Americans and the environment, as well as a point where they intersect in current debates, namely
the conflicts about oil pipelines. In this way, given the perspective provided by
the passage of time, the mirror Sixty Years of Boom and Bust holds up is—one
hopes!—broader and more revealing than that of the book that inspired it.
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Chapter 3
Physical Attributes of the Area
Bernt L. Wills
Geographic Location
The oil producing area is relatively small. For the most part it consists
of a field about thirty-five miles long (north-south) and about five
miles wide (east-west) located astride much of the common boundary
between Williams and Mountrail counties in northwestern North
Dakota. Several smaller fields lie nearby. A surrounding area of considerably larger size felt the impact of oil development very strongly,
however, and is included within the area of this study. The oil field, the
additional major impact area, and other significant features are shown
on the map, Figure 2. It will be noted that the oil field lies about forty
miles east of Williston, the county seat of Williams County, and about
twenty-five miles west of Stanley, the county seat of Mountrail County.
Topography
This area constitutes a part of the Missouri Plateau, a sub-province of
the Great Plains, and for the most part is a region of undulating plains.
Toward the southern portion of the area a change of slope conditions
occurs and the topography becomes much more rugged. There relatively high escarpments overlook deep coulees and valleys and finally
face upon the broad floodplain of the Missouri River. Glacial drift blankets most of the area except in the bluff section in the south where
underlying formations are exposed. These formations consist chiefly
of shales, some sandstones, and occasional layers of “scoria.”1 Gravel
deposits are quite common throughout the area.

This “scoria” is not that of most geologic literature, but is the term applied
locally to a naturally baked clay bed.
1
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Geologic Situation
The Williston Basin is a geologic basin, although, as indicated above,
it is a plains region topographically. It is a filled basin whose upper
sedimentary formations encompass more than half of North Dakota,
plus parts of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Montana, and South Dakota.
This large areal extent is shown in Figure 3.
As the name implies, the Williston Basin has the general shape
of a basin or dish. The bottom of the “dish” lies under western North
Dakota for the most part, and in its thickest sections the sedimentary
formations in that area have a total thickness of over 15,000 feet. This
dipping of strata and depth situation is graphically illustrated in the
diagrammatic geologic cross-section of North Dakota, Figure 4. This
drawing represents the eastern portion of the dish or basin. Westward
the basin and its structures incline upward upon the geologic extensions of the Rocky Mountains.
Within the basin are structures which serve as oil traps. Of these
the important one, for the purposes of this study, is the famous Nesson
anticline. This structure lies east of Williston, North Dakota, trends
roughly north-south, and is the present site of the producing wells of
this area.
Throughout the area of this study the oil producing formations are
relatively deep; most of the wells find “pay depths” at below 8,000 feet
and some at below 11,000 feet. This factor of depth is very important,
for it constitutes a critical cost factor in the production of the oil.
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FIG. 2—Williston Research Area

38

FIG. 3—The Williston Basin
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FIG. 4—Diagrammatic Geologic Cross Section of North Dakota from
Tioga to Grand Forks
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Climate
The climate of this area, as of any area, affects not only the agricultural
pursuits, but the efficiency and economy of men and machines in virtually all fields of endeavor. It affects the comfort and the cost of living
of the labor force. It affects the cost and convenience of transportation
of men and of goods. In this last regard crude oil transportation is no
exception, for climate affects depths to which pipe lines must be laid,
as well as cost of laying and maintaining road beds for trucks or trains.
Because of its location near the center of the North American continent, Williston and vicinity has a semi-arid continental type of climate
with relatively cold winters and warm to hot summers. During the long
hot summer days readings of 100°F are not uncommon, but nights are
usually cool and conducive to rest and sleep. Sunstroke is virtually unheard of in this dry region, and because of the dryness of the air even
the hottest days are not as uncomfortable as they would otherwise be.
The record maximum temperature of 110°F occurred in July of 1936.
The average temperature for the month of July in Williston is 69.4°F.
In winter temperatures below zero are common. The record minimum
–50°F also occurred in 1936. When temperatures are low, however, the
air is generally dry, with little or no wind, and the weather is clear and
invigorating. The average temperature for the month of January in Williston is 7.9°F. Variable weather characterizes this area for it lies in the
track of cyclonic air masses which move eastward across the continent.
This oil producing area is the driest part of the state of North Dakota.
The weather station at Tioga, with an annual average precipitation of
14.3 inches, has the lowest average reading of any station in the state.
The average at Williston is 14.66 inches. Winter is the dry season. Few
places so far north in the United States receive so little snowfall. Spring
and early summer is the time of maximum precipitation.
The wind blows much of the time, usually from a westerly direction,
and with an average hourly speed of about eight miles. The absence of
violent windstorms in this area is indicated by the fact that the highest
wind speed ever recorded at Williston was 60 miles per hour. However,
blizzards are not uncommon in winter, and when they occur outside
activity is brought to a halt. Fogs are infrequent and cloudy days are
few. It is therefore, healthy, invigorating climate, favorable to physical
and mental activity.
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Transportation Patterns and Oil Developments2
Major Transportation Routes
Figure 2 shows the major routes of supply of the area of this study.
This pattern was not altered by the discovery and development of oil.
It will be noted that the area is crossed by a single railroad, the main
line of the Great Northern Railway, which serves, in order from east
to west, the towns of Stanley, Ross, Manitou, White Earth, Tioga, Ray,
Wheelock, Epping, Spring Brook, and Williston, each a focal point of
local trade in the area. A branch line of the Great Northern Railway
extends northwestward from Stanley through Powers Lake and thence
north of the major oil producing area (FIGURE 1). This branch line is
of minor significance to the oil producing area but the main line is very
important.
The area is crossed only one federal road, U.S. Highway No. 2. This
is the only continuous, first class road which crosses the area. It, like
the railroad, connects Williston and Stanley and crosses essentially the
same territory but follows the lines of the township and section surveys, therefore nearly always running straight north-south or straight
east-west, consequently being of somewhat greater length than the rail
line. It misses several of the towns of the area, including Tioga.
Similarly the area of this study is served by only one state road,
State Highway No. 40. This road runs north from U.S. Highway No.
2 through the town of Tioga and thence northward through the Tioga
field. It became a very heavily used road following the discovery of
oil, and as a result had much increased maintenance costs including
additions of gravel. It was hard surfaced from the junction with U.S.
Highway No. 2 to Tioga in 1953; thus for three and one half miles it is
a first-class highway.
The remaining roads shown on Figure 2 as being major routes of
supply are gravelled county roads. The first of these, in importance, is
the so-called Ferry Road, which extends north-south across the Beaver
Lodge Field from U.S. Highway No. 2 to the ferry on the Missouri River.
The other is called the Scenic Highway. It runs eastward from Williston
through the southern portion of this study area and is of particular importance to the Cafce and Hofflund Fields. It is rather fittingly named,
as it skirts the breaks of the river and crosses small bad-lands areas.
Most of this section on transportation is condensed from the exhaustive work
done on this subject by Donald H. Poole, “The Impact of Oil Upon the Road
Patterns and Road Surfaces which Serve the Tioga-Beaver Lodge Oil Pools”
(unpublished research paper, Department of Geography, Northwestern University, 1954). The maps shown in Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are also by Mr. Poole.
2
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[fig5.tif]

[fig6.tif]

FIG. 5—Tioga Beaver Ledge Fields: Major Routes of Supply
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FIG. 6—Transportation Patterns, 1949
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Comparison of Road Patterns, 1949 and 1954
A comparative study of the road systems of 1949 and 1954 as shown
in Figures 5 and 6 point out three significant facts: (1) as previously
stated, the basic road patterns remained unchanged, (2) most of the
construction occurred within the oil producing districts, (3) most of
the construction consisted of well-access roads, although there was
some extension and improvement of township and county roads.
It may be noticed that the maps in Figures 5 and 6 show certain patterns which are identical on each of those but which are omitted from
Figure 4. Figure 4 shows the major arteries, and the additional roads
shown on Figures 5 and 6, while very important locally, are tributary to
the major routes.
One relatively minor change in road pattern occurred south of the
Beaver Lodge Field. Here new construction in 1954 resulted in the rerouting of the Scenic Highway two miles northward, in that area, and
thence eastward along the southern boundary of Dry Fork Township.
The older road was abandoned to the backwaters of the Garrison Dam
project.
Road Patterns Within the Oil Fields
Figures 7 and 8 show in considerable detail the road patterns within
the oil producing districts, as of July, 1954. It is significant that most of
the road mileage shown on these maps is a direct result of oil discovery
and development. For the most part these roads are well-access roads
and feeder lines to the major routes of travel.
These roads are graded and are intended for all-weather use although some are lacking in special surfacing. Many are scoria topped
and some are gravelled. The added mileage due to oil development is
about 100 miles, and this added mileage is almost entirely the result of
expenditures by the oil interests, particularly the Amerada Petroleum
Corporation, which controls about 85% of the production.
As shown on the maps, most of the oil wells, and most of the added
road mileage, are found in 8 townships. Six of those are in Williams
County and two are in Mountrail.
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FIG. 7—Transportation Pattern, 1954
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FIG. 8—Tioga Field: Road Pattern and Well Location

Traffic Flow—Traffic count data are available for 1950 through
June, 1954, for U.S. Highway No. 2; but for State Highway No. 40 the
data are available only for the years 1951 and 1953 (TABLE I). No traffic
count data are available for roads of the county system, nevertheless
certain roads of the county system do carry a considerable portion of
the traffic, including the oil traffic. This is especially true of those in
the Beaver Lodge Field, and on the basis of field observation it may
reasonably be assumed that the traffic count on certain of the county
roads, such as the Ferry Road, would approximate the figures given for
State Highway No. 40.
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An analysis of Table I shows a pronounced increase in vehicular
traffic for each of the years following the discovery of oil. However, it is
necessary to remember that this increase in traffic includes all vehicles
using the roads, not merely those involved in the oil activity. Thus to a
certain, but to an indeterminate, amount other factors combined with
the oil activity to account for the increases.
Perhaps more important than volume of traffic and its increase,
as results of oil development, was the increase in weights of vehicles
used on the roads. Oil drilling rigs and associated equipment are very
ponderous and weighty, and heavy loads on heavy trucks and dollies
are an integral part of oil development. Thus, almost every facet of the
oil program brought increased burdens and wear upon a road system
which had been built to serve a relatively simple agricultural economy.
Table I
TRAFFIC COUNT—U.S. HIGHWAY NO. 2
WILLISTON TO STANLEY
Comparison of Average Daily Traffic for All Days of each month at
Automatic Traffic Counter
			
January		
February		
March		
April		
May		
June		
July		
August		
September
October		
November
December
Annual Average
24 Hr. Traffic

1950
335
370
502
697
630
929
1194
1176
1011
828
665
541
——
740

1951
437
417
356
814
815
1043
1265
1253
1016
923
800
500
——
809

1952
450
641
749
1200
1236
1473
1854
1860
1498
1389
1219
1084
——
1221

1953
936
968
1060
1346
1361
1767
1961
2125
1732
1464
1162
924
——
1401

State Highway No. 40—Annual Average 24 Hr. Traffic
1951—Junction No. 2 to Tioga
610
Tioga to McGregor Junction
370
1953—Junction No. 2 to Tioga
2615
Tioga to McGregor Junction
590

1954
766
909
928
1103
1185
1688

——
......

48

FIG. 9—Beaver Lodge Field: Road Pattern and Well Location

Roadway Construction and Maintenance
Road construction in the area under survey was renewed in 1951 following the discovery of oil. New road construction by Williams and
Mountrail counties was insignificant for their highway expenditures
were directed to maintenance of existing roads. However, considerable
construction was done by the state of North Dakota and by the Amerada Petroleum Corporation.
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Table II shows actual expenditures for road construction and for
maintenance during the period 1950–June, 1954, by the state of North
Dakota, by Amerada Petroleum Corporation and by Williams County.
The expenditures by Williams County are almost entirely for maintenance. Table III shows the expenditures for Williams County by the
state of North Dakota for each year.
An analysis of these tables shows a significant increase in expenditures during the period of oil development. Percentagewise the greatest
costs are involved in routine surface operations.
As in the case of increased traffic, not all of the increase in maintenance costs can be attributed to the oil development program, but that
the oil program contributed cannot be questioned.
The harshness of the cold winter season and one of its effects on
road maintenance is evidenced by the percentage of maintenance costs
involved in controlling snow and ice. For the four-year period 1950–
1954 approximately 15 per cent of all maintenance expenditures were
so utilized.
TABLE II
N.D. HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION COSTS, JANUARY, 1950 TO
JUNE, 1954 BY AGENCY AND BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE
State of North Dakota
Highway No. 40
Tioga to Jct. ½ mile south of McGregor (1952) - 14 miles...............$18,002.30
Tioga Jct. to Tioga (1953) - 3½ miles ..............................................36,772.63
Highway No. 2
Ross to Stanley (1953) - 8 miles.........................................................81,151.82
Tioga Jct. to Ross (1953) - 18 miles...................................................241,304.27
Ray east to Tioga Jct. (1954) - 10½ miles .........................................145,428.25
————
$522,661.27
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION
Amerada Petroleum Corporation
Period from April, 1950 to June, 1954
Construction of Roads.................................................................... $475,285.43
Maintenance of Roads..................................................................... 121,604.06
Removal of Snow .......................................................................... 42,986.00
							 ————
							$639,875.49
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ROAD AND BRIDGE EXPENDITURES
Williams County
		
Federal Aid
Other Road Expenditures—County
1954–55		
$62,535.36
$380,281.70
1953–54		
105,633.36
291,491.25
1952–53		
55,970.86
257,596.78
1951–52				236,312.97
1950–51				259,231.16
		———————————
		
$224,140.18
$1,424,913.86
		 		224,140.18
				——————
				$1,649,154.04

Pipelines
The preceding discussion has dealt solely with surface transportation,
and in the early days of the oil development program that was the only
means of transportation, even for the crude oil. By 1955, however, virtually all of the crude produced in the study area was being transported
by buried pipe lines.
The system is as follows: In the oil fields there is a collection system
wherein pipe lines three or four inches in diameter, lead from the
wells to larger (six and eight inch) main lines which carry the oil to
Tioga. At Tioga there is a pumping station which starts the oil on its
way to Mandan, North Dakota, approximately 175 miles distant. From
Tioga the oil moves southward through a ten inch line to the Ramberg
pumping station in the Beaver Lodge field. From there the line extends southward as a 12 inch line approximately 70 miles to the Keene
pumping station south of the Missouri River. From Keene the oil is
pumped southeastward approximately 95 miles through a 16 inch line
to Mandan where it is refined in the 30,000 barrels-per-day capacity
Standard Oil Refinery.
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TABLE III
MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES FOR WILLIAMS COUNTY
BY THE NORTH DAKOTA STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT,
1950–1954

		
Routine Roadway
Surface Operations
Shoulders and
Side Approaches
Roadside and
Drainage
Removal of
Weeds and Brush
Traffic Services
Sand, Ice and
Snow Control
Sand, Ice and
Snow Removal
Prorated Accounts
Special Roadway
Surface Operations
		

1950

1951

1952

1953

$16,822.00

$15,598.00

$37,045.00

$49,737.00

76.00

19.00

77.00

216.00

3,068.00

2,848.00

3,869.00

2,469.00

1,651.00
1,005.00

2,324.00
3,113.00

2,692.00
1,673.00

4,386.00
5,728.00

1,332.00

1,662.00

1,691.00

2,115.00

5,379.00
1,098.00

6,263.00
915.00

5,742.00
2,861.00

4,291.00
2,344.00

......
$30,432.00

......
$32,742.00

26,205.00
$81,856.00

......
$71,286.00

January through June, 1954
Routine Roadway Surface Operations....................... $15,674.00
Roadside and Drainage.............................................. 566.00
Removal of Weeds and Brush.................................... 134.00
Traffic Services........................................................... 2,465.00
Sand, Ice and Snow Control....................................... 547.00
Sand, Ice and Snow Removal..................................... 1,919.00
				——————
				$21,305.00

Similarly the natural gas from the oil fields, formerly “flared” into
the atmosphere, is now brought by a pipe line collection system to the
Signal Oil and Gas Company’s Tioga-Beaver Lodge Gasoline plant at
Tioga where propane, butane, natural gasoline and sulphur are extracted from the gas. The remaining “sweetened” natural gas is sent by
pipe line for domestic and industrial uses to points east as far as Minot,
west to Williston.
Surplus gas not used when produced is piped into Montana where
it is returned underground into natural storage.
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Population Characteristics of Williams and Mountrail Counties3
In recent decades, North Dakota has been one of those few states experiencing a decline in population. This fact has in large measure resulted
from the prevailing character of the American agricultural scene, in
a state where a relatively narrow agricultural economy is dominant.
Fewer and larger farms with an increase in the numbers of non-resident farm operators has resulted in a steady decline in rural settlement
with an accompanying increase in the urban areas, and an exodus of
youth from the state due to limited opportunities. The development
of any newly found resources is bound to stimulate hope in such an
area. This trait has been notable in the enthusiastic manner with which
the opening of the Williston Oil Basin was greeted. The population
features associated with this event provide an indication of how such
developments may or may not assist in easing the state’s problems.
General Characteristics
Williams and Mountrail Counties, the principal counties affected by the
oil industry to 1954, have traditionally been noted for their wheat and
cattle industries. Reflecting the extensive system of land use essential
in this subhumid zone, the settlement pattern consisted of dispersed
farmsteads, occasional hamlets, and a single small urban center. Then,
as now, the populations of both counties were classified as rural farm
or rural non-farm with the lone exception of Williston. Since 1930,
the general trend in population has seen a steady decline in rural farm
residents, a fairly constant population level being maintained in the
rural-nonfarm hamlets, and a constant rise occurring in Williston.
It is against this distribution of people that the recent alterations in
terms of arrangement and numbers developed. The effects of the oil industry have brought numerous changes to this general area; however,
significant developments have been limited to a rather small portion of
the two counties. This area where the bulk of activity has taken place
includes Williston, functioning as the supply and service center; Tioga,
Tioga Environs, and Ray, the small villages located in the heart of the
oil area, all in Williams County; the Impact Townships of both counties; and the county seat of Mountrail County, Stanley (FIGURE 2).
These centers will on occasion be referred to as the oil affected areas.

This section was written by Richard V. Smith. It is based upon the data collected by the University of North Dakota field research team in the summer of
1954.
3

53
The Number of Inhabitants
Between 1950 and 1954, the population of Williams County increased
by 26.8% while that of Mountrail County decreased by 5.5% (TABLE
IV).4 However, a basic pattern of change existed in both counties. The
statewide trend of declining rural numbers persisted here, both within
the oil impact townships and throughout the remainder of the rural
area. In marked contrast to this rural reduction is the sharp increase
noted in each of those nonfarm centers affected by the oil development.
TABLE IV
WILLISTON BASIN AREA: NUMBER OF INHABITANTS
1950–1954

WILLIAMS
Williston
Ray
Tioga
Tioga Environs
Impact
Townships1
Other Rural2
Hamlets
Total
Williams Co.
Total Oil Areas3
MOUNTRAIL
Stanley
Impact
Townships1
Other Rural2
Hamlets
Total
Mountrail Co.
Total Oil Areas3

POPULATION 		
1940
1950
1954

PER CENT CHANGE
1940–50 1950–54

5,790
579
385
......

7,378
721
456
......

9,717
1,479
1,608
931

+27.4
+24.5
+18.4
......

+31.7
+105.1
+252.6
......

1,915
6,018
1,628

1,392
4,923
1,572

1,236
4,372
1,500

–27.3
–18.2
–3.4

–11.2
–11.2
–4.6

16,315
8,669

16,442
9,947

20,843
14,971

+0.8
+14.7

+26.8
+50.5

1,058

1,486

1,645

+40.5

+10.7

720
6,362
2,342

562
4,675
2,695

528
4,224
2,500

–21.9
–26.5
+15.1

–6.0
–9.6
–7.2

10,482
1,778

9,418
2,048

8,897
2,173

+10.1
+15.2

–5.5
+6.1

1. Depicted in Fig. 2
2. Rural farm areas other than impact townships.
3. Williston, Ray, Tioga, Tioga Environs, Impact Townships in Williams County.
Stanley and Impact Townships in Mountrail County.
SOURCE: 1940—United States Bureau of the Census.
1950—United States Bureau of the Census
1954—Projections from sample census.
Appendix A is devoted to a discussion of the methods used in obtaining 1954
figures.
4
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Rates of increase in these centers reflect their location with respect
to the principal areas of interest and the functions which each center
performed in this development. Tioga, Tioga Environs, and Ray benefited enormously as logical sites for settling migrants involved in the
establishment and operation of the fields. Williston became the central
supply and focal point for the oil industry, while Stanley absorbed the
overflow resulting from crowded facilities in the other, more ideally located, towns.
In general it would seem that Williams County has, at least for the
present, benefited considerably in terms of population change. Mountrail County, on the other hand, exhibits a pattern typical at the moment
of most rural North Dakota counties, with the steady rural decline and
the relatively slight but steady growth of the county seat. This general
picture of alterations in population directly reflects the advantages
possessed by Williams County as the area of principal interest and the
logical site for location of installations and personnel.
Age and Sex Composition
While all of those areas affected by the oil industry possessed a net population increase, with the exception of the rural impact townships, the
relative importance of that increase varied from area to area as noted
above. This same pattern exists with reference to the proportions of
people in the several age groups. In general, those areas most affected,
the rural non-farm villages, showed significant relative increases in the
younger age groups. Two age groups are particularly notable: first, that
from 20–29 years with 19.6% of the total population in 1954 against
12.9% in 1950, and secondly, that from 0–4 with 18.1% in 1954 compared with 11.1% in 1950. (TABLES V, VI, VII). This pattern would
seem to reflect the oil industries’ need for a considerable youthful element in the labor force, composed in this instance of young married
men whose children were within the youngest age category.
Complementing these changes was the relative decline in the other
age groups. Most significant of these was the sharp decline in the oldest
group, those over 65 years of age. The trend in these rural non-farm
centers was towards a much more youthful population level.
Urban Williston possessed a stabler pattern, though relative increases enhanced the importance of the 0–4 and 5–19 groups. Again the
complementing factor was a decline in the 30–64 and 65 age groups.
In contrast to these non-farm centers, the rural impact townships
retained expected rural characteristics. Reflecting the continuing
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agricultural occupation of the people, a generally older age pattern existed. No marked changes occurred in the age groups between 1950
and 1954.
The age composition of these oil affected areas indicates the extent to which individual areas were altered by these developments.
As the impact of the new industry increased in terms of areas, more
pronounced effects on the age groupings were felt, with a trend to a
younger age level.
Significant changes in the ratio of men to women are not apparent.
Both the total and relative importance of each group remained relatively constant in population totals, age group totals, and between the
several areas concerned. The one notable exception to this characteristic occurs in Williston where in the 20–29 age group, the number
of males increased whereas the relative number of females declined
markedly.
Marital Status and Relation to Head of Household
Marital status characteristics varied considerably from area to area,
depending in large measure upon the type of activities carried on and
upon the intensity of the oil industry’s impact. In general, there is a
higher percentage of married males in the more urbanized areas while
the reverse is true for females, though on a much reduced scale (TABLE
VIII). In the former case, about 40% of the rural-farm male population
was single compared with only 17–20% of the women in such areas. In
the urban area the figure for both sexes is similar, about 20%. In the
rural non-farm areas, these figures vary considerably depending upon
the stability of the area; for example, in Tioga 28.9% of the men were
single whereas in Ray 21.5% were single. Similar variations might be
noted, but the pattern remains essentially that of the generalization
stated above.
Relation to the head of the family presents a relatively constant picture throughout the counties. Certain variations from the standard are
notable, however, as for instance the higher percentages of sons than
daughters in the rural farm areas; no doubt this is an adjustment to
the labor requirements inherent in agriculture (TABLE IX). Lodgers
and hired workers as members of households are found in the area of
maximum migratory labor, the rural non-farm centers.
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TABLE V
WILLISTON: NUMBER OF INHABITANTS BY AGE AND SEX,
1950 AND 1954
Age MALE				
			
1950		
1954		
		 No. %
No. %
0–4
		
485 13.1 785 15.9
5–19
		
861 23.3 1191 24.1
20–29
		
543 14.7 805 16.3
30–64
		
1405 38.1 1720 34.8
65 and over
		 400 10.8 346 7.0
No data
		 ...... ...... 89 1.9
TOTAL
		
3694 100 4936 100

FEMALE			
1950		
1954		
No. % No. %

TOTAL
1950		
No. %

14.9 905

1954
No. %

420

11.4 713

12.3 1498 15.4

878

23.8 1359 28.4 1739 23.6 2550 26.2

629

17.1 665

13.9 1172 15.9 1470 15.1

1411 38.3 1651 34.5 2816 38.2 3371 34.7
346

9.4

....... .....

297

6.2

746

10.0 643

96

2.1

....... .....

185

6.6
2.0

3684 100 4781 100 7378 100 9717 100

SOURCE:1950 United States Bureau of the Census. 1954 Projections from
sample census.

TABLE VI
RURAL NONFARM:* NUMBER OF INHABITANTS BY AGE AND
SEX, 1950 AND 1954
Age		
MALE			 FEMALE			TOTAL
			
1950		
1954		
1950		
1954		
1950		
			No. %
No. %
No. % No. % No. %
0–4
		
150 10.8 507 16.7 145 11.4 518 19.8 295 11.1
5–19
		
351 25.2 703 23.1 362 28.5 645 24.6 713 26.8
20–29
		
174 12.5 556 18.3 169 13.3 555 21.2 343 12.9
30–64
		
510 36.6 962 31.6 460 36.2 682 26.0 970 36.4
65 and over
		 208 14.9 134 4.4
134 10.6 147 5.6 342 12.8
No Data
		 ............
179 5.9
............
75
2.8 ............
TOTAL
		
1393 100 3041 100 1270 100 2622 100 2663 100
* Ray, Tioga, Tioga Environs, Stanley.

1954
No. %
1025 18.1
1348 23.8
1111 19.6
1644 29.0
281

4.9

254

4.6

5663 100

SOURCE: 1950 United States Bureau of the Census. 1954 Projections from
sample census.
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TABLE VII
RURAL FARM:* NUMBER OF INHABITANTS BY AGE AND SEX,
1950 AND 1954
Age MALE 			
			
1950		
1954		
		
No. %
No. %
0–4
		 131 11.8 104 10.4
5–19
		 272 24.6 268 26.8
20–29
		 139 12.6 124 12.4
30–64
		 444 40.1 412 41.3
65 and over
		 120 10.9 84 8.3
No Data
		 ............
8
0.8
TOTAL
		
1106 100 992 100

FEMALE 			
1950		
1954		
No. % No. %

TOTAL
1950		
No. %

1954
No. %

124

14.6 100

13.2 255

13.0 204

11.6

240

28.3 224

29.3 512

26.2 492

27.8

105

12.4 108

14.2 244

12.5 232

13.1

315

37.1 264

34.6 759

38.8 676

38.3

64

7.6

64

8.3

184

9.5

148

8.5

4

0.4

............

12

0.7

............
848

100 760

100 1954 100 1764 100

*Impact Townships of Williams and Mountrail County
SOURCE: 1950 United States Department of Commerce. 1954 Projections
from sample census.
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TABLE VIII
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL STATUS FOR THOSE
14 YEARS YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, 1954
Williston Ray Tioga
					
MALE (number)
3262
503
641
Marital Status (percent)
Married
73.6
73.0
56.0
Single
20.6
21.5
28.9
Divorced or
separated
0.4
0.6
1.5
Widowed
4.3
1.8
3.0
No Data
0.1
3.1
10.5
TOTAL
100.0
100.0 100.0
FEMALE (number)
3140
Marital Status (percent)
Married
71.2
Single
18.3
Divorced or
separated
1.4
Widowed
8.5
No Data
0.6
TOTAL
100.0
MALE &
FEMALE (number)
6402
Marital status (percent)
Married
72.4
Single
19.4
Divorced or
separated
0.9
Widowed
6.4
No Data
0.4
TOTAL
100.0

Tioga Stanley Williams Montrail
Environs		
County County
354

569

496

204

64.6
21.5

70.6
25.4

54.8
40.3

54.9
39.2

......
......
13.9
100.0

......
4.0
......
100.0

......
3.2
1.6
100.0

......
5.9
......
100.0

429

446

241

557

352

160

80.0
11.4

78.9
13.5

96.1
3.9

64.9
18.0

75.0
17.0

67.5
20.0

2.1
5.7
0.7
100.0

......
7.0
0.5
100.0

......
......
......
100.0

0.5
9.5
7.1
100.0

......
6.8
1.1
100.0

2.5
10.0
......
100.0

932

1087

595

1126

848

364

76.2
16.8

65.4
22.6

76.9
14.6

67.7
21.6

63.2
30.7

60.4
30.8

1.3
3.6
2.0
100.0

0.9
4.7
6.4
100.0

......
......
8.5
100.0

0.2
6.8
3.6
100.0

......
4.7
1.4
100.0

1.1
7.7
......
100.0

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.
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TABLE IX
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF RELATION TO HEAD OF
FAMILY, 1954
Williston Ray Tioga
				
Head
27.5
26.6 25.1
Wife
22.5
23.9 21.7
Son
21.8
26.2 21.1
Daughter 20.8
18.5 20.2
Lodger-Hired
Worker
2.1
3.5
8.8
Relatives
2.1
1.2
2.2
No Data
3.2
...... 0.7
TOTAL
100.0 100.0 100.0
(Number) 9717 1479 1608

Tioga
Stanley
Environs		
28.7
28.3
23.8
23.1
18.8
21.7
20.8
21.0

Impact Areas
William & Mountrail
26.1
20.0
28.6
18.6

6.4
0.5
1.0
100.0
931

0.7
5.4
0.7
100.0
1764

3.7
1.9
0.3
100.0
1645

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.

Persons and Families by Dwelling Types
The relative stability of population numbers is in part indicated by the
type of dwelling occupied (TABLE X). In basically more stable areas
such as Williston and the rural farm impact townships, dwelling types
were almost exclusively of a permanent single or multiple nature.
TABLE X
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF PERSONS BY RESIDENCE TYPE,
1954

		
		
Williston Number
Percent
Ray
Number
Percent
Tioga
Number
Percent
Tioga
Number
Environs Percent
Stanley
Number
Percent
Impact
Number
Willians Percent
Impact
Number
Mountrail Percent

Total
Persons
9717
100.0
1479
100.0
1608
100.0
931
100.0
1645
100.0
1236
100.0
528
100.0

Single
Persons
7025
72.3
686
46.4
1093
68.0
253
27.2
1073
65.2
1205
97.5
528
100.0

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.

Trailer
Persons
408
4.2
558
37.7
343
21.3
465
50.0
321
19.5
17
1.4
......
......

Multiple
Persons
2274
23.4
229
15.5
172
10.7
100
10.7
239
14.5
14
1.1
......
......

Other
Persons
10
0.1
6
0.4
......
......
113
12.1
12
0.8
......
......
......
......
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However, in those areas of maximum relative recent population
increase, the rural non-farm centers, this pattern is in large measure
reversed. Here, the recent importation of labor for development and
operation of the oil fields has resulted in severe taxing of available permanent dwellings. Here also have settled those workers whose jobs
are in large part related to the development of a single aspect of the
installations and whose tenure in a given area is likely to be of a rather
short duration. As a consequence the number of trailers was of great
significance in those areas. In 1954 in Ray 37.7% of the population
occupied trailers, in Tioga 21.3%, and in the Tioga Environs 50%. Multiple dwellings are of recent origin in all of these areas except Williston,
where this type of dwelling is more common. The numbers living in
multiple dwellings become progressively less as less urbanized conditions are encountered.
The average household size throughout the area of study was relatively constant (SEE TABLE XI). Larger household units (3.8) were
found in rural farm areas, the smaller in the more urbanized areas
(3.65). This pattern is roughly similar to the general range of household
sizes normally found.
Migration Characteristics
The bulk of the population increase in Williams and Mountrail Counties has resulted from in-migration stimulated by the development of
the oil industry. The general pattern throughout the area of study reflects the degree to which the industry has affected each of these areas.
As would be expected, the rural farm impact townships have been the
stablest areas, with slightly over 80% of their population having been
resident in 1950 (TABLE XII). Williston, the largest and most diverse
center, had 66.7% of its 1954 population having been resident in 1950.
Stanley, the least affected of the rural non-farm areas, had 61.4% of
its population then resident. Ray and Tioga, both basically altered in
character by the proximity of the fields, had 39.7% and 34.6% respectively having been resident in 1950. Tioga Environs has the distinction
of having been nonexistent in 1950, hence owing its new settlement
exclusively to the oil industry.

61
TABLE XI
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAMILIES, BY RESIDENCE, TYPE,
AND AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE, 1954
		
Total
Single
Trailer
Multiple Other
		
Families Families Families Families Families
							
Williston
Number 2662
1858
112
689
3
Percent 100.0
69.8
4.2
25.9
0.1
Ray
Number 390
192
145
50
3
Percent 100.0
49.2
37.1
12.9
0.8
Tioga
Number 433
297
102
34
......
Percent 100.0
68.7
23.5
7.8
......
Tioga Environs
Number 248
68
135
9
36
Percent 100.0
27.3
54.5
3.6
14.6
Stanley
Number 467
305
82
71
9
Percent 100.0
65.4
17.6
15.1
1.9
Impact Williams
Number 325
312
8
5
......
Percent 100.0
96.0
2.6
1.3
......
Impact Mountrail
Number 136
136
......
......
......
Percent 100.0
100.0
......
......
......

Average
Household
Families
3.65
3.79
3.71
3.75
3.52
3.80
3.87

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.

Each of these areas drew a part of its population increase from
nearby tributary areas; however, the bulk of the increase was attracted
from some distance. A portion of these in-migrants came from the remainder of North Dakota and from contiguous states. However, very
considerable proportions have come from more remote states, mainly
the principal oil states of the southern Great Plains. In this latter category, 10.2% of Williston’s 1954 population, 44% of Ray’s, 21.4% of
Tioga’s, and 55.6% of Tioga Environs were attracted from these more
distant points. By and large, these individuals were permanently connected with the larger oil companies engaged in the development of the
Williston Oil Basin, and in some considerable part might be considered
a floating element of the population; that is, being continually on call
for transfer to some new site of development. The importance of this
group and the nature of their functions will probably be reflected in the
persistent shifts and fluctuations of the population totals of the centers
where they are now resident.
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TABLE XII
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INHABITANTS BY 1950
RESIDENCE
Williston Ray Tioga Tioga Stanley Williams
						Environs
County
MALE:
Same
66.7
36.8
35.2
.....
59.1
83.8
Within Area 4.9
4.7
9.8
10.3
10.1
4.8
Other
North Dakota 11.4
8.5
25.4
24.4
16.0
0.6
Contiguous
States
5.6
2.3
8.5
6.4
3.4
3.0
All Other
11.2
47.7
21.1
58.9
11.3
7.8
Total
100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
100.0
(Number)
4151
650
805
382
697
648
FEMALE:
Same
66.8
43.2
33.9
......
63.6
76.0
Within Area 5.9
5.7
12.9
7.8
12.8
9.1
Other
North Dakota 13.0
9.7
23.4
35.9
12.8
0.8
Contiguous
States
5.1
1.7
8.1
4.7
3.1
4.1
All Other
9.3
39.7
21.7
51.6
9.1
8.0
Total
100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
100.0
(Number)
4068
525
578
296
705
460
MALE AND FEMALE:
Same
66.7
39.7
34.6
......
61.4
80.1
Within Area 5.4
5.2
11.2
9.2
11.4
6.6
Other
North Dakota 12.2
9.0
24.5
29.6
14.3
0.7
Contiguous
States
5.4
2.1
8.3
5.6
2.7
3.5
All Other
10.2
44.0
21.4
55.6
10.0
8.7
Total
100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
100.0
(Number)
8219
1175 1383 678
1402
1108

Mountrail
County
85.7
3.2
7.9
1.6
1.6
100.0
248
77.8
13.0
7.4
1.8
......
100.0
204
82.1
7.7
7.7
1.7
.8
100.0
452

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.

The bulk of the in-migrants to this area were in the age groups from
5–9, 20–29, and 30–39 years, again reflecting the relatively youthful
manpower needs of the industry and the composition of these workers’
families (TABLE XIII). In terms of the male-female ratio, the total
in-migrants were about 55% male and 45% female.
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Employment and Labor Force Characteristics
The current characteristics of the population’s economic activities are
dealt with in a later section of this report. The concern here is with
the changes in industry group status of workers as indicated by their
activities in 1950 and 1954.
In the urban area, Williston, the industrial group categories showing
the greatest increase were mining and construction, trade and services.
The increases in these categories reflect initially the development of
the oil fields and secondly the increases in those activities which directly serve the industry and the individuals employed by the industry.
In general, recruits into these activities were drawn rather equally from
original residents of the area and from migrants. (TABLES XIV, XV).
TABLE XIII
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INHABITANTS BY AGE BY 1950
RESIDENCE
5-9 10-13 14 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65+ No TOT.
										Data
WILLISTON:
Resident 13.1 9.3 1.7 8.7
12.6 15.8 13.1 14.3 9.9 1.5 100.0
Migrant 18.5 5.8 0.8 4.1
31.6 22.5 9.2
4.7
2.4 0.4 100.0
No Data 2.3 2.3 ...... 13.7 38.6 31.8 9.1
2.2
...... ...... 100.0
RAY:
Resident 9.3 7.6 2.3 8.1
Migrant 18.0 7.0 1.5 6.5
No Data ...... ....... ...... .....

19.7
34.5
33.3

9.9
25.5
50.0

13.4
4.0
......

11.2
3.0
16.7

17.4 1.1
...... ......
...... ......

100.0
100.0
100.0

TIOGA AND TIOGA ENVIRONS:
Resident 12.7 6.9 2.3 11.2 15.0
Migrant 15.5 6.7 1.5 5.7
26.8
No Data ...... ...... 7.4 11.1 29.7

15.4
23.2
11.1

15.8
12.8
22.2

8.5
3.7
18.5

10.8 0.8
0.2 3.9
...... ......

100.0
100.0
100.0

STANLEY:
Resident 9.6 8.1 3.8 10.2
Migrant 19.7 4.9 ...... 4.9
No Data 4.8 14.3 4.8 4.8

9.3
23.8
43.0

12.3
6.5
......

13.8
1.6
9.2

12.6 5.3
...... 0.9
...... ......

100.0
100.0
100.0

WILLIAMS AND MOUNTRAIL COUNTY:
Resident 13.6 8.3 1.2 8.0
12.4 13.6 14.2
Migrant 24.4 4.9 2.4 4.9
30.0 19.6 2.4
No Data ...... 8.3 ...... 16.7 33.3 16.7 8.3

16.9
9.8
16.7

10.9 0.9
2.4 ......
...... ......

100.0
100.0
100.0

15.0
37.7
19.1
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TABLE XIV
WILLISTON: RESIDENCE AND INDUSTRY GROUP FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1950 AND 1954

		Residents
Migrants
No Data
		 1950
1954
1950
1954
1950
1954
Industry
Agriculture
		 247
214
94
25
......
......
Mining & Construction
		 176
305
204
292
......
16
Manufacturing, Durable
		 13
9
4
12
......
......
Manufacturing, Non-Durable
		 36
66
24
21
......
4
Transportation, Communications, & Public Utilities
		 357
401
69
107
......
4
Trade
		 421
603
78
263
......
65
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
		 57
89
25
32
......
8
Service
		 386
458
66
107
......
21
Public Administration
		 439
98
262
48
......
16
No Data
		 200
83
131
49
......
......
TOTAL
		 2332
2326
957
956
......
134

Total
1950
1954
341

239

380

613

17

21

60

91

426

512

499

931

82

129

452

586

701

162

331

132

3289

3416

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.

Industrial group classifications for those workers residing within
the oil field itself (rural non-farm and rural farm) indicated a simpler
pattern. The major change occurred in the mining and construction
category, which accounted for 16.2% of the workers in 1950 and 37.4%
in 1954. Much more moderate changes were characteristic of the other
categories.
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TABLE XV
IMPACT AREAS OTHER THAN WILLISON: RESIDENCE AND
INDUSTRY GROUP FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1950 AND 1954

Ray, Tioga and Tioga Environs, Stanley, Williams & Mountrail Impact Townships:
Residents
Migrants
No Data
Total
1950
1954
1950
1954
1950
1954
1950
1954
Industry
Agriculture
639
641
99
31
......
12
738
684
Mining & Construction
81
199
314
658
......
123
395
980
Manufacturing, Durable
.....
.......
6
......
......
......
6
......
Manufacturing, Non-Durable
3
5
11
......
.......
......
14
5
Transportation, Communications, & Public Utilities
79
112
41
79
......
6
120
197
Trade
168
243
88
131
......
6
256
380
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
9
20
6
12
.......
......
15
32
Service
72
133
45
60
......
3
117
196
Public Administration
228
43
188
11
......
5
416
59
No Data
147
32
213
46
......
6
360
84
TOTAL
1426
1428
1011
1028
......
161
2437
2617
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.

Indicated Changes 1954–1955
During the summer of 1955, a field survey was made to observe changes
occurring since the exhaustive field study of 1954, from which the foregoing statistics were derived. The impression left by this check survey
and reinforced by the statements of numerous residents of the area was
that a contraction in activities had developed.
Available evidence indicates that the peak of the oil boom was experienced during the summer of 1954, followed by a decline initiated
by the exit of refinery and pipe line construction workers, and rig crews
as drilling moved south of the Missouri River. In a more positive sense,
the attitude was simply that the area was reaching a level of stability
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adjusted to the present apparent potentials of the area and the likely
exploitation of the oil resource in the near future.
The significance of this would seem to lie in the characteristic labor
demands of the oil industry. During the exploration and development
stages a very sizable labor force is required. However, this long term
phase following that initial development, that is, the production stage,
is marked by much reduced labor requirements in a rather highly
mechanized industry. This character of the industry remains valid as
long as subsidiary industries based on the resource do not locate in the
area. As of this writing such developments have not taken place.
Population trends during the year following the field study and
census are distinctly downward. The extent of this decline varies markedly from area to area with the most notable changes having occurred
in Ray and Tioga Environs. In the former, a local official estimated that
the decline had reached something over 300 people. This estimate was
supported by a count of the temporary housing units in Ray which revealed the following: of the four trailer courts within the town limits,
one remained full; a second had 23 units, compared to a 1954 peak
of 59; and the fourth had 13 units; a third had 33 units, compared to
a 1954 peak of 102 units; a third had 33 units, compared to a peak of
59; and the fourth had 13 units and a capacity of 18. Ray’s decline is
further supported by such events as the mid-year cancelling of one of
the two original first grade sections in the local school, the considerable
number (17 of 34) of empty units in a modern housing development of
duplexes, and the fact that just five new permanent residences were
built during the period from September, 1954 to July, 1955.
Similar patterns are evident on a lesser scale in the other centers. It
would seem that the centers in question are reaching a lower but more
stable population level which is likely to persist for some time.

Chapter 4
The Geographic Setting of the
Bakken Oil Shale Play
Bradley C. Rundquist and Gregory S. Vandeberg
Introduction
Oil development in northwestern North Dakota has expanded greatly since
the 1958 Williston Report, with oil fields covering most areas of the counties
including the towns of Williston and Stanley. Petroleum development on a regional scale has also changed from the Williston Basin in 1958 to the Bakken
Formation at present, with much overlap between the two. This chapter focuses on the changing physical and human geography of the region, including
oil production and population dynamics of the top four oil-producing counties in North Dakota: McKenzie, Mountrail, Dunn, and Williams (Figure 4.1).
Because the cost of oil extraction from the Bakken Formation is higher than
most other shale oil plays where horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing
(or “fracking”) are used, the region is particularly prone to boom-to-bust cycles. Longtime North Dakota geographer Bernt Wills’s contribution to the
Williston Report on the “Physical Attributes of the Area” (chapter 3) was
published when the 1950s boom was on the wane. Just as Wills reflects back
upon the effect of the 1950s oil boom on northwestern North Dakota, the
authors of this chapter, also North Dakota geographers, analyze the impact of
the 2008–14 boom post peak.
Geographic Setting
Bernt Wills’s 1958 chapter described petroleum production in the region
as centered along the east-west boundary between Williams and Mountrail
counties in a region approximately five miles wide and thirty-five miles long
(Figures 4.1 and 4.2; see also Figure 3 in chapter 3). The Williston Basin was
the main geologic formation of interest, with oil wells extending between
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8,000 and 11,000 feet below the surface along the Nesson Anticline (p. 36).
Agriculture was the main economic driver for the area before the successful
production of oil (300 barrels in seventeen hours) from the Clarence Iverson
No. 1 well on April 4, 1951. The report detailed an average temperature of
69.4°F for July in Williston, and 7.9°F in January (p. 40). The average annual
precipitation was 14.66 inches at Williston, with winter being the dry season.
The 1958 Williston Report documented changes in the cultural landscape
with the construction of roads, oil drilling derricks, tanks and pump jacks
associated with petroleum production. Transportation changes in the 1950s
included the construction of 200 miles of new “all weather” secondary county,
township, and oil company service roads, mostly in the oil producing areas. The
major highways, U.S. Highway 2 and State Highway 40, were “hard surfaced,”
with the remaining roads being gravel (p. 41). Roads are typically oriented
north-south or east-west along section lines and township boundaries. Most
of the new road construction costs were expended by the state of North Dakota and the Amerada Petroleum Corporation, with Williams and Mountrail
counties concentrating on maintenance and upkeep costs due to increased
road traffic. Most of the oil was transported by pipelines by 1955, including a
10-inch line that was constructed to Mandan.
Population changes varied between Williams and Mountrail counties between 1950 and 1954. Williams County population increased by 26.8 percent,
whereas Mountrail County lost 5.5 percent of its total population from 1950
to 1954 (p. 53). At the same time, the cities of Williston and Stanley gained
population, and the rural areas saw a decrease in population. The age groups
of 0–4 years and 20–29 years increased in the non-farm rural areas. The ratio
of men to women stayed similar between 1950 to 1954, with 49.2 percent
women in 1954 compared to 50.8 percent men of all ages. There was a notable
increase of men (14.7 percent to 16.3 percent) in the 20–29 age group in Williston, compared to a decrease of the number of women (17.1 percent to 13.9
percent) (p. 56). Population increases were mostly the result of in-migration.
Topography
North Dakota’s core oil producing counties are within the Northwestern Glaciated Plains and the Northwestern Great Plains ecoregions (Bryce et al. 1998).
These ecoregions are part of the Great Plains physiographic province mapped
by Fenneman (1931). The northern parts of the counties are covered by glacial deposits and consist of a flat-lying landscape interspersed with small hills
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Figure 4.1. Core oil producing counties in North Dakota in the context of the
Williston Basin and Bakken Formation (source: author)

Figure 4.2. Oil fields of Williams and Mountrail Counties, North Dakota, by
year opened (source: author)
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and glacially-formed kettle lakes (knob and kettle topography), especially in
Mountrail County (Bluemle 2000). Large glacial erratic boulders are common.
The southern parts of Williams and Mountrail counties, known as the Couteau Slope, consist of a hilly and eroded landscape that forms bluffs along the
northern border of the level terraces of the Missouri River Valley (Fenneman
1931; Bluemle 2000). The present location of the Missouri River in this region
marks the southern boundary of the most recent continental glacier advance
in the area of the Wisconsinan stage of glaciation that ended about 10,000
years before present (Bluemle 2000). McKenzie and Dunn counties are within
the Missouri Plateau and Little Missouri badlands and are characterized by
rolling hills and very heavily eroded hilly areas adjacent to the Little Missouri
River (Bryce et al. 1998; Bluemle 2000) (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3. Little Missouri River Valley and badlands topography, North Unit,
Theodore Roosevelt National Park, ND (source: G. Vandeberg 2005)

Geology
The Williston Basin is a subsurface geologic structure with its base in Precambrian crystalline rocks of the Canadian Shield (Gerhard et al. 1982; Gibson
1995). The basin is somewhat elongated in a northwest to southeast direction
and underlies portions of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Montana, North Dakota

71

Figure 4.4. Generalized stratigraphic structure of the Williston Basin. Rock
units shaded lightly are petroleum-bearing, and those shaded darkly are gasbearing. (source: North Dakota Geological Survey 2000)

and South Dakota (Figure 4.1). The deepest part of the basin is more than
16,000 feet below the surface and contains a thick sequence of sedimentary
rocks that have been faulted or folded to create structures important for petroleum production, as well as petroleum-rich geologic formations (Figure 4.4).
The basin is not visible on the land surface.
Recoverable petroleum requires specific geologic conditions: the presence
of a source rock and a reservoir rock. Petroleum is typically produced from
organic-rich rock such as shale (source), and accumulates in a more porous
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(reservoir) rock such as sandstone or limestone (carbonates). Faults and
other structures within the rock formations help to trap and accumulate the
petroleum in specific locations. These structures are especially important for
oil production in North Dakota, where the Nesson, Antelope, Little Knife, and
Cedar Creek anticlines and the Red Wing Creek geologic structure are major
producing locations (Bluemle 2000). Most of the early petroleum production
in North Dakota covered by the 1958 Report and extending into the 1990s
was in carbonate rocks of the Madison Formation (Figure 4.4) (Bluemle
2000). Today, one of the most important formations for the production of oil
within the Williston Basin is the Bakken Formation (Smith and Bustin 1995;
Schmoker 1996; Zamiran, Rafieepour, and Ostadhassan 2018).
The Bakken Formation consists of three members: the lower member is
an organic-rich shale (source rock), the middle member consists of variable
siltstones and sandstones (reservoir rock) that are finely cemented, and the
upper member is organic-rich shale (LeFever et al. 1991; Smith and Bustin
1995). The formation has a maximum thickness of 150 feet in the Williston
Basin with depths greater than 7,000 feet below the surface in North Dakota
(LeFever et al. 1991; Abarghani et al. 2018). The main reservoir thickness of
the middle member is up to 87 feet (LeFever et al. 1991; Sonnenberg and
Pramudito 2009). The middle member of the Bakken has a low permeability,
meaning that pore spaces within the rock are poorly connected, and therefore
fracturing is required to recover substantial amounts of oil from the formation
(Sonnenberg and Pramudito 2009). Furthermore, the limited thickness of the
middle member means that standard vertical wells have had limited success in
petroleum recovery from the unit. The advance of horizontal drilling and fracturing has allowed for the increased development of oil from the Bakken, as
well as other oil shale fields in the United States such as the Eagle Ford shale in
Texas (Gaswirth and Marra 2015; Hao et al. 2018). The first horizontal well in
the Bakken was drilled in North Dakota in 1987, and most of the wells drilled
in the Williston Basin since that time have been horizontal (Bluemle 2001).
Multiple wells are currently being drilled from the same drilling pad, limiting
the footprint of drilling in the basin (Shrestha et al. 2017).
Climate
The Köppen-Geiger Climate Classification System (Köppen 1918; Geiger 1954,
1961) is the most commonly used method to classify climates at continental
and global scales. Researchers have applied the system to a wide range of
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climate and climate change studies and have updated world maps to account
for new data. Under a widely cited Köppen-Geiger update for 1951–2000
(Kottek et al. 2006), the Bakken region is in a transitional zone between Cold
Semi-Arid Steppe (BSk) in its western portion to Warm-Summer Humid Continental (Dfb) to the east. That is, Bakken Formation climates range from cold
and dry (but not as dry as a desert) in the west to continental (large seasonal
variations in temperature) with precipitation distributed throughout the year
(no monsoon) in the east. Nearly all of North Dakota outside of the western
Bakken is classified Dfb (Kottek et al. 2006).
Weather observers have kept records for the Williston area (BSk) since 1894.
Mean annual precipitation at Williston is 14.40 inches, although it has varied
between a low of 6.13 inches in 1934 to a high of 22.04 inches in 1896 (NOAA
2018). By decade since 1960, precipitation has been near the long-term average
except for the 1980s and the 2010s (Table 4.1). In the 1980s, the area was part
of a larger region of the Midwest that experienced an extended drought that
was most severe in 1983. The Williston area received below-average precipitation from 1979 to 1981 and 1983 to 1985, with only 9.52 inches falling in
1983. The 2010s so far have been wetter than average, highlighted by 21.28
inches received in both 2010 and 2013 and 19.23 inches in 2011 (NOAA
2018). Average annual rainfall in the 2010s has been more variable than in any
other decade since the 1960s (Table 4.1).
TABLE 4.1. AVERAGE PRECIPITATION AND TEMPERATURE STATISTICS
FOR THE WILLISTON AREA SINCE 1960 (SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL ATMOSPHERIC AND OCEANIC ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, NOWDATA 2018)
Decade Mean
Standard deviation
annual
of mean annual
precipitation precipitation
(inches)
(inches)
				
1960s
14.09
2.95
1970s
14.67
3.07
1980s
12.72
3.61
1990s
14.84
2.84
2000s
14.38
1.84
2010s (to 2017)
15.70
4.04

Mean
Monthly
Temp.
January (°F)

Mean
Monthly
Temp.
July (°F)

7.55
5.01
12.91
8.80
12.56

70.68
69.89
73.35
67.96
71.62

14.38

71.78
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Minot (Dfb), about 110 miles to the east on the eastern edge of the Bakken
Formation, generally experiences more rainfall annually and cooler temperatures than Williston (Table 4.2). The weather at Minot is also more variable
in terms of mean annual rainfall and mean monthly temperature. When data
from the Minot International Airport (collected since 1948) are used to fill
data gaps in the Minot Experiment Station record (collected since 1905), mean
annual precipitation is 16.88 inches (NOAA 2018). Precipitation by decade
since 1960 shows that the 2010s have been the wettest and most variable
(Table 4.2). High variability in the 2010s is, to date, attributed to extreme conditions this decade, with a record high 32.35 inches of precipitation in 2013
and a drought in 2017 when only 11.34 inches fell. The year 2017 was the
driest in Minot since 1992, and the ninth driest year since 1905 (NOAA 2018).
TABLE 4.2.
AVERAGE PRECIPITATION AND TEMPERATURE STATISTICS FOR
MINOT SINCE 1960 (SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL ATMOSPHERIC AND OCEANIC ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL
WEATHER SERVICE, NOWDATA 2018)
Decade Mean
Standard deviation
annual
of mean annual
precipitation precipitation
(inches)
(inches)
				
1960s
16.08
3.95
1970s
19.60
4.55
1980s
17.91
3.70
1990s
18.68
4.71
2000s
16.01
3.37
2010s (to 2017)
21.67
6.36

Mean
Monthly
Temp.
January (°F)

Mean
Monthly
Temp.
July (°F)

4.72
3.46
10.96
7.28
12.04

68.83
68.54
69.44
66.60
69.17

11.79

69.43

Mean annual snowfall in Williston is 38.0 inches. February is, on average, the
month with the most snowfall at 7.1 inches, followed by January at 6.7 inches
and April at 6.6 inches. Annual accumulation of snowfall has varied from 8.0
inches in winter 1908–9 to 107.2 inches in winter 2010–11 (NOAA 2018).
Minot’s mean annual snowfall is slightly higher at 39.1 inches. January tends
to be the snowiest at Minot, with 7.1 inches falling on average, followed by
March at 6.7 inches and 6.6 inches in December (NOAA 2018).
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Because it is located near the center of a continental land mass, the Bakken
region experiences extreme annual variability in temperatures. Williston’s
coldest month is January, with a mean monthly temperature of 9.3°F, and its
warmest month is July at 70.2°F (NOAA 2018). The record daily high of 110°F
occurred on July 5, 1936, and the record low of –50°F has occurred twice: on
February 16, 1936, and December 23, 1983 (NOAA 2018). In 1936, then, there
was a 160°F swing in temperature from the daily low on February 16 to the
daily high on July 5. The 2010s have witnessed the warmest January temperatures since the 1960s (Table 4.1).
January (7.5°F) and July (68.6°F) are also the coldest and warmest months
at Minot (NOAA 2018). A record daily high of 109°F was recorded twice at the
Minot Experiment Station: on June 20, 1910, and July 11, 1936. The station’s
record low of –49°F was measured on February 15, 1936 (NOAA 2018). As in
the Williston area, Minot experienced an enormous swing in seasonal temperatures in 1936. January and July mean monthly temperatures in Minot
during the 2010s are among the warmest since the 1960s (Table 4.2).
Land Cover and Land Uses
The dominant land covers in the core oil-producing counties are grassland
(pastureland) and cropland, and the primary land uses are livestock grazing
and crop production. There is more pastureland than cropland in Dunn and
McKenzie counties and more cropland than pastureland in Mountrail and
Williams counties (Table 4.3). The most recent continental glaciation covered
most of Mountrail and Williams counties, leaving behind topography and soils
well suited for crop production. The development of the oil industry has resulted in conversion of some pasture and cropland to oil well pads, oil field
roads, and other oil-related infrastructure (Preston and Kim 2016; Torgerson
2017).
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TABLE 4.3.
TRENDS IN AGRICULTURE IN CORE OIL PRODUCING
COUNTIES FOR SELECTED YEARS SINCE 1925
(SOURCES: USDA CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE
1925, 1950, 1982, 2012)
		

1925

1950

1982

2012

DUNN
Number of farms
Average farm size
Total cropland
Total pastureland
Cattle and calves
Corn for grain
Wheat for grain

1,459
668 acres
353,862 acres
365,146 acres
38,851
20,607 bu
2,068,041 bu

1,157
1,063 acres
447,947 acres
767,542 acres
55,629
39,764 bu
1,298,357 bu

697
2,005 acres
448,598 acres
978,778 acres
84,773
32,325 bu
2,792,201 bu

628
1,642 acres
374,287 acres
646,709 acres
79,898
936,778 bu
5,811,485 bu

McKENZIE
Number of farms
Average farm size
Total cropland
Total pastureland
Cattle and calves
Corn for grain
Wheat for grain

1,721
520 acres
309,068 acres
433,083 acres
35,181
28,710 bu
2,145,564 bu

1,234
968 acres
513,200 acres
651,731 acres
53,883
7,481 bu
1,839,371 bu

778
1,506 acres
499,163 acres
669,212 acres
71,151
48,285 bu
4,391,154 bu

574
1,854 acres
425,625 acres
614,787 acres
92,383
54,510 bu
6,214,714 bu

MOUNTRAIL
Number of farms
Average farm size
Total cropland
Total pastureland
Cattle and calves
Corn for grain
Wheat for grain

1,927
383 acres
405,747 acres
202,983 acres
28,182
3,399 bu
2,963,171 bu

1,484
770 acres
673,481 acres
431,128 acres
26,576
1,630 bu
3,391,231 bu

881
1,147 acres
693,423 acres
297,917 acres
36,697
8,984 bu
6,927,065 bu

670
1,438 acres
578,761 acres
347,622 acres
28,797
332,630 bu
9,951,091 bu

WILLIAMS
Number of farms
Average farm size
Total cropland
Total pastureland
Cattle and calves
Corn for grain
Wheat for grain

2,195
414 acres
482,666 acres
259,034 acres
32,678
10,297 bu
2,842,544 bu

1,157
1,063 acres
447,947 acres
767,542 acres
23,923
2,345 bu
3,544,688 bu

971
1,196 acres
811,330 acres
335,128 acres
33,999
(D)
8,690,944 bu

758
1,403 acres
739,086 acres
279,947 acres
22,574
301,553 bu
13,521,568 bu
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Indigenous Population
Several Indigenous groups lived in or made use of the region just prior to
Euro-American settlement. With overlapping territories, they were the Assiniboine (Nakota), Absarokee (Crow), Lakota, and Hidatsa, among others
(Robinson 1966). In the early 1800s, the Anishinabe (Chippewa) from the
Turtle Mountain region of north-central North Dakota hunted seasonally in
today’s western Williams County and areas of northeastern and north central Montana (North Dakota State Historical Society 2018). The Mandan and
Sahnish (Arikara) were found farther south along the Missouri River at the
time, but moved into the region by the mid-1800s following the devastating
smallpox epidemic in 1837 that killed an estimated 90 percent of the Mandan
and 70 percent of the Hidatsa (Meyer 1977; Parker 2011).
Lands of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara (MHA) Nation are now within
the Fort Berthold Reservation, which was established in 1870. The area of the
reservation is 988,000 acres, with 457,837 acres owned either by individual
tribal members or communally by the affiliated tribes. The size of MHA land
holdings has been reduced significantly from the approximately 12 million
acres assigned to the Three Affiliated Tribes by the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie.
More than 152,000 acres of the reservation were taken in the 1950s during the
construction of the Garrison Dam and creation of Lake Sakakawea, much of
which was agriculturally productive riparian land (Meyer 1977; Parker 2011).
The reservation is contained within McLean, Mountrail, Dunn, McKenzie,
Mercer, and Ward counties. Tribal headquarters are now in New Town within
Mountrail County. New Town was platted in 1950 as a replacement for the
towns of Sanish and Van Hook, both of which were flooded by the creation of
Lake Sakakawea. The population of the Fort Berthold Reservation was 5,874
in 2000, 6,341 in 2010, and 7,611 in 2015 (Taft 2017). The median age of its
residents was 29.3 in 2000, 31.0 in 2010, and 29.3 in 2015 (Taft 2017).
Established in 1975, the Trenton Indian Service Area (TISA) is a semi-independent extension of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa. Because there
was not enough land within the Turtle Mountain Reservation to satisfy the
provisions of the General Allotment (or Dawes) Act of 1887 and subsequent
amendments, the U.S. government allotted parts of Divide, Williams and McKenzie counties, as well as areas in northeastern Montana, to Turtle Mountain
Band members (North Dakota State Historical Society 2018). TISA, headquartered in Trenton about 14 miles west of Williston, provides a governing
structure and services to the descendants of Chippewa who settled on those
allotted lands, although TISA is legally bound to the Turtle Mountain Reservation centered at Belcourt, 250 miles to the east.
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Pre-Oil Euro-American Population and the Arrival of Railroads
The Euro-American population of the region grew throughout the late 1800s
and early 1900s because of land availability, railroad access, and weather that
was favorable most years for crop and forage production. It is challenging to
estimate population in the region before 1910 because contemporary county
names and boundaries, which serve as census enumeration units, were not yet
set. All four counties examined were created within the Dakota Territory in the
1870s and 1880s. Following statehood in 1889, however, Dunn County was
annexed by Stark County, and Mountrail County by Ward County. The state
legislature eliminated McKenzie County because of the lack of settlement. The
first Williams County, established in 1873, was replaced by a second in 1891,
encompassing an entirely different geographic area. Dunn County reappeared
in 1901, its current boundaries finally set in 1908. The North Dakota legislature recreated McKenzie County in 1905 and Mountrail County in 1909. The
area of today’s Divide County was split from Williams County in 1910.
The populations of what are now Mountrail and Williams counties grew
faster than those of Dunn and McKenzie counties for a few reasons. First,
lands in Mountrail and Williams counties are more suited to crop cultivation,
a factor that favored those areas for homesteading. Second, those counties had
access to railroad transportation much earlier than Dunn and McKenzie. The
St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Manitoba Railway (StPM&M, renamed the Great
Northern Railway by 1889) extended its main line from Minot through Mountrail and Williams counties in 1887 (Hidy, Hidy, Scott, and Hofsommer 1988),
two years before North Dakota statehood. StPM&M’s push through Mountrail and Williams counties was part of its “Long March to Montana” in 1887,
when an incredible 545 miles of track was laid from Minot to Great Falls (Hidy
et al. 1988). Development companies associated with the railroad founded
many towns along the new railway: Tagus, Palermo, Stanley, Ross, Manitou,
and White Earth in Mountrail County, and Tioga, Temple, Ray, Wheelock, Epping, Spring Brook, Williston, Trenton, and Buford in Williams County (Rand,
McNally and Co. 1911; Wick 1999). In 1911, the Great Northern built a nearly
51-mile branch from its main line in Stanley to Wildrose in Divide County
(Hidy et al. 1988), which led to the founding of Lostwood and Lund’s Valley
(Rand, McNally and Co. 1911; Wick 1999). The town of Plaza, founded in 1906
in Mountrail County, was the terminus of a Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Sault
Ste. Marie (“Soo”) branch out of Max (Rand, McNally & Co. 1911; Wick 1999)
until 1914, when the line was extended to Sanish through the newly formed
towns of Wabek, Parshall, and Van Hook. Coulee was founded on the Great
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Northern branch from Berthold in Ward County to Ambrose in Divide County
(Rand, McNally and Co. 1911; Wick 1999). All of the rail lines in Mountrail and
Williams are still in operation.
The first rail service in McKenzie County came from the west in 1913 when
the Great Northern extended a line thirty miles from Fairview, Montana, to
Arnegard, North Dakota, and an additional 7.5 miles to Watford City in 1914
(Hidy et al. 1988). Burlington Northern abandoned that entire stretch in 1992
(North Dakota Public Service Commission 2018). Dunn County received rail
service in 1914 when the Northern Pacific Railway laid 34 miles of track west
from Golden Valley in Mercer County to Kildeer in Dunn County, resulting in
the founding of Dodge, Werner, and Dunn Center and the relocation of Halliday (Rand McNally 1942; Wick 1999). Burlington Northern abandoned 41
miles of that line, including all within Dunn County, in 1984 (North Dakota
Public Service Commission 2018).
By 1920, the foreign-born in McKenzie, Mountrail, and Williams counties
were predominantly Norwegian, although there were also notable populations
from Canada, Denmark, Germany, Russia (primarily Black Sea Germans), and
Sweden (Sherman and Thorson 1988). Williams County recorded 77 Syrians
(Lebanese), with another 22 in Mountrail County (Sherman and Thorson
1988). Dunn County had more Germans from Russia than Norwegians, as
well as notable representations of Austrians (Ukrainians) and Hungarians
(Banat and Burgenland Germans) (Sherman and Thorson 1988).
After peaking in about 1930, the region’s population declined both during
and after the “Great Drought” of the mid-1930s. Although the region declined
overall, migration into larger towns meant continued growth, albeit slow, of
regional trade centers like Williston, Dickinson, Bismarck, and Minot. Smaller
trade centers lost population because fewer farm families on the surrounding
landscapes (Table 4.3) meant less demand for the goods and services they provided. For example, Williston grew by 13.4 percent between 1930 and 1940
while its county, Williams, shrank by 16.6 percent. Nearby small towns like
Tioga and Ray lost 11.5 percent and 6.8 percent of their residents, respectively
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1941).
Agriculture
As the number of farms and farm families declined across North Dakota, the
average size of a farm increased steadily (Table 4.3), the result of larger and
more efficient agricultural machinery and improved agricultural technologies.
Still, the average size of a farm in northwestern North Dakota has been large
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relative to the rest of the state since at least 1925. The USDA Census of Agriculture reported statewide average farm sizes of 452 acres in 1925, 630 acres
in 1950, 1,104 acres in 1982, and 1,268 acres in 2012, while McKenzie County’s average farm size was 520 acres in 1925, 968 acres in 1950, 1,506 acres in
1982, and 1,854 acres in 2012 (Table 4.3).
Larger-than-average farms in today’s “oil patch” are attributable to the region’s dry climate that generally limits crop yields per acre. For example, Cass
County, in the more humid southeastern corner of the state, was North Dakota’s top corn-producing county in 2012 with 44.9 million bushels (an average
yield of 129 bushels per acre), while yield in similarly-sized Mountrail County
was 332,630 bushels (64 bushels per acre) (USDA 2012). Cass County’s wheat
yield in 2012 was 5.3 million bushels, averaging 56 bushels per acre, while
Mountrail County harvested about 10 million bushels at 36 bushels per acre
(USDA 2012). North Dakota ranks second in the U.S. in wheat production
behind only Kansas (National Agricultural Statistics Service 2017). Among
the state’s counties, Mountrail ranked twelfth and Dunn nineteenth in spring
wheat, while Williams led the state in the production of Durum wheat (National Agricultural Statistics Service 2017).
Cattle ranching has been an important economic activity in the Bakken
region since the 1880s, with cattle thriving on extensive tracts of grassland,
including the Little Missouri National Grassland (LMNG) managed by the U.S.
Forest Service. At more than 1 million acres, the LMNG is the largest grassland area in the United States, and a significant portion is located in McKenzie
County. In 2016, Dunn County ranked fourth among the 53 counties in North
Dakota in the number of cattle and calves, while McKenzie was sixth, Mountrail was eighteenth, and Williams was twenty-ninth (National Agricultural
Statistics Service 2017). North Dakota ranked sixteenth among U.S. states in
cattle and calves on hand as of January 1, 2017 (National Agricultural Statistics Service 2017).
Oil Development
Oil was first discovered in North Dakota with the completion of the Clarence
Iverson well in Williams County on April 4, 1951, to a depth of 11,660 feet
(Bluemle 2001). This well, located about 8.5 miles south of Tioga and 11 miles
east of Ray (SW ¼, SW ¼, Sec. 6, T. 155 N., R. 95 W), was the start of many
more oil wells drilled and developed in the 1950s and subsequent years. Based
on data from the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources, 2014 was
the peak year for the maximum number of wells spudded (that is, those that
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companies began drilling), at 2,656 for all counties, with 2,277 of these wells
in Dunn, McKenzie, Mountrail and Williams counties (Figure 4.5). Figure 4.5
clearly shows the periods of high drilling activity centered on the years 1959,
1968, 1981 and 2014. Note that the study area counties have a substantial percentage of the total wells drilled beginning in about 2008, with development
of the Bakken Formation oil in full swing.

Figure 4.5. Number of oil wells spudded per year, 1951–2018 (source: North
Dakota Oil and Gas Division 2018)

The years 1966, 1984, and 2015 show three peaks in North Dakota crude
oil production (Figure 4.6). The yearly production in 1966 was more than 27
million barrels (42 gallons per barrel), versus more than 52 million barrels in
1984. More than 432 million barrels of oil were produced in 2015, with almost 90 percent of the production coming from the four counties of this study.
Daily oil production in North Dakota first exceeded 1 million barrels in 2014.
The U.S. Geological Survey (2015) has estimated that 7.38 billion barrels of
oil remain in the Bakken and Three Forks formations, so oil development is
expected to continue, depending upon crude prices.
Boom-to-bust Population Trends
Agricultural economics help to steer the population dynamics of northwestern
North Dakota, but the boom-to-bust cycles of oil economics have been the
dominant factors since the discovery of oil there in 1951. Zealous investors
who rushed to develop the new oil field drove the state’s first oil boom, called
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the “discovery boom” (Bluemle 2001). The 1950s, however, were a time of
global overproduction of petroleum, which meant low market prices for oil.
This eventually prompted U.S. producers to band together to limit supply,
increase prices, and ensure that every producer received a fair market share
(Bluemle 2001). The discovery boom ended in about 1960, but slower-paced
development of the oil economy of the region continued.

Figure 4.6. Number of barrels of oil produced per year in North Dakota and in
study area counties (Dunn, McKenzie, Mountrail, and Williams), 1951–2018
(source: North Dakota Oil and Gas Division 2018)

The first boom had a significant but localized impact on population. The location of the Clarence Iverson well in Williams County was near Tioga and Ray.
Between 1950 and 1954, Tioga’s population grew by 253 percent and Ray’s
by 105 percent (Table 4.4). Williston and Stanley grew noticeably during that
same time, although Mountrail County lost population overall. Wills (p. 53)
concluded that Tioga and Ray “benefited enormously as logical sites for settling migrants involved in the establishment of the [oil] fields,” while Williston
became a central supply point for the nascent oil industry and Stanley, located
about 26 miles east of the discovery well, absorbed overflow population from
Tioga and Ray. With later limits on production, the population of those towns
regressed significantly by 1970.
The second boom, called the “oil price boom,” began in the mid-1970s
with the discovery of a significant new oil field in 1972 (the Red Wing Creek
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Structure in McKenzie County about 40 miles south of Williston) and the success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in limiting
petroleum production by its member nations. OPEC’s oil embargo forced the
price of a barrel of oil from about $4 in 1973 to $9 in 1974 (Bluemle 2001).
The increase made Williston Basin exploration profitable, and exploration led
to the opening of several additional fields in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
During the second boom cycle, the state’s oil production peaked in 1981 at 45
million barrels. By 1982, oil prices began to fall, accelerated by overproduction
by OPEC. The second boom ended by early 1986.
The impact of the second boom on the region is most evident in the 20
percent increase in the population of Watford City between 1970 and 1980.
Watford City is about twenty miles north of the Red Wing Structure (Table
4.4). McKenzie and Williams counties experienced 16 percent and 15 percent
increases in population, respectively, while Williston grew by about 19 percent
(Table 4.4).
The period from the mid-1980s to 2006 was one of out-migration. Census
records show that every core oil-producing county lost population between
1980 and 1990 and between 1990 and 2000 (Table 4.4). From 1980 to 2000,
Dunn County lost 22.2 percent of its residents, while McKenzie lost 19.6 percent, Mountrail 13.6 percent, and Williams 11.1 percent. While the larger city
of Williston lost 6.2 percent between 1980 and 2000, the region’s smaller cities
suffered the most: Watford City declined by 32.3 percent, Ray by 30.3 percent,
Tioga by 29.6 percent, and Stanley by 21.6 percent (Table 4.4).
The third boom, called the “technology boom” because of the heavy reliance
on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, began in about 2006 with
the discovery of the Parshall oil field (near the town of Parshall in Mountrail
County). That find occurred during a period of high oil prices (more than $100
per barrel between October 2007 and August 2014). The break-even price
for Parshall oil at the time was about $38, by far the lowest among Bakken
fields, making extraction especially lucrative. The boom continued until oil
prices crashed globally between August 2014 ($103 per barrel) and February
2016 ($27 per barrel, well below the break-even price) because of global
overproduction.
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TABLE 4.4.
POPULATION STATISTICS FOR CORE OIL PRODUCING
COUNTIES AND SELECTED COMMUNITIES, 1940–2016
(SOURCES: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1940, 1950, 2000, 2010; WILLS, CURRENT VOLUME; AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 2012–16)
1940

1950

Population and Percent Change (in parentheses)
1954 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

2016

WILLIAMS

16,315 16,442 20,843 22,051 19,301 22,237 21,129 19,761 22,398 31,643
(0.8)
(26.8) (5.8)
(-12.5) (15.2) (-5.0)
(-6.5) (13.3) (41.3)

Williston

5,790 7,398
(27.8)

Ray
579

721

(24.5)

Tioga
385 456

(18.4)

9,717
(31.4)

11,866 11,230 13,336 13,136 12,512 14,716 23,902
(22.1) (-5.4) (18.8) (-1.5) (-4.8) (17.6) (62.4)

1,479

1,049

1,608

2,087

(105.1)

776

766

1,667

1,597

10,077 8,437

7,679

(-29.1) (-26.0) (-1.3)

(252.6) (29.8)

MOUNTRAIL
10,482 9,418 8,897
(-10.2) (-5.5)

(13.3)

(-20.1) (-4.2)

603

534

592

(-21.3) (-11.4) (10.9)

483

(-18.4)

(-20.0) (-12.0) (9.3)

1,278

1,125

1,230

(-8.5)

1,126

7,021

6,631

7,673

9,675

(-16.3) (-9.0)

(-8.6)

(-5.6)

(15.7)

(26.1)

1,371

Stanley
1,058 1,486

1,645

1,795

1,581

1,279

1,458

2,328

(40.5)

(10.7)

(9.1)

(-11.9) (3.2)

(-15.9) (-6.7)

(14.0)

(59.7)

−
−

1,216

1,246

1,059

943

903

1,125

(64.0)

(30.1)

(2.5)

(-15.0) (-11.0) (4.0)

(-8.0)

(24.6)

McKENZIE
8,426 6,849

–

7,296

6,127

7,132

6,360

(6.5)

(-16.0) (16.4)

Parshall
570 935

(-18.7) −

Watford City
1,023 1,371 –
(34.0) −
DUNN
8,376 7,212

–

(-13.9) −

Killdeer
650 698

(7.4)

–
−

1,631

6,383

981

5,737

(-10.5) (-10.1) (10.9)

1,435

1,865

1,768

2,119

1,784

(36.0)

(-5.2)

(19.9)

(-15.8) (-19.6) (21.5)

(165.5)

6,350

4,895

4,627

4,005

4,284

3,600

1,744

10,718
(68.5)

3,536

4,596

(-12.0) (-22.9) (-5.5)

(-13.4) (-10.1) (-1.8)

(21.2)

765

615

722

713

751

903

(9.6)

(-19.6) (28.5)

(-8.6)

(-1.2)

(5.3)

(20.2)

790
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During the third boom, oil-producing counties all grew (Table 4.4). Williston
and other towns also grew between 2000 and 2010, as well as 2010 and 2016.
For example, Watford City grew by 166 percent, Williston by 62 percent, and
Stanley by 60 percent (Table 4.4). Such statistics are more impressive when
one considers the likelihood of population declines between late 2014 and
early 2016, a period of relatively low oil prices. Ray and Tioga show decline between 2010 and 2016, suggesting that populations in those Williams County
towns began to decline earlier than in other parts of the Bakken region.
Demographics
The three oil booms and subsequent busts since 1951 have affected the age
and sex structures of the region. From 1950 to 1960 in Williston, the number
of preschool-aged children (0–4 years old) increased by 83 percent (Table 4.5)
and school-aged children and young adults (5–19 years) increased by 100 percent (some older teenagers arrived in Williston for work, not for school). The
“working age” population (20–65 years of age) in Williston went from 3,988
in 1950 to 5,534 in 1960, a 39 percent increase. The male working age group
increased by 36 percent while the female group rose 41 percent (Table 4.5).
Williston’s male-to-female ratio for 20- to 29-year-olds was 89 per 100 in 1950
and 72 per 100 in 1960, while the 30–64 age group held at 1:1 (Figure 4.7). It
is curious that Williston’s male-to-female ratio for the 20–29 age group decreased during the first oil boom, but the census reveals an increase of only 33
men compared to 167 women in that age cohort between 1950 and 1960. Oil
production sites, dominated by male workers, were near Tioga and Ray. For
census years 1950 and 1960, Williston’s male-to-female ratios for all age cohorts were less than the state averages (Figure 4.7), meaning there were fewer
men per women there than in the state overall. The median age in Williams
County went from 29.1 years in 1950 to 25.4 years in 1960, compared to the
statewide median age of 26.2 years in 1960 (Figure 4.8). The percentage of
married people increased while the percentage of single people decreased in
Williams County between 1950 and 1960 (Table 4.6), suggesting that those
entering the county for oil-related work at the time were either married when
they arrived or got married after they arrived, which contrasts sharply with
later booms.
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TABLE 4.5.
WILLISTON POPULATION BY AGE GROUP AND SEX, DURING THE
FIRST (1950–60) AND THIRD (2000–16) OIL BOOMS
(SOURCES: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1940, 1950, 2000, 2010; WILLS, CURRENT VOLUME; AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 2012–16)
Age

0–4
5–19
20–29
30–64
65+
Total

1950
1960
Male Female M
F
485
861
543
1,405
400
3,694

420
878
629
1,411
346
3,684

869
1,719
576
2,073
576
5,813

814
1,756
796
2,089
598
6,053

M

2000
F

381
1,451
686
2,667
807
5,992

383
1,440
698
2,702
1,297
6,520

M

2010
F

556
1,385
1,350
3,381
835
7,507

547
1,364
1,086
2,932
1,280
7,209

M

2016

1,086
2,402
2,930
5,842
871
13,131

F

909
1,906
2,279
4,383
1,294
10,771

Figure 4.7. Number of men per 100 women for Williston and the state of North
Dakota since 1950 (source: U.S. Census Bureau 2010; U.S. Census Bureau,
American Fact Finder 2016)
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TABLE 4.6.
SEX AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL STATUS FOR THOSE
14 OR 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER,1 1950–60 AND 2000–16
(SOURCES: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1950, 1960, 2000; AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 2012–16)
			DUNN			McKENZIE
1950 1960 2000 2016 1950 1960 2000
MALE
2,493 2,074 1,419 1,836 2,585 2,559 2,146
Married
60.3% 62.9% 62.0% 52.3% 59.0% 62.8% 61.7%
Single/
Never Married2 36.1% 33.5% 21.6% 32.4% 36.2% 32.0% 27.3%
Divorced
3.5%3 0.9% 6.9% 10.7% 4.9%3 2.0% 7.3%
Widowed
2.7% 3.5% 4.5%
3.2% 3.7%
FEMALE
Married
Single/
Never Married2
Divorced
Widowed

36.7%
10.5%
2.7%

2,197 1,861 1,397 1,628 2,109 2,199 2,192 3,700
67.7% 70.2% 60.4% 60.4% 71.6% 72.4% 60.2% 52.9%
25.4% 21.3% 20.1% 20.5% 17.8% 17.1% 19.2% 28.8%
7.0%3 0.6% 7.3% 10.6% 10.6%3 1.2% 7.4% 10.5%
7.9% 12.1% 8.5%
9.4% 13.2% 7.9%

		MOUNTRAIL		 WILLIAMS
1950 1960 2000 2016 1950 1960 2000
MALE
3,741 3,427 2,515 4,191 6,275 7,167 7,656
Married
55.8% 62.9% 59.1% 45.9% 61.6% 68.6% 58.2%
Single/
Never Married2 38.0% 31.3% 28.1% 42.4% 32.4% 26.1% 27.9%
Divorced
6.2%3 1.7% 10.2% 9.9% 6.0%3 7.6% 10.4%
Widowed
4.1% 2.6% 1.8%
3.6% 3.5%
FEMALE
Married
Single/
Never Married2
Divorced
Widowed

2016
4,329
45.9%

2016
13,686
49.5%
36.2%
12.9%
1.5%

2,936 3,140 2,615 3,376 5,465 6,967 8,088 11,031
70.8% 68.6% 54.9% 45.3% 69.6% 70.5% 56.3% 56.1%
18.9% 19.5% 21.5% 33.6% 19.2% 18.0% 21.1% 25.5%
10.3%3 1.9% 7.5% 12.3% 11.2%3 1.7% 9.9% 10.3%
10.1% 16.1% 8.6%
9.9% 12.7% 8.1%

14 years of age was the cut-off in the 1950 and 1960 U.S. censuses; 15 years of
age was the cut-off in the 2000 census and the 2012–16 American Community
Survey (ACS).
2
The term “single” was used in the 1950 and 1960 censuses; the term “never
married” was used in the 2000 census and the 2012–16 ACS.
3
The “divorced” and “widowed” categories were combined in the 1950 census.
1
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Figure 4.8. Median age for core oil-producing counties and the state of North
Dakota since 1950 (source: U.S. Census Bureau 2010; U.S. Census Bureau,
American Fact Finder 2016)

Census years 1970 and 1980 can be used to characterize the mid-1970s to
mid-1980s boom. The male-to-female ratio for 20- to 29-year-olds living in
Williston rose from 84 per 100 in 1970 to 118 per 100 in 1980 (Figure 4.7).
The number of men aged between 20 and 29 years increased by 159 percent
during the 1970s, while women of the same age increased by 84 percent.
Clearly the second oil boom in the region brought more young men to Williston than did the first, and there was no corresponding boom in pre-school
or school-aged children: 0- to 4-year-olds increased by 1.6 percent between
1970 and 1980 and 5- to 19-year-olds actually decreased by 24 percent. The
median age in McKenzie County dropped from 28.2 in 1970 to 27.3 in 1980,
while Mountrail and Williams counties saw reduced rates in the aging of their
populations (Figure 4.8).
Regional changes in age and sex structure since 1950 are most evident
during the most recent boom (2006 to 2014). For example, Williston grew by
91 percent between 2000 and 2016, driven primarily by a 276 percent increase
in 20- to 29-year-olds and a 161 percent increase in 0- to 4-year-olds, likely the
children of the 20- to 29-year-olds, and a 90 percent increase in 30- to 64-yearolds (Table 4.5). The core oil-producing counties all exhibited median ages
greater than the state median between 1990 and 2010. According to Census
Bureau estimates, McKenzie, Mountrail, and Williams counties fell to less than
or equal to the state median by 2016 (Figure 4.8).
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The male-to-female ratios for the period indicate that more men than
women have moved to Williston in recent years in the 20- to 29-year-old and
30- to 64-year-old cohorts (Figure 4.7). For example, in the 20–29 age group
there were 98 men per 100 women in 2000, increasing to 129 per 100 in 2016
(Figure 4.7). The 30–64 age group increased from 99 men per 100 women in
2000 to 133 per 100 in 2016 (Figure 4.7). Ratios are greater in Stanley, where
most age groups went from less than 100 men per 100 women in 2000 to
2016 when all age cohorts were at more than 100 per 100 (Figure 4.9). The
2016 ratio for 20- to 29-year-olds in Stanley was more than 200 men per 100
women (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9. Number of men per 100 women for Stanley and the state of North
Dakota since 2000 (source: U.S. Census Bureau 2010; U.S. Census Bureau,
American Fact Finder 2016)

The percentage of both married men and married women declined between
2000 and 2016 in all four core oil-producing counties, with corresponding
increases in the number of those who have never married (Table 4.6). For example, in McKenzie County the percentage of married men went from 61.7
percent in 2000 to 45.9 percent in 2016, suggesting that more than 70 percent
of the 15+-year-old males added to the county’s population between 2000
and 2016 were never married. To put that into perspective, there were 1,589
never-married men in McKenzie County in 2016 compared to 1,066 nevermarried-women (Table 4.6), or 149 never-married men per 100 never-married
women.
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In 2016, 9.5 percent of all people in North Dakota (10.0 percent of men and
9.1 percent of women) were divorced, numbers lower than those in most of
the oil patch (Table 4.6). In most cases, the change in the percentage of those
divorced increased by more than 2.5 percent between 2000 and 2016. Data
for McKenzie County show 157 divorced men and 162 divorced women in
2000, rising to 455 divorced men and 389 divorced women in 2016. While
some people arrived in the county already divorced, there has been an increase
in the number of divorce filings: 136 during 2000, 155 during 2010, and 200
during 2016 (North Dakota Supreme Court 2018).
The most current statistics for the region compared to state averages (Table
4.7) indicate that people living there have higher median household incomes
but also higher median home values and rent. Among residents of McKenzie
and Williams counties, the proportion of people born in North Dakota is about
10 percent lower than the state average, while the proportion of those born in
another U.S. state is higher (Table 4.7). The proportion of oil patch residents
born outside of the United States is less than in the state as a whole (Table 4.7).
By far, most regional residents are white, but in some counties the proportion of American Indians is significant (Table 4.7). The percentage of people
identifying as Hispanic or Latino of any race is higher in the four-county area
than the state as a whole. The proportion of Black/African-American residents
is low compared to the state as a whole, with the exception of Williams County
(Table 4.7).
TABLE 4.7.
SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATISTICS FOR CORE OIL-PRODUCING
COUNTIES, 2016 AND 2017
(SOURCES: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2016; AMERICAN COMMUNITY
SURVEY 2012–16; NORTH DAKOTA JOB SERVICE WORKFORCE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK 2018)
North
Dakota

Median
household
income2
$59,114
Median value of
owner-occupied
housing units2
$164,000
Median rent for
occupied buildings
paying rent2
$736

Dunn

McKenzie

Mountrail

Williams

$66,964

$78,179

$68,082

$90,080

$162,700 $202,800

$161,400

$224,000

$900

$723

$915

$895
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North
Dakota
Mining, quarrying,
and oil and gas
extraction, 20173
Jobs
17,841
Percent of all jobs 4.3%
Average weekly
wage for mining,
quarrying, and oil
and gas extraction,
20173
$1,944
Average annual
wage, all job types,
20173
$50,313

Dunn

McKenzie

Mountrail

Williams

506
25.5%

1,448
16.0%

1,261
22.1%

8,027
30.0%

$1,929

$1,817

$1,914

$1,996

$68,365

$70,987

$65,544

$74,287

PLACE OF BIRTH2
					
North Dakota
64.6%
61.0%
53.1%
68.8%
Other U.S. state 32.1%
37.0%
46.1%
29.4%
Outside of
United States
3.3%
2.0%
0.9%
1.8%
RACE1
					
White
87.9%
85.5%
83.0%
67.2%
Black or
African American 2.9%
1.0%
1.6%
1.1%
American Indian or
Alaska Native
5.5%
9.6%
11.9%
28.4%
Asian
1.5%
1.5%
1.0%
0.3%
Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Other Race or Two
or More Races
2.1%
2.5%
2.6%
3.0%
Hispanic or Latino
(of any race)
3.6%
4.9%
7.8%
7.2%
U.S. Census Bureau (2016)
American Community Survey (2012–16)
3
North Dakota Job Service Workforce Intelligence Network (2018)
1
2

54.9%
42.2%
2.9%

87.3%
4.6%
3.8%
1.1%
0.1%
3.3%
6.8%
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Environmental Impacts
The development of oil in the Bakken and other formations requires hydraulic
fracturing to increase the permeability of the formations and the ability to
remove oil. Water, proppant (sand or other granular material), and chemicals
are pumped down a well under high pressure to fracture the formation, and
to hold open the fractures to allow for oil or gas to flow more readily through
the system (Haines et al. 2017). The amount of water required for fracturing
in the Bakken in North Dakota has increased from 770 million gallons in 2008
to 4,274 million in 2012 (Shrestha et al. 2017), and will continue to increase
with each additional well that is drilled and developed. Estimates of water requirements for hydraulic fracturing of wells show that from 2.5 million to 6.0
million gallons of water are required for each well (Table 4.8). This is no small
impact for an area of limited precipitation, surface water, and ground water
resources. Currently, most of the water used in well development is coming
from the Missouri River or ground water (Shrestha et al. 2017).
TABLE 4.8.
VALUE ESTIMATES FOR WATER AND PROPPANT USE FOR OIL WELL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE BAKKEN
(SOURCE: HAINES ET AL. 2017)
Input Value

Minimum

Water per well
for hydraulic
fracturing
(million gallons)

2.5

Mode

Maximum

Mean

4.0

6.0

4.17

Proppant (sand, granular material)
to water ratio
(lb/gal)
1.0

1.2

1.5

1.2

Water per well
for drilling and
cement (million gallons)

0.15

0.20

0.15

0.10

One of the byproducts of hydraulic fracturing, well development, and petroleum extraction is brine water. Brine water has high concentrations of ions
such as chloride, bromide, and sodium and other toxic elements that make
it unsuitable for use for agriculture or drinking water (Lauer, Harkness, and
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Vengosh 2016; Shrestha et al. 2017). This water must be reinjected to keep it
from contaminating local surface water and ground water sources. The brine
water is often transported to the injection sites via pipelines. As drilling has
increased, so has the number of brine spills within North Dakota, from about
200 in 2007 to more than 800 in 2014 (Shrestha et al. 2017). Brine spill data
for the four counties of the study area indicate a maximum spill amount of
96,835 barrels in 2015 (Figure 4.10). The 2015 data includes a 70,000 barrel release of brine water into Blacktail Creek in Williams County in January (Lauer,
Harkness, and Vengosh 2016).

Figure 4.10. Contained and uncontained brine water spills in Dunn, McKenzie, Mountrail, and Williams counties (source: North Dakota Department
of Health 2018)

Oil spill amounts have also increased as production and the number of wells
have increased. The year 2013 had the highest amount of spillage within the
study area at 32,602 barrels (Figure 4.11). There was an oil spill of more than
20,000 barrels in October 2013 from a pipeline rupture near Columbus in
Burke County, North Dakota, just north of Mountrail County, that has been
identified as the “largest oil spill on U.S. soil” (Golgowski 2013). Oil spills have
also been associated with rail derailments, since up to 75 percent of all North
Dakota Bakken production in 2013 was delivered by rail to Canada, the eastern
United States, and the Gulf Coast (Reed 2013). At least 47 people were killed
in the town of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, when 72 tanker cars of Bakken crude
derailed and ignited (Reed 2013). Numerous other explosive derailments of
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Bakken crude have resulted in inquiries regarding the volatility of the oil and
the safety of tanker cars being used in both the United States and Canada
(Reed 2013; Thomas 2015).

Figure 4.11. Oil spill volumes by year in Dunn, McKenzie, Mountrail, and
Williams counties (contained and uncontained) (source: North Dakota Department of Health 2018)

Major Conclusions
The review of the geographic setting of petroleum production in western
North Dakota shows several conclusions and differences when compared
to the 1950s as documented by the 1958 Report. First, oil production has
switched to the Bakken Formation starting in the 1980s, with much higher
production rates and number of wells. Just over 1,214 petroleum wells were
present as of 1958 in the western part of North Dakota, whereas in 2016,
there were more than 14,000. Oil production was at almost 18 million barrels
for the state in 1958, and more than 380 million barrels in 2016. Second, oil
production has greatly expanded from a 5-mile by 35-mile area in Williams and
Mountrail counties in 1958 to oil fields covering most of Williams, Mountrail,
McKenzie and Dunn counties in 2016, including production within the major
cities of Williston, Stanley, and Watford City. This in turn has greatly increased
the number and length of oil service roads throughout the region compared
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to 1958. Third, climatic factors of precipitation and temperature have become
more variable since the 1950s. The mean January temperature for Williston
in the 1950s was 9.3°F and 70.2°F in July. The mean January temperature for
Williston from 2010 to 2017 was 14.4°F and 71.8°F in July. Precipitation mean
values for the 2010 to 2017 period in Williston were also slightly higher at
15.70 inches than the 1950s mean of 14.40 inches. Fourth, population demographics for the 2010s are different from the 1950s. Williston experienced a
62 percent increase in population from 2000 to 2010, and Stanley experienced
68 percent growth during this same period. The disparity between the number
of men versus women also was greater in this period, with 129 men per 100
women in the 20–29-year-old range in 2016, and 133 men per 100 women in
the age group of 30 to 64. The number of married men and women declined
from 2000 to 2016. Finally, Wills’s chapter in the 1958 Report concludes that
a decline in construction and oil field activities had occurred by 1955. Current oil field and construction activities in the study area in 2019 have also
constricted since the major drilling and oil field developments in 2014–15.
Many infrastructure projects such as new roads, hospitals and schools have
been completed, and the oil development has matured. The completion of new
pipelines such as the Dakota Access Pipeline have reduced the need for transportation of crude via train or truck.
In summary, the discovery of oil in the Bakken region of North Dakota in
1951 heralded boom-to-bust cycles that were heavily influenced by global
geopolitics and economics. Drivers of landscape and demographic change
that are largely outside of the control of the state and region have confronted
the area’s longer-term residents with change so rapid and at such magnitude
that carefully planned responses were often not possible, especially during the
most recent boom. On top of significant demographic shifts, the landscape
of the region has been altered dramatically, most notably through the losses
of agricultural and range lands to land covers associated with oil production.
In addition, the weather of the region has been more variable in recent years
when compared to the historical record. It’s fair to say that all of these phenomena have resulted in a general sense of uncertainty for the future of the
region.
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Chapter 5
Political Impact
Ross B. Talbot
I. Introduction: Scope, Method, and Limitations
Just what politics are; where they begin; where do, and should they
end, have been questions of endless controversy over ages of time. If we
can believe Lucy Stark—the courageous but bewildered wife of Willie
Stark in Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men1—politics eventually
entwines itself in every phase of human affairs, even the most private.
But this study of the politics of oil in the Williston Basin is vastly more
limited in scope than that. Essentially it will attempt to do four things—
show how oil has caused the formation of new political associations and
modified existing ones; describe the impact of oil upon existing units of
government; explain the formation and execution of oil policy; and analyze the effects of oil upon the existing political power structure. In all
instances the description and analysis is necessarily somewhat general.
This is not the place to enter into a controversy about empiricism
versus values, but basically this study is empirical. It may proceed
somewhat contrary to accepted scientific method as no hypotheses will
be advanced except during the last two sections of this chapter. Consequently much of the study is descriptive. This is admittedly a somewhat
“safer” method for the social scientist but it has advantages. In a relatively unexplored field, description is necessary in order to provide
an adequate frame of reference. Subsequently, it is then possible to be
analytical in a more meaningful manner.
Lastly, it must be understood that the writer is not a physical scientist and not a student in the technology of oil. Many of the issues to be
discussed in this chapter—well spacing, compulsory unitization, and
other geological and geophysical issues—are well beyond the technical
competence of the social scientist. Where such matters remain in the
Robert Penn Warren, All the King’s Men (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.,
1946), p. 355.
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physical realm an attempt will be made to describe, in general terms,
the conflicting attitudes, coupled with some information on the actions
of other states in comparable matters. However, where these issues
enter into the governmental process the discussion will be more analytical. This dichotomy between the areas of the responsibility of the
physical and social scientists is difficult to define, and just as difficult
to abide by, but a careful attempt will be made not to make judgments
where no empirical evidence is advanced, and not to tread in technical
fields of knowledge where the author has no competence.
II. A Brief Survey of North Dakota Politics and Government
The North Dakota political scene has some unique features of its own,
so a brief, general statement seems necessary at this point.
Since joining the Union, North Dakota has been a one-party state.
That one political party—in this instance the Republican party—has
practically dominated the politics of the state. In only two instances
since the turn of the century have Democrats been elected to the office
of governor2 and both times that was with the considerable aid of dissident Republican elements. In the 1955 session of the State Legislature
the Democrats had four of its party candidates elected to the Senate
and that was such an extraordinary event that the members actually
caucussed once.
As almost invariably true in one-party states, the primary election is the “real” election. Candidates in the Republican column who
are nominated in the June primary are almost always elected in the
November general election. Furthermore, and as usually is the case,
the dominant party is divided into factions. In North Dakota the two
principal factions of the Republican party have been the Non-Partisan
League (NPL) and the Republican Organizing Committee (ROC). In
one form or another, this division has existed in North Dakota politics
since the formation of the NPL in 1915. Some names of organizations
have changed; leadership dominates, then wanes; but the basic division seems to continue. However, and this is where oil politics presently
plays a role and may play a more important one, there are many and
varied forms of political discontent in North Dakota at the present
time. The NPL split into what might conventionally be termed liberal
and conservative factions;3 the ROC is divided into those who want to
2

John Burke, 1907–1912 and John Moses, 1939–1944.

The terms “radical,” “liberal,” and “conservative” are used herein to denote the
degree of social, economic, and political changes that are desired. That is, the
conservatives favor the status quo, or very cautious change, etc. In no instance
3
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dissolve the factions and amalgamate into a single Republican party
and those who are quite satisfied with the status quo; the Democratic
party is largely controlled by conservatives who are not very dynamic in
their party activities, but a younger, energetic, liberal group is actively
attempting to gain control; there is a small, but powerful, group in the
State Senate who consider themselves to be “genuine” Republicans and
these individuals are seeking to erase the factionalism within the Republican party if it will enhance their interests.
To further complicate the political scene, the North Dakota Farmers
Union has, since 1947, played a forceful, albeit somewhat erratic, role
in state politics. Political associations—more commonly termed “pressure groups” or “interest groups”—are exceedingly common and often
immensely powerful in the American political scene, but the Farmers
Union is somewhat unique.4 North Dakota is the most predominantly
agrarian state in the United States and, in 1954, the Farmers Union had
42,233 dues-paying members out of a total population—21 years and
over (1950)—of 366,590. Numerically, the Farmers Union is the largest
pressure group in North Dakota and generally conceded to be by far the
most effectively organized. As will be discussed later, this organization
is definitely involved in the oil politics of the state. Its position is sometimes rather ambiguous and unpredictable but this is probably due to
an ironic sequence of events. The strength of the Farmers Union is west
of the Red River Valley and it is very powerful in the Williston Basin
area. However, its left to left-of-center ideology has been somewhat
rebuked, where oil legislation is involved, by farmers who have oil on
their land or, more importantly, are certain that they will have.
Another feature of the North Dakota political scene which impressed this author during his research was the amount of intra-state
sectionalism in North Dakota politics. This phenomenon seems more
apparent in western North Dakota than elsewhere. There seems to
prevail an attitude, notably among the political leaders, that political
strategy must be based to an important degree upon their own sectional
interests. Political alignments and re-alignments are often discussed in
just those terms. Here, again, we shall see the impact of oil politics.
The governmental system of North Dakota—state, city, county,
and special districts—is not particularly different from the national
are the terms used in the sense of being anti-democratic. See Clinton Rossiter,
Conservatism in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955), passim, but
especially his introduction wherein these terms are more strictly defined.
The North Dakota Farm Bureau is a new and growing organization in the
state—10,196 members in 1954—but its strength in the Williston Basin area
is negligible.
4
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political pattern. However, a brief description of one feature of the
state government is necessary due to its impact upon oil politics. The
theory of separation of powers, coupled with a system of checks and
balances, has been carried to such lengths in North Dakota that many
of the state executive officers constitute what has been termed, in another instance, “the headless fourth branch of government.” That is,
many heads of departments and commissions are elected and thereby
not constitutionally responsible to the governor, or are selected in such
manner that executive responsibility becomes most difficult. This diffusion of political authority and responsibility has, as will be explained
later, been an important factor in the development of oil policy, and its
subsequent administration.
III. Oil and the Legislative Process
Oil was discovered in North Dakota not long after the adjournment
of the 1951 Session. This meant that no action would be taken on the
development of new oil policies until early 1953, unless the governor
decided to call a special session. The issue was not terribly and immediately pressing. There was already in the North Dakota statutes a 1941
law providing for the regulation of the production and conservation
of oil but it was apparent that 1953 would be a crucial year. Important
questions had to be acted on—taxes, well-spacing, administrative authority, conservation practices, etc. The political factions began to sound
about as political observers predicted, with the latter basing their judgments on historical observations. The ROC desired a low tax in order
to foster, from their viewpoint, an “infant” industry and thereby attract
more capital into North Dakota. The NPL was in a dilemma. The oil
companies were, to some NPL legislators, predatory interlopers, but to
those who represented the areas where oil was flowing, or likely to be,
the issue was not so simple. An economic basis of politics quickly manifested itself in the form of a “pork chopper” attitude and the radicalism
of some of the NPL’ers subsided rather considerably, particularly in regards to oil taxes.
The Formation of New Pressure Groups
As would be expected, oil brought into formation new pressure groups.
Of these, the most powerful are the North Dakota Oil and Gas Association (hereafter NDOGA) and the Williams County Land Owners and
Royalty Owners Association (WCLOA). Newer, and of less influence
thus far, are the Tioga Land Owners Association, the North Dakota
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Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association, and the
McKenzie County Mineral Owners Association.
The NDOGA was formally organized in Bismarck, North Dakota,
on August 21, 1952.5 It is an unincorporated, non-profit association
and designed to assist in the discovery, production, development, and
conservation of oil and gas in the state. Membership is restricted to
corporations, partnerships, or associations who are engaged in any
phase of the oil industry. Membership is $25.00 per year and each
represented enterprise is restricted to one vote, although it may purchase any number of memberships for its officers and employees. At an
annual convention, a Board of Directors composed of 40 members is
elected. After receiving the nominations of a Nominating Committee,
the Board selects the executive officers, including the President; the
President then appoints a ten-person Executive Committee with the
advice and consent of the Board. The office staff is a full-time Executive
Secretary and a clerk-typist, although, during the legislative sessions,
lobbyists are employed to represent the organization.6 By the summer
of 1955 the NDOGA had 400 members and this included practically
all the major oil producers in the United States, as well as representatives of other phases of the oil industry, and officers from most of the
major banks in Williston, Bismarck, Minot, and Jamestown. Besides
attempting to influence the formation and administration of oil policy
the organization conducts a public relations campaign aimed at the
general public and its own members. A monthly News Letter is rather
extensively distributed; the Proration Schedules and Oil Production
Reports of the State Industrial Commission are disseminated to the
NDOGA members, as are other pertinent and important publications.
Oil displays are organized and displayed at fairs, conventions, and
other such gatherings throughout the state.
The Williams County Land Owners and Royalty Owners Association was formed as a counteracting influence to the NDOGA and
creates what David Truman has termed a “competing claim” relative
to the latter organization.7 In the opinion of the WCLOA the other
interest group represents the “majors” (the large oil companies) and
thereby, in some instances, the NDOGA overlooks, or disregards, the
interests of the owner of the land on which oil is, or may be, produced.
North Dakota Oil and Gas Association, Articles Association and By-Laws,
dated August 21, 1952.
5

Five persons registered with the Secretary of State during the 1955 legislative
session as lobbyists for the NDOGA.
6

David Truman, The Government Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
1951), p. 150 and passim.
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From all appearances the WCLOA is not nearly as well organized
or administered as the NDOGA. Membership is $5.00 year and apparently there have been as many as 400–500 members. However, the
records were not available to the writer. Annual meetings are held; a
seven-person board is elected; and, since the origin of the WCLOA,
Mr. Iver Solberg, State Senator from Williams County and a farmer-landowner near Ray, has been its President. To some extent the
seemingly rather inefficient operation of the WCLOA is due to its limited objectives. Apparently the principal, if not the sole, purpose of the
organization is to fight the major oil companies on the spacing issue.
This controversy will be elaborated on later in this chapter.
Oil and the North Dakota Legislative Research Center
The North Dakota Senate had in 1951, by the passage of Senate Resolution 6, instructed the Legislative Research Committee to study and
make recommendations to the next legislature relative to the issue of
the development, taxation, and conservation of oil, along with other resources.8 This Committee is comprised of six members of the House, five
from the Senate. Since its inception in 1945 it has been used extensively
and effectively for the study of problems which are usually important
but contentious. The full Committee generally appoints a sub-committee to make the actual study. In this instance two Senators—Mr.
Clyde Duffy and Mr. Iver Solberg, along with one Representative—Mr.
R.H. Lynch—constituted the sub-committee. Three public hearings
were held—two in Bismarck and the other in Williston; advice and material were secured from the Interstate Oil Compact Commission; Dr.
Wilson Laird, State Geologist, made an on-the-spot study of oil regulations and administration in some of the major oil producing states; and
the Research Director, Mr. C. Emerson Murry, along with members of
the sub-committee, drafted 13 legislative measures concerned with oil.
Several of the proposed bills need not concern us here but it is necessary to note the principal features of the proposed bill for the taxation
of gas and oil:
1.

A gross production tax was recommended rather than an ad
valorem tax. The latter would have been very difficult to administer as accurate assessment of unproduced oil is hazardous, if
not impossible.

State of North Dakota, Report the North Dakota Legislative Research Committee, 33rd Legislative Assembly, 1953, pp. 39, 43.
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2. The tax rate was set at 4¼%—4% on the value of the oil when
produced and the ¼% for costs of administering the regulatory
program, although this latter amount was not to be ear-marked
but to go into the State’s General Fund.
3. The oil tax revenues, excluding the one-quarter per cent, were
to be allocated as follows:
a. of the first $200,000 in tax revenues, 75% to the county
where the oil was produced and 25% into the state’s general fund.
b. for the next $200,000 the recommended allocation was
50-50.
c. thereafter the state was to be allocated 75% and the county
25%.
The full committee reported out this tax bill with unanimous agreement. It had drafted a bill which, in the opinion of the Committee,
protected the interests of the state and local governmental units but
at the same time did not discourage the oil producers from a rapid and
efficient development of oil resources. A gross production tax rate of
5% was proposed but it was finally lowered one notch to encourage
the oil producers to drill with full speed.9 Also, the bill provided for no
exemptions from property taxes except for the permanent equipment
of the well-site and the oil itself.
The allocation of tax revenues was also debated. The system of redistribution seemed to favor the oil producing counties more than was
true in other states (for example, in Oklahoma the ratio is 80-20 in
favor of the state). However, Senator Solberg, who represented Williams County in the Senate, believed that the real property tax base
would not increase rapidly enough to provide the increased revenue
that would be needed for roads, schools, etc. His position prevailed.
The Committee adopted, essentially, the “model” oil and gas conservation bill that had been drafted by the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission.10 This proposed regulatory act grants considerable authority to the state agency that is responsible for its administration.
However, the Committee did not include the compulsory, field-wide
unitization feature of the model act—in substance, this permits, under
certain circumstances, an oil field to be operated as a single unit under
North Dakota’s gross production tax is, at 4¼%, higher than most other
states. See Interstate Oil Compact Commission, Gross Production and Severance Taxes Imposed by Various States (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, no date).
9

Interstate Oil Compact Commission, A Form For an Oil and Gas Conservation Statute (Oklahoma City, 1950), 33 pages.
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a single operator—but it did provide for voluntary unitization and also
included provisions for the determination of market demand and the
regulation of oil production.
The Alignment of Political Forces of the 1953 Session
A brief account of the confusion and delay in organizing both houses of
the State Legislature needs to be included herein as the outcome had a
considerable impact on the subsequent oil legislation.
In the Senate, no faction had a clear majority. There were 49 senators. The ROC controlled 24 votes; the NPL had 21. There were three
dissident Republicans—Carroll Day, Franklin Page, and Kenneth
Pyle—and there was a solitary Democrat, Mrs. Harry O’Brien. The
ROC could have organized the Senate with one more vote, but, for reasons that need not be advanced in this study, the ROC chose not to
invite any of the four to its caucus. After some consternation and delay
it was agreed between the NPL and the four that they would form a
coalition, with R.M. Streibel as majority floor leader, and organize the
Senate. This was done and the coalition never split its vote, that is, not
on issues that had been previously decided upon in caucus, except on
the gross oil production tax bill.
Organizing the House was hardly less confusing. Briefly, the NPL
had a clear majority but its intra-factional split was becoming more and
more obvious. When the House NPL members caucussed for Speaker
of the House, Mr. Halvor Rolfsrud was nominated. However, Rolfsrud
represented the insurgent element of the NPL. The “Old Guard” group
was determined not to be thwarted so its leaders entered into an agreement with the House ROC members to support Walter Bubel, an “Old
Guard” Leaguer, as Speaker. This idea prevailed and when the vote
was counted in the House it was 69 for Bubel, 40 for Rolfsrud, three
passed and one did not vote.11 Thus, the coalition of ROC—Old Guard
Leaguers controlled the House during the 1953 session.
The “ifs” of history are usually interesting, albeit perhaps useless,
but a different legislative organization would almost certainly have
produced different oil legislation.

State of North Dakota, Journal the House, Thirty Third Session of the Legislative Assembly (Bismarck, Bismarck Tribune, 1953), pp. 6–10.
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The Enactment of Oil Legislation at the 1953 Session
There was very little doubt in any politician’s mind that oil was to be
a, if not the, major political issue at the 1953 legislature session. It also
seemed reasonably clear that the usual political compromises would
have to be made. The ROC was rather definitely committed to a low oil
tax in order, from its point of view, to aid the growth and development
of an oil industry in North Dakota.12 The insurgent NPL’ers believed
that large capital investors, nearly all of them from out-of-state, were
moving into North Dakota to exploit a natural resource which actually,
according to their “picture”—to use Lippmann’s term—belonged to all
the people of the state. There were other conceptions of course, and
of those two just stated, some legislators probably used them as rationalizations in order to disguise their own self-interest. Also, an oil tax
makes an excellent political issue in the sense of personal popularity
and prestige and this factor can never be overlooked in understanding
the political process in a democracy.
The Legislative Research Committee’s gross oil production tax bill
was introduced on January 16, 1953, became Senate Bill Number 41, and
was sent to the Committee on Finance and Taxation.13 Forty-four days
later (February 8, 1953) the bill emerged “without recommendation”
The word “low” is somewhat of a value term as used in this sentence. The
ROC considered the tax to be “moderate.”
12

It is not considered necessary to document very extensively this account of
legislative action on oil measures. The printed sources are the Grand Forks
Herald and, to lesser extent, the Fargo Forum, Bismarck Tribune, Williston
Herald, Non Partisan League Leader, North Dakota Union Farmer, and the
official House and Senate Journals. Also, the author would like to acknowledge
some of the persons whom he interviewed on this subject of oil legislation.
Their assistance was cordially granted and most helpful. They were: W. Davidson, Sr., President of the American State Bank in Williston; Carroll Day,
State Senator from the 6th District in Grand Forks County and leader in the
Senate Coalitions in 1953 and 1955; C. Emerson Murry, Director of the Legislative Research Committee; Iver Solberg, State Senator from Williams County;
Harry Polk, publisher of the Williston Herald; Arley Bjella, attorney in Williston and member of the State ROC Executive Board; Arthur Link, former
chairman of the McKenzie County Farmers Union and presently State Representative from the 41st District; James Key, chairman of the Democratic party
in Williams County; Clair Amsberry, prominent Farmers Union member and
Vice-Chairman of the Williams County Democratic party; and Walter Burk,
Williston attorney who is acting Secretary for the Williams County Land Owner’s and Royalty Owner’s Association and President of the Upper Missouri
Development Association. Many other persons were very cooperative and generous with their time and information but in the field of oil politics the above
named interviewees were of the most assistance.
13
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for passage after the adoption of about two pages of amendments. The
most vital change was the proposal of a 5¾% gross production tax with
½ of 1% for administration of the tax. While the bill was in Committee
the lobbyists had been laboring diligently. Mr. C.E. Boone, a vice-president of Amerada Oil Corporation and a skilled lobbyist, maintained an
office at Bismarck during all of the session. In his testimony before the
Senate Finance Committee on January 27, he recommended a 3¼%
gross oil production tax. Mr. William Pearce, a Bismarck attorney representing the NDOGA, declared any such tax to be unconstitutional
as it taxed owners instead of property. Mr. Harold Pollman, lobbyist
for the WCLOA, testified, on February 8, in favor of a 4¼% tax if the
oil producers, including the landowners, were permitted a 27½% depletion allowance.14 The position of the Farmers Union was somewhat
ambiguous. At its 1951 State Convention, the Union had advocated a
“moderate” severance tax on oil.15 After Mr. Quentin Burdick, counsel
for the North Dakota Farmers Union, had completed his trip through
the oil states he wrote a series of articles for the North Dakota Union
Farmer in the last of which he stated that “it is the writer’s opinion,
that in no event should the initial tax be less than 5%.”16 At the Senate
hearings on S.B. 14, Burdick testified in favor of a 6, 7, or 8% gross
production tax if there was to be a depletion allowance, but, apparently,
not claiming then to represent the Farmers Union.17 Mr. Alex Lind, a
longtime North Dakota politician, principal lobbyist for the Farmers
Union, a resident of Williston, and a landowner in Williams County,
was a persistent advocate of a tax no higher than 4¼%. During this
period, according to the late Senator Day, the Senate coalition group
had caucussed and decided to push for a 6¼% tax reasoning that, in the
opinion of the caucus, “The Standard Oil Company of Indiana could
stand more tax.”18 In any respect the proposed amendments were voted
In essence, depletion allowance permits the oil companies and other owners
of mineral rights to deduct a certain percentage from their income tax, on the
income received from oil, and be taxed only on the remainder. Federal law has
such a provision but North Dakota, prior to 1953, did not. The theoretical justification for the depletion allowance is that the oil that is produced depletes
the capital investment and consequently such a provision is necessary in order
to attract more and adequate risk capital.
14

North Dakota Farmers Union, Policy and Action Program—1952 (Jamestown, 1952), p. 24.
15
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Burdick, op. cit. p. 16.
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Grand Forks Herald, February 13, 1955.

Interview with Senator Day, July 1955. He also stated that there was some
dissension within the Senate Coalition regarding the allocation of revenues
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on the next day and adopted but not before Senator J.A. Bridston (5th
District—Grand Forks County) had moved for a 4¼% tax.19 However,
Senator Gilman Klefstad (ROC) made a substitute motion for 5% and
Bridston then withdrew his motion. The vote on the substitute motion
was 24-25. The Coalition had not lost a vote. After the clincher motion
was applied by Senator R.M. Streibel, S.B. 41 went to the House.20 Political pressure continued to be applied. The Williston Junior Chamber
of Commerce conducted a statewide newspaper advertising campaign
favoring a 4¼% tax and a 27½% depletion allowance.
Then, on February 28, 250 western North Dakota farmers and
businessmen “snake danced” through the Senate and House Chambers
demonstrating in favor of a 4¼% tax.21 Prior to that energetic procedure, this group had held a meeting with Mr. Harry Polk as chairman,
in the Bismarck City Auditorium. Of the approximately 300 persons
present, newspapermen estimated, from a show of hands, that about
three-fourths of the demonstrators were farmers. There was counter-agitation on March 1st when 25 persons, primarily Farmers Union
county and local officers from Burke and Divide Counties, attended a
House hearing and advocated “at least 5¾%.”22 But, on March 3rd, the
House Committee on Finance and Taxation voted out S.B. 41 with a
recommended 4¼% tax, and the next day the vote on accepting the
amendment was 70-41 in favor. Of the Representatives from Williams,
Mountrail, and McKenzie Counties (at that time the “oil counties”) only
Mr. T.O. Rodhe of New Town voted against the lower tax, and on the
vote for final passage, 81-14, Mr. Rodhe did not vote at all. Thus, if the
Senate Coalition group refused to accept the lower tax, the bill would
have to go to Conference Committee. At this juncture the oil lobbyists,
led in this instance by W.S. Davidson, Sr., President of the American
State Bank in Williston, threatened to file recall petitions against Senator Solberg unless he changed his vote. In fact, several interviewees
stated that Davidson stood directly behind Solberg (the latter’s Senate
seat being right next to the outer rail) with recall petitions in hand
while the vote was being taken. Solberg switched; the vote was 25-24
received from the tax but in order to obtain the support of Senator Solberg, and
other “oil” Senators, it was decided not to disturb that feature of the bill.
State of North Dakota, Journal of the Senate, 33rd Session (Bismarck; State
Capitol, 1953), see Index, p. XIV.
19

The purpose of the clincher motion is to make reconsideration of a bill more
difficult.
20

Grand Forks Herald, February 28, 1953. There is some question as to whether
a “snake dance”, or anything like it actually occurred.
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Ibid., March 2, 1955.
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in favor of the House Amendment; and the oil tax was to be 4¼%.23 The
ROC governor, C. Norman Brunsdale, was a leading advocate of the
lower tax so a veto was not even considered a possibility. Senator Day,
in an interview with the author in July, 1955, claimed that even Mr.
C.E. Boone, after consulting his superiors in the Amerada Petroleum
Corporation, had agreed to accept 5¼%. (He also made this statement
at a talk given in the Spring of 1953 at the University of North Dakota.)
Further, he claimed that at no time during the Senate hearings was
there a single pressure group that was willing to support the 6¼% tax
advocated by the Senate Coalition.
S.B. 41 was the “showdown” bill, so to speak, for all oil legislation
and it proved to be the only instance in which the Coalition refused
to abide by a decision made in its caucus.24 On the issue of depletion
allowances, Senators Clyde Duffy and Milton Rue introduced S.B. 89
and S.B. 203, respectively. Rue’s bill was indefinitely postponed. The
legislative process concerning S.B. 89 was rather comparable with S.B.
41. The bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on Finance and
Taxation with a “do pass” recommendation for a 27½% depletion allowance. Senator Streibel moved to change it to 25% and his motion
passed. After Senator Rue attempted to rescind the change, and failed,
S.B. 89 passed the Senate by 49-0. Then the House changed the bill
back to 27½%. On March 3rd, the Senate concurred again by a vote of
25-24 as Senator Solberg switched his vote although Senators Hagen
and Olson continued to vote with the Coalition. However, Senator Day
insisted that the Coalition group decided not to make a concerted fight
for the lower depletion allowance.
S.B. 32 was the “model” oil and gas conservation bill. Although an
extremely important and potent piece of legislation it did not encounter
any considerable difficulties in either House. As stated earlier in this
chapter, the compulsory unitization feature was deleted but oil lobbyists
appearing before the Legislative Research Committee were agreeable to voluntary unitization. The Committee on Natural Resources
in both Houses made only minor changes. In the Senate hearings on
the bill, Mr. Harold Pollman and Mr. Milton Higgins testified in favor
of including a 40 acre spacing provision in the law. Dr. Wilson Laird,
State Geologist, testified to the contrary, that is, he advocated that the
Senator Orville Hagen of McKenzie County and Senator Axel Olson of
Mountrail County stayed with the Coalition on the 25-24 vote, but on the vote
for final passage of the amended bill, 28-21, Hagen voted “aye.”
23

Senate Journal, op. cit. pp. 720–724, has the remarks of Senators Schrock,
Day, Duffy, Bridston, Streibel, and Nordhaugen after the final passage of S.B.
41. Also, Senator Nordhaugen’s statement is on pp. 463–465.
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Industrial Commission be authorized to make administrative rulings
as to proper spacing—such was then, and still is, the procedure. Mr.
Boone stated that the issue should be decided between landowners and
operators.25 Charges and denials between Mr. Higgins and Dr. Laird
apparently became rather heated but the Committee made no changes
in regard to spacing procedure.
S.B. 35 was introduced by the Legislative Research Committee and
was designed to regulate oil brokers. A few of the brokers had proven to
be unethical and financially irresponsible so the use of the state’s police
power seemed necessary to the Committee. There was some discussion
of licensing the oil brokers, but this seemed to pose several administrative difficulties and it would not have necessarily enabled the injured
parties to have received any compensation. The bill was passed after
considerable opposition and a substantial number of amendments.
The NDOGA opposed the bill and Harold Pollman, representing the
WCLOA, recommended licensing of oil brokers rather than bonding.
The former organization apparently testified against S.B. 35 in order to
get the support of the small oil producers for S.B. 32. When the Senate
Judiciary Committee completed its hearing it recommended that the
$10,000 bonding provision be changed to $3,000. The Senate and
House approved this change, along with several others, and the bill received little other opposition.
There were other “oil” bills of some importance that were introduced
and passed at the 1953 Legislative Session but the process outlined
above accounts for the most important and controversial items of oil
legislation.
The Relative Inactivity of the 1955 Session
The “built-in” confusion of the North Dakota political system continued in the 1955 legislative session. The 1954 elections brought
rather moderate successes for the ROC. Its majority in the House was
substantial—the ROC nominee for Speaker being elected 64-45, four
members not voting. But in the Senate, the Coalition of 1953 was again
successfully formed. The NPL had maintained its strong minority
group; the “independent” Republicans had lost one cohort—Senator
Pyle, but there were now three Democrats in the Senate and toward the
end of the session that figure was increased by the special election of
another Democrat. Senator Day was elected the leader of the Coalition
group.
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The 1955 Session encountered a substantial number of serious
problems but the issues concerning oil were very few. This situation
was probably created by two main factors. With the two Houses controlled, in essence, by opposite factions it was rather evident that no
major policy changes would be made in the field of oil. Also, public
opinion—in the sense of interested and articulate groups—on the oil
issue was sort of at the fulcrum point. The initial lust and enthusiasm
for oil had rather died away as drilling was greatly diminished and “dry
holes” became more frequent. The politician was not too certain how
to move on the oil issue. This was a year of watching and waiting. But a
few interesting pieces of oil legislation were introduced, although none
by the Legislative Research Committee.
Senators Solberg, Dewing, Hagen and Olson dropped in a bill on
January 27, 1955, to prohibit the flaring of gas. This became S.B. 148
and it had a short but lively career. Many persons in the state, and in the
State Legislature, were increasingly concerned about the flaring of natural gas in the oil fields. For some considerable time the gas had been
flared at the well-site but by the late summer of 1954 the Signal Oil and
Gas Company had completed its plant at Tioga. After that development
the gas was piped into the Signal plant whereupon the butane, propane, and sulphur were removed but the natural gas that remained was
still burned. Only a few days before Senator Solberg’s bill was introduced, he, and several other Senators, had offered concurrent Senate
Resolution “H” which urged the effective utilization of natural gas and
stated that approximately 30 million cubic feet of gas was being flared
each day in North Dakota oil fields, including the Signal plant.26 Just
what Senator Solberg and the other Senators had in mind when they
introduced S.B. 148 is not known positively by the writer but it seems
fairly clear that it was an attempt to bring pressure upon Amerada and
the Montana-Dakota Utilities Company, or some other utility, to negotiate a contract for the sale of the gas. The bill prevented the flaring of
refined or dry natural gas and imposed a fine of $500 a day on each violator. Mr. Pearce (NDOGA), Mr. Richard Cook (Superintendent, Signal
Oil and Gas Company), and Mr. C.E. Boone (Amerada) testified before
the Senate Committee on Industry and Business that passage of the bill
would force the cessation of production of both crude oil and natural
gas; that no other state had such a law; and that there were not any
adequate storage facilities for natural gas in North Dakota. Then on
February 8, the Montana-Dakota Utilities Company announced that it
had consummated a contract with Amerada, subject to the approval of
26
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the North Dakota Public Service Commission, for the purchase of all
the gas produced at the Signal plant. The following day S.B. 148 was
reported out of the Committee with a recommendation for indefinite
postponement and such a report, in the North Dakota legislature, is
tantamount to killing a bill.
Then, on January 28, Senators Schoeder, Berube, and Tuft—all of
them influential in the Farmers Union—introduced a bill to increase
the gross oil production tax by 2% and this additional revenue was all
to go into the state’s general fund. At its 1954 State Convention, the
Farmers Union had proposed a “higher rate” for the oil production tax
with the revenues to be used for “schools and social services.”27 At the
January, 1955, meeting of the Farmers Union Board of Directors that
group recommended to the legislature that the tax be increased to 6¼%.
This recommendation was, in substance, the content of S.B. 181. However, in his biennial message to the state legislature in early January,
1955, Governor Brunsdale had opposed any increase in the gross oil
production tax. Also, the Senate Coalition, in caucus, had decided not
to make the oil tax an issue at the session ostensibly because the House
was ROC and no increase in the tax had even a slim chance of passage.
Furthermore, the Farmers Union seemed to be again working at cross
purposes. Mr. Stanley Moore, the assistant lobbyist for the Farmers
Union, was working hard to garner votes for S.B. 181 but Mr. Alex Lind
seemed convinced that the existing tax was equitable, and conducted
himself accordingly. Mr. Boone stated before the Senate Committee
on Finance and Taxation that Amerada had a gross investment of
$71,000,000 in North Dakota on which it had earned a profit of only
$18,500,000 and claimed therefore that a tax increase was not justifiable. Mr. Ernest Fleck, an attorney for the NDOGA, was of like opinion
and said that the oil industry had an investment of $450,000,000 in
North Dakota but that the oil production rate in the state was less than
one-half of one percent of United States production. Thus he agreed
that the higher tax would only impede the growth of the oil industry in
the state. The bill came out of committee “without recommendation”
and, when the bill came before the Senate for action, Senator Hagen
moved for indefinite postponement contending that a higher tax was
“poor psychology, when we’re trying to attract industry to our state.”28
On January 31, Senator Day introduced a bill (S.B. 214) which
would have authorized the Public Service Commission to regulate natural gas rates at the wellhead. As was the case with S.B. 148, the bill
27
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seemed designed to act as a further lever against the oil companies in
an attempt to make them negotiate more rapidly for the utilization of
the wasted natural gas. Also, as Senator Day remarked in a personal
interview, “the bill might have been introduced to get natural gas for
Grand Forks.” In any respect the oil lobbyists acted quickly and sharply.
Hearings were held in the evening in the famous Room 200 at the Patterson Hotel. Mr. William H. Hunt, the Texas oil multi-millionaire, flew
in for the hearings. Mr. Pearce, representing the NDOGA, and several
independent producers spoke against the bill by using the following
arguments—no state has such a regulation; it would be difficult to administer; such a law would impede wildcatting, etc. Mr. Boone claimed
that there was no monopoly in the production of natural gas.29 The bill
emerged from the Committee on February 16 with a recommendation
for “indefinite postponement.” Senator Dewing, a close friend and coalition supporter of Senator Day, moved that the Committee report be
adopted and this was done without a roll call vote.
The 1955 Session of the State Legislature adjourned without acting
on any other major oil bills, and of those that were considered none
were passed.
IV. The Administration of Oil Policy
Before the beginning of this century, Woodrow Wilson theorized on the
future role of public administration in modern government. He predicted correctly the increasing emphasis on bureaucracy and observed
the hazards of attempting to separate politics from administration.30
For, as some sage has remarked, “policy is often made in the interstices
of administration.” Thus it has been with the oil policy in North Dakota, to a certain extent. A legislature cannot foresee all of the facets
and ramifications of the policies it enacts; so, wisely, the law in most
instances is given sufficient flexibility to meet changing conditions.
This means that when a legislature has adjourned the political process
moves over to the administrative agencies and the struggle for control
and influence continues.
In North Dakota there are principally four state administrative
agencies concerned with the execution of oil policies—the Industrial
Commission, State Geologist, Public Service Commission, and the Tax
Commissioner.
29
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A. The Industrial Commission
Both the 1941 and 1953 state laws for the control of oil and gas resources gave the Industrial Commission the primary authority for the
formulation of oil conservation regulations. The Commission was created in 1919 for the primary purpose of supervising the state-owned
industries. It is an ex-officio organization composed of the Governor,
Attorney General, and Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor.
Because of its powers, and its control over some patronage, the Commission has always been kept closely in mind by the politicians when
it comes to “slate-making time” at the pre-primary conventions. Since
1950, with the exception of the brief period that Mr. Paul Benson was
Attorney General after the resignation of Mr. E.T. Christiansen, the
NPL has controlled the Industrial Commission, although not the office
of Governor.31 But in no instance, unless one includes the 1954 election of Mr. Leslie Burgum to the office of Attorney General, has the
insurgent group in the NPL had much authority in the Industrial Commission. For better or worse, this situation has strongly affected policy.
That is, the conservative Leaguers and the ROC have determined the
Commission’s actions. In the field of oil conservation the authority of
the Commission is largely due to its powers of issuing drilling permits,
determining market demand and regulating production, and deciding
upon spacing issues. The Commission’s procedure follows the rather
set pattern that has been established in order to comply with the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution—due notice, hearing, appeals to the regular courts, etc. The
principal problems of the Commission have been concerned with well
spacing and market demand rulings, particularly the former.32
The oil spacing issue has been a lively one in North Dakota and
still is. When a “pool” is determined for particular area, the Commission makes a temporary spacing ruling, which is in effect for not more
than 18 months. After the expiration of that time period, it must make
a “permanent,” or proper, spacing rule. The Commission is guided in
its actions, officially at least, by the testimony of interested parties at
the hearings and the advice of the State Geologist. The controversy has
arisen over the demands of the mineral rights owners for the drilling
It should be noted that the Governor has veto power over the decisions of the
Commission.
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of more wells. This demand has often been echoed, if not originally advanced, by the businessmen in areas where drilling rigs are becoming
scarce and, consequently, so are the customers. An interviewee in Tioga
claimed, to the writer, that $8,000 had been collected from the local
businessmen and the small independent producers to fight the temporary 80 acre spacing in the Tioga and Beaver Lodge fields from being
changed at the October, 1955, meeting of the Industrial Commission to
a “permanent” 80 acre spacing rule. This group would certainly prefer
a permanent 40 acre spacing rule. However, by the time the October
meeting had come and gone it was apparent that the $8,000 had not
been collected by the Tioga Field Mineral Association. That organization did not offer any testimony by technical witnesses at the hearing
and the Industrial Commission thereupon issued a “permanent” 80
acre spacing order.
The persons in the Williston area who are most aroused over the
situation are primarily concerned with having more wells in order,
in their opinion, to have more income.33 Spacing, of course, is not an
end in itself. It is ostensibly a conservation measure designed to maintain the highest possible “maximum efficient rate of production,” and,
thereby, to drain the field as thoroughly as possible. The usual spacing
order of the Commission reads—“one well to 80 acres in order to drain
efficiently, all of the recoverable oil from the sand pool, assure orderly
and uniform development and avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells,
and prevent waste in a manner that will protect correlative rights.”34
But the Commission has not been able to reconcile the differing
conflicts of interest. The WCLOA has vociferously charged that the
larger spacing ruling (primarily 80 acres)35 is solely for the benefit of
the major oil producers as the latter presently do not need the oil and
want to avoid the expense of extra drillings. The findings of the State
Geologist seem to concur generally with the major oil producers, but
he—the State Geologist—believes that the allocation formula is equitable to all parties concerned as the amount of oil allocated to a given
But there does seem to be a serious question of ethics involved here. In any
respect, a few of the landowners who were interviewed claimed that verbal
promises were made that the drilling on their land would be based on 40 acre
spacing. There seems to be adequate evidence to state that these and other such
types of practices occurred but by whom, and to what extent, is much more
difficult to ascertain.
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well is based on acreage and an increase in the size of the spacing unit
increases, in proportion, the allowable quota for each well. His critics
seem to have an unquenchable belief that an “independent” geologist
should be hired to make a “scientific” ruling rather than an economic
one. The WCLOA claims that other states have 10, 20, 40 acre spacing,
which in some instances is true,36 but comparisons are rather futile unless many geophysical factors are closely correlated. Factional politics
also play an important role as the NPL has become an advocate, for the
most part, of 40 acre spacing while the ROC adheres more closely to
the findings of the geologists for the state and the oil producers.
The market demand features of the oil conservation law are also a
source of conflict. The avowed purpose of a market demand provision
is to prevent waste of a natural resource by permitting only enough oil
to be produced as will “clear” the market. The Interstate Oil Compact
Commission (IOCC) believes that this is not an involved decision to
make—“it is not difficult to determine the current demand for crude oil
and the increasing or decreasing trend in that demand.”37 Probably that
is correct in North Dakota as the Standard Oil Purchasing Company at
Mandan is, by all odds, the largest single purchaser of the oil; in fact,
almost the sole purchaser.
A market demand law may well be necessary for proper conservation, an orderly market, and adequate risk capital,38 but in the short
run it means that an oil well may be able to produce its quota for the
month in a few days.39 Also, as long as the monthly quota remains lower
than the capacity of the wells to produce, and the formula remains unchanged, the discussion over spacing seems rather academic. But that
judgment is not concurred in by many landowners, businessmen, etc.,
in the Williston area. When the question of proper spacing for the
Tioga and Beaver Lodge fields was discussed before, and decided by,
the Industrial Commission in the fall of 1955 a considerable amount of
political conflict was expected, but failed to develop. The landowners
were apparently divided as to the strategy which should be followed.
Letter, from Mr. Lawrence R. Alley, Assistant Executive Secretary, Interstate
Oil Compact Commission, to the author, August 25, 1955.
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These quotas are based on a calculation which takes into account the acreage
of the field and the depth of the well, among other factors. That is, the larger
the spacing rule in that field, and the deeper the depth of the individual well,
the greater the production quota. See the Industrial Commission of North
Dakota, General Rules and Regulations for the Conservation of Crude Oil and
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B. The State Geologist and State Geological Survey
The professor of geology at the University of North Dakota is also,
ex-officio, the state geologist. As pertains to oil, he directs the activities
of the State Geological Survey and “as supervisor, is charged with the
enforcement of regulations and orders of the Industrial Commission
governing North Dakota oil and gas resources.”40 In the administration of the duties and responsibilities of his office, the State Geologist,
Dr. Wilson M. Laird, has organized the survey into three divisions—
geology, administration, and conservation.41 It is in the conservation
activities of the last named division that Dr. Laird has encountered
political difficulties. In his role as what might be termed the “principal
advisor” to the Industrial Commission on geological matters, politics
and science have become somewhat intertwined. Some individuals
and organizations in the Williston Basin area have, and do, charge Dr.
Laird with too close cooperation with the major oil producers and with
failing, as one politician phrased it, “to assist the landowners of North
Dakota whom he supposed to represent.” This matter of representation raises vital administrative questions. Who is Dr. Laird supposed
to represent? From his point of view, his responsibilities are to administer the provisions of chapter 38-08 (Control of Gas and Oil Resources
of the 1953 Supplement to the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943)
in as scientific and objective a manner as possible. But his findings,
notably in the field of well-spacing and conservation, have led him to
reach in many instances the same conclusions as the major oil producers. To those who consider their interests and conclusions to be
contrary to those of the producers, Dr. Laird is not performing in a
manner that is most beneficial for the citizens of the state. This is a
serious and delicate matter and the author has only the competence to
state the issues, not decide them. The concept of “state interest,” like
its larger counterpart—the “national interest”—has always been vague
and confusing. The following questions are some of the important ones
asked by influential persons in the Williston area and they indicate
that a consensus of opinion has not been reached on several matters
regarding oil production and conservation. Is Amerada, for example,
not really concerned with conservation in the spacing issue but rather
wants to keep North Dakota oil off the market and thereby protect her
investments and production in foreign nations and other states? Does
State of North Dakota, North Dakota Blue Book (Bismarck: Bismarck Tribune, 1954), p. 90 and Chapter 38-0804 of the 1953 Supplement to the North
Dakota Revised Code 1943.
40
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80 acre space most efficiently and completely drain the oil fields where
such an order is in effect, or is much oil left that will never be recovered
and thereby jeopardize the interests of mineral owners, the state, and
the nation? Is justice here not decided in the interests of the stronger,
that is, stronger in terms of political pressures, public relations, financial resources, etc.?
C. Public Service Commission
The Public Service Commission in North Dakota has the responsibility
for the regulation of public utilities in the state. Its powers of issuing licenses, permits, certificates of convenience and necessity, setting rates,
and the like, make it a potent force in the economic life of North Dakota. The three members of the commission are elected for overlapping
six year terms—assuming that it is not a special election. Because of the
authority of the office and the patronage that is to be dispensed, control
of this commission is avidly sought for by the political factions.
The commission has not played a particularly important role in oil
politics in the state but recently there have been attempts to secure the
Commission’s approval for the construction of natural gas pipelines to
certain cities and villages in North Dakota. The political and legal maneuvers that followed have somewhat shifted the conflicts centering
around oil politics from the Industrial Commission to the Public Service Commission.
On November 27, 1953, the North Dakota Natural Gas Transmission Company (hereafter NDNGT) applied to the Commission for a
certificate of convenience and necessity in order to build a pipeline
from the Signal Plant at Tioga which would serve many of the major
cities and towns in the northern section of the state east of Tioga and,
also, in the Red River Valley area. This project was estimated in cost
at $10,700,000. The Commission issued its findings of fact, conclusions, and order on May 24, 1954.42 In essence, the plan was approved
if the NDNGT would meet nine conditions. These need not be reiterated here but they imposed substantial demands upon NDNGT in such
matters as underground storage facilities, standby wells, and some
financial features which were not satisfactory with the Commission.
NDNGT claimed that it could not comply with six of the 16 stipulations set forth by the Commission and applied for an extension of time,
which was granted. Then on June 21, 1954, the Northern Natural Gas
Company of Omaha proposed to the Commission the construction of a
See North Dakota Public Service Commission, Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth
Annual Report, for the biennial period ending June 30, 1954, pp. 93–112.
42

122
somewhat similar line at a cost of $18,280,700. These companies were
apparently unable to meet the standards established by the Commission and all the while a presumably vital natural resource was being
flared away. It was not until June 23, 1955, that the issue began to
jell.43 On that date, Montana-Dakota Utilities Company announced an
agreement with Amerada on the use of the natural gas being flared at
the signal gas plant. This was to be, if approved, a five million dollar
pipeline extending east to Minot and west to Williston. Hearings before the Commission were held during parts of August. There seemed
to be general approval of the proposal as far as it went but the eastern
cities in the state were, in some instances, rather ardently opposed to
the idea.
There were some interesting developments in this Montana-Dakota
arrangement which indicate a “politics of business.” W.S. Davidson
Sr., President of the American State Bank in Williston and a definite
power in state politics, is reported to be the largest stock-holder in
Montana-Dakota Utilities Company. The former owners of the Minot
Gas Company were the sponsors for the NDNGT. Also, Mr. Ralph F.
Davis, a natural gas consultant, studied the availability of gas situation for the Montana-Dakota Utilities Company and claimed there was
only enough gas to satisfy Williston, Minot, and the cities and towns
in-between. Two days after this was announced by Montana-Dakota
Utilities, the president of Amerada denied, by telegram, the lack of
availability of gas.
In considering oil politics within the state, the most important
development was the division that occurred within the Public Service Commission over the proposed pipelines of Montana-Dakota
Utilities Company from Tioga to Williston and from Tioga to Minot.
The former pipeline involves interstate commerce and is thereby a
matter to be decided by the Federal Power Commission but the latter
line is a matter of intrastate commerce. To summarize a lengthy and
complicated dispute, the North Dakota Public Service Commission authorized, in late November, 1955, the Tioga-Minot pipeline, but subject
to several restrictions regarding price and future commitments which
Montana-Dakota Utilities and Amerada would not accept. To further
confuse the situation, that pipeline was already being constructed; the
Public Service Commission was trying to bring contempt proceedings
against the public utility as no construction certificate had been issued;
and many users of gas in the Minot area were protesting the ostensible
shortage of gas. The day before Christmas, 1955, District Judge A.J.
43
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Gronna authorized Montana-Dakota Utilities Company to begin immediately the distribution of natural gas in Minot.
Whatever the final outcome, this matter was becoming more and
more embroiled in North Dakota politics. One member of the Public
Service Commission, an interim appointee of the Governor following
the death of an elected member, was to run for election in 1956 to a full
six year term on the Public Service Commission, and, on this aforementioned issue, his vote had been favorable to the position of Amerada
and Montana-Dakota Utilities Company. In the 1956 election the issue
of pipelines, rates, etc., was almost certain to be an influential campaign issue.44
D. The Tax Commission
The general provisions of the North Dakota Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax Law (chapter 57-51, North Dakota Revised Code, 1953
Supplement) were outlined in Section III, Part B, of this chapter. The
State Tax Commissioner, an elected officer, is responsible for the administration of the act.45 Table Number XVI provides statistical data
concerning the collection and distribution of revenue received under
the provisions of the law. In comparative terms the tax has not been
much of an income producer as yet. That is, the state sales tax brought
in $12,696,000 for the fiscal year 1954 compared to the $335,831 that
oil tax accounted for in almost a two year period. Also the ¼ of 1%
for administration has not been equal to the actual increase of administrative costs. For 1952–54, the State Geological Survey’s budget was
$310,000. Actually the Survey had no full-time employees prior to
1951, other than the State Geologist, and his activities were principally
those of a teacher. By 1954 the staff had increased to 18 full-time and
eight temporary employees.46
Although the administration of the oil tax law is basically a ministerial function there are a couple of features which need to be mentioned.
It is clear from information received at the Tax Commissioner’s office
that there are instances where the discretionary powers of the Tax
Commissioner in the interpretation of the law are of considerable
For more detailed information regarding this dispute, reference is made to
Case No. 5351 and Case No. 5353, Public Service Commission, State of North
Dakota.
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importance.47 In addition, the tax is somewhat novel in that it appears
to be collected 100%. The reason for this apparently perfect collection is due to the source of collection, that is, the tax is collected at the
refineries.
E. Other State Agencies
Two other state agencies that have been directly affected by oil discoveries in North Dakota are the Board of University and School Lands and
the Bank of North Dakota. The Land Department had 723,000 acres
under lease by the end of 1954. Income from leases and royalties since
1936 has totaled $4,332,448. The revenue from leases is apportioned
to state schools and institutions while the income from royalties goes
into a permanent fund for reinvestment. The Bank of North Dakota
has collected $1,421,634 since it first leased mineral acreage in 1948. A
million dollars of these receipts was used to cover a transfer payment to
the motor vehicle fund directed by the state legislature in 1953.48
Both of the above organizations are ex-officio and politics, in the
sense of struggle for control, are moderately evident, but oil has, thus
far, played a minor role.
TABLE XVI
NORTH DAKOTA OIL AND GAS GROSS PRODUCTION TAX
COLLECTIONS AND ALLOCATIONS, 1954–1955, BY COUNTIES
			
			
County

Total taxes
collected
from each
county
Billings
$18,450.92
Bottineau 6,073.87
Bowman 1,332.25
Burke
6,427.35
McKenzie 54,588.67
Mountrail 225,955.72
Stark
.63
Williams 750,956.99
TOTAL $1,063,786.40

TAXES COLLECTED ALLOCATED AS
FOLLOWS TO STATE GENERAL FUND
To each
county per
57-5115
(2)
$13,024.16
4,287.44
933.35
4,536.95
38,533.19
159,498.16
.44
449,651.15
$670,464.84

1/4% tax
Per
per
57-5115
57-5115		
(1)
(2)
$1,085.35 $4,341.41
357.29
1,429.14
77.77
311.13
378.07
1,512.33
3,211.11
12,844.38
13,291.51 53,166.05
.04
.15
44,173.95 257,130.89
$62,575.09 $330,735.48

Total to
State
General
Fund
$5,426.76
1,786.42
388.90
1,890.40
16,055.48
66,457.57
.19
243,826.06
$335,831.79

SOURCE: Office of the North Dakota Tax Commissioner, July, 1955. 		
			
Letter, Office of the Tax Commissioner, to the Carter Oil Company, April 20,
1955; and Letter, Office of Tax Commissioner, to the Hunt Oil Company, August 14, 1953.
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V. The Impact of Oil Upon City Government
The discovery of oil in the Williston Basin area in April, 1951, enabled
almost any student of government to forecast the need for expansion of
municipal facilities and services in that area. This growth was certain
to be accompanied by increasing financial problems. The unanswerable
question seemed to be—how much? Hindsight is invariably simpler
and more accurate than foresight but even now it is difficult, and perhaps too soon, to state whether the expansion of municipal activities in
Williston, Ray, and Tioga was overly optimistic or unduly pessimistic.
This section of the study is not intended to provide an economic analysis of the public finance problems that were, and are, involved. Rather
it is to trace the growth of municipal services in the three cities and to
relate and account for the serious conflicts that arose over municipal
issues and institutions. Included within this discussion of municipal
government are the operations of the independent school districts.
Although separate units of government from the municipalities, the
problems of the school districts are comparable in cause and scope to
those of the cities.
Williston
(1) Expansion of Services and Facilities and the Problem of Finances
The United States Bureau of the Census declared Williston had a population in 1950 of 7,378. In a prior section this study indicated that by
1954 the population was approximately 9,717. This meant, in terms of
municipal services, that the city needed more and improved streets,
sewer and water main extensions, additional storm sewers, and improved waterworks, and more street lights—the new sewer system,
alone, cost $350,000.49 In addition to these rather obvious necessities,
Williston had drawn the plans and secured city approval for a new Armory building with probable construction in 1956, had funds to build
a city garage, and had remodeled the city hall.50 These capital improvements do not include new buildings and additions to the educational
system, or other non-governmental civic enterprises. Some of this activity would certainly have occurred if oil had never been discovered
but the tempo of change was much greater because of that event.
League of North Dakota Municipalities, Bulletin, February, 1954, Vol. XXII,
Bulletin II, p. 39. Apparently some of the residents complained about the imposition of a sewage charge because Mr. Willard Webster stated that the charge
was “unavoidable” as $150,000 of the costs of the new sewer here were to come
from special assessments and $200,000 from revenue. The Williston Herald
opposed the bond issue (April 1954) in a front page editorial.
49
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This building and improvement program meant that by May 31,
1955, the city owed $2,237,500 in general obligation and revenue
bonds, refunding special assessment warrants, and special assessment
warrants other than those of the refunding type.51 (SEE TABLE XVII)
TABLE XVII
WILLISTON BONDED INDEBTEDNESS, MAY 31, 1955
General obligation bonds
Revenue bonds
Refunding special assessment warrants
Other special assessment warrants
TOTAL

Amount of Issue
$153,000.00
226,000.00
1,578,000.00
280,500.00
——————
$2,237,500.00

Funds on Hand
$118,347.87
77,896.09
481,103.21
72,857.03
—————
$750,204.20

Even considering this substantial expansion of city facilities and
consequent debt, Mr. H.L. Grimstvedt considered the city to be on a
sound financial basis in May, 1955.52 No events seem to have transpired
since that time to cause a revision of opinion.
Property valuations—real and personal—have experienced a substantial steady increase; mill levies have remained relatively stable
since 1952; and revenues have consequently moved upward. (SEE
TABLE XVIII)
TABLE XVIII
WILLISTON PROPERTY MILL LEVIES, VALUATION AND EXPECTED TAX REVENUES, 1950–1955
Fiscal
Year

Combined*
Mill Levies

Taxable
Valuation

Expected
Revenue

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955

96.86
98.93
120.07
125.08
123.36
......

$4,837,541.00
5,185,454.00
5,801,790.00
6,845,675.00
7,511,671.00
13,423,649.00 (Est.)

$468,564.00
512,996.00
......
......
926,634.00
......

* State, County, City, Park, School, Special			

Table XIX shows how tax revenues, appropriations, and actual expenditures (including special projects) increased; how the demands for
51

Ibid., June 25, 1955.

52

Ibid.
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more services advanced the costs of strictly governmental services, and
how they moved upward. The figures are self-explanatory and comparative percentage estimates would not be particularly meaningful.
TABLE XIX
WILLISTON TAX REVENUES, APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEARS 1950–1951 TO 1954–1955
Fiscal Year
Year

Total Tax
Revenues

Total
Appropriations

Total
Expenditures

50–51
51–52
52–53
53–54
54–55

$105,112.67
122,688.77
200,466.03
219,118.26
252,695.96

$163,828.00
196,769.00
269,270.00
337,392.61
426,815.19

$124,058.60
175,982.12
243,241.66
955,957.00*
......

* This includes $489,554.23 for the construction fund plus $126,320.00 for
bonds.

The problems of the Williston school district are different in type,
but not magnitude, from those of the city. Two elementary schools had
to be built; another school was enlarged; a new parochial school was
completed; a $300,000 high school gymnasium was constructed by
early 1954 and two classrooms were used there during the 1954–55
school year. In July, 1952, there were $275,000 in outstanding school
bonds; $325,000 more were added in 1952–53 and another $118,000
in 1953–54. By mid-year in 1955 the school district had a bonded indebtedness of $687,000 due to its construction and improvements
program. (SEE TABLE XX)
TABLE XX
WILLISTON SCHOOL DISTRICT ENROLLMENTS AND TAX
RATES, FISCAL YEARS 1950–1951 TO 1954–1955
Year
1950–51
1951–52
1952–53
1953–54
1954–55

Number of Students
.....................................................
1,664 + 76 parochial students
1,972 + 93 parochial students
2,239 + 100 parochial students
2,315 + 194 parochial students

General Fund Mill Levy
21.57
23.54
25.04
25.7
25.99
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From the year 1952–53 school year to the 1954–55 school year, the
school system in Williston—public and private—experienced a little
over a 44% increase. This was a serious enough problem in itself but the
migratory nature of oil-drilling meant that the students were coming
and going at a rate which made student integration and administrative
efficiency even more complicated.
By the summer of 1955 the population cycle was at a sort of plateau
stage but there seemed to be what might be termed a careful optimism
among the public leaders in Williston about the financial condition of
the city and the schools. The indebtedness was substantial and the oil
boom was definitely tapering off but they looked for a period of stability
which would enable them to meet their financial responsibilities, and
continue to move forward, but at a slower pace.
(2) Internal Political Controversies and City Elections
As far as the author could ascertain, there was little evidence of oil
politics, of a direct type, in the organization or operation of city government in Williston. But there were two rather bitterly fought municipal
elections in 1954—one special, the other regular—which were precipitated by the sudden and rapid growth of the city due to the oil boom.
So, indirectly oil was certainly involved in local politics but it seems
doubtful if the officers and employees of the different types of oil companies played a very significant role.
The expansion of municipal services and the concomitant increase in taxes and assessments were the seeds of some discontent.53 A
number of the persons in the outlying areas of the city were dissatisfied
with the services and the cost of those services. The charge was also
made that organized labor had no representation on the Commission.
Others claimed the Police Department was operated in an inefficient,
even crude, fashion; and one interviewee stated that the rate of arrest
had been five times that of any other city in North Dakota.54 All five of
the Commissioners were, inadvertently it seems, living on the east side
Since April, 1913, Williston has had a Commission form of government. Four
Commissioners and president of the Commission are elected at large for five
years, overlapping terms. The president has no veto power. The salary for each
of the five officers is $780 per year.
53

One of the leaders for retaining the Commission form contended, in
an interview, that the police chief was a “news-hound” and thus created an
over-emphasis on the activities of the Police Department. Also, he believed that
some of the new personnel lacked judgment and maturity.
54
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of the city and this created charges of favoritism.55 One of the former
members of the City Commission had been, while a commissioner, an
employee of the engineering firm which was consulted about a new
sewer project. But he did not vote when the contract was decided on
by the City Commission. Nevertheless, some claimed this was a serious
“conflict of interest.” The City Attorney—Mr. Everett Palmer—contended that the Commission had discussed the ethics and legality of
his action and was advised by the Attorney-General of North Dakota
that his (Mr. Webster’s) actions were legal. Also, an opposition leader
stated, in a personal interview, that the former Commissioner’s participation in the sewer contract matter was not made an election issue as
there were no indications at all of illegal actions.
In any respect, 1801 citizens of Williston signed petitions favoring
the aldermanic form of government and on February 23, 1954 the citizens voted on the issue—“Shall the city of Williston change from its
organization under the Commission system of government and become a city under the Council form of government?” The leaders of
the opposition apparently desired to have a Council-Manager form but
disagreement within their own ranks dictated the expedient strategy of
making a Mayor-Council form the first objective.
Pressure groups were formed on both sides. There were the
“Women’s Vote for the Commission Form of Government,” and the
“Committee for Progress”—all favoring the existing form. The opposition formed an organization called the “Civic Improvement League.”
Mr. Palmer, the City Attorney, came to be the “…principal spokesman
for the Commission Form of Government.”56 Mr. Walter Burk switched
sides, at least the reformers declared so, and delivered a radio address
just prior to the election in favor of the Commission form. The League
of Women Voters worked diligently, seemingly in an impartial manner,
gathering and publishing facts about the issues. A prominent doctor
was, according to a leader for the aldermanic form, to provide the campaign eve “punch blow” through a radio address favoring the change,
but almost an hour before the broadcast he withdrew due to pressure
from his associates and the bank he was connected with. Apparently
the American State Bank “rode the fence” by contributing $50.00 to
each side.
It should be pointed out that, at the time of their election, two of the Commissioners lived on the west side of the city and the third Commissioner lived
on the far north side, north of Harmon Park. Afterward, however, the three of
them bought or built new homes on the east side of the city.
55

Williston Herald, February 22, 1954. One of the city officials doubted if Mr.
Palmer had taken a leading role in this particular issue at all.
56
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The reform group seemed to have a scarcity of funds for campaigning
while the status quo group had considerable financial resources. By
studying the advertising of the Williston Herald for five days (excluding Sunday as there is no edition that day) it was determined that
the “for Commission” forces spent $1,031.40 on political advertising as
compared to $28.80 for the “aldermanic” forces.57 After the ballots were
counted on February 23, 1954, it was announced that the vote was 1041
“yes” (in favor of aldermanic form) to 1195 “no” votes.
However, the conflict was not yet resolved as the regular election
was now due on the 13th of April. A group of interested and prominent citizens caucussed regarding a slate and decided not to support
the existing President of the City Commission and two other Commissioners whose terms were to expire. As its slate, this group selected Dr.
L.M. Carlson, a Williston dentist, to run for the office of president, and
Mr. A.J. Thomas and Mr. T.S. Bosh for the other two openings on the
Commission. “Tony” Bosh was considered to be a representative of the
organized labor. A few days before the election, Mr. W.N. Dittsworth,
then president of the Commission, withdrew from the race; Mr. Oscar
N. Lee, a Commissioner, declared himself not to be a candidate; and
Mr. Harris Anderson, the other Commissioner and who was then in
charge of the police and fire departments, did run but was defeated.
Table XXI shows the results of the election.
TABLE XXI
WILLISTON COMMISSION ELECTION RETURNS, BY
CANDIDATES AND BY WARDS,
FOR THE ELECTION OF APRIL 13, 1955
Pres. of B/C
G.M. Carlson*
Harry England
W.N. Dittsworth

1st
137
86
......

2nd
154
62
1

3rd
272
146
2

4th
291
202
......

5th
282
165
......

6th
196
155
......

7th
238
189
......

Totals
1570
1005
3

Comm. 								
A.J. Thomas*
145 154
257 326 274 210
270 1636
Gust Stokke
64
59
103 170 108 105
105 714
Harris Anderson 48
50
144 96
179 91
139 747
C.A. Scott
46
38
49
91
93
70
108 495
T.S. Bosh*
124 126
230 294 206 198
189 1367
* Elected								
57

Ibid., February 17-18-19-20-22, 1954.
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Doctor Carlson died unexpectedly on June 27, 1955 so the Commission had to call a special election. The “interested and prominent”
leaders again caucussed and the contest was between Mr. Burk, Mr.
H.M. Zahl—a former newspaper publisher—and Mr. Russ Nelson. The
election was held on September 19, 1955 and Burk received 1393 votes
to 455 for Zahl and 399 for Nelson.
Tioga
(1) Municipal Services and Finances
Tioga calls itself the “Oil Capital of North Dakota.” The oil boom began
practically in the city’s front yard. This study has already noted what
this discovery meant to Tioga in demographic, economic, and social
terms. From a population in 1950 of 456 the city has leaped forward
in a somewhat convulsive fashion to a point, by the summer of 1955,
where a city official estimated the population to be 1200.58
There seems to have been, among the Tioga residents, a rather severe ambivalence about this oil boom. Some were ardently attracted
to the powerful dynamism of an oil economy while others were much
more concerned about the destruction of a way of life which they had
found quite satisfactory. This conflict will be elaborated on to a greater
degree in the next section but this situation delayed the construction
and operation of new municipal facilities.59
But the rate of progress had still been considerable. Special improvement bonds of $743,000 value have been issued from 1951 to about
mid-1955 for water, sewers, curbs and gutters, sidewalks, etc. Paving
projects were not carried forth in a particularly speedy fashion but the
change was persistent. A sizeable program was carried out in 1954 and
in the late summer of 1955 bids were opened on paving, gutter, and
storm sewer projects with the apparent low bids being $120,626 for 34
blocks of paving curb and gutter and $13,505 for storm sewers.60 A new
city hall, including a new jail, was constructed and, for the most part,
in operation by January, 1954.
Our own research indicated that the population of Tioga in the summer of
1954 was 1,608.
58

North Dakota League of Municipalities, Bulletin Vol. XXI, No. 11, November,
1953, pp. 25–26. This article is a report of an earlier editorial from the Bismarck Tribune.
59

60

Ibid., September 1955, p. 41
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The general budget of the city went from $9,149.58 in 1952–53
to $39,946.61 in 1954–55. There was no park district in 1952–53 but
by 1954–55 one had been organized and its budget for that year was
$1,976.
Construction and extension of school buildings advanced at a comparable pace. School bonds for the amount of $158,000 were issued in
1954 and in May, 1955, the voters approved a $70,000 bond issue for
new school buildings by a vote of 119-24. An election was to be held in
the fall of 1955 as to whether or not the community desired a $400,000
bond issue for a new high school.
All this building meant, almost surely, more taxes. But the mill levy,
although high, was on the decline after 1953 as Table XXII indicates.
Assessed valuations for the city increased from about $405,000 in 1951
to $740,548 for 1955. The increase in valuation was even more substantial for the Tioga School District, which includes farming areas outside
Tioga, but the, perhaps, more realistic valuations have permitted a
decrease in mill levies. Table XXIII also indicates that the pupil population has increased over 300% since the discovery of oil.
TABLE XXII
TIOGA PROPERTY VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES, 1950–1955
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955

Property Valuations		
Mill Levies
$153,430.00		112.44
155,551.00		109.21
196,095.00		124.11
614,864.00		113.79
740,548.00		110.75
......		
100.00 (Est.)

TABLE XXIII
TIOGA SCHOOL DISTRICT ENROLLMENTS, PROPERTY
VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES, 1950–1954
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

School
Property Valuation		
General Fund
Population			
Mill Levy
......
$412,466.00		 54
187
475,631.00		
51
350
1,102,418.00		
51
515
2,625,221.00		
32
601
......		30.47
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(2) Internal Controversies and Elections
The conflicts have probably been more considerable in Tioga than in
Ray but of a somewhat different variety. Tioga had been a village until
1953 but, by an almost unanimous popular referendum held that year,
it incorporated and became a municipality with a commission form
of government. The city limits have not been extended to include the
Signal gas plant because the property that is used by that plant belongs to the Great Northern Railroad Company and the strategy seems
to be to build city improvements first and, perhaps later, annex more
property.
An early, and apparently rather bitter, conflict concerned what
was called the “wets and drys” issue. The “wets” wanted city water and
sewage and the “drys” favored the status quo. Even after referenda were
conducted and bond issues thereby authorized, a series of lawsuits
were begun which sought writs of injunctions against these new improvements. There was a substantial amount of community animosity
and neighbors were, even in the summer of 1954, sometimes quite irate
toward each other over this issue, although the water system was installed in 1952.
Newcomers to the community were gradually being elected to
the Tioga City Commission and the school board. In the summer of
1955 there were two on each of the five-member boards. The elections
have been relatively peaceful although a Catholic-Protestant conflict
did arise in the 1955 election to the school board. Thirteen teachers
voluntarily resigned from the school system and, because a Catholic
was chairman of the school board, there were charges made that the
vacancies would be filled from teachers of that faith. In the election,
two Protestant candidates entered the race, one later withdrew, and
the Protestant candidate received 25 more votes than the incumbent
chairman. However, both were elected as there were two vacancies.
Apparently many of the citizens of Tioga, including the editor of the
Tioga Tribune who did some editorializing on the matter, looked upon
this ruckus as sort of an unfortunate affair and it now seems to have
substantially subsided.
The time of troubles is certainly not over for the governmental organizations in Tioga but the peak period seems to have passed.61 There
has been a water shortage but the city installed a new pump in the
south well to alleviate that problem. An influx of trailers had created
Grand Forks Herald, February 17, 1953. The financial plight of the schools
was apparently so serious in the winter of 1952–53 that some of the Tioga
teachers received lOU’s rather than paychecks.
61

134
a difficult sort of problem for the City Commission but an ordinance
regulating trailer parking has mitigated that situation. There was a noticeable reluctance to provide the city with natural gas after the Signal
plant was in operation so in July, 1954, the City Commission let it be
known that it was considering the construction of a municipal gas
plant. During the following month the Montana-Dakota Utilities Company announced that natural gas service would be available in Tioga by
October 15, 1954. This statement became a reality and, by the summer
of 1955, 239 permits had been issued for the use of natural gas.
Ray
(1) Municipal Services and Finances
The city of Ray is several miles west of the original oil discovery areas
but the boom soon pervaded the life of the whole community. The natural topography of the city favored additional development and there
was available already a municipal water and sewage system to attract
the oilmen and their families.
Accurate statistical information was more difficult to secure in Ray
but the general impressions were that the financial situation was less
satisfactory than in Tioga. Leaders in the community stated, in personal interviews, that the bonded indebtedness for schools in Ray
was up to the legal limit; that the mill levy was up to 141 (71–72 mills
for school district,62 26 for City, and the rest State/County and minor
levies); and that the City budget for 1954–55 was $22,000–$23,000.
But the city of Ray had no bonded indebtedness in 1954, although it did
incur one in 1955 of $13,800 in order to install new storm sewers. One
of the residents provided the author with a statement of the property
taxes for his own home and these figures indicated a gradual increase
in property taxes from $82.09 in 1951 to $102.24 in 1955.
The activities of the Farmers Union Credit Union in Ray indicated
the economic trend to some extent. In 1955, it had assets of $488,950
and 771 members while in 1952 the assets were $390,000 and the
membership was 625. However, if these statistics indicate pessimism
as to the future it should be quickly stated that such did not seem to
be the prevalent attitude in the summer of 1955, although there was
a much more cautious optimism than a year previously. Table XXIV
points out the increases in property valuations and mill levies.
62

He was including the mill levies for sinking, reserve, and building funds.
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TABLE XXIV
RAY PROPERTY VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES, 1950–1954
Year		
Property Valuation
Total Mill Levy
1950		$221,374.00		113.76
1951		234,786.00		130.45
1952		246,336.00		140.83
1953		333,693.00		140.69
1954		381,134.00		141.69

The schools had to meet a new and pressing situation. Three bond
issues totalling about $225,000 had to be floated. One school burned;
another started but could not be completed until another bond issue
had been sold. However, again, the community leaders believed that
the burden could be handled. The following table (TABLE XXV)
outlines the general picture of school population increases and the financial situation.
TABLE XXV
RAY SCHOOL DISTRICT ENROLLMENTS, PROPERTY
VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES, 1950–1954
Year

School
Property Valuation		
Population			

General Fund
Mill Levy

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

......
246
393
413
413

45.00 mills
42.50 mills
40.65 mills
40.00 mills
40.00 mills

$505,673.00		
528,920.00		
620,274.00		
679,808.00		
......		

There was, in 1955, criticism of high taxes. One community leader
estimated that taxes had been doubled since the coming of oil; another
thought the increase was 65–70%. This writer, at least, gained the general impression that more skepticism toward the future was prevalent
in Ray than in either Williston or Tioga.
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(2) Internal Controversies and Elections
The political schisms in Ray rather compared with those already
noted in Tioga. The issue was largely between the “Old Guard” and
the “Progressives,” or in other words, the “status quo” group versus the
“reformers.” Prior to the April, 1954, election there was considerable
criticism of the existing city commission. The then President of the
Commission had occupied that position for 12 years but decided not
to run for reelection, perhaps because of considerable criticism of his
actions by some of the residents. A slate of “Progressives,” including a
member of the Commission to run for the office of President, was put
forward in the April election and all were voted into office. It seemed
to be a rather prevalent opinion that the new Commission came about
primarily because a majority of the citizens thought that community
development was preceding too slowly. But in the referenda on community projects the storm sewer proposal was defeated 56-165 while
the curbs and gutters proposal was approved by 142-81. The new President of the City Commission, Mr. Arnold Anderson, seemed confident
that the schisms were not overly serious; rather they were largely those,
he believed, of a small town nature in which everyone knows everyone
else’s business and resulting frictions are the consequence.
Public Attitudes on Local Government Services and
Educational Facilities
The Questionnaire Survey team spent most of the summer of 1954 in
the Williston area. The different methodological aspects of this survey
have been discussed in Appendix A. Two of the questions that were
directed to the respondents provided some worthwhile data as to
the opinions of the citizenry of Williston, Tioga, Ray, and the Impact
Area relative to the condition of local government services, including
education.
In regards to local governmental services, the question was—“Since
the beginning of the oil boom have local government services improved?” This question was varied slightly in Tioga and Ray in order
to interject the possibility of a decline in the quality of the services but
the changing of the question resulted in approximately the same type of
answers so no distinction is included in Table XXVI following.

137
TABLE XXVI
TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON BASIN LOCALITY RESIDENCE, TO THE QUESTION: “SINCE THE BEGINNING OF
THE OIL BOOM HAVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES
IMPROVED?”1
Types of
Answers

Williston
Old2
209

New
45

Either Total
4
258

Tioga Ray
27
36

Impact
Areas Totals
13
334

Improved
No Change
or Declined 84
26
156
266
9
36
81
392
Both
4
1
......
5
1
...... ...... 6
Don’t Know 53
49
2
104
10
27
4
145
TOTALS
350 121
162
633
47
99
98
877
1. This question was re-worded in Tioga and Ray but obtained the same kinds of
answers.
2. The word “old” means that the interviewees lived in that particular city, or
area, prior to 1951.

The results of the survey seemed to point to no particular change
in attitudes about local governmental services because of the oil boom.
But a substantial number—334 out of 877—believed that the services
had improved and that was rather remarkable in itself considering the
large expansion in population over a brief period of time. The status
quo category (a minority indicated a decline in the quality of services)
was preponderant but such an attitude might well be considered a
commendation during such a period of development.
The question concerning educational institutions was phrased as
follows—“Has the rapid increase in population affected educational
facilities in your area? If ‘yes’—How?” For Tioga, the question was
re-stated—“How have educational facilities been affected?” The alteration, in the case of Tioga, was made because the wording of the
original question was somewhat leading. That is, stressing the fact that
there had been rapid increase in population rather led the respondent
to believe that the educational institutions might have been drastically
affected. Table XXVII outlines the results on these particular questions.
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TABLE XXVII
TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON BASIN LOCALITY RESIDENCE, TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE PRESENCE AND
NATURE OF CHANGES IN EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES
Types of answers		
Old
No—no data
......
No—data not
available
7

Williston			
New Either Total Ray
1
......
1
3

Impact
Areas
39

Total
43

8

......

15

......

......

15

1

1

......

2

3

1

6

59

20

......

79

......

12

91

......

......

......

......

23

......

23

2

......

......

2

2

......

4

3

3

......

6

2

2

10

146

38

4

188

50

32

270

1

1

......

2

......

2

4

9

......

52

2

......

54

2
......

......
......

2
1

......
......

......
......

2
2

1

......

......

1

......

......

1

13

5

......

18

......

3

21

27
4

16
1

......
......

43
5

......
18

......
6

43
29

No opinion—
data not available

17

30

......

47

......

......

47

TOTALS

325

135

4

464

103

98

665

Yes, better—
improved teaching
Yes, better—
improved facilities
Yes, better—
improved
administration
Yes, better—
data not available
Yes, worse—
poorer teaching
Yes, worse—
poorer facilities
Yes, worse—
data not available

Both—some facilities
better, others worse
43
Both—
some teaching is better—
others worse
......
Both—no data
1
Indefinite—
teaching may be worse
Indefinite—
facilities may be worse
Indefinite—
data not available
Indefinite—no data
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It points to a dislike of the way that educational facilities have
fared since oil discovery. Almost 43% believed that the schools were
in worse condition and nearly all of the criticism was directed at what
the respondents considered to be poorer facilities. But a rather sizeable
proportion—nearly 18%—were of the opinion that education institutions had improved in various ways. It would seem that, in the long
run, oil discovery would improve the quality of educational institutions, at least in terms of plant and equipment, due to the extensive
building programs that have occurred. The key issue will probably be
one of finances. That is, can the payments on the bond issues be met
without lowering the quality of educational services?
VI. The Impact of Oil Upon the Government of Williams County
A new courthouse building was slowly coming to be an absolute necessity in Williams county but the discovery of oil and the aura of wealth
and power that followed hurried along its construction. Somehow this
courthouse seems to symbolize the coming of a different era for this
county. Probably the economic revolution will not be as rapid or thorough as was originally contemplated, at least by a few, but it has been
substantial.
A. Increased Governmental Activities
One needs to do very little research in order to arrive at an accurate
generalization about Williams County government—oil discovery
meant that all county governmental offices had more work to do and
needed a larger budget. Presumably even the coroner was more active
than before but this section will only deal with those offices which felt
the impact quite severely.
The administrative personnel of the County Public Welfare Board
seemed convinced that “oil” added greatly to their problems. It was one
interviewee’s opinion that, in terms of public welfare costs, oil had been
harmful. But the situation was apparently about what they had expected.
The influx of oil workers, particularly from 1951 to 1954, meant more
transients, more marital desertions, more stranded persons, and the
like. However, it does not appear from statistics that the burden was as
much as one might conjecture. For example, the “General Assistance”63
Part of the Federal grant-in-aid program initiated by the Social Security Act
of 1937.
63
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load was 40 families in 1953–54 as compared to 80 families in 1954–55.
But the increase was probably due to lower farm income that year as
much as a decline in oil development in the area. The oil workers were
mostly from warmer climates and had lived in a somewhat different
culture. Child welfare work became more of a problem due to a considerable increase in child neglect, etc. Also, the “white collar” oilmen
and their families were “accepted” but the laborers were much more
isolated. Perhaps it was just a misleading stereotype but several of the
interviewees made a definite distinction between the oil executives,
etc., who were “educated and cultured,” and the oil workers, who were
often characterized as “bums,” “drunks,” etc.64 This “black and white”
distinction appears to be vastly overdrawn; in fact, there were a few
interviewees who believed that the moral standards of the oil workers
were superior to those of the “native” population, and these persons
were not “outsiders.” But this aforementioned dichotomy was rather
a commonplace finding. Where increased public welfare needs did
arise—and that occurred primarily in Williston, Tioga, and Ray—many
voluntary non-governmental associations were very helpful in assisting
the needy and, thereby, in aiding the public welfare officials. Church
organizations were, in some instances, quite effective in helping the oil
workers; business organizations also contributed to the mitigation of
their problems. The Public Welfare office constantly needed more staff
personnel but it was most difficult to secure them, and that situation
still existed in the summer of 1955.
Since 1947, Williams County has been a part of the Upper Missouri
District Health Unit, as have the counties of Divide, McKenzie, and
Mountrail. The headquarters for the District are in Williston. Oil has
meant a noticeable increase in the activities of this public health organization but by the summer of 1955 the peak period seemed to have
passed. Along with a District health officer, the authorized staff consists of a sanitary engineer, two sanitarians, five public health nurses,
and a clerk, but it has been difficult to recruit a full staff, particularly
so in regards to the public health nurses. The District is financed by
a ¾ mill levy and the income from the mill levy has increased due to
the rise in property valuations. There was a considerable amount of
work to be done in Tioga and Ray as the District had to approve plans
for water and sewer systems, inspect plumbing, approve semi-private
water supplies and sewage disposal systems for trailer camps, and
certify restaurants and taverns as to health standards. Also, there was
a substantial increase in the medical examinations (vision, hearing,
This is a general statement and does not necessarily reflect the attitudes of
the public welfare staff.
64
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general physical condition and immunizations) that had to be given in
the rural and city schools. All of these functions would, of course, have
been carried out even without the discovery of oil and the rapid influx
of new workers, facilities, etc., but the burden and responsibilities were
much greater because of this expansion.
Oil created a new type of responsibility for the County Agent. He advises, rather than dictates to, the farmer, but now his advice concerned
such matters as mineral rights, royalty rights, compensation claims for
damage to land and crops, and other such situations that arise between
lessor and lessee in an oil development area.65 Oil was a unique and
often exciting experience for the farmer. On occasion, his enthusiasm,
coupled with a lack of legal knowledge, led to consequences that were
not in his best interests. In order to assist the farmer to arrive at a more
judicious decision the County Agent decided to provide him with some
general but accurate instruction in the science and economics of oil
development. To meet this situation, Mr. Don Hotchkiss, the County
Agent, conducted 14–15 meetings throughout Williams County to familiarize farmers with mineral rights. The meetings were well-received
and well-attended. Apparently the County Agent was so successful in
this educational venture that a group of oilmen offered him a lucrative job—contacting farmers about selling, leasing, etc., their mineral
rights. He declined. According to the County Agent, the farmer in the
oil area has, in general, not altered his attitudes or his techniques to any
appreciable degree because of oil. There was an original burst of enthusiasm and a period of great expectations but as drillings slowed down
and the oil fields proved to be restricted to rather limited areas the
farmer began to develop a considerably more cautious “wait-and-see”
attitude.
The County Superintendent of Schools has been an important
participant in a rapidly moving educational system. Her responsibilities have not increased proportionately due to the fact that the main
changes occurred in city schools—Williston, Tioga, and Ray—which
are largely beyond her jurisdiction, but the ministerial duties of her
office have increased. There was a rapid upsurge in school population
in the Pleasant Valley School District near Tioga, as indicated by Table
XXVIII, but this situation was apparently well under control by 1955.
See S.N. Voelker and L.A. Parcher, Land Ownership Problems and Oil
Development, North Dakota Agricultural College and U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Agriculture Economics Report No. 6 (Fargo: N.D. Agricultural
College, December 1952) and Stanley Voelker, Mineral Rights and Oil Development in Williams County, North Dakota, North Dakota Agricultural College
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bulletin 395 (Fargo: North Dakota
Agricultural College, September, 1954.)
65

142
TABLE XXVIII
PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT (RURAL TIOGA)
ENROLLMENTS, PROPERTY VALUATIONS AND TAX RATES,
FISCAL YEARS 1950–1951 TO 1954–1955
Year
Students
Property
		Valuation
1950–51
......
$138,804.00
1951–52
13
160,200.00
1952–53
75
453,902.00
1953–54
44
561,048.00
1954–55
47
......

General Fund
Mill Levy
33
33
22
20.03
......

In general, the Superintendent of Schools considered the children
of the oil workers to be reasonably well-behaved and usually rather
apt pupils but the migratory sort of life that many of them had to lead
meant some retardation. These pupils usually assimilated well and
the “ins-outs” relationships were not considered to be at all a serious
problem.
Oil has not caused any vast changes in School District No. 8 which
is, in itself, larger than the State of Rhode Island.66 For the year 1954–55
the gross oil production tax had brought in over $6,000 in revenue for
the school district but increased tuition costs in the Williston school—
where some children outside of the Williston area must attend, and
that includes a trailer camp west of Williston which is in the District
No. 8 area—have been an additional burden on the District’s budget.
The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District in North Dakota,
which has original jurisdiction over nearly all important civil and criminal cases, had a somewhat busier calendar due to the discovery of oil,
but, as Table XXIX indicates, perhaps not as much so as one might
conjecture.
Lastly, the County Highway Department was faced with constructing and reconstructing many county roads, or at least assisting
in the process. This interviewer heard quite variegated opinions about
the conditions of secondary roads before and after the discovery
of oil. Comments such as “we never had any roads to begin with,” to
denunciations of the destruction of these roads by heavy oil drilling
equipment, to opinions that the roads were much better in 1955 than in
1950, were all garnered. Just in terms of finances it would seem that the
There is an article on School District No. 8 in the Farm Journal, October
1953, pp. 50–51, 183–85.
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oil production tax was not sufficient to meet the additional expenses
incurred although there are many factors to be considered. However,
in about a two year period (July 1, 1953–June 2, 1955), the amount of
the fund allocated to counties which had been directed to roads totalled $179,860.40 while the highway appropriations increased from
$307,610 in fiscal year 1952 to $490,860 in fiscal 1953. Still, this increase might have been primarily due to an improved revenue situation.
TABLE XXIX
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
CASES, 1951–1955

Time Period

Jan.–Dec., 1951
Jan.–Dec., 1952
Jan.–Dec., 1953
Jan.–Dec., 1954
Jan.–June, 1955

Number of
Time Period
Number of
Criminal Cases1 		
Civil Cases2
46
Aug. 19–Dec. 31, 1952
122
50
Jan. 9–Dec. 31, 1953
236
66
Jan. 4–Dec. 31, 1954
204
54
Jan. 5–June 15, 1955
115
29			

1. Most of these persons were charged with “driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.”
2. Most of the civil cases were “actions to quiet title” although this type of case is
becoming less frequent, for example:					
Month
Total Cases
Actions to Quiet Title
October, 1952
34			17
October, 1953
23			6
October 1954
27			5

B. Financing Government
From what has been discussed thus far it becomes obvious that Williams County had to have more income in order to meet the increased
governmental costs (SEE TABLE XXX). The tables are so self-explanatory that few comments need be made in the way of description or
analysis.
Tax collections stayed remarkably high—100% in some areas—although the percentage seemed to decrease as the anticipation of oil
discovery lessened. For example, in the city of Tioga the collections
were 99.84% in 1951, 98.09% in 1952, and 87.14% in 1953.
Table XXXI shows the funds that were actually appropriated for
administering the various activities of government in Williams County.
When one considers that in a four year period appropriations had increased somewhat over 45% the impact of oil discovery becomes more
apparent.
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TABLE XXX
WILLIAMS COUNTY PROPERTY VALUATIONS, BY TYPE, AND
TAX RATES, 1950–1954
Year

Real Estate
Valuations
		

Personal
Public Utility Total
Property
Valuations
Property
Valuations		
Valuations

County
Mill Levy

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

$2,781,318
3,168,281
3,974,908
4,972,631
5,301,063

31.75
34.16
35.84
36.33
31.63

$9,406,404
9,709,184
10,005,710
11,249,553
13,040,654

$3,365,187
3,448,721
3,485,301
3,718,131
4,151,832

$15,552,909
16,336,186
17,465,919
19,940,315
22,572,583

This study has practically excluded the impact of oil in other counties in the Williston Basin area, notably Mountrail and McKenzie
counties, but a cursory investigation indicated that the effects were less
in those counties than in Williams. It is impossible to predict at present
whether this will continue to be true but the recent discoveries of oil in
Bottineau, Burke, and Renville counties strongly indicate that oil development in North Dakota is still in a period of flux.
TABLE XXXI
WILLIAMS COUNTY APPROPRIATIONS, BY TYPE OF PURPOSE,
FISCAL YEARS 1951–1952 TO 1954–1955
General
Gov’t
51-52
$116,700
52–53
121,780
53–54
134,186
54–55
161,728

Protection Health
Ag. and
to persons and
Econ.
& propt. Sanitation Develop.

Relief
Education Recreation Highway
Charities

TOTAL

$38,140

$7,778

$6,408

$97,890

$9,596

$......

$307,610

$584,122

56,485

8,139

6,408

94,323

9,770

400

448,400

745,705

57,473

13,049

6,702

93,839

10,414

......

485,075

800,038

61,353

14,979

10,324

101,245

11,134

......

490,960

851,722

$43,944

$29,842

$387,297 $40,914

$400

$1,732,045 $2,981,587

Totals by Purpose
$534,394 $213,451
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C. Federal Agencies and Oil Development
It was deemed to be somewhat outside the scope of, or at best peripheral to, this study to relate the changes made by oil discovery to the
operation of Federal agencies. However, a general inquiry brought to
the surface enough facts to state that the functioning of the Farmers
Home Administration, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Committee (formerly the PMA), and the Soil Conservation Service was
influenced by the discovery of oil. For example, the Williams County
official for the Farmers Home Administration—Mr. John Freeman—
estimated that at least four farmers received sufficient income from
the sale of mineral rights to pay off all their FHA loans; another ten
farmers had made, and were making, enough from their oil leases to
pay off their farm ownership loans. It is true that the emergency, subsistence, and production loans increased from approximately $150,000
in 1953–54 to $163,508 in 1954–55, but this was due primarily to the
hail and drought that had struck in the northern and southwestern
parts of Williams County. How much, if any, oil had changed the attitudes of farmers toward soil conservation who are in the Little Muddy
Soil Conservation District and the Eastern Williams Soil Conservation
District, a soil scientist assigned to the Soil Conservation Service office would not, when interviewed, predict, but the logic of the situation
was that more income would mean more conservation. An indication
that farmers in the oil county had not radically revised their attitudes
toward national farm policy was discovered in a perusal of the wheat
referendum that was held on June 24, 1955, in the Tioga area. Those
in favor of marketing quotas and acreage allotments totalled 153; only
two farmers were opposed. The total vote for Williams County was
2,150 for and 62 against.67
VII. Oil and the Political Power Structure in the Williston Basin Area
A. The Locus of Political Power and the Decision-Making Process
The general hypothesis of this section is that the political power structure in the Williston Basin area remains essentially the same today
as it was prior to the discovery of oil.68 The one exception pertains to
67

Tioga Tribune, June 30, 1955.

Power, herein, is defined as the ability of certain men to control and/or influence the actions of other men in obtaining the deference, goods, and services
which the former desires. There are many definitions of power. See Floyd
68
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oil policy where the interests of the oilmen have added what might be
termed a new dimension to the power structure.
The specific hypothesis of this section is—businessmen69 and some
professional men, primarily lawyers, are the community leaders and
largely determine oil policy, and attitudes toward oil policy, in the communities of Williston, Tioga, and Ray.70 Such a supposition does not
mean that these individuals and their associations are always in agreement—there are conflicts—but the ideas that become formalized in
laws and administrative decisions are mainly formulated and espoused
by these individuals and groups.71 This hypothesis does not adequately
account for the power of the Farmers Union in rural areas but, as has
already been noted, the deviation here in terms of oil policy is not as
drastic as one might expect.
In order to test this tentative theory regarding the locus of power
and to determine those who are the decision-makers, the researcher
must offer adequate and effective empirical data. The sources of that
type of factual information, in this instance, are primarily two—the
questionnaire type of survey which has already been referred to many
times in this chapter, and personal interviews with those who were considered, by others as well as the writer, to be leaders in various phases of
community political activities. The following brief analyses of certain
power situations are presented as a substantiation of the above-stated
hypotheses.

Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), pp. 2-3-4-139; John Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern
Political Thought (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1950), Chapter I; V.O. Key,
Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1952), Chapter I.
The term “businessmen” includes the top officials of the different types of oil
concerns.
69

70

See Hunter’s observations relative to “Regional City,” Ibid., pp. 81 and 102.

A prominent state official questioned seriously the validity of this hypothesis.
He believes the evidence reveals that the Legislative Research Committee was
“the” prime formulator of oil policy in North Dakota, notably the Committee’s
role in the 1953 legislative session. But it is interesting to speculate as to what
might have occurred if the proposals of the Legislative Research Committee
and those of the business interests in the Williston area had been in substantial
opposition.
71
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(1) Oil and Gas Legislation
The principal oil and gas legislation for North Dakota has already been
discussed earlier in this chapter. What is to be considered at this juncture is policy formation and public attitudes concerning the gross oil
production tax. When one considers the pressures that were exerted
upon the 1953 legislature, and especially upon Senator Solberg, the
logical assumption would be that a low tax had the support of the constituents, in the Williston Basin area. But, as Mr. Justice Holmes once
wrote: “Logic is not the life of the law, but experience,” and such seems
to be the situation in this instance. Parenthetically, it is not contended
here that the results of the survey are by any means infallible, rather
the contention is that the data is generally indicative as to whether or
not the interviewee understands the issue. The following question was
asked those who were interviewed in Williston, Ray, and the rural impact areas: Question 10: Do you know what the main features of the
state oil tax are? If “YES”—a. Do you believe that the gross production
tax is too high or too low? Why? b. Are you in favor of the 27½% depletion allowance? If “YES” or “NO”—why?
The results of the survey are disclosed by Table XXXII and it should
be noted that those questionnaires on which no data on this question
was contained have been excluded from the tabulation.
In analyzing these results one has to exclude the results received
in Ray as the great preponderance of interviewees did not participate
in answering this question, but for Williston, in particular, the results
are noteworthy. Out of a grand total of 475 (143+332) respondents to
this question 431 did not have any factual understanding of the issue.
In other words, only slightly over 10% had any comprehension of the
oil production tax at all and even they were undecided or showed no
particular grasp of the issue. Perhaps a closer questioning of the interviewees might have produced more enlightened answers but there is
little reason to believe so. However, of those community political leaders
who were interviewed, all could discuss this oil tax issue although there
were a few instances where they were not certain as to how the refunds
to the county were allocated. A rather certain conclusion seems to be
that oil policy is understood by a very few, that is, those who—to use a
phrase of John Dewey’s—have a “perception of the consequences.”72 In
fact, it seems to be confined to the community leaders—businessmen,
lawyers, politicians, newspapermen, officials of oil concerns, and the
like. With them, the issue was created, articulated, and meaningful.
John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: Gateway Books, 1956),
p. 59.
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TABLE XXXII
TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON BASIN LOCALITY RESIDENCE (AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN WILLISTON),
TO THE QUESTIONS: “DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE MAIN
FEATURES OF THE STATE OIL TAX ARE? IF ‘YES’: A. DO YOU
BELIEVE THAT THE GROSS PRODUCTION TAX IS TOO HIGH
OR TOO LOW? WHY? B. ARE YOU IN FAVOR OF THE 27½% DEPLETION ALLOWANCE? IF ‘YES’ OR ‘NO’: WHY?
				Williston			
New
Old
Ray Impact Areas
Answers to the Question
Residents Residents1		
(Old)
No—
Did not understand the issue
130
301
7
16
Yes, O.K.—no reason
4
10		
2
No—not necessary				
Undecided—no reason		
3		
1
Others
9
18
6
10
Totals
143
332
13
29
1. Where the respondent did not signify whether he was “new” or “old” he has
been included as “old.” There were few such instances.			

The future of this oil tax issue will be interesting to observe. In the
summer of 1955, opinion on this matter among the leaders was in a
process of re-thinking. Roughly half of those interviewed still believed
that the present tax was proper; none desired a lower tax—or at least
would not openly advocate such; the other half was moving toward
higher tax but almost invariably no more than “1–2% more.” Whether
this gradually changing opinion will create “higher oil tax atmosphere”
in the 1957 legislative session remained to be seen.
(2) The Question of Factionalism
In The Federalist (No. 10), James Madison stated that “liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires.”
Then he proceeds to explain that although factions do, even must, exist
in a republic it is still mandatory to control their effects.
The results of the survey seem to indicate that factions are actually
considered to be non-existent by a very large majority of the respondents in Williston, although this is much less true in Tioga. Further, the
discussion in the earlier sections of this chapter point to the active and
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effective operations of factions in different phases of policy-making.
Here, again, the evidence points to apathy and indifference to public
affairs on the part of the many. The results of the survey on this particular issue are presented in Table XXXIII.
TABLE XXXIII
TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON AND TIOGA RESIDENCE
AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE TO THE QUESTION AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WERE LOCAL FACTIONS AND
WHO CONSTITUTED THE FACTIONS
Williston
Tioga
Types of Answers			
Old
New
Old
New
No				205
63
27
40
No opinion			108
57
8
10
Labor				1			3
Farm Organizations		1			
Religious Groups			7
1		1
Business Groups			1			3
Banking Groups			 3
4		
Other (including combinations)
15
8
9
12
Total				341
133
44
69
GRAND TOTAL			474		113

Less than 9.5% of those interviewed in Williston stated they believed
there were factions but almost 33% acknowledged their existence in
Tioga. This might indicate a more satisfied and static community atmosphere in Williston but incidents that have already been recounted
in this chapter tend to a contrary opinion. One seems rather directed
to the conclusion that the “interests” Madison refers to are definitely
minorities and that the majority did not realize that the minorities
were organized into factions and that these factions formulate public
policies. His comment that “…measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but
by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority party”
should perhaps be revised by interchanging the words “minor” and
“majority” and then changing “minor” to read “minority.”
The results of this survey are not offered, by any means, as conclusive evidence but are rather just another example of a growing body of
data concerning this political reality.73
Hunter, op. cit. pp. 81, 102, 109, 148. Also David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd
(New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953), particularly Chapter X, contains
73
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(3) The Issue of Leadership
On the issue of oil policy, the leadership has come predominantly from
the business community in the Williston Basin area, primarily bankers,
the Williston Chamber of Commerce, and lawyers.74 Again, the “public”
has been very limited but it is growing and the story of the techniques
used in forming the public into a mold which is favorable to the oil
companies needs to be related.
In 1946, all the oil companies in the United States which were
members of the American Petroleum Institute formed, within the API,
an Oil Industry Information Committee. After considerable research
and assistance from some educators, there was begun a “Petroleum
Industry School Program” that was designed to provide a reciprocal
exchange of information and understanding between the oil industry
and the schools.75 In the words of the OIIC, the objectives of its “school
program” are:76

several useful insights and hypotheses bearing on this matter of political power
in present-day America. But “veto groups” were not at all apparent in oil politics in North Dakota, except in regards to the spacing issue. However, to use
Riesman’s term, the public was the “unorganized.”
At the state government level, a few of the politicians and government officials have provided a moderate amount of leadership.
74

It should be clearly stated here that the author believes there is considerable
merit in the educational program of the American Petroleum Institute. The
knowledge of most laymen will be substantially broadened by studying the material. However, it is questionable if this is education. Are there no alternatives
to the courses of action presently followed by the major oil companies? Have
no controversies arisen over the organization and actions of the oil industry?
What different arguments were advanced by those engaged in the conflict?
The questionable nature of this kind of an educational approach seems to be
indicated by the text that the Committee issued on the economics of petroleum. (American Petroleum Institute, What Makes This Nation Go. New York:
American Petroleum Institute, 1955.) A fine example of Spencerian philosophy
is noted in the statement that “…every month last year, many hundreds of businesses were forced out of the race. Many have failed to offer the right product at
the right price, and have seen their customers drift away…” “In time, the profit
motive weeds out the inefficient and encourages the best.” Ibid., p. 11. This may
be true, or at least partially so, but are there not alternative philosophies as
well as alternative analysis of what has actually occurred, that would need to be
offered in a truly educational process?
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American Petroleum Institute (OIIC), Conducting the Petroleum Industry
School Program (New York: American Petroleum Institute, 1954), pp. 2–3.
76
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1. To provide information about the oil industry to the schools in various acceptable ways, with the expectation that teachers, students
and parents may thereby better understand the industry’s contribution to the well-being, security and improved standards of living
of the American people.
2. To inform oil men about the schools and acquaint them with the
people and problems of education, with the expectation that they
will be stimulated to take greater personal interest in education
and more effectively lend their support and cooperation to the
schools at local, state, and national levels.
The program has three basic and important characteristics:
FIRST: It has been developed from the outset in accordance with
principles recommended by educators as a result of a study
concerning business-sponsored educational materials. It has
been designed to furnish teachers and students with accurate
and objective information about the oil industry. It has been
prepared to fit appropriately into regular courses of study.
SECOND: It is now being conducted on a basis planned to provide
experience and guidance for sound expansion of the program
during succeeding years. The ultimate goal is a nation-wide
school program.
THIRD: Responsibility for contact with the schools, for distribution of the materials, and for providing the program services is
placed with the local oil men.
Apparently the American Petroleum Institute had a survey conducted of public attitudes toward the oil industry and discovered that
many people knew about the Teapot Dome, the exploits of John D.
Rockefeller Sr., and the like, but little about the vast dynamic developments in the oil industry.
Mr. Gregg Kildow, II, a sales officer of the Northern Mud Company
in Williston, spearheaded the activities of the Oil Industry Information Committee in the North Dakota oil areas. The Committee had
(1955), approximately 80 members and each membership was $5.00,
although that appears to be only a minimum charge. Members of this
local OIIC organization have visited many of the high schools in Williams, McKenzie, Mountrail, Divide, Burke, Bottineau, and McHenry
counties, talked to school assemblies, and informed the school superintendents and teachers of the study program which was offered, free of

152
charge, for their use.77 The printed materials have been prepared for junior and senior high school students, are attractively presented, and are
comprehensive in coverage. The many phases of the oil industry from
chemistry to the social sciences are discussed in individual booklets;
film strips are included; movies on the oil industry may be borrowed
at no cost; and teacher’s aids and a handbook are a part of the total
package.
During the 1954–55 school year the Committee became particularly
active. First, a panel of experts on all phases of the oil industry was organized. Then, during the school year, the panel visited high schools—10
in 1954—and at scheduled assemblies they answered any questions
regarding oil production, etc., which the students were interested
in asking.78 Second, an essay contest was held with the theme being,
“What Has Oil Done for Me?” Every school that participated received
a $25 Savings Bond and an engraved plaque for the two winners—one
junior and one senior high school student. Six hundred students participated, and an area prize of a $50 bond for the best essay was awarded.
A banquet was then held in Williston for the winners and their high
school teachers. Third, a radio program—30 minutes every Monday
night—called the “Oil Forum” was initiated. It was a mixed panel composed of oil experts and local citizens. The local citizens would pose
questions concerning the various phases of the oil industry and radio
listeners would call in questions for the panel of experts to answer. The
local OHC group paid for the radio time. From all appearances the activities of this Committee have been well received. It cannot be foreseen
at this time whether this Committee will take the lead when, and if, the
issue of compulsory unitization of oil fields arises,79 but it appears that
the issue will become important in the not too distant future. However,
it does seem worth noting that the North Dakota OIIC was considered
the best in the nation in 1954 by the American Petroleum Institute.
The Williston Chamber of Commerce has also been very active in
taking the lead in advancing the interests of the oil industry and thereby,
in the opinion of the Chamber, the interests of the region and the state.
The committee, or its representatives, visited 24 high schools in 1954 and all
placed orders with the committee for the free materials.
77

Mr. Kildow insists that “political” questions—such as a “proper” oil production tax—were the only kind that received no answers. The line between
political and non-political questions would be difficult to draw but he believes
that it has been strictly adhered to.
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See the booklet published by the American Petroleum Institute, The Conservation of Petroleum, 1954, p. 10, and the Interstate Oil Compact Commission,
Oil For Today—And For Tomorrow, op. cit., pp. 23, 30, 43, 57.
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Since 1953, one Director on the 15 member board of the Chamber of
Commerce has been an oilman. The Chamber has lobbied for a low oil
production tax, 27½% depletion allowance, and a market demand law;
but opposed the anti-flaring bill. The activities of the Upper Missouri
Development Association—this organization has been almost solely
concerned with attempting to defeat an 1850 foot level for the Garrison
dam—have been largely financed by the Chamber and this issue is presumed to be of significant interest to the oil companies as the additional
flooding of land will increase drilling costs. The Chamber has assisted
in the radio programs of the OIIC, pushed for a commercial airline stop
at Williston which the oilmen desired, and sponsored an annual Oil
and Farm Festival Day in Williston. It has been avowedly neutral in the
oil spacing issue because, as has been previously discussed, there has
been definite conflict here between the oil industry and the Williams
County Landowner’s and Royalty Owner’s Association. With this last
possible exception, the Williston Chamber of Commerce has energetically sponsored and promoted activities which were presumably in the
interests of oil development in the Williston area.
The results of a survey question concerning leadership are interesting and somewhat indicative. The question posed was—“What
about town leaders? Who in your opinion are the town leaders?” Only
the interviewees in Williston and Tioga were quizzed. The results are
presented in Table XXXIV.
TABLE XXXIV
TYPES OF ANSWERS, BY WILLISTON AND TIOGA RESIDENCE
(AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN WILLISTON), TO THE
QUESTION AS TO WHO WERE LOCAL LEADERS
Types of Answers		
There are none		
Don’t know		
Business Groups		
Professional Groups
Politicians and
government officials
Other			
Older Group		
New Group		
TOTAL			

Williston1		
Old
New
Tioga
4
2
5
109
64
39
73
21
5
13
2
8
35
5
17
4

8
1
3
3

31
4
4
10

260

104

106

1. The “either” category are included in the “old” column.		
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Thus, approximately 47% of those polled in Williston did not know
if there were any town leaders to provide the community with leadership but the percentage was lowered to about 38% in Tioga. However,
nearly 26% of those questioned in Williston considered business
groups to be the source of leadership; in Tioga, that percentage had
decreased to less than five. To this writer, it seemed rather remarkable
that almost 30% of the respondents in Tioga selected politicians and
government officials as the town leaders but that the percentage was
less than twelve in Williston. But the results seem generally to support, either directly or indirectly, the original hypothesis—most people
are not interested enough in community affairs to be concerned about
leadership or else they look mainly to business groups to supply the
necessary leadership.80
(4) The Farmer Versus the Corporation
In a hearing before the House Finance and Taxation Committee of the
North Dakota state legislature in late February, 1953, Mr. C.E. Boone,
a vice president of the Amerada Oil Company, was queried as to how
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company was able to get a 30% royalty
agreement with Amerada for any oil that might be discovered under the
extensive tracts of land which the Northern Pacific owned in western
North Dakota. Mr. Boone’s comment was: “there will always be exceptional deals.”81 Thus the farmer’s usual ⅛ or 12½% becomes 30% for the
railroad, or, in other words this railroad receives about 2½ times the
customary amount of oil income.
Again, Professors Voelker and Parcher write that “the most common
primary term for leases granted by private owners in North Dakota is
10 years, although many leases for 5 and 7 year terms have also been
recorded. Where a state or a political subdivision holds the mineral
rights, the leases are generally for 5 year terms.”82
Both of these situations have been related in order to exemplify the
concept of power in the formation of oil policy. One might conjecture as
to what would have happened if the farmers had organized themselves
effectively into a “land bloc” which could then have presented itself to
the oil companies as a genuine “countervailing power.”83
Riesman believes that “the only followers left in the United States today are
those unorganized and sometimes disorganized unfortunates who have not yet
invented their veto group.” Riesman, op. cit., p. 247.
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Grand Forks Herald, March 2, 1953.
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Voelker and Parcher, op. cit., p. 5.

The term is explained in some detail in John Kenneth Galbraith’s American
Capitalism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952).
83
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VIII. The Future of Oil Politics in North Dakota
In the early years of oil discovery in North Dakota there was an abundant amount of speculation as to how oil would affect the political
scene. The major postulate of this section is that oil has, thus far, meant
more of the same. The northwestern area of North Dakota is strong
Non-Partisan League country. The election returns point up the following general voting patterns in this area for the years 1950, 1952,
and 1954. The NPL’ers vote for their candidates who have thus far filed
in the Republican column in the primary and the Democrats are not
much in evidence. In fact, many of the latter, as well as some independents, vote for the NPL candidates. Then in the fall the Democratic
candidates receive a vote four to ten times more than was true in the
primary. Apparently that vote comes from NPL’ers who switch to the
Democratic column, from some “stay-at-home-in-the-primary” Democrats, and from those inscrutable, but prevalent, independents.
A. An Influx of Democrats
The political soothsayers in North Dakota have been conjecturing upon
the voting habits of the new population that oil has brought into the
state. The simple syllogism was—Southerners are Democrats; Southerners have moved into North Dakota. North Dakota will receive an
influx of Democrats. The election returns seem to indicate that the oil
workers have not stayed in North Dakota long enough to meet residence
requirements or that most have simply failed to exercise the franchise.
The questionnaire was used again in an attempt to gain some further
insight into this matter. In Williston, Ray, and the Impact Areas, this
question was posed—“Would you please state your political party or
factional affiliation, if any, in 1952? Today?” and the resulting answers
were compiled and organized into Table XXXV.
The results of this survey appear to substantiate partially the hypothesis although the years used were 1952 and 1954 and a pre-oil
discovery year, such as 1950, was not a part of the question. The Democrats, according to the survey, increased their strength in Williston
by over 6% from 1952 to 1954, but the Republican, ROC, and Republican-NPL vote for 1954 (196 votes) is still substantially more than the
Democrat and Democrat-NPL combination (146). The key vote then
is in the “independent” and “undecided” categories (121 votes). Some
political unrest and uncertainties are clearly evident from a percentage
increase in the “undecided” vote from 5 in 1952 to 38 in 1954.
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The data obtained in the Impact Area are indecisive. There was a
noticeable loss in the Republican and Republican-NPL vote but the respondents seemed to be rather negative in terms of present intentions.
The statistics from Ray may be rather deceptive. It appears that
slightly over 50% of the respondents were Democrats in 1952, although
the percentage had decreased by 1954. However, the Democrats never
carried Ray in any election from 1950 through 1954 for federal offices,
or the office of governor. It is always possible that the Democrat vote
stayed at home, but not likely.
All in all, there is only slight evidence of any influx of Democrats
into North Dakota because of the discovery of oil. The potential Democratic vote was of a migratory type and the more or less permanent oil
personnel is not of sufficient numerical size to alter the existing patterns to any appreciable degree. Nevertheless, the “independent” and
“undecided” vote is significant and offers the potential for a considerable shift in the political intentions of the electorate.
TABLE XXXV
POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS, BY WILLISTON BASIN LOCALITY
RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE,
FOR 1952 AND 1954
Types of Answers

Williston
Old
New
Totals
1952 1954 '52 '54 '52 '54
Democrat 90 97 44 44 134 143
DemocratNPL
2
3
...... ...... 2 3

Impact Areas
Ray
Old
New
Totals
'52 '54 '52 '54 '52 '54 '52 '54
14 15 1 1
15 16 54 46
1

1

Republican 100 84
RepublicanROC
38 37
RepublicanNPL
21 18

31 33 144 117 13 9

Independ.

67

Other

...... 2

Undecided 4

57

23

...... ...... 1
1

1

...... 14 9

1

2

19

19

19 18 58 55

15 15 ...... ...... 15 15

6

5

6

20 13 ...... ...... 20 13

2

2

31 25 97 83

17 17 5

21

21

...... 1

...... 8

...... ...... ...... 8

...... 3

3

...

4

5

2

...... 2

1

9

90 90

109 109

1

6

27 24

...... 1

15 5

...... ...... 1

39

4

No Data

...... 1

...... ...... 1

TOTALS

322 322 142 142 464 464 83 83 7

5

...

...... 1
7

22 22

3
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B. Oil and Possible Political Realignments
Without exception, those political leaders in Williston and surrounding areas who were interviewed stated that the oil companies
and their interests were being supported by the ROC. Some believed
that the coming of oil had definitely been instrumental in the increased
strength of the ROC in the Williston area. But others thought a reaction was setting in, especially among the farmers, due to increased farm
labor costs, poorer farm roads, higher legal fees, the arbitrary attitude
and procedure of a few of the oil companies, and decreased drilling.
Heretofore, however, the ROC had supported the oil companies on
every major oil policy issue and has not especially suffered at the polls
for doing so.
There is considerable diversity of opinion as to the role the oil companies have played thus far in direct support of the ROC. A prominent
leader in the NPL said that the oil companies had remained aloof from
any factional affiliation and would continue to do so on his advice. An
important official in the ROC said that the oil companies, as such, had
made no contributions to the ROC and he believed that individual
oilmen, in 1954, had furnished not more than $500 of the Williams
County ROC budget of around $3,500. But a well-known Williston
lawyer “knew” that the Williams County ROC organization had contributed $25,000 to beat Senator Carroll Day in the 1954 primary
and that most of this money was from oil interests. However, Senator
Day, in a personal interview, estimated the sum to have been around
$15,000 and he was not certain as to its source, but “probably some of
it came from oil interests.”84
This information is obviously somewhat contradictory and, just as
obviously, someone is in error. What this means for the future one can
only conjecture. If the NPL stays in the Republican column it appears
more and more likely that the organization will favor a slightly higher
oil tax. In such a case the oil interests may become more than lobbyists
and actually participate, at least financially, in the factional fights. If
the Democratic and NPL organizations merge, the issue of oil politics
remains in doubt. One political leader who might be influential in this
merger, or in preventing it, thought that the gross oil production tax
should be increased up to even 50%, “such as is done in Saudi Arabia.”
If this were openly advocated in the campaign, oil politics in North Dakota would really be at the explosive stage.
84

Senator Carroll Day was killed in an airplane crash on March 4, 1956.
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C. The Key—The Future of Oil in North Dakota
The future role of oil politics in North Dakota appears to be governed
primarily by the future of oil development in this state. If a relatively
static condition, such as was evident in the latter part of 1954 and
during most of 1955, continues then oil interests are going to be a powerful lobby but not “king oil” as some have claimed. But an expansion
of the oil fields—such as might occur in Burke, Renville and Bottineau
counties where wildcat wells have proved to be producers—might well
change the political scene. It must be remembered that usually 12½%
of the gross income from oil goes to the landowner, or the owner of
mineral rights. If oil production becomes very widespread—and it is
also worthy of note that, in statewide terms, “discovered” oil fields account for a very small percentage of total land area—the oil “public”
will be expanded somewhat proportionately. Discovery of many new
fields, or substantial enlargement of those already discovered, would
also increase the political base of the oil interests. The reason for the
increase in power is rather well summarized by recent story—“the last
time you reported on him [a cousin] they had struck oil on his land and
his liberalism was going down just as fast as the oil was coming up.”85
Thus we return to the ancient dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus—“Listen, then, Thrasymachus began. What I say is that ‘just’
or ‘right’ means nothing but what is to the interest of the stronger party.
Well, where is your applause?”86 Whether one applauds or not is question of values.
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The Leader, September 1, 1955.

Francis M. Cornford (ed.), The Republic of Plato (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 18.
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Chapter 6
Political Impacts of Oil in an Era of
Sustainability
Andrea Olive
The impacts of the recent (2008–14) oil boom in the Williston Basin are farreaching. They include increases in population and state revenue, and they
have made transportation and infrastructure more complex and produced
numerous environmental externalities (see, for example, Caraher and Conway
2016; McGranahan, Allen, Fernando, and Kirkwood 2017; Ruddell, Jayasundara, Mayzer, and Heitkamp 2014). The political impacts cannot be overstated,
as the government of North Dakota is mainly responsible for regulating oil
development in balance with social, economic, and environmental issues. The
main concern is no longer developing an oil industry and economy in the state,
as it was the 1950s, but instead balancing this booming industry with society’s
best long-term interests—including economic (see Chapter 8) and social (see
Chapters 10, 11 and 13) interests.
This chapter will provide a brief overview of North Dakota politics and the
government administration of oil. Similar to Ross Talbot’s 1958 “Political Impact” chapter, this one is also authored by a social scientist as opposed to a
physical scientist or a scholar of oil technology, and the focus is still on government processes and regulation. This chapter tries to follow the structure
and format of the original 1958 piece, but has had to include new actors (like
Native Americans and their governance systems), new regulations, and an entirely new emphasis on the environmental impacts of oil, given the realities of
science, climate change, and sustainability.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the regulation of oil was centralized in a few government agencies, especially the North Dakota Industrial Commission. Today,
regulation has moved from a narrow government model to a governance
model whereby actors outside of state government are also involved in oil administration. These new actors include not just other agencies inside the state,

160

but also Native American tribal councils and interest groups. In 2018, there are
hundreds of laws associated with oil production in the state, as compiled into
the state RuleBook (North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2017).
The focus of this chapter will be four areas of policy where the government is
trying to balance oil development with environmental protection: severance
taxes, flaring regulations, water permits, and transportation policy. In each
area the government and other actors have created new, and sometimes innovative, regulations and rules to govern oil.
Brief Survey of North Dakota Politics and Government
While North Dakota has long been associated with Republican Party rule, between 1958 and 2018, Democratic-NPL politicians held the governorship for
twenty-seven years. Historically, the Nonpartisan League (NPL) was a third
party in North Dakota, but in the early 1950s that party split into two—one
side merged into the state Republican Party and the other side merged with
the Democratic Party of North Dakota to formally create the Democratic-NPL
party in 1956. Thus, today North Dakota is a two-party state with the Republicans and the Democratic-NPL. The latter held the governorship of the
state with a continuous twenty year stretch between 1961 and 1981 and a
seven-year stretch from 1985 to 1992. The governorship has since been dominated by Republicans. The current governor is Doug Burgum, who was elected
December 15, 2016, with 75 percent of the popular vote. The remainder of the
executive branch’s main office holders, from the lieutenant governor to the agriculture commissioner, are all members of the Republican party. See Table 6.1
for a list of main executive offices. Some of these offices have longtime incumbents, such as Al Jaeger, who has been the secretary of state since 1993, and
Kelly Schmidt, who has served as state treasurer since 2001. These individuals
have served North Dakota through the entirety of the recent oil boom.
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TABLE 6.1.
OFFICE, PARTY, NAME, AND YEAR ELECTED FOR MAIN EXECUTIVE
BRANCH POSITIONS

Office		
Party
Name
Year
				
Elected
Governor
Republican
Doug Burgum
2016
Lieutenant governor
Republican
Brent Sanford
2016
Secretary of state
Republican
Al Jaeger
1993
Attorney general
Republican
Wayne Stenehjem
2017
State auditor
Republican
Josh Gallion
2017
State treasurer
Republican
Kelly Schmidt
2001
Agriculture commissioner
Republican
Doug Goehring
2009
Public Service commissioners Republican
Julie Fedorchak
2012
			
Randy Christman
2013
			
Brian Kroshus
2017
Insurance commissioner
Republican
Adam Hamm
2007
Tax commissioner
Republican
Ryan Rauschenberger 2013

The state House and Senate are also both dominated by Republicans. At
the outset of 2018, the House had eighty-one elected Republican and thirteen
Democratic-NPL members, while the Senate had thirty-eight Republican and
nine Democratic-NPL members. The congressional districts that comprised
the Williston Basin have long been dominated by Republican officials. For
example, during the sixty-third, sixty-fourth, and sixty-fifth legislative assemblies, District 1 in Williams Country had a Republican senator and two
Republican representatives (North Dakota Legislative Branch 2018). However,
at the federal level North Dakota has elected at least one U.S. senator from the
Democratic-NPL party since 1959. And both U.S. senators from North Dakota
were Democratic-NPL from 1989 to 2011, when Republican John Hoeven was
elected.
North Dakota is a predominantly rural state. There are fifty-three counties,
and the U.S. Census Bureau classifies thirty-nine of them as completely rural,
meaning there are fewer than 50,000 people (North Dakota Census Office
2017). However, North Dakota’s population has experienced a significant
increase in the past ten years. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates the state population to be 755,393 as of July 1, 2017. That is a 12 percent increase over
the 2010 census population, and a significant gain since the twentieth century
low of 617,000 in 1970 (Census Bureau n.d.a). Most of the recent newcomers
have moved into the Williston Basin to work in the oil industry. When oil
was discovered in the Williston Basin in 1951, the city of Williston had only
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7,000 people, while North Dakota had only 617,000 people. By 2010, the city
of Williston had a population of 14,716, and by 2015 the population grew to
26,426 (Census Bureau n.d.b). The demographics of North Dakota reveal that
the population is mainly white (88 percent) with a median household income
of $59,000 in 2016, which is above the U.S. average of $57,000 (Census Bureau
n.d.a).
While migration to North Dakota has occurred in step with oil production,
the state maintains a vibrant Plains Indian heritage. In 2018, Native Americans comprise about 5 percent of the population, or 31,000 individuals. There
are five federally recognized tribes: the MHA Nation (Mandan, Hidatsa, and
Arikara Nation), the Spirit Lake Nation, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate
Nation, and the Trenton Indian Service Area (North Dakota Indian Affairs
Commission n.d.). These tribes each have a reservation and govern themselves according to their own constitutions. However, in recent years Native
Americans have started to run electoral campaigns for seats in North Dakota’s
legislature (Fragoso 2016). Notably, in the 2016 election, Ruth Buffalo became
the first Native American Democratic woman elected to the North Dakota
Legislature. She beat the incumbent, Republican Randy Boehing, who had
previously sponsored a bill to limit the Native vote in the state (see Figure 6.1).
Administration and Governance of Oil Policy
The administration of oil policy is highly decentralized in the United States.
The federal government has a minimal role to play in the exploration, production, or refining of oil across the fifty states. Issues pertaining to interstate
commerce and transportation as well as the protection of some environmental
resources (such as air quality or water quality) involve federal agencies and
regulations. However, oil is predominantly a state issue. As evidenced in the
original “Political Impact” chapter, in 1958 North Dakota had four state administration agencies largely responsible for oil policy and administration—the
Industrial Commission, the state geologist, the Public Service Commission,
and the Tax Commission. In 2018 these offices are still central to the regulation of oil, but governance has expanded to include other government agencies
as well as Native Americans, non-governmental agencies, and federal agencies.
While not all actors involved in the administration of oil can be reviewed here,
it is worth highlighting the main actors in North Dakota.
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State Agencies
The Industrial Commission, which was created in 1919 to manage certain utilities and industries, consists of the governor, attorney general, and agriculture
commissioner. This commission includes the Oil and Gas Division, the Oil and
Gas Research Program, the Pipeline Authority, and the Geological Survey division. In this sense, it remains the key agency for oil and gas regulation in North
Dakota. However, the Public Service Commission also oversees issues related
to oil and gas production, including energy plant sitings, railroads, and pipeline
safety. This commission comprises three elected officials who serve a six-year
term. Finally, the Tax Commission is also important to oil and gas production
as it oversees the different state taxes, such as production and extraction taxes,
related to the oil industry in North Dakota.
Outside of these main commissions, there is a plethora of other actors
relevant to the administration of oil and gas in 2018. This is largely because
oil production, especially hydraulic fracturing, is associated with numerous
environmental risks. These include impacts on water quality and quantity,
methane emissions (climate change), soil quality, air pollution, wildlife habitat
destruction, and earthquakes. There is a small but growing literature on the

Figure 6.1. Location of Native American reservations in North Dakota (source:
ND Indian Affairs Commission n.d.; image source: David Veller)
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environmental impacts in the Bakken Formation (see for example, Hill and
Olson 2013; Horner et al. 2016; Olive 2018; Scanlon, Reedy, Male, and Hove
2016; Shrestha et al. 2017; Thompson, Johnson, Niemuth, and Ribic 2015).
In order to govern the areas that oil production impacts, other government
agencies are now involved in oil regulation and policy. These include agencies
such as the Water Commission, the Department of Health, the Department of
Labor, the Game and Fish Department, and the Parks and Recreation Department. For example, the Air Quality division of the North Dakota Department
of Environment is responsible for granting construction permits to new projects that will impact air quality in the state. Likewise, the Water Commission is
responsible for granting permits to withdraw surface and groundwater in the
state for all recreational and industrial uses. This means that oil firms need a
water permit before they can begin oil production. In the 1950s, the environmental externalities of oil production were both smaller and less studied, so
regulation was either nonexistent or appeared unnecessary. Today oil production is known to have substantial impact on the environment and, therefore,
requires a larger governance structure to oversee policy.
Native Americans
Although missing from the 1958 “Political Impact” chapter, Native American
tribes are important actors in North Dakota oil and gas administration in
2018. As noted, there are more than 30,000 Native Americans living in the
state as members of several Plains Indians tribes. There are five reservations,
two of which cross into South Dakota (see Figure 6.1 for a map). Inside the
Williston Basin, the Fort Berthold Reservation is 1,319 square miles with a
2015 population of 6,840 people (North Dakota Census Office 2015). These
peoples—the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nations (MHA Nation)—are divided into six segments on the reservation. The Tribal Council has an elected
representative of each segment, as well as a chair. These members then serve on
the council’s five committees: natural resources, health and human resources,
judicial, economic development, and education (MHA Nation n.d.b). The MHA
Nation has a constitution, and the tribal council oversees policy on the Fort
Berthold Reservation. The impact of oil and gas development on the Berthold
Reservation is immense, and the regulation of the industry on reservation
lands is notoriously complex (see Raymond 2011).
The Indian Affairs Commission is the liaison between the executive branch
of the North Dakota state government and the tribal councils. Part of the
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commission’s mandate is also to “increase the economic self-sufficiency” of
American Indians in the state (North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission n.d.).
This would include encouraging management of oil and gas development on
the reservations. Given the location of the Fort Berthold Reservation, it is not
surprising that there are significant oil reserves beneath it. Crude oil production on the reservation has been steadily increasing over the past ten years.
Today there are more than 1,300 oil wells, which account for almost 20 percent
of North Dakota’s oil production (Energy Information Administration 2018).
However, the vast majority of these wells have been drilled and produced by
non-Native American oil companies.
In 2012, the MHA Nation received approval from the federal Department
of the Interior to take control of part of its reservation land (which is held in
trust by the federal government) to build an oil refinery (Smith 2012). This
is known as the MHA Nation Clean Fuels Refinery, and it is operated by a
tribal-owned entity called Thunder Butte Petroleum Services. Construction of
phase one of the project was started in 2014 (see MHA Nation n.d.a). The MHA
Nation also owns an oil company, the Missouri River Resources, and in 2015,
it drilled its first tribe-owned well (Sisk 2016). As oil production continues in
the state, Native American involvement will likely increase. An on-reservation
oil refinery will be an important source of revenue for the MHA Nation, but
also a much-needed refinery for the Bakken Formation and the state, which
presently has only two oil refineries.
Interest Groups
Environmental groups, which have evolved over the twentieth century, are
now significant actors in North American oil and gas politics (Dodge 2015;
Dokshin 2016; Gullion 2015). In the context of North Dakota, they are probably associated mainly with opposition to the Dakota Access Pipeline and the
Keystone XL pipeline (see Sisk 2016). However, at a smaller and more local level,
environmental non-governmental groups act as pressure points and collaborators in the governance of land, water, air, and other environmental resources
in the state. For example, the Sierra Club Dacotah Chapter has led campaigns
to advocate for and support flaring regulations in the state (see Sierra Club
Dacotah Chapter n.d.). Similarly, the Dakota Resource Council has focused on
oil and gas issues since the group’s founding in 1978. Their campaigns have included advocacy for flaring regulations, pipelines, and public land conservation
(see Dakota Resource Council n.d.). As the environmental risks of oil production are becoming better known, participation by environmental groups is
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increasing. In fact, in some states, like New York, environmental groups have
led campaigns to ban hydraulic fracturing because of the associated environmental externalities (Dodge 2015; Dokshin 2016).
The oil industry has also formed its own interest groups to lobby the state
government for pro-oil policy and regulations. The oil sector was the top contributor to former-Governor Jack Dalrymple’s political campaigns. In 2012,
Dalrymple raised $3.6 million total, with about 10 percent or $370,000 coming
from oil interests (Kusnetz 2017). The North Dakota Petroleum Council is one
of the largest and most prominent oil interest groups in the state. It represents
about five hundred oil and gas companies and is overseen by a Board of Directors, chosen every four years at the group’s annual meeting. Their main goal is
“promoting and enhancing the discovery, development, production, transportation, refining, conservation, and marketing of oil and gas in North Dakota”
(North Dakota Petroleum Council n.d.). Whether the oil industry has become
too rich and politically influential in the state is contested (Kusnetz 2017). But
suffice it to say, the oil interest groups do wield substantial power.
Federal Government
The federal government can also be an important actor in state administration of oil and gas by creating national regulations and standards for issues in
federal jurisdiction. One example is the transportation of oil and gas through
North Dakota. Pipelines and railways are an area of shared governance in the
U.S. federal system. Railway and pipelines that cross state and international
borders are always part of the federal domain. The U.S. Secretary of Transportation has general regulatory and enforcement authority regarding protection
against risks to life and property posed by pipeline transportation and pipeline facilities (Murrill 2016). Similarly, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA), inside the Department of Transportation, is
responsible for developing and enforcing regulations for the safe, reliable, and
environmentally sound operation of pipeline transportation (Murrill 2016).
This is a top-down system in which the federal government sets regulations
that states are required to follow for all interstate railways and pipelines. However, for intrastate issues, the North Dakota Public Service Commission can
“establish and enforce minimum safety standards for the design, construction,
and operation” of pipelines and railways that distribute or move oil and gas
(North Dakota Public Services Commission 2018).
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The federal government is also responsible for interstate waters and safe
drinking water in the country. The Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA) set federal regulations in these domains. In the context
of the Williston Basin this is important because the Missouri River system
crosses state lines and, therefore, permits to withdraw water are granted by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Under the SDWA, North Dakota is required
to meet drinking water quality standards as set out by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (see Environmental Protection Agency n.d., 2016).
These regulations are discussed further below. But similar to transportation,
water is an issue that draws the federal government into oil administration in
the fifty states.
Oil Legislation
Ever since oil was discovered in North Dakota in 1951, it has been a major
issue on the government docket. Oil governance is decentralized, and states
oversee much of the production and some of the transportation. As noted in
other chapters (Rundquist and Vandeberg, current volume), one of the biggest differences between 1958 and 2018 is the size of the oil patch and the
consequential environmental externalities that require government oversight.
Essentially, states “must weigh fundamental trade-offs between aggressive
pursuit of resource development and aggressive pursuit of environmental protections” (Rabe 2014, 8371). While there have been hundreds of oil regulations
created in North Dakota since 1958, this section will focus on four areas of oil
policy that speak to the challenge of balancing oil production with environmental protection.
Severance Taxes
Severance taxes put a cost on the extraction of natural resources, such as oil,
as they are being removed or “severed” from the earth. The impetus behind
these taxes is generally to capture revenue from a nonrenewable resource that
is being permanently withdrawn and consumed (Rabe and Hampton 2014).
In the U.S., states have a long history of applying such taxes to coal and other
minerals. In the twentieth century, severance taxes were attached to oil and
gas development in many U.S. states. Texas was the first to pass a severance
tax in 1905, while Michigan and Louisiana followed in the 1920s. In the twenty-first century, especially with the oil boom of the last decade, these taxes
have garnered significantly more attention. Questions of how much states
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tax extraction and how they choose to allocate those funds (that is, general
revenue versus environmental or heritage funds) are now scrutinized more
carefully by policymakers and academics (Rabe and Hampton 2014).
North Dakota has overlapping severance taxes—an oil and gas production
tax and an oil and gas extraction tax. These are imposed on the industry in lieu
of property taxes. The state enacted its first production tax in 1953, when it
set a 4.25 percent tax rate on the gross value of a well. And it enacted its first
oil and gas extraction tax in 1980 through a ballot measure passed by voters
in the general election. The oil extraction tax was set at 6.5 percent, which was
to be distributed to the state general fund (45 percent), schools (45 percent),
and a trust fund (10 percent) (see North Dakota State Tax Commission 1998).
As of 2018, the oil and gas production tax is a 5 percent rate applied to the
gross value of all oil produced at a well (with exemptions for Native American
holdings within the boundaries of a reservation). The oil extraction rate fluctuates between 5 percent and 6 percent depending on whether the average price
of oil is above or below $90 a barrel for three consecutive months (see State of
North Dakota State Tax Commission 2016). See Table 6.2 for recent changes
to North Dakota’s severance tax scheme.
TABLE 6.2.
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO NORTH DAKOTA’S SEVERANCE TAX
(2010–PRESENT)

Year

Legislation

Summary

2010

HCR3054 and
ballot measure
		

Development of a Legacy Fund and ballot
measure that allocates 30 percent of oil and gas
revenues to the fund

2013
SB2014
		

Allocates oil extraction development funds to
newly created energy conservation grant fund

2013
HB1358
		

Changes revenue allocation to counties and
some cities

2013
HB1278
		

Changes portion of production tax revenue to
newly created Heritage Fund

2015
HB1476
		
		
		
		

Beginning January 1, 2016, the oil extraction
tax rate is reduced from 6.5 percent to 5
percent and a new “high price” trigger method
is created that raises the oil extraction tax rate
to 6 percent in a triggered-on environment.
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North Dakota has seen so many recent changes to these taxes where “the
combination of growing social strains and abundant revenue intake has
made Bismark a place for near-constant debate over revenue use” (Rabe and
Hampton 2015, 404). The share of state severance tax revenue in total tax
revenue has increased from almost 17 percent in 2005 to 46 percent in 2013
(Rabe and Hampton 2014). This represents a significant amount of increasing
government revenue—in dollars this is a jump from roughly $262,000 in 2005
to $2.5 million in 2013 (Rabe and Hampton 2015). What this money can and
should be used for is a contentious political debate.
In 2010, the state’s referendum process led to a constitutional amendment
(Section 26, Article X) to create the North Dakota Legacy Fund. The state puts
30 percent of annual severance tax revenues into a designated fund, overseen
by the elected state treasurer, that has no specific purpose or plan for expenditure. Instead, the fund reflects “a broad political desire to set aside substantial
portions of revenue for longer term needs, including those that might be tied
to the impacts of share development or consequences of any future decline in
production” (Rabe and Hampton 2015, 405; see also Gold 2012). The Legacy
Fund was created in such a way that accumulating revenue was invested in
stocks and bonds. No interest from the fund could be allocated or spent until
2017. See Figure 6.2 for a depiction of how the fund is designed.

Figure 6.2. The Legacy Fund rules and procedures (source: Great Plains Institute 2015)
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Outside of the 30 percent designated to the Legacy Fund, the separate statutes of 2013 concern reallocation of some other portion of the severance tax
funds. House Bill 1278 allocates money to a new “outdoor heritage fund” that
protects water quality and nature resources. The fund will collect up to $40
million per biennium to provide grants to state agencies, tribal governments,
and interest groups that want to support wildlife and outdoor activities
(North Dakota Industrial Commission n.d.). There is a hierarchy for funding
projects that prioritizes projects that (1) create fish and wildlife habitat and
provide access to hunters, (2) improve or restore water quality, soil quality,
plant diversity, and other wildlife stewardship activities, (3) develop or enhance conservation of wildlife and fish habitat, and (4) develop parks or other
recreation areas (North Dakota Industrial Commission n.d.). The money is
overseen by the Outdoor Heritage Fund Advisory Board as part of the North
Dakota Industrial Commission. By the end of December 2016, the board had
distributed over 28 million dollars in seven grant cycles. The projects can be
found on the Industrial Commission’s website.
In 2013, another bill addressed reallocation of severance revenue. Senate
Bill 2014 allocated money to “hub cities” where oil and gas development was
having the biggest social or infrastructure impact. Specifically, the bill provided money for schools, fire departments, nursing homes, emergency medical
services, policy services, and hospitals. There was also money for roads and
highways in oil counties (Andrist 2013). However, this funding was still inadequate, leading Governor Jack Dalrymple, in 2014, to sign into law $1.1 billion
in “surge funding”—as a “one time infusion of funding for infrastructure repair and development in oil-producing areas” (Rabe and Hampton 2015, 404).
How much revenue from severance taxes is allocated to counties that produce
oil is an ongoing discussion in the state and a likely topic for each biennial legislature. Counties that produce oil, such as those in the Williston Basin, argue
that they require the most funding since they need more and better roads and
have increased costs associated with water quality and other environmental
issues (Dalrymple 2017).
Flaring Regulations
When oil is extracted from the Williston Basin, the wells also produce significant—and potentially valuable—natural gas. The Bakken also contains 6.7
trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 530 million barrels of natural gas liquids
(NGLs) (Energy Information Administration 2018). However, this produced
gas is often considered just a byproduct of the oil producing process. Moreover,
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natural gas production exceeds pipeline capacity in the state (Energy Information Administration 2018). Thus, the gas is typically flared (burned) rather
than collected for storage and transport. For environmental and safety reasons, North Dakota prohibits venting, or releasing the gas into the air, without
flaring or collecting it. Natural gas contains dangerous and toxic hydrocarbons
such as propane and butane. It also contains methane, which is a very potent
greenhouse gas (Energy Information Administration 2016). While flaring natural gas does create carbon dioxide, another greenhouse gas, it is less potent
that methane, so it is considered better to flare gas than to release it.
Over the past decade, North Dakota has carefully examined natural gas
policy in light of oil production. From the state’s perspective, flaring gas is
problematic not just because of the lost revenue and royalties, but because it
is associated with environmental and public health externalities. Ideally, oil
firms should be capturing the natural gas for energy. However, the low price of
natural gas makes it unprofitable for the oil industry or the state to invest in
the necessary infrastructure to capture, store, and use natural gas for energy.
In 2014, the state did something to dramatically shift how gas is treated in
the Williston Basin. The North Dakota Industrial Commission passed one of
the country’s most aggressive laws to reduce gas flaring—Commission Order
24665. Under this law, all operators must capture a minimum percentage of
gas produced at their wellsites—starting at 77 percent of gas produced in
2016 and climbing to 91 percent by 2020. These percentages must be met
monthly by each firm. However, there is some flexibility in how firms can meet
standards. Firms can allocate these captured percentages across all their wells
in the region and they can bank excess gas captured for up to three months
(Lade and Rudik 2017).
As a result of this new regulation, both the production side and the processing side of the industry are responding. Oil firms are now busy installing
connecting wells to pipeline infrastructure in the Williston Basin. Essentially,
they install small pipelines, or “gathering lines,” that connect the oil well site
to larger pipelines that transport the captured gas to a processing plant (Lade
and Rudik 2017). On the industry side there are two projects in the development stages that could significantly add to North Dakota’s gas gathering and
processing capacity. The first is the construction of a new plant in McKenzie
County near Watford City capable of processing 200 million standard cubic
feet of gas per day. The region has been void of processing capacity and, consequently, is one of the worst areas for excess flaring (Jean 2018). The second
project is a gas gathering system in McKenzie County, near Fort Berthold
(Jean 2018).
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Figure 6.4. Flared natural gas in North Dakota, as total percent of natural gas
produced, 2002–19 (source: North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources
2019)

Figure 6.3. Flared natural gas in North Dakota, 2002–19 (source: North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2019)
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Since the new regulations went into effect, flaring has fallen sharply in
North Dakota. In March 2016, 10 percent of total natural gas production
was flared, even as total natural gas production grew (Energy Information
Agency 2016) (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). However, in 2018, the state appears
to still be struggling with flaring, as gas capture peaked and then plateaued
around 88 percent (Nemec 2018). In December 2017, twelve companies failed
to make their three-month target but have not faced any restrictions for two
reasons. First, under the 2014 law, wells are allowed to produce unrestricted
amounts of gas for the first ninety days, and second, regulators exempt wells
that produce less than one hundred barrels daily from the main regulations
(Associated Press 2017). With so many firms missing targets, the North Dakota Petroleum Council has reconvened its industry task force to deal with the
issue, and the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources is also studying
flaring regulation (Nemec 2018). Natural gas flaring is a good example of a
negative environmental externality in the oil patch, and so far, North Dakota
has struggled to find the balance between growing the industry and regulating
emissions.
Water Regulations
Oil production is deeply tied to water quantity and quality issues. This is particularly true of hydraulic fracturing, where the fracking of a single well can
use 2–8 million gallons of water and create wastewater that contains high
levels of total dissolved solids (TDS) and must be treated, disposed of, or recycled (Konkel 2016). In places like the Williston Basin, where a shale boom
has occurred, “local water resources are impacted by this rapid development,
through both an increased demand for water, which is used for oil extraction
and to support the burgeoning population of workers, and an increased production of saline wastewater from the oil-bearing formation” (Horner et al.
2016, 3275). Indeed, the amount of water consumed annually for hydraulic
fracturing activities in the Bakken play has increased more than five-fold, from
770 million gallons to 4.27 billion gallons, over the five years from 2008 to
2012 (Horner et al. 2016). North Dakota has no choice but to confront the
water quality and water quantity issues created by oil production in the state.
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Quality
For water quality, the Industrial Commission is responsible for regulations for
wastewater storage and requirements for the protection of underground and
surface water during the oil production process. Similar to other states, North
Dakota requires oil firms to submit a list of chemicals using in the fracking process to FracFocus.org. It is important that regulators know what chemicals the
industry is pumping into the ground because 10 to 90 percent of fracking fluid
is returned to the surface during production (Colborn, Kwiatkowski, Schultz,
and Bachran 2011). In general, produced water (water that flows out of the
shale during fracking) and extraction liquids that return to the surface have
been stored in “open evaporation pits” until the well is shut down, potentially
years later. Toxic chemicals are found in these pits and can pose a threat to
wildlife, soil, and public health (Ramirez 2010; Trail 2006). Even where chemicals are re-injected underground—a growing practice in the Bakken, and
common in the eastern United States—they can create a “potential sources
of extremely toxic chemical contamination” (Colborn et al. 2011, 1054). The
U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act is the main federal law protecting water quality
across the country. However, the 2005 U.S. Energy Policy Act exempts from
the Safe Drinking Water Act the phase during which water mixed with chemicals is injected into the ground as part of the hydraulic fracturing process. This
means that North Dakota has enforcement authority for underground water
injections in the state.
The production of wastewater during oil production cannot be understated.
In North Dakota, wastewater produced per well is rising (about five times between 2005 and 2012) and is higher than that of other shale plays: produced
water amounts are about 440,000 gallons per year for wells completed during
2005–7, but 2.2 million gallons per year for wells completed in 2011 and 2012
(Horner et al. 2016). Wastewater from the Bakken is among the most saline of
all shale formations, and most of it is disposed through “deep-well injection,”
meaning it is “pumped back underground into depleted oil formations or deep
saline water reservoirs” (Horner et al. 2016, 3280). There are now over 400
saltwater disposal wells operating in the state (Horner et al. 2016). Another
disposal option is the reuse of wastewater for fracturing other wells, which
is a practice common in some other shale plays such as the Marcellus in the
eastern United States. However, in the Bakken no wastewater is recycled because of the high salinity of the formation’s water. Recent developments in
water recycling designed specifically for the Bakken have been piloted with
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technical success but are not yet “economically competitive” (Horner et al.
2016, 3280). Instead, there are now 479 saltwater disposal wells in the Bakken
(Scanlon et al. 2016, 10273).
Wastewater spills are also an area of growing concern in the Williston Basin.
In 2015 alone, there were “12 spills greater than 21,000 gallons (79,500 liters),
five spills greater than 42,000 gallons (160,000 liters), and one spill of 2.9 million gallons (11 million liters)” in North Dakota (Environmental Protection
Agency 2016, 31). These spills were a result of either human or equipment
failure, or leaks from hoses or storage equipment. In the Bakken, wastewater
spills are reported to occur mainly during wastewater transportation by pipeline and during the filling or emptying of holding tanks (Lauer, Harkness,
Vengosh 2016). These spills have been reported to impact both groundwater
and surface water in the state. Studies of air and water quality surrounding
Williston during the time of a large (11.4 million liter) wastewater spill in
January 2015 described elevated levels of chemicals used in fracking, such as
boron and strontium, with effects including fish deaths and estrogen inhibition in downstream fish (Cozzarelli et al. 2017). Other studies of wastewater
spills in the Bakken have also detected naturally occurring radioactive materials, high salinity, and toxic trace elements (Lauer et al. 2016).
North Dakota presents an ideal case to test for wastewater effects because
there was virtually no twentieth century conventional oil production that led
to soil and water contamination before the past ten years of unconventional
development (Lauer et al. 2016). In 2017, the North Dakota House of Representatives passed Bill 1409 to require that water quality tests be conducted
prior to oil production (on a surface owner’s property) and reported to the
North Dakota Department of Health, which then analyzes the test and adds
the results to a database maintained by the department. This helps state regulators understand the impact of oil production on water quality with “before
and after” data.
Quantity
When it comes to water quantity, administration depends on the water source.
Most of the water used for oil production in the Williston Basin is from public
or private water distribution sites and trucked to the oil wellsite (Horner et al.
2016). These distribution sites, or water depots, can source water from surface
or groundwater. The State Water Commission administers and enforces water
law, including permitting for different water uses throughout the state. The
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permitting process includes assessing the availability of ground and surface
water, the impacts on prior water users, the impacts on water quality and
quantity, and the “probable long-term effects of climatic variation” on water
supplies (see North Dakota State Water Commission n.d.). A water permit is
required for all industrial uses of water in the state, but temporary permits
(those that do not go through the entire impact process) can be granted for up
to twelve months.
North Dakota recognizes a hierarchy of appropriated water uses, with domestic and municipal at the top, agricultural/irrigational second, industrial
third, and recreational (related to fish and wildlife) lowest (Scanlon et al. 2016).
While in theory this means water transfers from higher to lower priority uses
are not allowed, a policy was developed in 2011 to “accommodate a change
in purpose from irrigation to industrial water uses through temporary water
permits (1 year maximum) termed ‘Industrial Use in Lieu Of Irrigation Policy’
(ILOP),” which generated thirty-three permits and supplied almost 30 percent
of water used in fracturing—also reducing water truck traffic and wait times
at depots (Scanlon et al. 2016). The program was phased out in most places by
the end of 2015 due to expansion in pipelines and water depots (Scanlon et
al. 2016).
The federal Army Corps of Engineers controls permits for interstate waters,
such as the upper Missouri River system, which includes Lake Sakakawea. This
river system is the largest and most reliable source of water in the Williston
Basin. Since the Bakken Formation is so large, transportation of water from
the river system can be costly. Thus, there are numerous oil firms that source
their water from the nearest water depot, managed by the state (Horner et al.
2016).
As of 2018, there is enough water in the state for oil production, but no
single source alone is adequate. Up to 3.7 billion gallons of groundwater can
be withdrawn annually in North Dakota, but in 2012, 4.3 billion gallons were
needed just for hydraulic fracturing in the Bakken (Horner et al. 2016). Thus,
surface water withdrawals are necessary. Up to 10.3 billion gallons annually
are permitted for withdrawal from surface waters in the state. Lake Sakakawea
has at least 32.5 billion gallons of annual surplus water that are being made
available by the Army Corps of Engineers (Horner et al. 2016).
In 2017, the North Dakota House of Representatives passed HB1020, which
makes changes to the operation and composition of the state water commission. The bill also mandates a legislative management study of industry water
use in the oil and gas industry.
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Transportation Regulations
There are thousands of oil and gas pipelines that cross through North Dakota—some small gathering lines and some very large and internationally
significant pipelines. However, despite all of these pipelines, oil producers were,
and still are, sometimes forced to ship crude oil by rail or truck simply because
production has outpaced pipeline capacity. In 2013, roughly 75 percent of
crude oil produced in the state was shipped by rail. This number has fallen, and
in 2016 only about 30 percent of oil was shipped on the railroad (Energy Information Administration 2018). Rail and pipeline transport were roughly the
same in 2012, before rail transport increased as pipeline transport decreased.
The safety of oil transportation is a controversial and political issue in the
United States and Canada. In 2013, a train carrying crude oil from North
Dakota to a refining plant in New Brunswick, Canada, crashed and exploded
in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec. The result was not just the destruction of thirty
buildings in the downtown core, but more tragically the death of forty-seven
people. This was the deadliest non-passenger train railway accident in Canada’s history. The incident immediately put railway safety—and the Bakken
Formation—on the front page of every newspaper in Canada and the United
States. And the federal governments of both countries acted quickly to issue
emergency orders.
Nevertheless, in 2014 a train carrying 3.5 million gallons of oil crashed into
a grain train and forced the evacuation of more than 1,000 residents in the
town of Casselton, North Dakota. This event again led to more media coverage
that focused attention on the Bakken Formation. A New York Times exposé
appeared on Page A1 on January 26, 2014, about oil transportation in North
Dakota. At the time, about 65 percent of oil produced in North Dakota’s Bakken
was shipped on railway, often because of a shortage of pipelines. According to
the Times, “Safety officials have warned for more than two decades that these
cars were unsuited to carry flammable cargo: their shell can puncture and tears
up too easily in a crash” (Krauss and Mouawad 2014). However, the problem
was more than just tank cars, as the Times also brought to light the fact that
“crude oil produced in the Bakken appears to be a lot more volatile than other
grades of oil, something that could explain why the oil trains have had huge
explosions” (Krauss and Mouawad 2014).
As a result of these crashes and the U.S. federal government’s emergency orders, the North Dakota Industrial Commission created new standards for oil
being transported from the state. Order 25417 set new operating standards in
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2014 for the equipment that separates production fluids into gas and liquid.
These standards include “new parameters for temperatures and pressures
under which the equipment must operate to ensure that light hydrocarbons
are removed before oil is shipped to market.” The oil’s temperature must be
raised to at least 110°F to boil off the most volatile fractions which become
highly flammable or even explosive if they become separated in transit. North
Dakota standards are now more stringent that federal regulations. Bakken
crude oil must be at a vapor pressure of no more than 13.7 pounds per square
inch (psi) whereas the federal standard is 14.7 psi. Order 25417 applies
without exception to all Bakken crude oil produced in North Dakota (North
Dakota Industrial Commission 2014).
To confront transportation problems, the state also opened a new oil refinery
in 2015, with plans to open more in the future. In 2018 the state has two oil
refineries, the Mandan Refinery in Mandan and the Dakota Prairie Refinery
in Dickinson. But to keep pace with production and prevent transportation
delays and risks, more refineries are necessary. Meridian Energy Group has
proposed a facility, the Davis Refinery, in western North Dakota, just outside
the Theodore Roosevelt National Park. In December of 2017, the North Dakota Department of Health Air Quality Division granted a draft permit to
construct the refinery. The Billings county board already approved the project
and necessary zoning for the facility in 2016. The process for a finalized permit
to construct is ongoing (Meridian Energy Group 2018).
Future of Oil Politics in North Dakota
Oil production in the United States is experiencing a historic resurgence. This
is due largely to the discovery of new deposits and the development of new
technologies that enable oil recovery at cheaper rates. In November of 1970,
the U.S. produced 10.04 million barrels of oil per day (see Figure 6.5). Between
1970 and 2010, oil production steadily declined with few interruptions (a brief
period in the 1980s, for example). However, since 2010, production—largely
due to fracking technology—has been rising. In January 2018, the United
States produced 10.2 million barrels of oil per day. North Dakota is producing
about 1.2 million barrels per day—almost 10 percent of total production in
the United States. Oil production in the Williston Basin is prospering.
While the future of oil looks stable, the pressures of climate change are creating real political and social pressure across the country and throughout the
world. In 2015, by executive order, President Obama created the Clean Power
Plan—a policy aimed at reducing greenhouse emissions from electrical power
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generators and coal-fired power plants in each U.S. state. This signaled a new
era of climate change policy in the United States. In 2015, President Obama
also signed the United Nation’s Paris Agreement, which further committed the
United States to reducing its greenhouses gas emissions over the next thirty
years (the Agreement goes into force in 2020). The election of Donald Trump
in 2016 signaled yet another era in American climate change policy. Trump
campaigned on a pro-energy (anti-environmental regulation) campaign and
after sweeping into the White House, he quickly asked the Environmental
Protection Agency to repeal the Clean Power Plan, which was under review by
the U.S. Supreme Court. President Trump has spoken against the Paris Accord,
and in June 2017 he announced that the United States would withdraw from
the international agreement. (However, the earliest possible withdrawal date
by a signatory to the 2015 agreement is November 4, 2020—so the United
States technically remains a party to the convention.) Trump remains very
skeptical of climate change and is against environmental regulations that slow
U.S. energy production (Parker and Davenport 2016). During a 2016 campaign
stop in Bismarck, Trump told a packed arena of thousands that he wants to
see “more fossil fuel drilling and fewer environmental regulations” (Parker and
Davenport 2016). Not surprisingly, in the 2016 election, Trump won North
Dakota’s three electoral college votes with 63 percent of the popular vote in
the state. In Williams County, Trump won 10,069 votes compared to Hillary
Clinton’s 1,735 votes (New York Times 2017).

Figure 6.5. Daily crude oil production in millions of barrels per day in the
United States, 1920–2018 (source: Energy Information Administration
2019)
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However, even in light of the Republican administration and Trump’s support in the Williston Basin, it seems clear that North Dakota oil production
will be accompanied by increasing alternative energy production in the state.
Like oil and gas, North Dakota also has abundant renewable energy resources,
especially wind energy. In 2016, the state ranked fifth in the United States
for electricity generation produced by wind energy (Energy Information Administration 2018). And North Dakota still has significant undeveloped wind
energy resources. In 2017, the Industrial Commission approved $1.1 million in
research and development grants for three renewable energy projects—two
involving portable solar development and one developing geothermal energy
for residential use (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2017a). North Dakota is already one of the top ten ethanol-producing states with five ethanol
plants, and among the top ten in biodiesel production capacity (Energy Information Administration 2018). It also generates hydroelectricity through
the Garrison Dam outside of Bismarck. The dam produces about 5–7 percent
of the state’s net electricity (Energy Information Administration 2018). Although the state is committed to oil production, it is not forgoing other energy
production opportunities.
North Dakota is also pursuing carbon-and-capture storage (CCS) technology.
It is a process whereby carbon dioxide emitted from large projects, such as
coal-fired power plants, is captured, transported, and deposited underground.
The purpose is to prevent the carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere.
However, it can also be used for “enhanced oil recovery” where that carbon
dioxide is injected into the ground to help recover more oil. This is a process
used in Saskatchewan to increase oil production in its portion of the Bakken
while decreasing emissions from the province’s coal-fired power plants. In May
2017 the state became the first to receive EPA approval for CCS. Essentially,
North Dakota now has primary regulatory authority over the geologic storage
of carbon dioxide (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2017b). Saskatchewan already as a CCS facility in its Bakken region, just outside Estevan. In
December 2017, the province signed a memorandum of understanding with
Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming related to CCS technology. The four
subnational jurisdictions will “collaborate on carbon capture, utilization and
storage (CCUS) related to sharing of capacity, as well as regulatory expertise in
the fields of carbon dioxide capture, transportation, storage and enhanced oil
recovery” (Fraser 2017).
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The balance between oil production and environmental protection will be
an ongoing political pursuit in the Williston Basin. Responsible oil production
requires a plethora of actors and a complex governance system. The North
Dakota administrative system has increased capacity and opened up avenues
for non-government actors. While the main emphasis still appears to be increasing oil production, there is now greater attention to the environment.
The state has set aside severance funds specifically earmarked for outdoor
heritage projects and has a legacy fund that could potentially be used to offset
landscape changes or other environmental externalities of the oil patch. Water
quality and quantity as well as flaring and transportation are now regulated by
North Dakota’s government. The past ten years has shown that North Dakota
is taking more seriously the environmental responsibility of oil production.
And there is certainly more state regulation of the industry and the environment in 2018 than in 1958, at the time of the first Williston Report. However,
the balance still tips toward fossil fuel production. North Dakota, like many
U.S. states, has been unable to balance the industry’s booms with society’s
long-term interests in an era of sustainability.
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Chapter 7
The Economic Impact of Oil
Development
Samuel C. Kelley, Jr.
An area that is committed to an economic function specialized in
agriculture and in particular to a specialized commodity structure is invariably characterized by a level of income that is significantly lower and
far more unstable than that of an economy founded on manufacturing
activity. Extreme fluctuation and chronic depression in the commodity
market accompanied by rapid technological change in methods of agricultural production have produced, in areas such as North Dakota,
a low wage structure, persistent underemployment and standards of
living that are not in accord with the dynamic growth present in other
areas of the national economy.
Much of the current argument which treats the agricultural problem
as one of improper allocation of resources to be corrected by the market
mechanism is appropriate only to areas where alternative uses of resources are technically possible. In those areas where the alternatives
are limited, as in North Dakota and much of the Great Plains area,
the alternative to continued employment in agriculture is migration
to other geographic areas. The many forces which act to restrain population movements assure that the short term will be characterized
by a labor force excessive relative to demand. For the long term the
residual population of the declining area must continue to bear an unreasonably high and increasing overhead cost of the public and private
services essential to the community welfare.
The impact of economic decline upon the population of the agricultural areas of the nation is evident in the fervor with which they have
sought protective legislation and in the intense competition through
which they are now attempting to broaden the economic base of their
communities. Throughout the South and increasingly in the Great
Plains area, private and public agencies are engaged in gigantic promotional efforts to attract nonagricultural industries. Offers of financial
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assistance, tax offsets, land grants, low wage rates and “favorable” labor
laws are the bait being used to attract new industries to areas in desperate need of additional employment opportunities and a bigger tax
base.
Many of these areas are at a distinct disadvantage in the competitive struggle. Their small populations offer no concentrated market;
they are remote from the urban concentrations that consume a large
part of the nation’s product; the labor force possesses few of the skills
required in the complex of industrial production, and the physical resources possessed by the area are usually exploited most economically
by shipping them in unprocessed form to established manufacturing
areas. Their primary asset is an abundant labor supply continuously
supplemented by the technological displacement of farm workers.
A taxonomic description of the impact of oil discovery on a local
economy is in itself of little value to anyone other than the local historians and those eager members of the Chamber of Commerce who
search for microscopic evidence of the utopian characteristics of their
communities.
It may well be that the results of this study will serve no other purpose. It is, however, our premise that the Williston Basin Area possesses
some relatively unique characteristics and that these characteristics
provide an analytical basis for inference that may be applied appropriately in other situations and in other times.
The economic process which may be described here in terms of a
real situation is the process of the induced response of an economy to a
major autonomous change within it. In the majority of real situations
the complexity of interrelationships between economic components
and a wide variety of institutional restraints serves to confuse the analyst and to obscure the causal relationships between autonomous and
induced changes.
From an economic viewpoint the characteristics that lend value
to data derived from this area are the internal simplicity of the local
economy and the simplicity of its relationship with other portions of
the larger economy of which it is part.
It is in this type of economic environment that the Williston Basin oil
development occurred. To interpret many of the economic phenomena
within this development some general description of the environment
is required. The Williston area is typical of the state in nearly every
respect. The differences between it and other regions of the state are
differences of magnitude rather than kind.
The two counties selected for analysis were selected primarily because at the time of the study they contained nearly all activity directly
related to oil development in North Dakota. Fortunately, they also
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comprise the most important components of the economy of the area
and inferences can be drawn for the residual areas with a relatively high
level of confidence as to their validity.
The Economic Area
The basic economy of these two counties and the counties contiguous
to them is agricultural. Until the oil discovery in 1951, land was the only
natural resource in use, and all labor resources were used in direct or
indirect relation to its cultivation.
Even the structure of the area’s agriculture is simple. Limited rainfall, severe northern climate, conditions of topography, and isolation
from major consumer markets have limited land use to the production of two basic commodities, small grains and livestock. The same
conditions have required an extensive use of land, and the area is characterized by a relatively small number of very large farm units. Since
the dry-farming techniques appropriate to the area permit extensive
use of mechanical farm equipment, the labor requirements per farm
unit are very small, normally being met by family labor.
This type of agriculture has limited the development of local manufactures in two ways. First, the farm products are those which may be
shipped to areas closer to primary consumer markets in unprocessed
form more economically than in processed form. There is no processing
of agricultural products in this area other than that required for immediate domestic consumption. In fact, only a relatively small part of the
local consumption of milled grains and livestock is satisfied by local
production. Even the farmers of the region produce little for their own
use, depending on the sale and export of their products in raw form and
the import of finished goods.
A second way in which the development of local manufacture has
been inhibited by the type of agriculture dominant in the region is that
its limited and declining need for labor has produced a very low population density. In 1950, McKenzie County had fewer than three persons
per square mile; Mountrail five persons, and Williams fewer than
eight. Further, the population of the area has declined continuously
since 1930. The net number of persons leaving Mountrail County in
the period 1940–1950 was equal to 24 percent of its 1940 population.
The Williams County loss was nearly 14 percent, although the city of
Williston had a population increase of over 27 percent in the period.
A sparse and declining population offers little opportunity for
the development of domestic manufactures intended to serve local
markets, such as are found in most areas of the United States. In the
Williston Basin, this industry group has been limited to a few dairies,
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bakeries, job printers and newspapers. Virtually all other commodities
used in the area are produced elsewhere and nearly all that is produced
in the area is exported from the area in a raw state.
In essence, the area is a raw materials producing economy which
trades its raw commodities for finished goods imported from “abroad.”
Like most areas of the world’s economy which produce raw materials
for export, the local welfare is directly dependent upon economic conditions in other areas. Further, the dependence of the manufacturing
economy on the welfare of this “basic” component is tenuous and remote. The demand for the commodity materials which it supplies is
relatively inelastic under ordinary conditions of economic activity. In
contrast, the conditions of supply are extremely competitive. This kind
of an economic relationship has tended to promote and to preserve a
rather primitive economy with the type of economic institution characteristic of the national scene at the turn of the century.
The primary employment is farming. The major secondary employment is in trade and transportation. Although farm establishments are
very large in terms of land use relative to the national pattern, business establishments are very small. The proprietorship, partnership
and cooperatives are far more characteristic than the corporate form
of business organization. No firm in the area other than major utilities
employed more than 200 persons prior to oil discovery.
The communities of the area are also small. Williston, the only
urban area in the two counties, had a 1950 population of less than
8000, and there is no larger community within a radius of one hundred miles. Williston is the trade center of the area and a very large
percentage of the goods consumed in the area pass through it in much
the same way that imports arrive at and are distributed from a port city
in the more primitive economic areas of the world. To a lesser degree,
much of the area’s product is collected for export through the facilities
of this trade center.
The smaller communities of the area serve two basic functions.
They are secondary areas of distribution for those consumer products
which meet day-to-day needs such as groceries or farm materials and
building supplies. They are also residential communities for retired
farmers and for many of the numerous farmers and ranchers who do
not live on their farms in the winter months.
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The Trade Area Structure
Some evidence of the relative importance of Williston as a center for
trade and service to the Williams County area is contained in the results of a sample of farm families and residents of the major secondary
communities. It should be noted that these data were collected in 1954
and reflect a part of the developed changes induced by the oil activity.
Although Williston is approximately 50 miles from the oil field area
(impact area), 73 percent of all families interviewed in this area bought
their dress apparel from Williston merchants. Nearly all bought household furnishings in the same place, and more than a third did their
banking in Williston banks. One development resulting directly from
oil activity was the establishment of a medical clinic in Tioga, which
is contained in this area, yet half of all residents in the area went to
Williston for medical care.
Of all farm families in areas of Williams County, other than the
eastern townships defined as the impact area, slightly more than half
generally bought their groceries in Williston. Nearly 95 percent bought
clothing there and went there for more medical care. About 90 percent
thought of Williston as their center for bank transactions. Even more
pertinent is the fact that in Tioga and Ray, the largest secondary trade
centers in the area, two-thirds of all resident families purchased dress
apparel and other consumer goods of the same class in Williston rather
than in their own community.
The eastern edge of Williston’s trade area is a topographical feature, a long coulee running north and south through Mountrail County
passing through the community of White Earth just east of the major
producing oil fields. This barrier has interrupted the county and
township roads which would normally permit a westward movement.
Westward traffic must move on U.S. No. 2 or to the north of the county
line.
Much of the area to the east of this feature is served by Stanley, the
county seat of Mountrail County, or by Powers Lake to the north. The
trade distribution in this area is not so sharply defined as in Williams
County. Stanley is a much smaller community than Williston and is
without the variety of business establishments found there. The smaller
communities of the county, Parshall and Newtown, are able to compete
in the types of consumer demand usually satisfied in nonurban places.
More important, Minot in Ward County is the State’s third largest community and attracts many of the area’s consumers of durable consumer
goods and higher quality non-durables. For the western range of townships, Powers Lake is the dominant trade center. In all other areas of the
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county, using clothing and medical care as illustrative of consumption
items, Stanley serves about a third of all farm families, while Newtown
and Parshall together serve about 15 percent and Minot 40 percent.
The concentration of the area’s trade and service activity is Williston; Stanley’s and Minot’s has been reduced in some ways and
increased in others by the development of the oil extracting industry
in the area. In a few cases, notably Tioga and Powers Lake and to a
lesser extent Ray, the influx of population and the daily presence of
large numbers of oil field workers has resulted in the establishment of
new trade and service establishments and in the modernization and
expansion of others. However, the majority of these establishments are
bars, restaurants and grocery stores or service establishments of the
business repair type. In several of the relatively few cases of additions
to merchandising establishments, the new establishment has been a
branch outlet for an existing firm in Williston.
In contrast to this slight diversification of trade in the area, Williston has experienced a greater increase in new establishments and
in new lines of service than has the remainder of the area. This is primarily a result of the fact that although Williston is nearly 50 miles
from the major oil discoveries, it occupies the center of the apparent
geological area for oil prospects. By 1954, only the fringes of the area
had been developed, in the Tioga area on the east and in the Montana
fields on the west. In appraising both the existing situation and future
possibilities, the major producers and the firms supplying materials for
drilling activity selected Williston as their base of operations as a result
of its location as well as its size.
In this sense, the trade structure of the area has not been modified
by oil activity. Although growth in a few areas such as Tioga has been
great relative to the past, Williston continues to dominate business
activity in the area. The major economic impact of the development,
changes in employment, income, sales and receipts, can be measured
in terms of the changes in the economy of Williston. These changes are
described and related to the causal development in a following section.
The Oil Industry
The autonomous factor inducing change in the area was the abrupt
development of an industry completely new to the region. There had
been interest and activity related to oil in the region for many years.
The early activity was largely speculative, involving the sale of mineral
leases based upon limited, intermittent and unsuccessful drilling activity. At the time of the present discovery, there was little or no interest
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among the general population in the oil potential of the area. The discovery well unleashed a psychological force which was intensified by
the great need of the area for supplemental income and employment
and by the fact that earlier failures had eliminated many expectations
for this line of development.
In this type of situation, the petroleum extracting industry is particularly well suited to induce a wave of secondary development based
upon the psychological and economic impacts of direct oil activity. As
an industry, it is somewhat unique in the present American economic
scene. It is a heterogenous mixture of speculative finance, production
and service. It is a hard, driving, competitive business with the overtones of a circus and is encompassed in the speculative manipulation
of a legislative session. In its totality it is as much a movement as an
enterprise.
It is doubtful whether any other act of industrial development with
equivalent economic potential can generate the psychological impact
that is induced by an oil discovery. The search for oil involves several
major acts of chance and provides an area of speculation for those who
participate on the fringe. The speculative nature of oil development
originates in two facts. First is the fact that in spite of the great improvement in the techniques for the study of the subsurface geological
structure, there is no way to prove the presence of an oil reserve except
to drill for it. Well drilling is an expensive operation, in particular when
drilling depths are great. The cost of an exploratory well may range
from 50,000 dollars to twice or three times that amount. The probability of success for a wildcat well is probably about 10 percent for
the nation as a whole. On the other hand, the potential rewards are
sufficient to induce many gamblers, large and small, to join the game.
A second condition adding greatly to the psychological impact is
that the oil producer seldom owns the right to the oil which he hopes
to discover and produce. He must obtain these rights by lease or in rare
instances by purchase of the mineral rights. The rental that he must pay
for the right to explore and produce oil on another’s land will depend
largely on the amount of interest by others and thus on the competition
for lease rights. Delay rentals may vary from ten cents a mineral acre
when there is little prevailing interest to more than one dollar when
there is an actual oil show in the area. Further, it is customary for the
lessee to pay a bonus at the time of leasing. Bonus payments may range
from ten cents or even nothing to ten dollars or more.
To maximize his potential gain and to assure an unrestricted right
to exploration, the producer must acquire mineral leases without initiating competition by his own acts of acquisition. Yet, the earlier he
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moves, the less information at his disposal with which to improve his
estimate of the probabilities of success. As in stud poker, every turn of a
card adds to one’s knowledge of the probable value of the hand. At the
same time, it increases the cost of staying in the game.
The oil game is played by amateurs and professionals. The fervor
with which it is played is due in part to the fact that nearly everyone
can get into the game. The sharp trading in leases adds to the cross
current of rumor and confusion. The competitive pressures on rental
price induce an optimism and excitement in the community that may
easily lead to a rate of investment in other areas of local economy which
are not warranted by the realities of the situation.
The pattern of lease buying in the Williston Basin has been described in an excellent pamphlet by Stanley Voelker of the North Dakota
Agricultural College. He notes that Amerada Petroleum Corporation
and Hunt Oil Company were assembling lease blocks early in 1948.
By September 1949, several companies and brokers were competing
for leases and slightly more than 120,000 mineral acres had been
leased. In this early period, delay rentals averaged 13 cents a mineral
acre, as did bonus payments. In the next six months, ending with the
completion of the discovery, well acreage leased increased 189 percent
and average delay rentals and bonus payments increased to 20 cents
and 21 cents respectively. The most intense leasing activity began at
the time of discovery in April, 1951. By the end of October of the same
year, more than 568,000 additional acres were brought under lease.
Average delay rentals had increased to 85 cents and bonus payments to
1.52 dollars per mineral acre. In terms of monthly rates, leasing activity
in the seven months following discovery was 215 percent of the rate in
the six months preceding activity. At the beginning of leasing activity,
82 percent of all leases were at 10 cents an acre. In the period after
discovery, 99 percent were at one dollar or more. Dr. Voelker estimates
that bonus payments varied from less than 10 cents (in some cases,
nothing) to an extreme of 135 dollars in a few cases in the oil field area.
Data comparable to Dr. Voelker’s data for Williams County are not
available for other areas. However, the location of the proven oil fields
indicates that the leasing pattern for Mountrail County was very similar
to that of Williams County. As wildcat drilling extended through the
Williston Basin, in attempts to define the area, lease activity occurred
in nearly every area of the state. The extent and rapidity of the action
is evident in the fact that by January 1954, 67 percent of the land area
of North Dakota was under oil or gas leases. The boom characteristics
of this phase of the oil development are indicated in a comparison of
North Dakota and Oklahoma, a state with a much older oil extraction
industry. These two states are of nearly equal size, yet only 39 percent
of Oklahoma’s land area was under lease.
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In contrast to these indications of extremely rapid development in
the Williston area, nearly all of those persons who came into the area
with oil producing or contract and service companies felt that the Williston Basin development was restrained. At least, its development was
slow relative to their experience in the Texas, Oklahoma and Wyoming
areas.
This restraint is explained in several ways. Physical factors such as
the greater than average drilling depth, the extreme cold of prolonged
winters and the geographical isolation of the area all add to drilling
costs and discourage marginal independent producers.
Institutional factors, in particular such political issues as depletion
allowances, production tax rates, well spacing and production allowances appear to have encouraged major producers to move slowly in
an effort to improve their position of power. These issues are discussed
elsewhere in this study. From the standpoint of economic impact, it
should be noted here that the domination of the Williston Basin Development by the Amerada Petroleum Company was generally believed
by those interviewed to be a paramount factor in the relatively slow
development of the area. The position taken by the corporation on
oil issues was almost universally echoed by the local business people
where the success of their business ventures was contingent on oil related expansion.
In the development of an oil reserve, charges are often levied against
the producers concerning intentional restraint of the development,
usually by the owners of mineral rights. Some land owners insisted
that supposed dry wells were potential producers. They believe that the
producing company is exercising a means of market control in a glutted
domestic market. This type of attitude may be more prevalent in the
Williston area than in many other oil producing regions of the United
States, first, because the isolation of the area, the supply problem in the
national market, the lack of refining facilities and the limited means of
transport of crude combined to create serious market problems. This
situation was not relieved until the completion of the Standard Oil Refinery in Mandan and the pipelines from it to the east.
Second, the Williston development has been dominated by one
major producing company, Amerada. It is more logical to attribute
monopolistic activities to a dominant firm than to assume conspiracy
among many otherwise competitive firms. The records of the State Geologist indicate that by mid-year 1954, drilling permits had been issued
to more than 150 producing companies. Many of these are large and
established firms. Many others were “one-shot” combinations of individuals or business firms joined for the single purpose of producing
one well.
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Although the large number of “wildcat” operations provide an illusion of feverish competitive activity and support the psychological
pitch of the community, a very large proportion of exploration and production has been conducted by Amerada. By mid-year 1956, there were
699 wells producing oil in the state. Nearly 76 percent of these (533)
were drilled on leases owned by this company. Eight of every ten barrels of oil produced in the state prior to 1956 were produced through
Amerada wells. Eighty-five percent of the state’s oil output was produced in one of two fields, the Beaver Lodge and Tioga fields. Amerada
produced 84 percent of this output.
It appears quite probable that Amerada did follow a very conservative development policy, as many employees of the company and its
drilling contractors have stated. Such a policy may have been intended
to serve the industry in the power struggle on regulatory issues. It
seems also to have served the community by permitting a more orderly
development with fewer stresses and unwarranted actions than might
have been experienced under other conditions.
Economic Impacts
Oil field exploration and development has affected the local economy
in quantitative and qualitative ways. It has increased the population,
income and employment of the area. It has also changed the structure
of the labor force and of business. The measurement of these changes is
complicated by the fact the area of development is extensive and transitory. As was noted above, leasing activity has extended throughout the
state, geological survey has also moved over a large area, and drilling activity in a particular location varies from week to week. The employees
of a producing company and those who provide contract services are
scattered in varying patterns among the many fields under production
or areas under exploration.
Consequently, the measurements of income and employment, related to the industry, described below, have for the most part been
derived by allocation of aggregate amounts on the basis of measures of
activity such as the number of wells drilled or the volume of production.
The basic data from which the allocations were derived were obtained
from the individual well records of the State Geologist. In some cases,
the results of allocation may differ slightly from later summary figures due to two major causes. One is the fact that the disposition of
a well may change, the other, that the completion date of a well does
not indicate accurately the period in which drilling activity occurred, in
particular if completed early in the year.
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In the structure of the petroleum industry, the producing company is the prime mover and the primary source of direct income. It
initiates exploration, assembles lease blocks, sells and distributes the
recovered oil. Most of the drilling activity is accomplished by a hierarchy of specialized subcontractors. Nationally, about 90 percent of
all drilling is done on subcontract. In turn, drilling contractors contract for such specialized services as logging and cementing wells,
rig moving and acidizing. The extent of sub-contracting complicates
income accounting when income is accounted for on a cost basis. To
avoid these complications, estimates of total cost have been based on
average cost per well in North Dakota in 1954. These costs were then
allocated by aggregating the major expenses of firms engaged in crude
petroleum extraction and those in oil and gas field contract services.
Major expenses include contract expenses only if they cannot be allocated within the major industry group.
Apart from leasing activity and geophysical exploration, the beginning of the present oil development was in 1950 and the initial
production year was 1951. Tables XXXVI and XXXVII indicate the
rapidity of development and the concentration of activity in Williams
and Mountrail Counties. By the end of the study period, the preponderance of drilling activity had moved out of the two county area although
the area continued to produce nearly 90 percent of the state output of
petroleum.
TABLE XXXVI
WELLS COMPLETED IN NORTH DAKOTA—BY AREA AND BY
PRODUCING STATUS, 1951–1954

Williams County
Mountrail County
Other
State
Total Wells (Yearly)
Total Wells
(Cumulative)

1951		
P*
NP**
1
0
0
0
0
9
—— ——
1
9
10		

1952		
P
NP
80
17
10
2
2
58
—— ——
92
77
169		

1953		
P
NP
119 10
42
2
19
85
—— ——
180 97
277		

1954
P
107
42
39
——
188
343

10		

179		

456		

799

NP
13
6
136
——
155

* Producing Wells.
** Non-Producing Wells.								
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TABLE XXXVII
PRODUCTION OF CRUDE PETROLEUM, NORTH DAKOTA AND
SELECTED AREAS, 1951–1954 (THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
Williams County
Mountrail County
Other
North Dakota

1951
25
0
0
——
25

1952
1,481
91
26
——
1,598

1953
4,248
900
218
——
5,466

1954
4,135
1,253
637
——
6,025

It should be noted in the drilling record that in the wildcat area only
two of eight wells drilled have produced oil. Within the area nearly nine
of every ten wells drilled have produced oil, although not always continuously in commercial quantities. This fact adds to the concentration
of oil related income in the two county area in view of the additional
cost of completing and equipping a producing well.
These data indicate the concentration of oil production in Williams
and Mountrail counties in the years prior to 1955. Further, nearly twothirds of all production in other areas of the state occurred in McKenzie
County; most of it in the Charlson (Madison) field. McKenzie County
adjoins Williams County on the south and is relatively isolated from
areas to the east by the Missouri River. It is a part of the Williston
trade area, and a very large part of oil related income originating in this
county is spent in Williston.
On the basis of this record of drilling activity and oil production
it is estimated that the total income derived from oil field expenditures in North Dakota amounted to approximately $700,000 in 1951.
By 1954, annual expenditures had increased to nearly $33,000,000.
These estimates do not include income derived from mineral leases,
bonuses, oil royalties, the sale of mineral deeds or expenditures for the
improvement of oil lands. The latter estimates are discussed below.
Table XXXVIII contains estimates of expenditures by county and state
for the years 1951–54. It is probable that they understate actual expenditures in 1951 due to the reliance on well drilling activity as the basis
of estimate. Developmental activities such as geophysical exploration
tend to be underestimated by this technique.
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TABLE XXXVIII
EXPENDITURES BY THE CRUDE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN
NORTH DAKOTA, 1951–1954 (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
1951
Williams County
120
Mountrail County		
Other
580
——
North Dakota
700

1952
1953
10,890 15,220
1,350
5,270
3,960
7,780
——— ———
16,200 28,270

1954
13,940
5,530
13,500
———
32,970

The potential effects of these expenditures on the economy of the
area is limited by two factors. First, in oil field exploration and petroleum production, labor costs are small relative to the costs of supplies
and machinery. Second, few of the materials and none of the equipment used is produced in the area or in the state. Of the amount spent
for such goods, only that portion that is attributed to transport and
distribution accrues to the benefit of the local economy. Further, the
supply of drilling materials and equipment is a specialized area of
business. The major suppliers follow the field establishing branch
distribution outlets in competition for the market. Although these
units may provide additional income to the area through consumption
expenditure by staff and in the construction of service facilities, the
major portion of their revenue is used to pay for a product produced
elsewhere. For example, a major cost of completing a well is the cost
of casing. Several major steel companies have established distribution
centers in Williston and Tioga. These distribution points are relatively
small establishments with few employees. The wage and salary income
originating in their activity is a very small portion of the total expenditure for their product.
The distribution of expenditures by type and by area may be noted
in Table XXXIX.
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TABLE XXXIX

EXPENDITURES BY OIL PRODUCERS AND OIL AND GAS
FIELD CONTRACTORS BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE BY AREA,
1951–1954 (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Wages &
Supplies,
Machinery
Not
Total
Salaries
Minerals,
&
Allocated
		
Fuel &
Equipment
		Energy
Williams County					
1951
18
24
64
17
123
1952
1,714
2,318
5,225
1,632
10,890
1953
2,285
3,091
7,665
2,176
15,218
1954
2,123
2,873
6,910
2,023
13,930
———
———
———
———
———
Period
6,140
8,306
19,854
5,848
40,160
Mountrail County					
1952
213
286
652
201
1,353
1953
780
1,054
2,695
742
5,273
1954
850
1,149
2,723
809
5,530
———
———
———
———
———
Period
1,844
2,489
6,070
1,752
12,156
North Dakota					
1951
174
235
127
165
701
1952
2,963
4,006
6,411
2,822
16,202
1953
4,871
6,589
12,167
4,639
28,266
1954
6,015
8,136
13,084
5,729
32,964
———
———
———
———
———
Period
14,023
18,966
31,789
13,355
78,133

In the four years after 1950, oil activity, exclusive of the acquisition
of mineral rights, cost more than 40 million dollars in Williams County
and over 12 million in Mountrail. Of these amounts, approximately 8
million was spent for wages and salaries by oil producers and contractors. They spent nearly 11 million on supplies, minerals and fuel, and
more than twice that amount (26 million) on machinery and oil well
equipment. The total expenditure includes nearly 14 million dollars
that has not been allocated by type of expenditure. These unallocated
expenditures contain two major accounts; the entrepreneurial profits
of contractors and expenditures for contract services outside of the industry group.
Of major importance in estimating the direct impact of the oil development on the local economy is the fact that less than 16 percent
of the total expenditure was for wages and salaries. It has been noted
above that a very small proportion of expenditures of other types benefit local establishments and payrolls.
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In contrast to oil field expenditures, income from mineral leases
and royalty payments are received in large part by the landowners
of the area and are a source of additional consumption expenditure.
The magnitude of income of this type has been estimated for the years
1948–53 on the basis of the Voelker study for Williams County. The
pattern of leasing activity has been described above where it was noted
that the leasing of mineral rights began in 1948. In the first two years
of activity, total payments for leases and bonuses in Williams County
are estimated at less than $50,000. By 1951, lease activity in the area
reached a peak and bonus payments above exceeded one million dollars. By the end of 1953, royalty payments had reached the same level
and offset the decline in bonus payments. Total income from mineral
rights approximated $2,000,000. Due to the sale of mineral acres by
mineral deed it is impossible to estimate the proportion of lease and
royalty income accruing to original owners in the area. In 1951, the
value of mineral acres sold was slightly more than three million dollars.
Approximately one-third of the acreage sold was sold by owners, the remaining two-thirds by brokers. Income derived from sales are a type of
transfer payment and duplicate in part the income received from lease
payments and oil royalties. In one sense, the owner is receiving a prepayment of lease and royalty income with the sale of mineral acreage.
The speculative gains of brokers are primarily transfers of income
from other persons or corporations and are not usually net addition to
income.
Data on the pattern of leasing activity in Mountrail County are not
available. In view of the location of the major proven fields, it is probable that the pattern approximates very closely that of Williams County
and that income from leases and bonuses is only slightly less than the
amounts indicated in Table XL.
TABLE XL
DELAY RENTALS, BONUS PAYMENTS AND OIL ROYALTIES TO
INDIVIDUALS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES, WILLIAMS COUNTY, 1948–1953.
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

1948–49
1950
1951
1952
1953

Delay 		
Bonus
Royalties
Rentals		 Payment
19		25		
50		36		
332		1,139
6
644		224
374
650		60
1,074

Total
44
86
1,447
1,242
1,784
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A. The Business Structure
In view of the volatility of the business expansion during the period
of oil development and the high mortality of small business ventures
during the period, it is extremely difficult to describe the pattern of
change that occurred. Data from the 1948 and 1954 Census of Business
indicate that the number of establishments in the trade and service industries increased by 32 percent in Williams County and declined by 11
percent in Mountrail County. The net increase in Williston included 82
of the total net increase of 133 establishments in Williams County. Yet
a comparison of the Williston telephone directories for 1950 and 1953
indicates that the number of new establishments operating in the area
during the period was much greater than census data suggest.
The 1953 directory listed 132 trade and service establishments that
were not listed in 1950, exclusive of 33 firms supplying the oil industry
and 24 firms in oil field contract services. Further, the 1950 directory
listed 40 such establishments not listed in 1953. This difference in the
number of establishments reported results in part from definitions of
business establishments, in part from the inadequacy of directory information, and in part from changes in ownership and in the name
of the establishment. Together, these factors account, however, for a
relatively small part of the difference. Direct investigation verified the
extremely large turn-over in establishments in the early period of oil
development.
Table XLI below offers some comparison of the number of establishments for selected years.
TABLE XLI
NUMBER OF ACTIVE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS BY TYPE
OF ESTABLISHMENT, TRADE AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
1948–1954, WILLISTON, NORTH DAKOTA
Wholesale Trade:
Retail Trade:
Food Stores
Eating & Drinking
General Merchandise & Apparel
Furniture & Appliances
Automobiles & Gasoline
Lumber & Hardware
All other
Service

19481
21
127
16
25
16
9
23
16
22
63

19502
19
142
16
28
16
9
33
17
23
59

19532
50
169
26
29
16
14
36
19
29
79

19541
46
153
22
28
15
9
32
15
32
91

1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Business.
2. Derived from local census and telephone directories.			
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The estimates derived for 1950 and 1953 are the number of establishments active in that year. As was noted above, these point data
obscure the number of establishments entering and leaving the area
during the period and estimates of payrolls, income and employment
for the area are understated by such data.
Within this limitation, the major changes in the business structure
of the study area appear to have been in the number of new establishments in wholesale trade and in the service industry. In absolute terms,
Williston experienced a very large proportion of the total increase
and Tioga and environs much of the residual gain. Mountrail County
gained only in the number of service establishments and had a net loss
in the number of firms in wholesale and retail trade. Williston contained 73 percent of the total increase in Williams County. It had 86
percent of new firms in wholesale trade, nearly 60 percent of new retail
establishments and a little more than half of the net addition to the
service industry. In relative terms, the greatest change in the trade and
service structure was in wholesale trade, an increase of 119 percent. The
greatest change in the Tioga area was in service, a gain of 104 percent.
These two measures describe the pattern of development in the area,
the concentration of oil field suppliers in Williston and of subsidiary
services in the oil field area.
Changes in the sales, receipts and payrolls of the three industry
groups are shown in Table XLII. Sales and receipts in Williams County
in 1954 exceeded the 1948 level by 24,319,000 dollars or 51 percent.
The gain in Williston was 19.3 million dollars, an increase of 71 per
cent over 1948 and nearly 80 percent of the county gain. Williston also
received 94 percent of the increase in wholesale sales and nearly 80
percent of the gain in service receipts.
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TABLE XLII
SALES, RECEIPTS AND PAYROLLS IN TRADE AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES, 1948 AND 1954—WILLISTON, WILLIAMS COUNTY
AND MOUNTRAIL COUNTY (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
		
Sales & Receipts Payrolls
		
1948
1954
1948
1954
Wholesale Trade:				
Williams County $25,628 $39,000 $551
$1,541
Williston
10,763 23,377 338
1,073
Mountrail
(D)
(D)
(D)
(D)
Retail Trade:				
Williams County $21,207 $30,357 $1,653 $3,030
Williston
15,601 20,914 1,277
2,294
Mountrail County 8,112
10,839 454
763
Service:				
Williams County $972
$2,769 $166
$523
Williston
781
2,168
153
476
Mountrail County 178
426
16
52
U.S. Department of Commerce: 1954 Census of Business.			

Business expansion added nearly three million dollars to payrolls
in Williams County, with the greatest absolute gain in retail trade and
the greatest relative gain in the service industry. Three-fourths of the
increase in payrolls occurred in establishments located in Williston.
Mountrail County had modest gains in payrolls in retail sales and services, however, the gain in this county as a whole was less than a third
of the increase in the same industry groups in Williston.
One general indication of the effect of oil activity on the trade structure of the area and the state may be inferred from state data on sales
tax collections for the period 1950–1953. (TABLES XLIII AND XLIV.)
TABLE XLIII
SALES TAX COLLECTIONS FOR SELECTED COUNTIES AND
THEIR SUB-DIVISIONS, 1950–1954
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
		
Williams County
Williston
Ray
Tioga
Mountrail County
Stanley

1950
$375.7
288.6
22.2
11.6
148.6
62.7

1951
$407.7
318.4
23.1
12.8
155.5
62.6

1952
$578.6
460.1
34.6
30.4
158.9
65.2

1953
$788.9
614.8
45.5
70.9
173.9
74.0
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TABLE XLIV
PERCENT OF STATE SALES TAX COLLECTION BY SELECTED
COUNTIES AND THEIR SUBDIVISIONS, 1950–1954
		
Williams County
Williston
Ray
Tioga
Mountrail County
Stanley

1950
3.32%
2.55
.20
.10
1.31
.55

1951
3.37%
2.63
.19
.11
1.29
.52

1952
4.70%
3.74
.28
.25
1.29
.53

1953
6.30%
4.91
.36
.57
1.39
.59

SOURCE: North Dakota Tax Department, Sales Tax Division. 			

Both counties and their major subdivisions gained relative to the
state in sales activity as reflected by tax collections. The gain in Mountrail County and in Stanley was slight and occurred late in the period
as exploration spread away from the site of discovery. In Williston and
Tioga, the gains were immediate and large. It is descriptive of the pattern of development that in 1950, tax collections in Ray were nearly
double those in Tioga. By 1953, collections in Tioga were almost 50
percent greater than in Ray.
A second general indicator of changes in business activity is found
in bank deposit data for the area.1 These data indicate that the banks in
Williams County experienced virtually no net increase. The following
data for banks in the ten northwestern counties indicate the relative
rates of increase.

The analysis of bank deposit changes was made by W.E. Koenker, Professor of
Economics, The University of North Dakota.
1
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County				
				
————————————
Burke
Divide
McLean
Mountrail
Williams
Renville
Bottineau
McHenry
Ward
McKenzie
Nine counties other than Williams

Percentage Change in Total Deposits
Dec. 31, 1950 to Dec. 31, 1954
————————————
+15
+9
–4
+2
+48
–24
0
0
+1
0
+.18

The increase in deposits in Burke County is attributable almost entirely to the deposits placed in the new bank at Powers Lake, only about
ten miles from the production area.
Despite the fact that a considerable portion of the oil production
area lay in Mountrail County, there seems to have been little effect on
deposits in banks in that area. The bank at Stanley, which was only
about 20 miles away, experienced a ten percent decline in total deposits
during the four year period.2 The banks at Newtown and Parshall were
too remote, too far off of Highway Two, to experience much effect from
the oil business.
Except in accounting for the new bank at Powers Lake, the major
impact of the oil development seems to have been in the two banks
at Williston and the banks at Tioga and Ray. These banks had the
following percentage increase in demand and time deposits between
December 31, 1950, and the end of 1954.
Williams County Banks

Percentage Increase in
Demand
Time
Ray—Citizens State Bank
57
41
Williston—American State Bank
36
62
Williston—First National Bank
31
50
Tioga—(New bank in 1951)			
Total for all banks in the County			

Deposits
Total
54
42
37
48

During the last portion of this period; however, most of the oil companies
operating in the area were beginning to maintain accounts at this bank as well
as at the banks in Williams County. These accounts were drawn upon to make
lease rental and royalty payments in the area.
2
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In contrast with the banks at Williston and Ray having increases
ranging from 37 to 54 percent in total deposits, none of the other banks
in the ten county area had increases in excess of 16 percent. This included the three banks in Minot which had increases of only about 2
percent during the period.
Since the banks in the other nine counties located in the same general area of the state experienced virtually no net gain in total deposits,
it seems logical to assume that the increases experienced by the banks
in Williams County are attributable directly or indirectly to oil. In absolute amounts, this increase amounted to about six and one-half million
dollars, an increase from $13.4 million to $19.9 million.
The increase in demand deposits was somewhat less than that for
time deposits. This increase in demand deposits is significant since only
one other bank in the ten state area had an increase in excess of ten percent. Two thirds of these banks experienced decreases in deposits. This
increase in demand deposits in Williams County banks reflected the
increased number of households and business firms serviced by these
banks.
Percentage data on time deposits are somewhat more unreliable for
comparison purposes since some of the smaller banks began making
real efforts to attract time deposits during this period. Total time deposits, however, for all banks in the nine counties other than Williams
County increased by only 13 percent. This was in contrast to the 60
percent increase in time deposits in the Williams County banks.
A concomitant of an increase in deposits is usually a comparable
increase in loans and investments. In Williams County loans increased
by 189 percent or an increase from about 3 million to 8.6 million dollars. This increase was very much in excess of the 45 percent increase
for the other nine counties. In only one other county was the increase
in excess of 80 percent.
This was a period of rather substantial expansion in loans
throughout the state and some decline in assets held in the form of U.S.
government bonds and other securities. The expanding communities
served by the banks in Williams County, however, provided substantial
outlets especially for housing and installment loans.
Data for two of the banks in the county indicate the following percentage increases in major loan categories.
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Percentage Increase
		
Dec. 1950 to Dec. 1954
Bank A
Bank B
Medium Size		Large
Commercial and Industrial Loans
83
130
CCC Loans
390
26
Other Loans to Farmers
242
286
Real Estate Loans
1430
86
Installment Loans		
Auto
1350
217
Other
1700
267

The phenomenal increase in real estate and installment loans in the
medium sized bank was a reflection of a marked change in the pattern
of lending. Many North Dakota banks in this size category were just
beginning to make loans of this type. Obviously, however, in this case
the oil boom provided a much enhanced opportunity for loans in these
categories. This is confirmed by the very marked increase in installment lending by the large bank which even in 1950 had a substantial
amount of this kind of paper.
Another indication of the financial impact of the oil industry is to
be found in sales of savings bonds. Since these are limited as to type of
purchaser and to the amount which may be held, they provide some
indication of liquid savings held by individuals. The growth in savings
bond sales in Williams County and the decline in most of the other
counties in the northwestern portion of the state is shown in the following tabulation. Sales for the two year period of 1954 and 1955 are
compared with the two year period of 1949 and 1950, because individual year comparisons are apt to be erratic.
Only two of the ten counties had significant increases. The increase
in Divide County is attributable to exceptionally good crops in both
1954 and 1955. There has been a declining amount of income from
lease rentals in this county, so this factor would not account for any
of the difference. Some of the increase in bond sales may be due to a
rather aggressive “pushing” of bonds on the part of the Crosby bank.
The increase in Williams County is largely attributable to the oil development. Part of it, however, is also due to the better than average crop
in these two years. The data seem, therefore, to indicate that, while
some of the increase in savings bond sales may be due to oil, that factor
may be no more significant in this respect than a better than average
crop.

211
Percentage Increase or
Decrease 1949 and 1950 to
1954 and 1955

County
Burke
Divide
McLean
Mountrail
Williams
Renville
Bottineau
McHenry
Ward
McKenzie
Total (nine counties other than Williams County)
Total for North Dakota

–21
+34
–17
–29
+25
–37
–10
+4
–18
–48
–13
–17

B. Construction
The major part of contract construction stemming directly from oil development and nearly all construction induced by it have occurred in
two areas, Williston and Tioga and its environs. Apart from these two
localities, only Ray with two trailer camps and an unwarranted residential development and Stanley with modest residential expansion
show any evidence of oil related influence on construction activity.
The pattern of construction activity in Williston is evident in an
analysis of building permit valuations from 1950 to 1954. The value
of construction covered by permits was $1,620,000 in 1950 and
$1,380,000 in the following year. It increased abruptly in 1952 to
$5,371,000 and reached peak at $7,241,000 in 1953. (SEE TABLE
XLV)
TABLE XLV
VALUE OF BUILDING PERMITS, BY TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION—WILLISTON, NORTH DAKOTA, 1950–1954
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Type of Construction
Residential
New
Remodel
Public and Other:
Commercial
All Types

1950
$719
634
95
154
737
1,620

1951
$761
657
105
315
303
1,380

1952
$3,622
3,311
311
538
1,211
5,371

1953
$3,707
3,472
235
1,474
2,060
7,241

1954
$1,186
1,053
133
641
1,217
3,044
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Residential construction provided the major part of building activity in the four years after 1950. Approximately 54 percent of the total
value of permits issued was in residential construction. In 1951, only
61 new dwelling units were authorized. In 1953, permits were issued
for 273 units and for 324 units in the following year. By 1954, a surplus of housing was apparent in the community, in particular in rental
apartments. The number of units declined to 84 and the value of construction authorized was less than half of the number in the preceding
year.
This abrupt increase in 1952 over 1951 was without question a response to the very strong pressures exerted by the influx of population
with the discovery of oil. Although there had been a significant expansion in residential building after 1948 following a peak farm income,
there was little vacant housing for the addition of several hundred migrant families. The “boom” characteristic of residential building activity
in Williston is obvious when compared to new residential construction
authorized in all urban areas of the state.
TABLE XLVI
PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM PRECEDING YEAR IN URBAN
RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZED, NORTH DAKOTA AND WILLISTON, 1950–1954
Area:
Williston
North Dakota

1951/1950
+4%
–20%

1952/1951
+376%
+20%

1953/1952
+5%
+15%

1954/1953
–70%
+20%

SOURCE: Derived from original data in office of Williston City Engineer.		
		

The impact of preliminary oil activity was more than adequate to
offset a general decline in 1951. Activity moved dramatically to a high
plateau where it remained relatively constant through 1953. It fell
sharply in 1954 and continued to decline through the first half of 1955.
Non-residential building responded to the new development in a
similar way although with less force. It, too, is largely induced in a secondary manner rather than by the immediate needs of the oil industry.
Further, the lag in activity was greater in this area of construction, since
a greater proportion of expenditure appears to have been induced by
secondary demand. The major construction items by or for the oil
industry were an office building for Amerada, a small refinery and a
number of warehouses or combination office-warehouses for major
suppliers and contract service firms. Both office and refinery were
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authorized in 1952 and more than 50 percent of the value of warehouse
permits issued, were issued in the same year.
In the five years extending through 1954, the permit valuation of
the offices and warehouses noted above were less than 11 percent of the
total value of private non-residential building authorized. In contrast,
the valuation of utility construction (primarily telephone communication) was 26 percent of the total, hotels and motels nearly 21 percent
and stores and service stations, 20 percent.
The secondary effects of oil development acting through wage and
salary payments, delay rentals, royalty payments and taxes, combined
with the pressures exerted by a rapid increase in population, are evident
in public expenditures. Within five years, Williston spent 740,000 dollars on school construction, 675,000 dollars on church buildings and
790,000 dollars for additions to hospital and clinic facilities. Another
half million was spent by the county for a new courthouse in 1953.
Comparing Williston to all urban places in the state, an index of
building permit valuations based on the 1947–49 average indicates that
activity in Williston greatly exceeded the state pattern (SEE TABLE
XLVII).
TABLE XLVII
INDEX OF BUILDING PERMIT VALUATIONS, ALL URBAN
PLACES OF NORTH DAKOTA AND WILLISTON, 1950–1954
1947 to 1949 = 100
North Dakota
Williston

1950
201
188

1951
115
160

1952
133
625

1953
201
842

1954
167
354

SOURCE: Williston public records and U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.					

Since building permit valuations are not available for Mountrail
County or other areas of Williams County, a precise description of
building activity in these areas is not possible. Inspection of the areas
suggests that there was very little primary or secondary construction
in Mountrail County and that the pattern of activity in the Tioga area
was similar to that of Williston in every respect save one. In Tioga, the
major proportion of construction originated in the oil industry. Major
expenditures by the industry included several million dollars by the
Signal Oil and Gas Company for a gas refining plant just east of the
community. Amerada constructed a multi-unit “village” for its field
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personnel south of Tioga and several suppliers and contract service
firms erected office and storage facilities within and adjacent to it.
Although commercial development was far less impressive in Tioga
than in Williston, it occurred in a community that at the beginning
of oil activity was rapidly becoming a “ghost town.” Hotel, restaurant
and entertainment and recreation facilities were virtually non-existent,
and the community had no paved streets, sewage system, or municipal
water supply. The oil industry literally created a new and living community from the old.
In addition to the large number of oil field workers moving into
the area, the construction of the gas refining plant employed more
than 300 people at peak activity. Many oil field workers, in particular
drilling crews, own and live in trailers. Although large trailer camps
were established in Tioga and vicinity, many migrants were forced to
move into intolerable housing conditions. In several cases, abandoned
grain storage sheds were moved into crowded rows and, after some
slight renovation, rented at exorbitant prices as family dwellings. By
1954, two relatively large housing projects were nearing completion,
reducing the demand pressure and eliminating much of the market for
sub-standard housing.
The completion of the gas refinery and other major construction
projects had restricted the boom activity in construction in 1954. By
June of that year, unemployment was a more pressing problem for construction workers than were housing accommodations.
C. Labor Force and Employment
Changes in population in the area between 1950 and 1954 have been
discussed in another section of this study. It is only necessary to repeat here that the attraction of employment opportunities created by
the oil industry and the employment pattern of that industry brought
many migrants into the area, expanding the size of the labor force. Over
the period, Williston gained nearly 32 percent in number of inhabitants, Ray over 100 percent and Tioga and its environs more than 450
percent.
In contrast Stanley experienced an increase of less than 11 percent
and Mountrail County and all other areas of Williams county had population losses.
The extent to which these population gains resulted from in-migration is evident in the statistics derived from the population sample
census in 1954. (SEE TABLE XII.) One of every three persons living
in Williston in that year did not live there in 1950. Nearly 28 in 100

215
persons came to Williston from beyond the borders of the two study
counties. The proportions of migrants into the smaller communities of
Ray and Tioga are much larger. In both communities, approximately
65 percent of the 1954 population entered the area after 1950. Less
than 5 percent of the migrants into Ray and 10 percent of those into
Tioga were former residents of Williams or Mountrail county. In the
Tioga environs, only 10 percent of all inhabitants were 1950 residents
in the two-county area.
The impact of this migration in the local labor force was much
greater than population changes indicate. This fact is a result of the
age structure of in-migrants, the majority of whom are relatively young
and within the normal limits of work life. In Williston, more than 63
percent of all in-migrants were between the ages of 19 and 50. Of those
resident in Williston in 1950 and residing there in 1954, only 41 per
cent were in this age category. These differences in age between “natives” and migrants also hold in every “oil” location in the study area.
One aspect of this situation affecting the local economy, other than
in terms of the labor force, is that these young migrant families had a
large number of children in the younger school ages. The great increase
in the school age population required new schools in Tioga and Ray, as
well as Williston. The school at Ray was completed about the time that
migrant population, primarily families of drilling crews, began to move
on to other locations.
The impact of oil development on primary and secondary employment has been relatively great. The effect was not as great as the
business leadership of the area assumed. One indication of the difference between the illusion of growth commonly held and the reality of
the situation is in local population estimates. In 1954, the Williston
Chamber of Commerce estimated the population of Williston to be
12,000, compared with the estimate of 9,717 derived from the sample.
Of these two estimates, the study figure must be credited with the
highest validity on the basis of the employment estimates explicit in
it. Two estimates of employment are available for Williston for July
1954. One is the sample estimate. The other is the estimate of the State
Employment Service based on their sample of business establishments.
Allowing for differences in the structure of these two samples, they
compare very favorably. (SEE TABLE XLVIII.)

216
TABLE XLVIII
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY AND OCCUPATION, 1950 AND
JULY 1954, WILLISTON, NORTH DAKOTA
			
Williston			
% Change % Change
		
1950
1954
1954
1950–54 1950–54
		
(census) (sample) (NDES) (sample) (NDES)
Agriculture
150
180		
+20
Mining & Construction
235
494
477
+110
+103
Manufacturing
120
181
190
+50
+58
Transportation,
Construction and
Public Utilities
535
461
387
–14
–28
Trade
880
1054
1199
+20
+36
Finance, Insurance &
Real Estate
72
98
87
+36
+21
Source
679
727
774
+7
+14
Public Administration
126
221
248
+75
+97
No Data
76				
All Occupation
2863
3416
33621
+19
+24
1
Excludes Agriculture		
Professional
256
330		
+17
Farmer
113
153		
+35
Manager, Proprietor,
Official
338
586		
+73
Clerical
351
411		
+17
Sales
343
384		
+12
Craft, Foreman, Kindred
448
489		
+9
Operatives
333
359		
+8
Service
363
366		
+1
Farm Laborer
27
27		
0
Other Laborer
200
311		
+56
NEC.
71				
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce. 1950 Census of Population.		
			

The survey sample shows a total non-agricultural employment of
3,236, a gain of 19 percent over 1950. The ES figure is 3,362, a gain of
24 percent over the census estimate of 1950. The similarity of the two
figures suggests that unless there has been a significant decline in labor
force participation rates, the local estimate of population change must
be excessive.
Nothing in the characteristics of the local population suggests that
the proportion of the population in the labor-force has changed in
significant degree. While the number of children and young persons
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under age 20 has increased since 1950, the proportion of the population over 65 years of age has declined. The off-setting effects of these
changes and the migration of relatively large numbers of unmarried
males into the area limit the possibility of a major decline in labor force
participation rates.
It will be noted in Table XLVIII that although the two estimates
of employment by industry do not agree in magnitude, they do agree
in the direction of change in every industry sector. In each case, the
greatest gain was in mining and construction, followed by public administration and manufactures. In both samples, the service industry
demonstrated the least positive gain and both agree that transportation, communication and public utilities had a decline in employment.
In absolute terms much of the new employment was in mining, construction and trade. The study sample shows an increase of 433, and
the ES sample 561 in these industry groups, compared to total gains of
523 and 649 respectively.
The small differences in the two samples can be explained in the
fact that the study sample measures the employment of persons living
in Williston without regard to their place of employment. Thus it tends
to overstate employment in mining and construction in Williston since
many persons dwell there who perform their employment in the oil
fields. On the other hand, it is probable that a relatively large percentage of persons living outside of Williston, but employed there, are
employed in trade and service and that employment in these industries
is under-stated in the sample. Since the two samples measure employment in different terms, it is expected that the ES estimate should
exceed the sample estimate. It should be noted that the survey sample
is structured in the same manner as the decennial census and is the
only one of the two measures that is comparable to it. Conversely, the
ES sample is structured like the Census of Business.
Occupational changes in Williston suggest the pattern of business
change. A detailed business census indicated that the intensive change
in employment was slight and that most new employment was in firms
new to the area. Further, most of these new establishments were small.
Other than the largest oil producing companies, and major drilling
companies, only one oil-related firm employed a large number of persons. In all other industry components, the small firm pattern was
characteristic. As a result, the greatest change in occupation was that
of managers, proprietors, and officials: a gain of 73 percent over 1950.
Detailed employment data for Ray, Tioga, Stanley and the rural
impact areas are contained in tables XLIX, L, and LI. The impact of
drilling activity and related construction on Tioga and Ray is obvious.
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Nearly half of all employment in Ray and more than half of that in
Tioga and its environs was in mining and construction. Stanley also
suggests this employment effect with nearly a third in these industries.
The importance of the location of a large drilling company in Ray is
reflected by the large proportion of the labor force classified as operatives, nearly 41 percent. Similarly, nearly 35 percent of all employees in
Tioga were in this category with another 14 percent in the category of
craftsman and foreman. The latter category reflects the construction of
Signal Oil and Gas Company’s oil refinery. The project was the major
employment in the area.
TABLE XLIX
LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT, PERSONS 14 YEARS AND
OLDER, SELECTED AREAS, 1954
								
Williston			
Ray			
Male Female Total
M F T
Employed
2548 868
3416
424 59 483
Unemployed
57
25		 82
3 6 9
TOTAL LABOR FORCE
2605 893
3498
427 65 492
Keeping House
8
2025
2033
..... 326 326
In School
147 216
363
21 28 49
Unable to Work
155 98		
253
21 7 28
Retired
145 .....
145
29 ..... 29
Other
21
17		
38
4 ..... 4
No Data
44
28		
72
1 3 4
TOTAL NOT IN LABOR FORCE
520 2384
2904
76 364 440
TOTAL IN AGE GROUP
3125 3277
6402
503 429 932

Impact					 Tioga &
Counties
Stanley		
Environs
M F T
M F T
M F T
612 20 632

462 123 585

824 86 906

4

6

17

..... 4

5

11

8

29

616 20 636

468 128 596

841 94 935

0

..... 338 338

4

534 538

33 56 89

28 50 78

41

61 102

20 4

24

43 35 78

27

12 39

4

12

15 ..... 15

31

..... 31

20 ..... 20

3

3

..... 3

4

13 5

31

3

423 423

8

4

8

..... 3
18

34

81 495 576

102 428 530

137 610 747

697 515 1212

570 556 1126 978 704 1682

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.					
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TABLE XLIX-A
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION
							 Impact					 Tioga &
		
Williston		
Ray			
Counties		
Stanley		
Environs
Male Female Total
M
F
T
M
F T
M
F T
M
F
T
Employed
97.8
97.3
97.7
Unemployed
2.2
2.7
2.3
Total Labor Force
100.0 100.0
100.0
Keeping House
1.6
84.9
70.7
In School
28.2
9.1
12.5
Unable to Work
29.8
4.0
8.7
Retired
28.2
......
5.0
Other
4.0
0.4
1.3
No Data
8.1
1.2
2.5
Total Not In Labor Force
100.0 100.0
100.0

99.3 90.8 98.2

99.4 100.0 99.4 98.8 95.7 98.2

98.0 90.9 97.0

0.7

0.6

2.0

9.2 1.8

......

0.6

1.2

4.3 1.8

9.1 3.0

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
......

89.6 74.0

......

85.5 73.4 ......

78.9 63.7

2.2

87.6 72.0

27.6 7.6 11.1

40.8 11.3 15.4 30.9 11.6 14.8

31.1 10.0 13.8

27.6 1.9 6.3

24.7 0.8

4.2

42.4 8.2 14.8

20.0 2.0 5.3

38.2 ...... 6.6

4.9

1.6

2.1

12.1 ...... 2.8

22.2 ...... 4.1

5.3

...... 1.0

24.7 ......

3.5

3.0

2.2

1.3

0.9 1.0

4.9

1.4

12.1 1.3 3.3

0.8

...... 0.6

...... 0.4

22.2 0.4 4.5

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.

TABLE L
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, SELECTED AREAS, 1954

		

			
			
			
		
Ray
Agriculture
Mining and Construction
Manufacturing, Durable
Manufacturing, Non-Durable
Transportation, Communications
and Public Utilities
Trade
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
Service
Public Administration
No Data
TOTAL

Impact
Counties		
Williams		
Mountrail
Stanley

Tioga
and
Environs

58
237
......
......

524
60
......
......

30
186
......
5

72
498
......
......

46
83
5
31
5
18
483

16
20
......
4
......
8
632

57
147
16
88
36
20
585

66
130
9
72
17
42
906

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.				
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TABLE L-A
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
			
			
			
		
Ray
Agriculture
Mining and Construction
Manufacturing, Durable
Manufacturing, Non-Durable
Transportation, Communications
and Public Utilities
Trade
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
Service
Public Administration
No Data
TOTAL

Impact
Counties		
Williams		
Mountrail
Stanley

Tioga
and
Environs

12.1
49.0
......
......

82.9
9.5
......
......

5.1
31.8
......
0.9

8.0
55.0
......
......

9.6
17.2
1.3
6.4
1.3
3.1
100.0

2.5
3.2
......
0.6
......
1.3
100.0

9.8
25.2
2.8
15.0
6.1
3.3
100.0

7.3
14.4
1.0
8.0
1.9
4.5
100.0

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.				

TABLE LI
EMPLOYMENT BY TYPE OF OCCUPATION,
SELECTED AREAS 1954
					
			
Impact		
		
Ray
Counties
Stanley
Professional
6
12
46
Farm
37
479
28
Managers
31
4
74
Clerical
25
8
44
Sales
31
4
71
Crafts
49
12
52
Operatives
197
52
97
Services
25
8
52
Farm Laborers
22
40
3
Other Laborers
34
4
96
No Data
26
9
22
TOTAL
483
632
585
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.				

Tioga
and
Environs
17
55
81
87
24
130
315
46
17
101
33
906
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TABLE LI-A
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

				
		Tioga
			
Impact		
and
		
Ray
Counties
Stanley
Environs
Professional
1.3
1.9
7.9
1.9
Farm
7.6
75.8
4.7
6.1
Managers
6.4
0.6
12.6
8.9
Clerical
5.1
1.3
7.5
9.6
Sales
6.4
0.6
12.1
2.6
Crafts
10.2
1.9
8.9
14.4
Operatives
40.8
8.3
16.8
34.8
Services
5.1
1.3
8.9
5.1
Farm Laborers
4.5
6.4
0.5
1.9
Other Laborers
7.0
0.6
16.4
11.2
No Data
5.7
1.3
3.7
3.8
TOTAL
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
SOURCE: Projections from sample census. 				

The employment distribution of residents compared with migrants
is shown in Table LII below.
TABLE LII
PERCENT BY INDUSTRY OF ALL PERSONS EMPLOYED IN 1954
WHO LIVED IN THE SAME AREA IN 1950, WILLISTON AND
OTHER IMPACT AREA
1954 Employment:
Agriculture
Mining and Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, Communication
and Public Utilities
Trade
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
Service
Public Administration
All Industries

1950 Residence
Williston
90%
51
69

Other Impact Area
95%
23
100

79
70
74
81
67
71%

SOURCE: Projected from sample census. 		

59
65
63
69
80
58%
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While 7 out of 10 persons employed in Williston in 1954 lived in that
community in 1950, only 4 of every 10 employed in other study areas
were 1950 residents of the area. In both areas, the greatest penetration
of migrants was into the mining and construction industry. Less than
a quarter of those employed in this industry outside of Williston were
native to the area of employment. In Williston, the numbers of natives
and migrants in the industry were nearly equal. In the smaller communities and in the rural impact areas, there was no other industry group
in which migrants were employed in greater proportion than they bear
to the total labor force. Natives of the area while being interviewed
often complained of the fact that the oil industry favored migrants in
employment. In the long term, it may be that this factor is favorable to
the community. When oil activity moves out of this area, those who will
first suffer employment loss are those who came to the area in search of
employment. The sustaining effects of oil derived income supplements
may be adequate to maintain employment in the secondary industries
in which the majority of “residents” are employed.

Chapter 8
The Economic Consequences of Oil
Development
David Flynn
Introduction
That oil changed the economic trajectory for Williston and Williams County in
North Dakota is made clear by the data contained in the 1958 Williston Report.
The consequences of oil industry growth are ongoing. In many ways the growth
and development of Williston and the surrounding areas is a familiar story of
technological progress combined with fortuitous circumstances and appropriate resource endowments. While not identical to the situation in Silicon
Valley, the application of hydraulic fracturing to “tight” shale oil formations,
such as those found in the Bakken Formation of North Dakota and Montana,
represented a new opportunity for oil in North Dakota and the Williston area.
Comparison of the current boom with the descriptions and data provided by
the 1958 Report show that the region has gone through a third “boom” (the
second having happened in the 1980s; see Rundquist and Vandeberg, current
volume), a rarity in economic history, and is making even larger changes in
economic growth and development than the first time.
Growth and economic development are common goals for communities of
all shapes and sizes, though success in these areas is rarely absolute and often
involves ambiguities or mixed signals. There are all sorts of ways to measure
economic consequences, such as growth rates, economic impacts, or unemployment rates. Media reports during the 2008–14 boom focused on factors
like the unemployment rate, oil output, income, and tax revenues. To accurately convey the story of the economic consequences it is important that the
selected measures show the rare story of overnight success in Williston over
the last decade, but set against the backdrop of the last fifty years.
The data also need to reflect the challenges in telling this story and avoid
overselling both the struggles and the successes. Striking this balance requires a broader view of the economic data punctuated by key outcomes and
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occurrences. Some direct comparisons to the 1958 Report are possible, but in
other cases, certain measures are more relevant to the most recent boom (and
unavailable with respect to the first). The press attention focused on the oil
industry, and rightly so. However, a focus on the economic consequences for
Williston based solely on the performance of the oil industry is too narrow, as
the 1958 Report showed. While oil is clearly the impetus for change, we need
to understand the broader changes that occurred. At the time of this writing,
Williston, the Bakken shale formation, and the state of North Dakota have
been through one complete oil cycle, and that is the proper geographic scale
for the analysis, unlike in 1958. And while commodity cycles are not foreign
to these areas, the experience is more commonly felt in the agriculture sector.
Kelley recognized the same situation with underemployment, migration being
motivated as one of the “alternatives to continued employment in agriculture”
(p. 189). With one iteration complete, government, companies, and workers
now enter a learning phase where adjustments to the supply chain, employment circumstances, technology, and other factors occur. (For a journalistic
account, see Brooks 2015; Yardley and Killelea 2016; “Bakken Seems to Be in a
Steady Growth Cycle” 2018.)
What this means is that some of the euphoric praise for the industry has
now settled to a low roar. There was a stark realization that oil prices can and
do decline, and consequently so do other measures of economic activity in the
Bakken region, such as level of employment. Oil is not gone and is not likely to
disappear anytime soon, and it still represents an important economic engine
and opportunity for Williston, the surrounding communities, and the state
of North Dakota as a whole (Smith 2018). However, the path of decline from
peak prices, including job losses and tax revenue shortfalls, represents an important part of a revised attitude towards oil and the related economic activity.
While an economy is made up of more than numbers reflected in gross income
or employment, the statistics are—or can be—the unbiased part of the discussion around the story of growth and development.
During the most recent boom, the story of the Williston economy in many
ways became the story of the entire Bakken oil region and the state of North
Dakota as a whole. This identification was more than symbolic; in many ways
the singular focus of North Dakota business and industry became integration
within the supply chain for the oil industry, expanded beyond the regional
nature the last time. For a micropolitan area like Williston, or the larger Bakken
area, to become the vital cog in the economy of the state (and so important as
a source of growth) is an amazing story. In that regard, then, the consequences
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of oil also offer a perspective and a frame of reference with respect to the oil
economy. Economic history, like most history, reflects the circumstances of the
time during which the writing occurred. Perspectives change over time, and
thus the important constraint on this assessment is that it comes at the end of
the first fracking-induced up-and-down cycle, while the industry continues on
the way up for a second time.
To measure and discuss the consequences of oil, there first needs to be a discussion of what happened with oil. The oil price and quantity data are relevant
as a starting point and are interesting in their own right. The dramatic changes
due to the oil industry can then first be seen through changes in taxable sales
and purchases. The sales data provide a sense of the enormous change that
occurred as a result of changes in business and consumer practices. The consequences for labor markets are the next topic of discussion. Labor was in short
supply as oil prices took off and the voracious appetite for workers created
large changes in labor force and compensation, a situation described in 1958 as
“persistent underemployment” (Kelley, p. 189). There is a problem with labor
market information, however. There is a very real prospect that the oil industry
never sated its appetite for workers and as such the data, as impressive as they
are, did not complete their upward adjustments (Milijkovic and Ripplinger
2016). To broaden the perspective, the examination turns to other income and
employment data, looking at both general numbers and sector-specific information. The last industry identified for special attention is construction. The
stories about inadequate housing and “man camps” make a look at the data for
this industry necessary. As mentioned before, indicators of the consequences
of oil abound and in fact depend on one’s definition of the term “economic.”
I do not discuss crime data here, though that could be thought an economic
consequence of oil (see, for instance, Peterson 2012; Eligon 2013; Jayasundara,
Heitkamp, and Ruddell 2016; Heitkamp and Mayzer 2018). Nor is there a discussion of government budgeting or social service provision. Choices need to
be made in any undertaking of this sort and these very important topics are
left to other authors or other volumes for investigation and discussion.
Oil Price and Output
The attention given to oil in North Dakota might lead one to believe discoveries of oil and development of fields are recent activities when in fact the
North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources data on oil go back to the
1950s, and the first Williston Report came out in 1958. The long presence of oil
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does not imply a lack of volatility. As we will see in this section, there has been
significant volatility in the oil industry and Williams County in particular.
The geographic area comprising the Bakken varies somewhat (see Wills, current volume, and Rundquist and Vandeberg, current volume). There are many
other counties included in the overall Bakken region, from both North Dakota
and Montana, although Dunn, Mountrail, McKenzie, and Williams counties
in North Dakota were some of the most productive. The focus on Williston directs us towards these counties and Williams County in particular, as Williston
is the seat for Williams County.
Potential profits drive expansion and contraction in the oil industry as they
do in all business sectors. The confluence of price and technological development in the form of hydraulic fracturing created a profitable opportunity for
oil in the area around Williston. As we will see, the technical ability to recover
oil and the profitability of actually recovering the oil are not identical, although
they both represent an important part of the recent changes in Williston.
The monthly North Dakota first purchase price for oil from mid-1977 to
mid-2019 in North Dakota is shown in Figure 8.1. From mid-1977 to the end
of the twentieth century, the price moved within a relatively small band, a low
of $8.41 per barrel and a high of $41.77. When adjusting for inflation, with
January 2000 as the base period, the spread widens from $8.88 at the low
end to $79.82 at the high end. At that time, it started a prolonged, though not
straight-line, increase for much of the first decade of the twenty-first century.
After January 2000 the low price per barrel was $16.80 while the high was
$126.88. Adjusting for inflation again the spread is reduced where the low is
$16.04 and the high is $98.62. Even when we control for inflation the price
increase was sizable and impressive and the response of oil activity to the elevation in prices was predictable, though possibly not to the extent eventually
seen.
Annual oil production in the state of North Dakota increased dramatically
(Figure 8.2). Prior to the onset of the price increases in 2000, there was only
a three-year period from 1983 to 1985 when state production exceeded 50
million barrels per year. In fact, after declining as low as 27.6 million barrels,
production did not exceed 50 million barrels again until 2008. The eventual
peak in production occurred in 2015 at more than 400 million barrels of oil
per year. From the start of the series in 1951 to the peak in 2015, annual oil
output increased at an annual growth rate of 16.38 percent, with most of the
growth clearly coming late in the period as a response to the increase in the
prices. The Bakken region was a significant driver of the eventual growth as
Figure 8.3 illustrates.
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Figure 8.2 also displays the distinction between this report and the 1958 Report. The production levels are not even remotely similar. There were increases
in both time periods under analysis, but the scale of the increase in the current
episode is amazing by comparison.

Figure 8.1. North Dakota first purchase oil price, 1977–2019
(source: Energy Information Administration 2019)

Figure 8.2. North Dakota annual oil production, 1951–2018 (source: North
Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2018)
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Figure 8.3. Bakken oil production as a percentage of total North Dakota oil
production, 1954–2019 (source: North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2019a, 2019b)

The Bakken region was not always an important part of oil production in
North Dakota. Prior to 1981 the highest percentage of North Dakota oil production coming from the region was only 5.28 percent. This is consistent with
the perception that it was expensive to extract oil from the tight oil formations
like the Bakken and therefore prices needed to rise significantly above their
long-run average. In the early 1990s there was a brief increase in the share of
state production coming from the Bakken, though it quickly dropped back to
the normal, lower contribution. After 2000 there was a significant change.
In fact, at the end of 2004, Bakken oil production was still only 2.04 percent
of total state output. By December 2005 the amount increased to 3.74 percent,
with a further increase to 8.81 percent by December 2006. By the end of 2007
Bakken oil production was just shy of 25 percent of the state total at 24.38
percent, and its share continued to grow. By June 2012 the Bakken region represented over 90 percent of the state’s oil production and remained above that
level since crossing the threshold.1
Earlier production graphs may give the perception that there was no volatility in oil production for the Bakken region. This is not the case, as the
monthly percentage changes in Bakken oil production show (Figure 8.4). The
1

The highest percentage is also the last available observation at the time of writing, May 2018,
at 95.61 percent.
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period from the 1950s to 1970 experienced high monthly percentage changes
in production, both positive and negative. This would not be surprising during
the start-up phase of oil exploration and production in the industry. To remove those early effects Figure 8.5 starts with 1974, removing about the first
twenty years of exploration but allowing for the oil embargo price shock of the
1970s to show in the data.

Figure 8.4. Monthly percentage change in Bakken oil production, 1954–2019
(source: North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2019a)

Figure 8.5. Monthly percentage change in Bakken oil production, 1974–2019
(source: North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2019a)
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There were no moves up or down in excess of 100 percent as happened in
the earlier graph. The volatility of the 1970s is quite noticeable at the early end
of this figure. What is more notable and important for the growth story of Williston, the Bakken region, and the state as a whole is the period surrounding
2010. This was a time of significant expansion of the oil sector. During the
eighty-four months from January 2006 to January 2013, there were only
sixteen months where the monthly percentage change in oil production was
negative. The average percentage change in production for positive months in
this time was 9.2 percent while the average percentage decline was 4.6 percent.
Oil became a more secure sector in the regional economy at this time, as these
production data demonstrate. The transition into permanence can be seen in
the data related to spending, such as taxable sales and purchases.
Taxable Sales and Purchases
Clearly oil price and production experienced significant changes over this time
period. Evaluation and assessment of the consequences are made all the more
difficult and, at some level, chaotic in that the bulk of the changes occurred in
a condensed time frame. One way to proceed is to consider the larger consequences of business and consumer spending decisions. There were discussions
of similar factors in the first report (for example, Table XLII, p. 206).
The micropolitan area of Williston has always been important to Williams
County and the Bakken area in general as the most accessible urban location
within the oil producing region (see Table 8.1). From 1998 to 2017 the city of
Williston accounted for 82 percent of taxable sales and purchases in Williams
County. During that time the percentage never dropped below 75 percent and
was as high as 95.4 percent in 2015. Of note is the fact, however, that as the
oil activity in the Bakken increased, Williston accounted for less of Williams
County taxable sales and purchases because economic activity spread beyond
the Williston borders into the county and the entire Bakken region.
However, as the oil industry developed and expanded within the Bakken
region and the state, the city of Williston became more significant for the state
as a whole, a contrast with the earlier growth story. While important for the
region, the discussion did not, and likely could not, attach similar importance
to oil and the region within the state’s economy. Williston taxable sales and
purchases in 1999 accounted for slightly more than 2 percent of the total taxable purchases for the state. For some sense of scale, in the same year, Fargo
(the state’s largest city) accounted for 22.4 percent of the taxable sales and
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purchases in the entire state. Oil activity increased taxable sales and purchases
in the city of Williston and Williams County as a whole such that at its peak
the city of Williston accounted for 12.8 percent of state taxable sales and purchases in 2011, which was more than the 12.3 percent accounted for by Fargo.
Williston remained in this position for the next three years before falling back
down below 10 percent of the state taxable sales and purchases in 2015. For
contrast, Table XLIV (p. 207) in the 1958 Report listed a peak value for Williams County of 6.3 percent.
TABLE 8.1.
TAXABLE SALES AND PURCHASES FOR SELECT REGIONS, 1998–2017
(SOURCE: NORTH DAKOTA OFFICE OF THE STATE TAX
COMMISSIONER 1998–2017)
Year Williston
		
1998 150,295,787
1999 140,483,646
2000 169,947,181
2001 187,935,122
2002 172,187,821
2003 183,836,462
2004 210,877,027
2005 270,115,186
2006 357,546,219
2007 439,619,535
2008 773,170,192
2009 675,040,776
2010 1,336,306,479
2011 2,521,286,467
2012 3,518,532,535
2013 3,378,607,395
2014 3,682,778,083
2015 2,264,499,283
2016 1,085,477,900
2017 1,378,456,764

Williams Co.

Fargo

Cass Co.

North Dakota

165,470,498
156,152,168
189,571,906
210,858,980
190,365,110
204,255,883
236,898,107
300,664,981
398,381,346
504,284,708
903,807,261
799,497,870
1,611,720,192
3,226,767,967
4,688,118,804
4,400,324,668
4,732,830,190
2,373,326,151
1,142,355,580
1,449,029,110

1,442,140,395
1,539,637,392
1,531,075,477
1,576,834,106
1,621,210,606
1,716,327,256
1,828,816,117
1,868,107,039
1,981,270,180
2,086,245,604
2,195,210,182
2,129,797,379
2,221,235,368
2,422,391,342
2,640,098,193
2,690,898,800
2,797,822,914
2,738,758,575
2,578,604,632
2,439,546,655

1,610,533,335
1,728,696,608
1,730,867,919
1,784,909,487
1,837,923,479
1,942,797,279
2,100,762,530
2,140,351,698
2,262,165,598
2,377,531,817
2,500,612,201
2,417,009,645
2,526,120,822
2,775,649,629
3,055,069,906
3,125,583,081
3,256,646,158
3,199,609,785
3,001,106,671
2,874,488,805

6,476,111,865
6,863,857,581
6,826,387,672
7,147,128,090
7,044,743,275
7,347,458,242
8,000,269,656
8,566,950,882
9,284,289,973
10,251,031,277
12,397,074,757
11,743,211,404
14,137,315,824
19,690,371,061
25,290,676,807
25,464,563,890
28,222,431,451
22,881,848,847
17,328,567,822
17,900,699,259

Spending decisions by businesses clearly changed as a result of oil. These
data represent only consumption- and investment-type spending by individuals and businesses. Absent from these data is spending on labor resources.
The labor market in the region experienced significant changes as a result of
the oil boom as well.
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Labor Market Consequences
As mentioned earlier, one of the most important economic consequences from
growth in any one sector relates to the labor market changes and the permanence seen in those markets. Oil activity was the impetus for other changes
in economic structure and performance in the Williston area. The sinking of
new wells requires a significant amount of labor that was clearly unavailable in
Williston at the time of the first price increases. Figure 8.6 demonstrates that
the Bakken area did not have spare capacity with people waiting for oil prices
to rise enough to generate interest in local production. It also documents the
success of importing more labor resources into the region, as neither Williston
nor the state of North Dakota had labor supply sufficient to accommodate the
scale of the increase in oil production, let alone any other industries seeing
growth at the time.

Figure 8.6. Williston labor force, 1990–2019 (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019a)

The increase in labor force was nothing short of amazing, rising from a level
of around 10,000 at the beginning of 2000 and increasing to around 33,000
by 2015. As oil prices cooled and economic activity related to oil decreased,
the labor force retreated to a level still more than double what it had been in
2000. The pace of increase and the ever-present volatility in the economy make
breakdowns of the data into industry segments questionable, seen in the first
report as well (for example Table XLVIII, p. 216). We can use other data to
provide some evidence of impacts on other sectors.
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While there is little dispute that oil was the sector driving economic growth
and expansion, the key question is whether the gains in that sector transferred
to others. Figure 8.7 displays the average wage in natural resource jobs in Williams County, which increased by substantial amounts from 2001 to 2018. In
that time frame, wages more than doubled, while employment in the same
sector increased more than twenty times (Figure 8.8). It is important to note
that the natural resource sector jobs were always, on average, higher paying
than the overall average job in Williams County. Even though the employment
level declined in the last few years because of reduced oil prices, the wage
level did not follow suit. This fact demonstrates the importance of the sector
and the beginning of the preeminence of the sector in the regional economy.
Another significant outcome of the economic transformation in the Bakken
region is that the average weekly wage for all private employment in Williams
County more than tripled during the growth in oil prices, and remained near
peak levels through 2018.
The rest of the county economy enjoyed similar change, driven by the
success of the oil industry and its supply chain. This pattern included the increase as well as the decline in employment seen as oil prices declined. The
connections between the various data indicate the importance of oil activity
as a keystone of the local economy and the source of much of its growth and
economic development.
One added value of looking at employment is the ability to discern better
the additional employment effects from the oil sector. The comparison of natural resource and all occupations, along with the share of overall employment
represented by natural resource employment, offers a better look at the labor
market impacts beyond the gross measure of labor force. What we see is that
the natural resource sector introduces significant employment impacts beyond its own industry.
Natural resource employment and overall employment moved on the same
general, shallow upward trend from 2001 to 2010. There were some minor
added ups and downs in overall employment that seem not to come from the
natural resource sector over this time, although they do not move employment
away from the overall trend. Both lines increase after 2010, but the increase
in overall employment appears higher for the overall employment series. As
an example, the increase in natural resource employment from January 2010
to June of 2012 was 9,850 people. The overall increase in employment for the
same period was 21,887 people. This difference is significant because it means
there was job growth beyond the oil sector alone, some 12,037 to be precise.
However, it means that the oil sector jobs accounted for 45 percent of the total
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Figure 8.7. Williams County average weekly wage, 2001–18 (source: Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2019b, 2019c)

Figure 8.8. Williams County employment, 2001–18 (source: Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2019b, 2019c)
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Figure 8.9. Williams County employment, 2001–18, all occupations excluding
natural resources (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019b, 2019c)

Figure 8.10. Williams County natural resources employment as a share of all
occupations, 2001–18 (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019b, 2019c)
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increase in employment over that time period. It is difficult to imagine the
ability to handle the influx of more workers, though it appears there was a
need for more. This gap implies a failure to fully capitalize on the significant opportunity presented by oil development due to a binding labor constraint. To
facilitate this discussion Figure 8.9 presents the natural resources employment
as before, and then deducts that series from the overall employment.
It is not surprising that the gap between the two series narrows, further
evidence of the importance of the oil sector. It is easier to identify when the oil
impacts transferred to other sectors in this graph. After mid-year 2012, the adjusted overall series rises more sharply than the natural resources employment
data. That pattern continues until the end of 2014, at which time both series
start to take a significant and sharp drop. Another way to think about this
is through the percentage of overall employment represented by the natural
resources sector (Figure 8.10).
Despite the increases in both types of employment, the oil sector increased
its share of overall employment with only a few periods of retreat from 2001
to early 2012, at which time it accounted for over 40 percent of employment
in Williams County. This was a significant concentration of employment in the
one sector paying higher wages, and therefore the jobs there filled first.
Labor markets are vital to the story in North Dakota. However, during much
of the current oil expansion North Dakota experienced persistent shortages of
labor, which is to say, job openings in excess of the number of people available
and able to work.2 These circumstances suggest labor market variables, while
important to consider, are potentially biased, or at least less informative than
usual, as economic indicators. Curtailed growth due to a lack of population
growth or willingness on the part of people to migrate in numbers sufficient
to fill positions can bias downward the relative contribution or importance
of sectors. Such a bias may influence the relative importance of a sector in the
economy.
Income and Earnings
In an attempt to overcome this problem, I report income and earning measures
in addition to employment and wage measures. The income and earning measures counteract some of the potential bias in labor market measures. A sector
facing a labor shortage and an inability to readily hire sufficient workers locally
2

Such information can be gleaned from the North Dakota Workforce Intelligence Job Openings Reports prepared by Job Service North Dakota for various time periods.
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will likely increase wages in an effort to attract more workers. Greater wages
should increase total earnings and compensation in the sector. As a result, even
if employment is not increasing, the compensation to that sector should rise
and indicate increasing vitality and importance in the region.
There was a major change in the classification of industries in this time
with the switch from the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system to the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) for the 2001 data
and later. These changes in classification represent important changes in economic and industrial structure occurring in the United States and the world,
but they also make comparisons of data difficult. The SIC system includes data
from 1969 to 2000, while only NAICS data are available for 2001 and beyond.
The per capita personal income in the Williston micropolitan area saw a significant increase over this time as well. In nominal terms it was $3,406 in 1969.
Peak per-capita income occurred in 2014 at $128,586, again in nominal terms.
This is per capita, not per worker, so it includes the entire official population,
even those not working. The implied annual growth in per-capita personal income over that time period was 8.4 percent. When adjusted for inflation the
growth rate remains 4 percent per year.
The Williston micropolitan area earning structure was closely tied to commodity prices, whether viewed through the lens of agriculture or energy
extraction. There is a certain volatility that comes from these sectors, and the
importance of the sectors does not always show up directly in numbers. Farm
earnings, for example, ranged from a low of –5 percent of total earnings to a
high of 39.6 percent. The average of farm earnings as a share of total earnings
from 1969 to 2000 was right around 8 percent. The next two highest averages
over this time period were mining (almost exclusively oil and gas extraction)
and services. The highest subcategory within services over this period was
health services, at 11 percent. Manufacturing in the Williston micropolitan
area ranged from a low of 2 percent to a high of 8.88 percent.
A similar story plays out from 2001 to 2016 with the NAICS data. Manufacturing earnings range from a low of 1.09 percent to a high of 3.39 percent.
Even though there is significant economic growth in income and other metrics, this growth does not transfer to or transform the manufacturing sector
in Williston. Some may view this as a lost opportunity for economic diversification, but as the price of oil demonstrates, the returns on energy activity are
high and investment in that specific activity could be viewed as nothing less
than rational.
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Oil and gas extraction changes significantly between the two classification
schemes. From 1969 to 2000, under the SIC scheme, oil and gas extraction
ranged from 9.6 to 36.9 percent, averaging 20.6 percent per year. Oil and gas
extraction after 2001 averaged 4.6 percent only with a range from 2.7 to 8.4
percent. The incredible increase in the volume of activity would seem to contradict these percentages, though it becomes easier to understand when we
look at the category of support activities for mining, broken out under mining
in the NAICS scheme. Support activities ranged from 11.6 to 41.3 percent,
averaging 27.8 percent per year. The two combined show an increase in activity after the price increases commenced at the beginning of the twenty-first
century.
The breakout into services and extraction is also important, although it
does not represent diversification with respect to the industrial base of the
area. Extraction was the important basic activity that created and allowed for
extensive add-on activities in the form of service provision. The amount of
41.3 percent represents a significant addition to the activity. At its peak in Williston, the general category of mining was almost 44.2 percent of the nonfarm
private earnings (Figure 8.11).

Figure 8.11. Williston farm and nonfarm proprietors’ income, 1969–2017
(source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 2019a, 2019b)

With respect to general economic sector rivalries in North Dakota, agriculture tends to be pitted against energy, a situation that has been exacerbated
since the rise of shale oil in the Williston area. With respect to proprietors’
income in the Bakken area, there is a noticeable divide between farm and
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nonfarm income. The separation between the two is not significant prior to
2000, although for the most part nonfarm proprietors’ income exceeds that
of farm proprietors. After 2000 there is a rapid increase in farm income as
agriculture increases, but it still cannot keep pace with the nonfarm revenues.
One industry sector singled out for attention here is construction. Construction, particularly of housing, was an important additional consequence of the
economic changes in Williston.
Construction
Construction received special attention in the 1958 Report (p. 211), and it is
important to provide a parallel look during this oil episode. Housing was a constant source of friction and debate in Williston during and after the recent oil
expansion (Brue 2007; Dalrymple 2015; Jean 2016). An area known for lack
of housing during a boom and for man camp-type residences might appear
to have low shares of earnings in construction. Similar issues occurred in the
1950s too, with a discussion comparing “trailer camps and an unwarranted
residential development” in some areas to permitted increases elsewhere (p.
211). The limitations on available labor would also be a significant contributor to a reduced upper bound on this sector. In the SIC data the average share
of nonfarm private earnings was 7.4 percent, and although it did move higher
in the post-2001 NAICS data to 10.5 percent, construction of buildings represented only 1.9 percent of earnings. However, the nonfarm private earnings
increased by so much over this time that this amount is a smaller slice of a
much larger pie. A better indicator of the consequences in this area comes from
building permits data (Figures 8.12 and 8.13).
The permits data provide a look at both the local housing market and the
change in construction activity outside the direct benefits to the oil industry.
The number of permits for buildings demonstrates a sizable increase occurring
contemporaneously with increased oil prices and activity in the oil sector. Simultaneously the average number of units with permits increased, although it
lagged a bit until economic prosperity was more entrenched. Consistent with
the labor constraint in the sector, there were some booms and busts in the
building activity level as well, seen in the decline in permits and the transition
into larger numbers of units with lower numbers of building permits. Other
chapters focus on the various social and demographic aspects that led to a
willingness to move into newly built units. One issue with the housing market
was a desire to avoid overbuilding in case oil was a transitory economic phenomenon without sufficient staying power to develop long-term population
changes.
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Figure 8.12. Williams County building permits for units in single-family structures, 1990–2017 (source: Housing and Urban Development 2019)

Figure 8.13. Unit counts for Williams County building permits, 1990–2018
(source: Housing and Urban Development 2019)
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Conclusions
The book is not closed on the Williston economy and the oil industry in North
Dakota. The fact that this is an update on an excellent report about an oil
boom from the 1950s in the same area is evidence of that. The fact that this is
a first fracking-induced cycle makes this an important ongoing topic for study,
while the forecasts attempt to predict variations in the next cycle. Oil prices
fluctuate based on policies and events far beyond the reach of individuals and
companies in Williston and the state of North Dakota. As a result, company
production decisions and strategies are not completely determined by events
on the ground. Such a lack of control over economic direction is a difference for
many communities, specifically those in western North Dakota.
What the information in this chapter demonstrates is that oil is unlikely
to disappear as an economic driver in Williston and surrounding areas, even
though it did before. Global politics and policy, as well as the importance of
the energy sector in the economy, make such a decline unlikely. This chapter
does not attempt to end discussions, but rather looks to continue them from
the 1958 Report by pairing them with other important topics. The addition of
a second commodity-based industry in the region further entrenches a potential high return, high volatility paradigm for the local economies and possibly
the state as well. As the second cycle starts for Williston and the Bakken, it
is clear there is still a need for planning. The first cycle caught many of the
policy makers off guard, both in the region and outside of it. The primary concern is still expanding employment in oil and leveraging that growth for other
sectors while improving the quality of life in the region. There should also be
continued and increased focus on the impacts generated by economic growth
on non-economic factors such as population growth and distribution, social
infrastructure, and physical infrastructure, many of which are covered in the
rest of this book.
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Chapter 9
Social Change in the Basin1
Robert B. Campbell
Along with the demographic, the economic, the political and the geographic changes, specifically social change was expected—and social
change there has been in the Williston Basin area since the discovery
of oil. General social change occurs in three broad kinds of situations:
(1) where a homogeneous society is suddenly confronted by people
who differ from its members in background, and thus in attitudes and
values; (2) where innovations, especially technological ones, are introduced into a static social organization system necessitating changes in
that system to “absorb” the innovation; or (3) where a stable population has a sudden change in numbers. Theoretically any such situations
would be marked by a conflict in values and would become “social problems,” that is, conditions which are considered undesirable in terms of
the previously existing values of the society. Typically those changes
which result in the greatest conflict in the society are those which are
brought in from outside the system, perhaps because the society is not
likely to have set up techniques for handling such changes. There is
likely to be no consensus as to how the situation should be dealt with;
consequently the society will be characterized, however temporarily, by
a conflict in attitudes. Social change proper occurs in the resolution of
attitude differences and in the elimination or control of the “undesirable” conditions.2
The sociological research part of this project was posited on the
assumptions of this theory of social change, and it was designed to discover what value conflicts and what “problems” occurred as a result
of the large immigration of people from other parts of the country. It
was hypothesized that: (1) local organizations which were purely social
Conclusions drawn in this section are based exclusively upon the field work
done in the summer of 1954. All supplementary information of later date is
identified as to date.
1

From the sociological point of view situations are never inherently problematic; they become problems only when they are defined as undesirable by the
people involved in them.
2
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would not attempt to attract migrants into membership while those
which were primarily economic or religious would make the attempt;
(2) migrants, as a category, would be the objects of negative attitudes of
the local citizenry; and (3) various kinds of social problems, such as increased crime, immorality, and low-grade housing, would arise. These
hypotheses were based upon the theoretical assumptions that the local
social organizations already in existence would be defensive as to their
unity and would tend to repel outsiders, that the migrants would be
defined as “outsiders” representing different values from those of the
natives, and that the presence of a large number of new people would
cause the existing societal organization to fail to operate in a way that
was satisfactory to its new, as well as many of its old, members. With
respect to this last, it was assumed that some of the old residents would
define change itself as a problem and would resist any efforts at reorganization of the community while others would seek change but would
not agree as to how the change should be brought about. The former
would tend to have negative attitudes toward the migrants, the latter
would tend to align themselves with the migrants.
A. Local Organizations and Group Membership
Local organizations in Williston were affected only slightly by the influx of new residents. (It must be remembered that Williston—the only
urban place in the research area and, thus, the only one having a relatively complete institutional organization—had only a 32% population
increase as compared to 105% in Ray and 253% in Tioga, the two small
trade centers.) Few of these organizations deliberately recruited new
members in the migrant category, although apparently only one or two
avoided, however indirectly, such membership. One group (social, educational and service) having twenty members responded to questions
about the number of “oil-related” participants and the kind of effort
made to get such participation as follows: “This is a small study group
with a limited membership, thus your questions do not apply.” Another
group (social, fraternal and service) which had two of its 45 members “oil-related” and which was making no effort to get “oil-related”
participation, reported that “membership is by invitation or transfer
only. Invitations are primarily to local women.” This latter group also
answered the question as to what problems had been created for the organization by the oil development as follows: “A minor problem seemed
to develop as prospective transferees moved here; however, very few
are here long enough to become members of our chapter.”
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The most typical attitude expressed by organization officers was
that the migrants who wanted to join were welcome but that the organization did not make a special effort to get them to join. For example,
only two churches reported that they made a special effort to attract
migrant participation and could estimate the number of such participants; and one of these expressed its limitation in the fact that “‘oil
people’ are mainly from areas where the ——— Church is not strong.”
Most of the organizations polled (SEE TABLE LIII) had an increase in
membership as a result of the population increase.
While the primarily social organizations showed almost no inclination to recruit members from among the migrants, neither did the
religious and fraternal organizations. This generalization is indicated
more markedly by the existence of two particular groups in Williston.
The first of these was a new church (“H” IN TABLE LIII), the Southern
Baptist Church, which was organized in 1953 apparently to minister
to the unfulfilled spiritual needs of the large southern contingent of oil
workers, who provided three-fourths of its membership. This group,
with its 65 members, had already outgrown its building in its one full
year of existence. The other group was a purely social one, the Ladies
Petroleum Club, which was composed exclusively of women involved
directly or indirectly with oil development and which had reached its
physical limit in membership in 1954. The group was organized in the
middle of 1952 and in one year’s time increased its membership from
55 to 125 (the limit). That the group felt the lack of local group invitation is indicated in this voluntary comment on the questionnaire:
Probably worth mentioning is the fact that this club was organized
for the purpose of enabling oil wives to get acquainted and as a
means of furnishing them with some type of social life probably not
offered any other place. Frequently it is difficult for new people to
step into many of the older activities of a community.
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TABLE LIII
MEMBERSHIPS IN POLLED CHURCHES AND NATIONAL FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WILLISTON, 1950–1954, AND
1954 “OIL RELATED” MEMBERSHIPS
Churches		Year			Oil Related
						Memberships 		
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
(1954)
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H

175
220
80
50
15
25
93
......

185
......
85
50
15
30
93
......

215
......
86
60
24
48
101
......

215
......
99
65
26
57
110
11

250
325
95
65
32
68
123
65

20
40
......
......
......
......
15
48

Fraternal Organizations						
Elks
745
831
876
973
997
175
Moose 1421
1626
1479
1445
1578
95
Some of the data above, particularly those in the “oil related” memberships
column, represent the best estimate the ministers or presidents could make.		
				

The main business group in Williston was reported by residents in
informal conversations to have made a complete and deliberate change
from having no migrant members to providing special positions for
them. At the time of the project field work there were representatives
of the petroleum industry in the business group, and there were reports
that the business group had brought them into membership for the
specific purpose of eliminating some of the conflict which was developing. (An interesting sidelight on the social level of this relationship is
the observation of the researchers that there were two distinct informal
groups which met almost daily for lunch in a popular Williston cafe.
The “old” business group met for lunch, as it had for years, at a table reserved for it in one part of the cafe; the “new” group, predominantly oil
men, met at another table at the same time. The humor in the situation
was apparent at least to the latter in that they had adopted a name for
themselves which was a “take-off ” on the name of the former, like, for
example, “long-snorters” and “short-snorters.”)
In general, then, the hypothesis that local social organizations
would not recruit migrants while religious and economic organizations would do so was only partially supported. The social groups
had not attempted to bring in the new oil people, but neither had
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the religious organizations to any substantial degree. The business
group had brought in oil people, but it did so relatively lately and, in
a sense, under the duress of a potential conflict situation. These conclusions, drawn from the analysis of the organizations, are supported
by responses obtained from heads of households in Ray and Williston
concerning their organization memberships (TABLE LIV). Not only
did “old” residents belong to organizations significantly more than did
“new” residents, but the association between length of residence and
organization membership was greater in Ray than in Williston.
TABLE LIV
MEMBERSHIPS IN ORGANIZATIONS FOR
OLD AND NEW RESIDENTS, BY LOCALITY
(RAY AND WILLISTON), 1954
Locality		
Number of
Memberships

Old residents

Ray (Total)
One or more
None		
No data		

60
37
14
9

New Residents

Total

Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
100
62
23
15

64
18
39
7

100
28
61
11

124
55
53
16

100
44
43
13

Chi-square is 17.9 for 2X2 table, omitting “no data”; C = .37*			
			
Williston (Total) 349
100
164
100
513
100
One or more
229
66
79
48
308
60
None		 116
33
79
48
195
38
No data		 4
1
6
4
10
2
Chi-square is 12.1 for 2X2 table, omitting “no data”; C = .15*			
			
* C, coefficient of mean square contingency, is a measure of association whose
maximum value of .707 for a 2X2 table, thus these may be considered “moderate” amounts of association.					

No attempt was made to poll the organizations in the smaller communities on the assumption that they would be few and small. There
were indications, on the basis of the residence sample interviews, that
on a general social level organizational conflict was closer to the surface
there than in Williston, reaching even to the level of political action
(SEE PAGES 131–6). The ex-mayor of one of the communities cited
the existence of an oil organization which had effected a considerable
opposition to him in the previous election because of his refusal to make
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concessions to oil interests. In both localities (Ray and Tioga) at least
semiformal organizations came into existence to press for change or for
maintenance of the status quo. Both places were caught with a virtual
lack of services for the expanded populations. The desire, particularly
of newcomers, for what they considered basic and necessary services
resulted in what was described by participants as a battle between the
“progressives” and the “conservatives.” In one of the places these organizations were the “wets” and the “drys” in the issue as to whether
a water system should be installed. Paving and sewer system were
other issues around which informal groups arose. In one sense these
issues actually cemented relations between newcomers and some of the
long-term residents much faster than might otherwise have occurred
because the migrants, demanding the services, were joined by many of
the regular residents. Some of the latter mentioned with obvious pride
and respect that their community now had an active business group
which was leading toward a general progress. (One such group was
the “J-C-ettes,” composed of oil workers’ wives and the wives of local
businessmen, which not only had a political and economic influence
but which had a strong social effect in terms of developing favorable
attitudes toward the oil people and toward change.)
Conflicts on the personal level in Ray and Tioga were more apparent
than in Williston not only in the aforementioned political issues but also
in general attitudes about people of one sort or another. One woman,
whose son was a leader in the fight for the water system, reported that
her neighbor had not spoken to her for a year as the consequence of the
fight. Others referred to the “backwardness” of the native residents, to
the “riff-raff ” who came in to work the oil fields, and to the destruction
of the close friendly relations between town and country since the business had begun to cater to oil workers, such statements reflecting an
outspoken but numerically small group of people. (In interpreting the
detailed material on personal and social attitudes, the reader should
bear in mind a possible overall explanation of differences in the degree
of value-conflict between Williston and the other two centers—Williston tended to draw the “white-collar” oil workers, Tioga the more
nearly permanent oil field workers—the better paid, supervisory field
personnel—and Ray, the transient and temporary employees.)
These differences are supported indirectly by the facts (SEE TABLE
LV) that Williston’s population was 66% “native” (i.e., present before
April 1950) as contrasted with Tioga’s 33% and Ray’s 39%. Of the Williston population only 4% resided in trailers, while Tioga and Ray had
21% and 38% respectively. (The 1955 observation that Ray had lost the
most population was further evidence in this regard.)
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B. Intergroup Attitudes
The gross indications of conflict between “new” and “old” residents,
while important in the situations in which they were found, were not
sufficient to support the hypothesis that there would be generally-held
negative attitudes of each grouping toward the other. One aspect of
the study was an attempt to discover whether such attitudes were
widespread and more nearly constant than the temporary conflicts
centering around political issues. This attempt was somewhat superficial because of the impracticality of “depth interviewing” as far as the
purposes of the general study were concerned, but it was suitable to
give the broad type of answer sought.
The most important conclusion about the intergroup attitudes is
that the new residents of Williston who had met many of the old ones
had a good opinion of them almost without exception, 99% of them
having expressed this in answer to the direct question: Have you met
many of the new residents (since 1950) of Williston?* If “yes,” what
do you think of them generally? (SEE TABLE LVI.) (The researchers
missed what might have been a good chance to test the secondhand
nature of stereotypes and prejudices when the 58 heads of households,
38% of the total, who replied that they had not met many of the old
residents were not asked their opinion of old residents.)

*Context suggests that the author meant old rather than new in this question
(Editor’s note).
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TABLE LV
PERCENT RESIDENCE (1954), 1950 RESIDENCE, TYPE OF
DWELLING: BY PERSONS, WITH “SAME RESIDENCE” PERCENT AND WITH PERCENT OF PERSONS IN TRAILERS
Total									
Persent Residence Number of
Types of Dwelling			
1950 Residence
Persons Single Trailer Multiple Other
Williston
2335
1687
98
548
2
Williston
1544
1246
12
284
2
Other N.D.
374
229
38
107
......
All other areas
417
212
48
157
......
Williston %
66.1
73.9
12.2
51.8		
Tioga
616
419
131
66
......
Tioga
202
151
8
43
......
Other N.D.
224
168
45
11
......
All other areas
190
100
78
12
......
Tioga %
32.8
36.0
6.1
65.2		
Ray
470
218
177
73
2
Ray
181
148
17
16
......
Other N.D.
62
18
16
26
2
All other areas
227
52
144
31
......
Ray %
38.5
67.9
9.6
21.9		
Stanley
560
365
109
81
5
Stanley
351
279
13
56
3
Other N.D.
131
74
40
15
2
All other areas
78
12
56
10
......
Stanley %
62.7
76.4
11.9
69.1		
Williams County
285
278
4
3
......
Williams County
236
236
......
......
......
Other N.D.
16
12
4
......
......
All other areas
33
30
…...
3
......
Williams County % 82.8
84.9
0.0
0.0		
Mountrail County
116
116
......
......
......
Mountrail County 104
104
......
......
......
Other N.D.
12
12
......
......
......
All other areas
0
0
......
......
......
Mountrail Co. %
89.7
89.7
......
......
......

Percent of
Persons in
Trailers
4.2
0.8
10.2
11.5
21.3
4.0
20.1
41.1
37.7
9.4
25.8
63.4
19.5
3.7
30.5
71.8
1.4
0.0
25.0
0.0
......
......
......
......
......

The distribution of opinions of both old and new residents of Williston as to whether or not newcomers had been accepted into the
community is, perhaps, of even more interest. As Table LVII shows,
a total of 96% of the old residents and 95% of the new residents
thought that newcomers had been accepted, 92% and 89% respectively expressing no qualifications to their opinions. Only 3% of the
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old residents and 4% of the new believed that newcomers had not been
generally accepted.
TABLE LVI
NEW RESIDENTS’ OPINION OF OLD RESIDENTS,
WILLISTON, 1954
Have Met Old Residents
								
				 No
Total
Opinion
No
Yes *
Yes ** Data
Number
Percent
Good		 41
17		
58
81
Good, qualified		
8
5		
13
18
Poor		1			 1
1
Total of Opinions		
50
22		
72
100
No Opinion		
2
1			
No Data		
10
9		
19
Does not apply***
58			
11
69
TOTAL
58
62
32
11
163
Percent***
38
41
21			
* (Unqualified)						
** (Qualified)						
*** Omitting “no data” with respect to having met old residents—The “does not
apply” arose from the interviewing procedure of not asking opinions of those
who had not met many of the old residents.					

TABLE LVII
OPINIONS OF OLD RESIDENTS AND
NEW RESIDENTS AS TO WHETHER NEWCOMERS HAD BEEN
ACCEPTED INTO THE COMMUNITY, WILLISTON, 1954
Accepted?
TOTAL
Yes
Yes, qualified
No, qualified
No
Indefinite
Total of Opinions
No opinion
No data

Old Residents
Number Percent
349			
294		 92
13		
4
1			
8		3
4		1
320		
100
22			
7			

New Residents		
Number Percent
Total
164		
124
89
418
9
6
22
0		
1
6
4
14
1
1
5
140
100
460
14		
36
10		
17
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These facts certainly do not indicate the hypothesized negative attitude towards the migrants as a category or any reaction back toward
the “natives”; furthermore, they appear to be out of harmony with some
of the description of the conflict and lack of association in organizations in the previous section. This disharmony is “more apparent than
real.” Firstly, these facts were obtained from Williston residents, and
Williston had a minimum of conflict about migrants for reasons described earlier. Facts from Ray, Tioga, and particularly the rural areas
pointed up a greater measure of negative attitudes. Secondly, none of
the failures to recruit migrants into organizations carried with them
any overt negative attitude, that is, the officers of organizations did not
express any antipathy toward migrants in describing their membership
and recruitment policies. The failure to recruit migrants might be as
indicative of the organizations’ failure to identify migrants as a separate
category as of the negative attitude respecting the category. Finally, the
research was conducted late enough in the development that tendencies to generalize negative attitudes may have been dissipated because
of the increased and increasing opportunities for association on a personal level between members of the two categories. What may have
been general negative attitudes as a consequence of isolated contacts
could not be expected to persist when contacts became more frequent
and more personal. The conflicts may have represented issue differences rather than residence differences—at least this conclusion is
more consistent with the facts than is the hypothesis that there would
be generalized, negative categorical attitudes.
C. Social Problems
In order to avoid the prejudices or preconceptions of the researcher,
a social problem is considered in this report as any situation which is
reported by people involved in it as undesirable and, therefore, about
which they express a negative opinion, possibly indicating a tendency
to act to change the situation. From this point of view a situation may
not be a problem to the participants despite the fact that the observer
is disturbed by it. An example of a situation of this sort is one of the
residences in Ray which, according to a consensual estimate of three
of the researchers, was about 6 feet by 8 feet and 7 feet high. Not once
did a resident of the town express a negative attitude about this particular “house,” not to mention a small bus which had become someone’s
home. This simply was not considered a problem in Ray to the knowledge of the participants in the research project.
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1. Housing
As one might easily suppose on the basis of the tremendous population changes reported earlier, housing was one of the major social (and
personal) problems in the area. Even though the population peak had
been passed, there was still a pressure for permanent-type housing in
parts of the area. An interesting paradox is, however, that some rental
housing in both Williston and Ray was “going begging” in 1955, thus
creating what might be a noticeable economic problem. Realtors in
all three localities were still building extensively in 1955 to meet their
estimates of the market for homes, thus changing the situation which
constituted a problem for many of the migrants.
According to local businessmen in Williston, the explanation of the
paradox was that the demand for temporary housing had been met but
that there was a backlog of demand by residents in temporary housing
for permanent homes. Their theory was that many people had to take
substandard housing during the boom, but in 1954 they were seeking
better housing; thus there was an upward mobility toward the best
housing, tending to eliminate the social problem of low-grade housing.
The evidence presented in favor of the theory was that a number of
homes which were being built by a Williston contractor had already
been spoken for and that he planned to start an even larger number as
soon as he could do so.
On the other hand, a government official reported that employment
and wages had not risen sufficiently to meet the costs of better housing.
As new homes became available in Williston they were filled by those
families who were already living in the more expensive rental units,
thus there was a gap which was not being filled from below because of
the inability of the “common laboring man” to pay the high rents.3
The observations of the researchers tended to support this latter
view. That there was a general social problem in housing was evidenced
by the often-mentioned concern about the “flats” (a low-grade housing
area of Williston) and the shared idea among business people that
more and better housing was in continuous demand. That the general
mobility upward was not taking place was indicated by the stability of
the “flats” population and the availability of a number of high rental
apartments (observed in both 1954 and 1955).
In Ray the “wrong side” of the problem was even more obvious.
Local business interests built a large number (34 units) of high rental
The extent of the rent pressure is indicated, perhaps, in the fact that Representative Burdick was quoted in the newspapers in February 1956 as reporting
the government’s approval of Williston as a low-rent government housing area.
3
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apartments (duplex and four-plex) to relieve the pressure of trailer and
basement dwelling, only to find that the demand for such residences
was insufficient to make them pay. The bulk of the migrants were temporary residents who either could not afford the apartments or were
satisfied to reside in their trailers. (Most of the trailer residents were
employed by a drilling company which provided large, new trailers for
low rent, the rent being applied toward the purchase of the trailers so
that the renter would obtain ownership if he remained with the company for a certain length of time.)
However much the trailers represented a social problem for the
home owners in Ray, the fact remained that they were not a problem
for their inhabitants. They were, rather, the solution to the problem of
high rents. The trailer camps provided ample facilities for those inhabitants, apparently.
A major housing problem arose in Tioga out of an interesting
migration situation. Tioga had a considerably greater proportion
of in-migration of North Dakotans than did either Williston or Ray
(TABLE LVIII). Of the total population of Tioga 36% came from other
parts of North Dakota while the corresponding figures for the other
places were 16% for Williston and 13% for Ray. The Tioga migrants,
particularly the North Dakotans among them, did not find available to
them the opportunities for rental trailer residence that characterized
Ray. Neither did the Tiogans have much opportunity for multiple-type
dwelling units, which had only 5% of the North Dakota migrants living
in them (as compared to 45% for North Dakota migrants who resided
in Ray in 1954.) The result was that Tioga generally had recognizably
poorer housing than the other two places, composed partly of older
trailers and partly of make-shift single dwellings. The prime problem,
on the basis of local comment as well as being the one the observations
of the researchers indicated, was a single dwelling housing group (12
or 16 units). These were reported as being “grain bins” and “chicken
sheds” which had been hauled in from a farm to be rented. One of the
residents of Tioga commented on them approximately as follows:
Did you see those grain bins down the street? People are living in
those. I don’t see how anyone could rent them. They can’t be very
substantial; they’re not very heavy. I sat here one morning and
watched two of them being carried on one truck.
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TABLE LVIII
TYPE OF DWELLING BY PRESENT RESIDENCE (1954)
AND BY 1950 RESIDENCE,
FOR THE THREE MAIN LOCALITIES OF THE AREA
Present Residence				
Type of Dwelling
1950 Residence
Total
Single		
Trailer
Multiple
100%
72%
4%
24%
Williston
100% 2335 100% 1687 100% 98
100%
550
Williston
66
1544 74
1246 12
12		 52
286
Other N.D.
16
374
14
229
39
38		 19
107
All other states 18
417
12
212
49
48		 29
157
100%		68%		 21%
11%
Tioga
100% 616
100% 419
100% 131 100%
66
Tioga
33
202
36
151
6
8		 65
43
Other N.D.
36
224
40
138
34
45		 17
11
All other states 31
190
24
100
60
78		 18
12
100%
46%
38%
16%
Ray
100% 470
100% 218
100% 177 100%
75
Ray
39
181
68
148
10
17		 21
16
Other N.D.
13
62
8
18
9
16		 38
28
All other states 48
227
24
52
81
144		 41
31

These were actually one-room sheds with a loft which served as
supplementary sleeping space and was accessible by ladder. They were
made of low grade lumber which was covered, top and sides, by tarpaper roofing material.
Generally speaking, then, the increase in population created a situation of tight, “substandard” housing which was interpreted variously
as a social problem—high rental apartment vacancies in Williston and
Ray and grain bins in Tioga. There were other housing situations which
properly were personal rather than social problems as herein conceived.
Examples of these were the following:
a. One person reported that Tioga was going to require that all
residences, including trailers, be connected to the sewer lines.
He didn’t know what to do because he couldn’t comply in his
trailers’ present location and he didn’t know where he could
go.
b. A man who had just arrived in Tioga with his family met the
interviewer in the yard of a small hut. He opened the conversation (after the usual introduction by the interviewer as
to why he was there) by asking, “Can you do anything about
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this? How can they expect a man to live in something like
that? I’ve come all the way from (a southern state) because of
my job and I’ve never had to live in anything like this before.”

RESIDENCES—TIOGA, N.D., SUMMER, 1954
The rapid increase in population created tremendous pressure on local housing
resources. These sheds were hauled in by truck from a nearby farm to be used as
family residences.

Additional Aspects of the Housing Situation… Despite the fact
that only “problem” situations were hypothesized for the specialized
research, this report would be incomplete without some description
of the objective situation in housing. Referring back to Table LVIII,
72% of the Williston population, 68% of the Tioga population, and
only 46% of the Ray population resided in single dwellings. In 1950,
according to the U.S. Census of Housing, the figures for residences by
type were 55% single dwellings for Williston and 92% single dwellings
for Williams County rural nonfarm areas; these suggest that there was
a great relative decrease in the supply of single dwellings in Ray and
Tioga and an increase in the supply for Williston.
Trailers were ordinarily located in camps which were limited in the
space they had available. As the picture indicates, the ground space
allotted to each trailer household was small—an estimated 20’ by 40’
area being typical (inclusive of that part occupied by the trailer itself ).
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There was not nearly the crowding that these observations might
suggest, since all three localities had space available in the immediately
surrounding areas. The big trailer camps appeared at the north and
south edges of Ray, the east and south edges of Tioga, the north edge
of Williston, and in what has been called herein the “Tioga environs.”
This last was a completely new settlement area from U.S. Highway No.
2 into Tioga (a distance of about 4 miles). There were several trailer
camps in this particular area and a complete village of low-rent, permanent type single dwellings (including garages) which were provided
by one of the oil companies for its permanent, operating staff.
All three localities had whole areas of new rental and/or ownership
single dwellings amounting, at least in Williston, to separate communities in the sociological sense. The northwestern edge of Williston
had been expanded several block depths with new houses, new stores,
and a new school to provide for the numerous children in the area.
An exclusive, high-cost housing development occurred in the northeast
corner of Williston, inhabited by both “old” and “new” residents in the
city. Ray and Tioga have their new streets of new residences, too, the
latter particularly having a “new community” on the south side of the
railroad, inhabited primarily by migrants who are associated with the
petroleum industry. As mentioned earlier (cf. Wills) one is impressed
on first arriving in Ray or Tioga by the obvious combination of the new
and the old in the residential as well as other building. Most buildings
appear as being either pre-World War II or post-1952.
2. Crime and Immorality
As soon as one hears that a particular place is a “boom” area, he is likely
to think of a general laxity of law enforcement or, at least, of a greater
incidence of loose spending for illegal and barely legal pleasures.
Couple that conception with the idea that there has been a considerable
increase in population composed largely of unmarried men in “rough”
occupations and the ingredients are complete for a common-sense
prediction that criminality and immorality will be greatly increased.
Such a prediction would have been only partly correct, apparently, in
the Williston Basin. Assuming that there are some exceptions to a generally useful theory, the problem is to explain why some things did not
occur as well as why some did.
First, the assumption that a large proportion of the increased population was composed of unmarried men was contrary to the facts. The
bulk of the oil field workers not only were married but had children.
(In both Ray and Tioga only about one-fourth of the men were single.)
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Second, there was a general provision of increased law enforcement
facilities. As the data presented in Table LIX indicate, Williston had an
increase in expenditure for the purpose of expanding the police protection as well as increases in revenues from fines levied against offenders.
There had been an increase in police department employees from 6 in
1949 to 13 in 1954.4 Ray had employed a full-time policeman who was
reported by the citizens as being “tough” on violators of any sort but
particularly on speeders, speeding having been apparently the main
problem. The situation there was that U.S. Highway No. 2 ran directly
through the town and the highway carried a tremendously increased
traffic flow between Williston and Tioga. (SEE PAGE 41)

RESIDENCES—RAY, N.D., SUMMER, 1954
Regular employees of established drilling companies brought their housing
with them. This is part of one of the large trailer camps which characterized the
oil development area.

Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, Semiannual Bulletin, Vol. XXV,
No. 1, 1954 and Vol. XX, No. 1, 1949.
4
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TABLE LIX
WILLISTON EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS, FISCAL YEARS*
1950–51 TO 1953–54, FOR SELECTED ITEMS

		

			EXPENDITURES
Year
Police			 Liquor
Magistrate’s Police
Prisoner Licenses
Courts
1950–
$2,142.00@ $18,113.82
$1,711.50		
1951
$2,142.00@ 15,045.76@			

Total
$97,545.58
63,554.22

1951–
1952

3,173.00@
3,173.00@

24,753.53
2,512.00		
19,104.46@			

108,934.76
72,729.56

1952–
1953

4,791.30@
4,791.30@

42,770.70
4,086.11		
34,119.84@			

164,859.05
110,955.17

1953–
1954

3,471.40@
3,471.40@

49,176.34
1,892.38		
43,079.81@			

203,984.21
144,661.47

		RECEIPTS				
1950–					
1951
8,644.70			
14,500.00 94,886.56
1951–					
1952
14,499.00			
17,500.00 131,426.10
1952–					
1953
35,110.50			
18,916.67 189,035.30
1953–					
1954
27,006.00			
19,250.00 178,281.02
@ Salaries					
* To get approximate semiannual data, figure 40% for first half, 60% for second
half year					

Third, drunkenness was prevented from developing to the problem
proportions it might have reached by a combination of already existing circumstances. Williston had already put into operation a police
technique for controlling excessive drinking prior to the peak in oil development migration. The Williston officials had been considering the
migrant farm labor population as a source of the prospective problem
and had instituted a system of quick pick-ups in the “skidrow” section.
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(In Williston the taverns tended to be concentrated within a 3-block
area, thus it was possible to station one or two policemen in the area
during the peak periods of activity, particularly Saturday nights.) This
system was supplemented by an informal one which was probably unknown to the local officials. One owner-operator of a quiet but fairly
popular tavern reported that he had avoided trouble with the police
because “once trouble starts in a tavern they will really check on you.”
His solution was not the curtailment of beer sales, but the personal care
of the over-imbiber by sending him home in a taxi at his (the tavern
owner’s) expense. He had never been bothered by the police because
no difficulty had resulted from drinking in his establishment. Another
factor which probably helped prevent a drunkenness problem was the
attitude of the local judiciary (at least prior to 1955 when a local “revolution” occurred with respect to arbitrary and selective enforcement
of the law by Williston police). The police magistrate penalized to the
maximum offenders of the drinking laws. (SEE TABLE LIX).
Fourth, a main source of drinking and gambling activity was
available immediately outside the area, thus what might have been a
problem within the area was removed. An active gambling, drinking,
dining and dancing “club” just across the Montana state line attracted
a large clientele from the oil development area although it has been
restricted since the field survey following a raid in which the gambling
devices were confiscated. Any compelling urges to participate in relatively large-scale gambling could be satisfied through this well known
channel.
Finally, evidence is lacking that there was a greater inclination
among migrants than among “natives” to participate in illegal and
“fringe” types of activity, although some of the people interviewed
referred to one particular kind of illegality which was attributed exclusively to oil field workers. There were a few instances when, apparently,
migratory workers wrote “bad checks” or moved out from under debts.
The rural residents in the area were particularly disturbed by this because it resulted in a complete redefinition of the relationship between
themselves and the businessmen in small centers. Where formerly they
had been able to cash checks at any business place without even considering having to identify themselves, now they could not cash checks
at these places at all.
There were no indications available to the researchers that there
had been a notable increase in, or even the presence of, organized criminal or immoral activity—gambling houses, theft rings, “protection” or
houses of prostitution. There were two known prostitutes in Williston,
but in no sense were their activities organized, continuous or flagrant.
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These explanations account for the absence of readily observable
behaviors in contradiction to the mores and laws, but official statistics
show that the “problem behaviors” which were expected did occur.
TABLE LX
WILLISTON POLICE MAGISTRATE’S CASES, SEMIANNUAL,
JULY 1952 TO JUNE 1954
DRIVING
LIQUOR			
Reckless
Speeding		
Open Drunk
Half-Year
Driving
Stop
Drunk
Bottle and
		
Sign
Driving in Car Disord. Misc.
1952—2nd
49
490
41		 50
668		219			
1953—1st
80
418
67		 28
529		118			
1953—2nd
95
287
72		 44
529		194			
1954—1st
56
101
43		 39
329		173			

Total
1517
1240
1221
741

GRAND FORKS (a city three times as large—for comparison)						
1954—1st
60
120
32		
12
286*
*This does not include 14 cases of disorderly conduct. 				
			

COMPARISON OF WILLISTON CASE RATE WITH THAT FOR
THE NATION FOR CITIES OF COMPARABLE SIZE, ON TWO
COMPARABLE TYPE OFFENSES, 1953

Offenses
Drunk driving
Drunkenness

Williston rate
cases/100,000 pop.
(computed at Williston
9,500 pop.)
1454.5@
11109.0

US rate
cases/100,000 pop.				
for cities of 2,50010,000 pop.**
Williston Cases
346.0		 139
1714.0		1058

@ This category may not be directly comparable, inasmuch as “drinking and
driving” or “driving while having been drinking” might more nearly characterize
the Williston situation. 					
** IBID.						

As Table LX indicates, Williston had a large number of cases in which
offenders were held for prosecution (and a comparison of the total
number of cases in this table with the receipts of the police magistrates
court in Table LIX indicates the financial punishment of the offenders).
The sample figures for Grand Forks, North Dakota, a city more than
twice the size of Williston, and for two comparable offenses nationally
for cities of the same size make possible a gross interpretation of the
greater frequency of offenses (and/or prosecution) than one would expect of a city like Williston.
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The reader might well ask at this point if the researchers had their
eyes shut in order to cite these statistics in the same paragraph in which
the “absence of readily observable behaviors” was mentioned. In the
monthly figures, furthermore, June 1954 (one of the months in which
the field research was conducted) exceeds all the months in the biennium except March for the number of offenses, 178 as compared to 202
for these months. The explanation, it appears, is the quick apprehension of offenders (particularly liquor) which was mentioned earlier.
Returning to the conception of social problems with which this
analysis was approached, the only situations which were represented as
social problems by residents of Williston in the area of immorality and
illegality were the drinking-fighting incidents involving, for the most
part, immigrant farm labor and the drinking-driving activities of the
Williston young people, neither of which could be attributed (except
very indirectly through economic change) to the oil development.
3. Welfare Activities
There are a number of institutionally-recognized “social problems”
which were little, if at all, affected by the development of oil in the Williston Basin. Old age cases, aid to dependent children cases and the
like were simply not changed materially by the situation. There was,
however, an increase in the incidence of payments to transients who
were temporarily unable to leave the area. The Williams County office
of welfare services reported as their biggest new problem the number
of transient persons who moved in after hearing about the “big oil
boom,” who should not have moved and who had become stranded.
The Mountrail County office had had an increase in cases involving
negligence of children and tracing of people, but payments to cases had
not been affected materially by the oil development.
4. The Public Service Situation
Some of the social service or community service agencies encountered
problematic situations which were, at least, indirect social problems,
that is, situations about which the public through its agencies desired
change toward a more acceptable alternative.
a. Schools. In all three communities there arose the necessity of expanding school facilities to relieve crowding in both space and time.
In Williston, for example, 22 elementary class rooms had been constructed and 26 persons had been added to the staff to accommodate
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the 36% increase in enrollment between 1950 and 1954 (SEE TABLE
LXI). The superintendent has calculated, as nearly as was possible, that
about 24% of the total enrollment was “oil-related.” In Ray and Tioga
emergency measures, such as the split day, had to be taken because of
the tremendous expansion in enrollment. All three communities have
expanded the physical plants considerably.
TABLE LXI
WILLISTON PUBLIC SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND EMPLOYMENT, OCTOBER, 1950–1954
		
Enrollment
Employment

1950
1508
60½

1951
1639
62½

1952
1524
63

1953
1815
73½

1954
2041
86

b. Library. An interesting change occurred in the Williston Library service, although the librarian was so pleased that she was more
inclined to call it a solution rather than a problem. There was a disproportionate participation in library services by migrants (including
children) and a “revival of local interest” following a general revision of
the library in 1951. The circulation of library materials had increased
373% from 1950 to 1954 (SEE TABLE LXII). There had been, furthermore, increased monetary contributions by the local citizens and the
donation of technical books by a large oil company.
TABLE LXII
WILLISTON LIBRARY CIRCULATION, FISCAL YEARS 1950–1954
1950
7,967

1951
13,925

1952
24,303

1953
32,826

1954
37,679

c. Post Office. One of the most serious problems encountered by
a specialized public service agency was the situation in the Williston
post office. The building was much too small to admit easy handling
of the increased volume of business, particularly since much of that
increase involved commercial and transient (general delivery) mail. On
one Monday alone a special test conducted by the postmaster indicated
that one single company had over 1000 pieces of mail. The situation
was equally difficult because of the relatively continuous necessity of
reorganizing the carrier service and expanding it into new areas. Table
LXIII shows the extent of the increase in service that followed the oil
discovery.
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TABLE LXIII
WILLISTON POST OFFICE; ANNUAL RECEIPTS AND FIRST
CLASS MAIL PIECES HANDLES, 1950–1954
1950
1951
1952
Annual Receipts ($) 109,184 114,154
140,192
Pieces of 1st-class 1,594,120 1,720,300 2,121,096

1953
150,074
2,281,323

1954*
......
1,078,005*

* January 1–June 30 only.

d. State Employment Service. The State Employment Service encountered an increased demand for its services in both directions,
for workers and for jobs. It had problems in both directions, finding
enough workers in 1952, finding enough jobs in 1954. There was a continuous increase in the use of its facilities despite these labor supply
and demand fluctuations because of the increase of total employment.
e. Newspapers. The increase in population was accompanied by a
corresponding increase in the circulation of newspapers in Williston,
local circulation people maintaining that the newcomers did not differ
from the older residents in their interest in the coverage of local papers.
TABLE LXIV
WILLISTON NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION, AVERAGE, 1950–1954
								
1949
1950 1951
				
				
Williston
Herald
42001
......
5981
Williston
Plains
Reporter
......
......
......
Minneapolis
Star and
Tribune3
......
200
300

1952
1st half/
2nd half

1953
1st half/
2nd half

1954
1st half/
2nd half

5739/6438

6775/7021 7112/......

....../......

....../......

32002

450

550

600

1. Circulation manager’s estimate for January.
2. Publisher’s estimate.
3. Circulation manager’s estimates						
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Summary of Investigated Social Changes in the Williston Basin and
Conclusions
Social changes—changes in numbers and kinds of people, in attitudes,
in organizations, in personal and agency actions—were general as
a consequence of the oil discovery and its development. Certain hypothesized changes, however, did not occur in Williston to any marked
extent. Economic and religious organizations made no special attempts
to attract migrants into their memberships, although there were no evidences that migrants were unwelcome. Migrants were not disapproved
of categorically except by a small number of people in the rural areas.
There were value conflicts, particularly in Ray and Tioga, but enough of
the “natives” joined forces with the migrants that the opponents tended
to be labeled “progressives” and “conservatives” rather than “old” and
“new” residents. The opinion was general among both natives and migrants that the latter had been accepted into the community.
Some of the hypothesized changes or failure to change were borne
out at least partly. Social groups did not recruit migrant members. At
least two groups were organized by Williston migrants—a Southern
Baptist Church and a social club for the wives of oil workers. There
were social problems but they were far short of the anticipated magnitude. Housing of the “right” type was short, and there were a few
indications of general dissatisfaction about it. There were high rates
of minor offenses against the law, but there were no indications of organized crime. There were no serious complaints about the migrants
being responsible for the increased offenses. Special problems were
created for various public service agencies: schools were crowded and
additions had to be built; the library, the post office and the state employment service all encountered considerable increases in the demand
for their services; the local governments had to provide new and expanded services.
Most of the evidence presented is of the descriptive survey type in
keeping with the general purpose of the study. It is, at best, suggestive
with respect to any general theory of social change. On the other hand,
the description itself could have general usefulness for the officials and
interested citizens in any community which is confronted with rapid
change in helping them anticipate the kinds of actions which they
might have to take. There is no question that the people of the Williston Basin knew little or nothing as to what to expect, consequently
many of their actions and reactions contributed little to the solution
of their problems or of the general situation. In our opinion (the data
were not and are not available to express these as facts or as systematic
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predictions): realtors over-extended themselves into the construction
of residences for which there was no continuous, or future, demand;
many North Dakotans migrated to the Basin in anticipation of unlimited opportunities only to find no more opportunities than in the areas
they left; school officials committed too much permanent building
expansion;5 a general spirit of over-optimism, reflected in expansions,
investments, and population estimates, left the citizens unprepared to
handle the out-migration and the decrease in economic activity which
had already begun in 1954. (One of the unfortunate aspects of a report of this sort is that some of the predictions which are practically
useful are not available early enough. We could have predicted fairly
accurately the amount of immediate decrease in Tioga’s population as
we were conducting the fieldwork because of our knowledge that particular individuals already knew the dates on which they were to be
transferred. Furthermore, we could have predicted the decrease in activity because of the knowledge we obtained about the relative number
of employees needed in exploratory as compared to development activity in the oil fields. The predictions of this sort that we expressed
orally tended to be ridiculed as obviously wrong or as attempts to devaluate the importance of the oil development to the state of North
Dakota. This reaction, itself, would be an interesting study.)
The total report is, in effect, a case study and as such tends to give
the appearance that it is a description of unique situation. The practical
usefulness of such a report depends in large measure on the applicability of the results to other situations of the same sort. The following
quotation indicates the similarity of the consequences of oil development to those of industrial development in the small community; if
North Dakota is successful in its attempts to attract industry the picture will be repeated.6
The information in this study illustrates the nature of social changes which
are almost certain to occur in a community as a consequence of industrial
development in or near its borders. The need for increased and improved
trade facilities develops, and the demand for various public-supported services grows. Sewage disposal, street improvements, additional water supply,
expanded hospital facilities and more school buildings were problems which
It is our prediction that the population of Ray and Tioga will decrease markedly from the 1954 figures, thus tending to leave a surplus of classroom space.
This will be no total loss by any means, since the communities will at least have
modern buildings which they would not have had otherwise.
5

C.R. Hoffer and W. Freeman, Social Action Resulting from Industrial Development, Michigan State University Agricultural Experiment Station. Special
Bulletin 401, September 1955, pp. 29–30.
6
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were present in Mohawk, as they are likely to be in any community which has
rapid increase in population.
The ways in which communities deal with these problems are varied. Systematic and scientific planning to take care of needs as they arise would be the
ideal course to follow, but many communities are not successful in achieving
this goal. In most instances, the need becomes very great—sometimes critical—
before a community will act. Mohawk, for instance, did not make definite plans
to build a sewage disposal plant until the village was threatened with a court
action. Such situations emphasize again the need of city and county planning
as a basis for community action in response to social change.
In Mohawk, as in most communities, different points of view emerged in
regard to the various action programs proposed to meet community needs.
These views varied along a continuum from opposition to change to support
for it. Such attitudes are characterized in different ways—conservative or progressive—old or new—reactionary or progressive. The name is not particularly
important. The significant point is that in community action such divergent
points of view are almost certain to rise.
Many of the old roots in Mohawk, that is the residents who had been in the
community for a long time, tended to take the cautious, conservative position
in regard to community action. Those who became residents as a consequence
of industrial development favored a more aggressive program of community
action. As in other similar situations, these points of view had to be harmonized, at least to the extent that some kind of social actions to meet community
needs could be accomplished.

Chapter 10
Social Impacts of Oil Development
Rick Ruddell and Heather Ray
North Dakota experienced three oil booms between 1951 and 2008, and while
the effects of the 2008–14 boom and the subsequent cycle of slowdown and
expansion are still playing out as this book goes to press, each of these expansions in oilfield activities presented a set of distinctive economic, political, and
social benefits and challenges for local and state governments. To a large extent these three factors are inextricably connected, economic activities being a
key driver of political behavior as well as shaping a boom’s social impacts. With
respect to economic activity, for example, between 1951 and 1955, oil production in North Dakota increased from less than 30,000 barrels to 11 million
barrels per year (North Dakota Industrial Commission 2019). That increased
production, however, occurred primarily in Mountrail and Williams counties,
and while oilfield activities disrupted the lives of local residents, these effects
were generally contained in a relatively small geographic area and for a relatively short period of time.
The 2008 boom, by contrast, saw oil production increase in the Bakken region of North Dakota from less than a half-million barrels per month right
before the boom to a peak of over 361 million barrels in December 2014
(North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources 2019). When the June
2014 price of oil reached $112 per barrel, that production represented $44
billion in revenue, a figure that does not count the revenue from natural gas.
The 2008 boom was also spread across seventeen counties, although most oil
was extracted in four of those (North Dakota Workforce Intelligence 2018). In
contrast to what happened during the 1950s and 1980s booms, the economic
benefits and the political and social impacts rippled from the Williston Basin
throughout the entire state. Not only did the 2008 boom have a significant
statewide impact, but extraction activities have waxed and waned since then
and peaked in 2019. Thus, when examining the impacts of a resource-based
boom, we have to consider the location, magnitude, and duration of the activities. Table 10.1 provides a framework for better understanding resource-based
booms based on these three factors.

272
TABLE 10.1.
LOCATION, MAGNITUDE, AND DURATION OF
NORTH DAKOTA OIL AND NATURAL GAS BOOMS
Boom (Era)		1951–4		1981–6		2007–19
Location			
2 counties
4 counties
17 counties
Duration			
48 months
60 months
152 months
Magnitude		Minor		Minor		Major

Prior research shows that a common set of social problems emerge after the
rapid population growth and industrialization associated with resource-based
booms; these outcomes are called boomtown effects or social ills. The Government of New Brunswick (2012, 5) observes how these social ills include
increased levels of crime, substance abuse, sexually transmitted infections, a
lack of safe and affordable housing, higher levels of community dissatisfaction,
growing child welfare, mental health, and social service caseloads, increased
hospital admissions, and an inability to meet the need for health, education,
public safety, and social services. Although no two booms are the same, Ruddell
(2017, 16–18) contends that booms have a life cycle that starts with a rapidly
growing population that overwhelms local government services, breaks down
community order, and reduces the residents’ quality of life.
Despite the existence of a growing body of research highlighting the challenges of resource-based booms, local government officials have often failed to
learn from the mistakes their predecessors made, and most rural governments
lack the capacity to effectively manage these events (Morrison, Wilson, and
Bell 2012). Oil company officials, by contrast, are more familiar with the ups
and downs of commodity-based business cycles and have learned to manage
the expansion and contractions.
Although studies focusing upon a single boom and bust, such as the conditions described in the 1958 Williston Report or North Dakota government
reports about the 1981–6 boom (see Heck 1992), provide us with insight into
the impacts of booms occurring in the past, we have to be careful consumers
of that research. Jacquet and Kay (2014) argue that the findings of research
about rapid growth communities prior to 2000 provide limited insight about
contemporary booms. They say that the economic and social conditions and
demographic makeup in rural America—where most booms occur—have
undergone a profound change in the past four decades. For example, booms
occurring after 2000 are distinctive because many regions are experiencing
cycles of boom, bust, and recovery over periods spanning decades. As oil and
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natural gas prices decrease, wells are shut down and personnel laid off, but as
prices increase, wells are reactivated and workers rehired. Communities in the
Bakken are experiencing this cycle, and after the downturn in drilling in the
2008 boom when production bottomed in 2016, there was a subsequent 51
percent production growth by midyear 2019 (North Dakota Department of
Mineral Resources 2019).
Most social problems associated with booms are interrelated (Gilmore
1976). Fernando and Cooley (2016) contend that all boomtowns suffer from
an inability to provide enough safe and affordable housing to meet demands.
High housing costs force those without homes into unsafe, temporary, or undesirable living conditions. Temporary or makeshift housing arrangements can
also contribute to crime as living in cramped and unsuitable conditions leads
to tension and conflict and can result in increased family violence (Jayasundara, Heitkamp, Mayzer, Legerski, and Evanson 2016). Furthermore, as rents
increase and quality of life decreases, some longtime community residents on
fixed incomes move to more affordable communities. The presence of these
longtime residents, however, is important for building community resiliency
through their volunteerism and support of family members, such as providing
low-cost child care (Flanagan, Heitkamp, Nedegaard, and Jayasundara 2014).
Moreover, reducing the proportion of established community residents
increases antisocial behavior and crime because informal social controls are
weakened (see Freudenburg 1986). A lack of safe and affordable housing also
leads to other social problems, and some women, for example, may feel forced
to stay in dysfunctional or abusive relationships as they rely upon their partner’s housing (Jayasundara, Legerski, Danis, and Ruddell 2019). Writing about
women in resource-based communities, Amnesty International (2016) has
described this problem as a form of precarity, saying that some women are
only one argument away from living on the street, as there are so few housing
alternatives. Last, a lack of affordable housing makes it difficult to recruit
human service personnel into education, health-related, or law enforcement
jobs (Jayasundara, Heitkamp, and Ruddell 2016).
Social Impacts of the 1951–4 Boom: A Brief Overview of the Williston Report
The authors of The Williston Report describe the social impacts of the 1950s
boom and identify the biggest challenge as that of responding to the rapid
population increase. From 1950 to 1954, the population of the oil-producing
areas in Williams County increased by half (50.5 percent), whereas Mountrail
County experienced a 6.1 percent growth (Wills, p. 53). Similar to other
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booms, the population increase in those counties was driven primarily by men,
and in Williston the gain between 1950 and 1954 was 33.6 percent men and
29.8 percent women (Wills, p. 56). One challenge in fully understanding the
population changes in a resource-based boom county, however, is that some individuals are missed in the census counts. These so-called shadow populations
are often living in nontraditional housing arrangements such as man camps
(see Caraher, Weber, and Rothaus, current volume), campgrounds, or other
out-buildings in the countryside. Campbell (p. 252) notes, for example, that a
very high population of long-term county residents were living in trailers after
the boom.
One of the strengths of the analyses presented in the 1958 Williston Report
is related to the research strategies used by these scholars. Campbell, for example, surveyed newcomers and established residents from the oil-impacted
counties about their perceptions of the boom. Moreover, these residents were
asked about their behaviors, whether they had met new residents to their
community, and what they thought of them (the newcomers were also asked
about their perceptions of the community). These researchers also went to
community-based organizations such as churches to solicit additional information about the boom. So what did these efforts tell us about the 1950s
Williston boom?
Similar to the case in other resource-based booms, the characteristics of
these newcomers to the Williston Basin—many of whom were from out of
state—may have been threatening to longtime community residents. Some
of these newcomers were from minority racial and ethnic backgrounds, and
because most of these oilfield personnel were shift workers, it was difficult for
them to join local organizations or develop a stake in the community. Interestingly, many newcomers had families, which differentiated this group from
similar groups in other boomtowns, where the influx of new residents included primarily young men with few attachments to the community. Despite
this influx of families, Campbell writes that few newcomers became members
of local churches or joined fraternal organizations.
Researchers found evidence of tension or conflict between the newcomers
and longtime residents, and Campbell says these disagreements were sometimes based on the perception that newcomers were “riff-raff” and their
presence disrupted existing relationships (p. 250). Other community-level
conflicts emerged over disagreements about development, although those
disputes did not seem to result in long-term problems. When asked whether
newcomers had been accepted into the community, only 3 percent of longtime
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residents said they had not, while a similar proportion of newcomers (4 percent) expressed the same feeling (Campbell, p. 253).
When it comes to describing the social problems related to the boom,
the challenges identified by Campbell are similar to those reported in other
studies of rapid growth communities: a severe housing shortage, an uptick in
disorder and crime (and especially offenses related to alcohol abuse), a rise in
traffic flow and congestion, the challenges of dealing with transients seeking
work, and the increased demand on public services and local businesses. With
respect to the municipal or county services, for instance, school enrolments
increased and the library’s book circulation grew fourfold (Campbell, p. 265).
Increased demands were also placed on state and federal agencies, and the
state employment service was busy during both the boom and the bust, while
the post office was overwhelmed with business-related mail.
To accommodate these demands, many human service agencies expanded
capacity in terms of increased office space and personnel, although these solutions became problems once oil production waned and county populations
dropped. One of the hard lessons learned in the oil-impacted communities
was the risk of making long-term investments in physical infrastructure,
such as housing, in these places as investors lost money when the population
decreased in the bust. This lesson may have reduced interest in investing in
housing developments in subsequent booms.
Altogether, a review of The Williston Report shows that the rapid population
growth led to a severe housing shortage and government services, and local
businesses struggled to meet their demands. While the results of surveys revealed the presence of tension between newcomer populations (“outsiders”)
and the existing residents (“insiders”), Campbell and his colleagues found that
most new residents felt accepted. Yet, the 1950s boom was distinctive as it
lasted only four years and its impact centered primarily on two counties. One
interesting question is the degree to which municipal leaders learned from this
experience, and whether the social impacts of the post-2000 resource-based
boom were similar to ones that occurred earlier.
Social Impacts of the 2008 Boom
Every resource-based boom is distinctive in regards to its location, duration,
and magnitude, but one common factor is the inevitable bust (Marais and Nel
2016). With respect to North Dakota, the 1950s oil and gas boom-and-bust
cycle was followed by a similar one in the 1980s. The boom that started in
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2008 differed from the prior booms because of the massive scale of the development and duration of the boom, and because extraction activities were
being carried out over an entire region, rather than in several out-of-the-way
counties. Kelsey, Partridge, and White (2016) describe how the increasing
value of oil and natural gas, combined with the introduction of hydraulic
fracturing (or “fracking”) enabled producers to extract oil from areas where
conventional drilling was not profitable. Taken together, these factors resulted
in a “perfect storm” that led to unprecedented levels of oil and natural gas
production in sparsely populated rural counties throughout the Bakken (Montana and North Dakota), Eagle Ford (Texas), and Marcellus (Pennsylvania and
New York) regions. Of all these locations, however, the oil boom in the Bakken
had the most significant social impact, especially considering an almost 1300
percent increase in oil production between January 1, 2007, and May 31, 2019
(North Dakota Industrial Commission 2019).
Both the rapid population increase and industrialization in the 2008 North
Dakota boom differed from its 1950s counterpart in a number of ways. When
it comes to population growth, Scheyder (2016) reports that over 80,000
people came to North Dakota to work in the oil and gas and supporting industries. It is not surprising these newcomers had a disruptive impact, especially
considering there were fewer than 660,000 residents in the entire state population before the boom. As was the case during prior expansions in oilfield
activities, many of these newcomers were young men, but in contrast to the
1950s boom described in the Williston Report, few brought their families to
the oil patch. The fastest population growth occurred in the early phase of this
boom as a greater number of workers was required to drill the wells and to
construct the infrastructure, such as plant structures, railways, and pipelines,
that move these commodities.
The stressors placed on the communities affected by a rapid population increase depend upon the community’s resiliency and the characteristics of the
newcomers. Some of these new residents stay a short time, thus increasing
the population turnover. The deployment of the workforce might also influence the social ills experienced in a boomtown. Depending on the location of a
boom, many of the out-of-town personnel live in company housing, and either
fly (or drive) in and out on a rotating work schedule (e.g., two-weeks on, and
two-weeks off). These full-time workers and part-time residents will typically
have little investment in community life. Taken together, the rapid growth
and population turnover contributes to community instability by reducing informal social controls, which in turn increases disorder and crime. Population
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growth can also have a corrosive effect on some communities by increasing
conflict between different groups of longtime residents as well as the longtime
residents and newcomers (Ruddell 2017).
There is a predictable set of outcomes when the population of young men
with little stake in a community increases and the informal controls decrease,
and these ill effects were reported after the 2008 boom. Incidents of alcohol
and drug abuse increased. Women reported being hounded by men and feeling
unsafe, and a growing number of them experienced assaults and stalking
(Jayasundara, Heitkamp, Mayzer, Legerski, and Evanson 2016). Law enforcement agencies in the Bakken reported a substantial increase in calls for service
beyond what could be expected by a population increase (Dahle and Archbold
2105; Montana All Threat Intelligence Center and North Dakota State and
Local Intelligence Center 2012).
The second factor common to all resource-based boom towns or counties
is the increased level of industrialization that reduces the residents’ quality
of life. Loh and Loh (2016) describe how noise, light, and water pollution are
common by-products of resource extraction. One factor differentiating the
2008 boom from the prior booms was the introduction of fracking, which is a
technologically complex undertaking requiring massive investments in material and personnel. For example, Kondash and Vengosh (2015, 276) point out
that between 3.6 and 6 million gallons of water are required to frack each well,
and this water must be hauled by trucks, which creates traffic-related problems such as congestion, the destruction of roadways, and a rise in the number
of collisions. A series of surveys carried out in one boomtown over almost a
decade reveals that aggressive, dangerous, and drunk driving are among the
greatest concerns of community residents (Britto 2016).
Boomtown Effects after 2008
Every rapid growth community differs in the extent to which social problems
affect its residents. The magnitude, duration, and location of the 2008 boom
in the Bakken created a situation where the impacts of these factors were
many times those experienced in the 1950s. One of the challenges of fully
understanding the extent of these social problems was the exaggeration by
the media of the impacts of the boom, as news accounts featured sensational
headlines such as “crime turns oil boomtown into Wild West” (Ellis 2011), a
theme that was repeated in magazine articles, blogs, news reports, and television series over a seven-year period (Ruddell 2017). But were those accounts

278

accurate? In what follows, we provide a short summary of the boomtown effects in the Bakken region by drawing on official government statistics and the
perceptions of human service workers and police officers.
One of the challenges of relying upon official statistics to assess the impact
of rapid population growth is that booms are often located in out-of-the-way
places where local governments have often done an incomplaete job of collecting and reporting statistics about the demand and delivery of human
services. Thus, educational or health agencies might not formally track information about their students or patients regarding their origins or other
characteristics, such as their histories of special needs. As a result, after the
population surges, local agencies frequently scramble to justify additional
funding from the state or federal governments to manage the increased demand, but lack accurate pre-boom statistics. Researchers and journalists have
consistently reported how the demands for services exceeded the capacity
to respond effectively in the health (McChesney 2012), education (Schafft,
Glenna, Green, and Borlu 2014), and social services (Weber, Geigle, and Barkdull 2014).
With respect to crime, Ruddell, Jayasundara, Mayzer, and Heitkamp (2014)
analyzed the pre- and post-boom crime statistics in Montana and North
Dakota counties affected by the expansion in oilfield activities. One of the difficulties in carrying out this type of research is that sparsely populated rural
counties did not consistently report their annual crime-related statistics to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for its annual Uniform Crime Report. One of
the barriers to researchers interested in studying crime in these rural counties is that police departments or sheriff’s offices are not required to submit
statistics about the crimes reported to them, the number of arrests made by
their deputies or officers, or the calls for services their agencies receive. Unless
those statistics are accurately reported, our knowledge of crime in these rapid
growth communities will continue to be incomplete.
When frontline human service workers from education, health, public safety,
and social service agencies were asked about the impact of the boom, they
clearly indicated their workloads became overwhelming and their agencies
lacked the resources to adequately manage demands. Because these officials
work directly with clients, their perceptions and insights are important when
considering the social impacts of rapid population growth. In order to better
understand the impact of the boom, Flanagan, Heitkamp, Nedegaard and
Jayasundara (2014, 93) conducted focus groups with human service workers,
and the consensus was that while many North Dakotans benefited from the
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boom, these workers carried the burden. They found that the boom had the
following impacts:
• Changes in the nature of service delivery: The workloads and the complexity
of cases these workers managed increased, and many of the clients these
workers served had serious addictions issues.
• Difficulties in hiring and retention: Agencies lost staff members to more
lucrative jobs in the oilfield, and it was difficult to replace them as the
high costs of living in boom counties made it difficult to recruit. Consequently, the workloads of existing workers increased.
• Lack of training to meet changing needs: The increasing complexity and seriousness of cases required additional training, although agency staff had
few opportunities to participate in training and their agencies lacked the
funds for training.
• Insufficient services to address needs: In addition to high workloads, many
organizations lacked the physical resources to meet client demands; domestic violence shelters, for instance, did not have enough beds and some
abused and vulnerable women were told to seek help in other counties.
• Economic realities of resource allocations: Workers reported that their
funding agencies were reluctant to expand the capacity of local services
because they felt the boom would be short-lived. (Flanagan et al. 2014,
94–100)
Altogether, a lack of resources forced agency staff to exercise creativity in
order to meet an almost relentless demand for services with no corresponding
increase in funding or staffing. Respondents indicated they engaged in more
partnerships, coordinated activities to reduce duplication, and sought donors
to fund their efforts (Flanagan et al. 2014). Human service workers made a
similar set of observations about the impacts of the oil boom, mentioning a
discrepancy between the caseloads they reported to the agencies that funded
them and their actual workloads. They also described how shortages in areas
such as housing contributed to crime and reported that clients showed up
at human service agencies with a greater set of unmet needs (Jayasundara,
Heitkamp, and Ruddell 2016, 72). As Everingham, Devenin and Collins (2015)
observe about the impact of resource-extraction in Australia, “the beast doesn’t
stop.”
Police scholars have also examined the impact of the oil boom on officers
policing North Dakota counties. Dahle and Archbold (2015, 810) describe how
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police workloads—as indicated by calls for service—increased in oil-impacted
North Dakota towns and cities between 2000 and 2013. Although some agencies, such as the Minot Police Department, had relatively modest increases in
calls (26.4 percent), Williston, which was the epicenter of the boom, experienced a 857.5 percent increase in calls. While workload demands increased
exponentially, these agencies were slow to add additional officers or to receive budget increases that were commensurate with the new demands. The
complement of sworn officers in Williston, for example, increased from twenty-one to thirty-eight (81 percent) in those thirteen years, and their annual
budget tripled. These results were similar to those published in the Montana
All Threat Intelligence Center and North Dakota State and Local Intelligence
Center (2012) report. The question that follows those statistics is how officers
manage these expanding workloads.
Dahle and Archbold (2015, 811–16) asked three questions about managing
the impacts of rapid population growth on crime in North Dakota, and after
analyzing the responses of 101 police officers and sheriff’s deputies in focus
groups, they observe:
• The impact of rapid population growth on police organizations: Over twothirds (67 percent) of respondents reported that their agencies lacked
the resources to keep up with workloads, although half of their agencies
hired additional personnel. Participants said that the quality of their services decreased as officers were more reactive (and no longer had time to
spend explaining their actions with the public) and were not engaging in
informal community-building efforts.
• The impact of changing work environments on police organizations: Not only
did calls for service related to disorder and crime increase, but officers
were responding to very high numbers of traffic-related incidents. Officers also reported that there was a cultural change in their communities,
and they believed that some outsiders had little stake in them. They
were also perceived as having less regard for the law than established
residents. Participants said they had less time for informally interacting
with teachers, students or business owners due to workload demands.
Similar to the results reported by the human service workers in Jayasundara, Heitkamp, and Ruddell’s (2016) study, the high workload demands
increased the number of collaborative relationships with other law enforcement agencies.
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• The impact of rapid population growth on police resources: Almost one half
of the respondents said their organizations were “stretched thin,” and
even though most agencies hired additional officers, the recruiting and
training of these new officers (in the academies and in the field) placed
additional demands on their operations. Although the opportunity to
work overtime increased due to the staffing shortages, working longer
hours contributed to burnout and fatigue. Participants also reported
that the resources needed for their operations, such as office space or jail
cells and vehicles, did not meet their needs.
A consistent theme underlying the observations of human service workers
and law enforcers is that workload expectations became unreasonable and the
ability of their agencies to provide responsive services decreased as the boom
progressed. Agencies already criticized for being reactive could no longer engage in preventative activities, and almost all respondents said that the quality
of their services suffered. In some cases, the human service agencies did not
have the resources to help some clients.
Summary and Conclusions
The 1950s boom in the Williston Basin resulted in a rapid population increase
that placed great demands on local businesses and human service agencies.
But as Campbell observes, the boom was relatively short-lived, and local
governments overcame these shortcomings. The boom starting in 2008, by
contrast, had a much greater social impact due to its longer duration and its
impact on all aspects of community life, starting in the Williston Basin and
radiating throughout the state. Whereas prior booms were contained to several counties, the 2008 boom had a profound effect throughout western North
Dakota and eastern Montana. The final chapters about the 2008 boom have
not been written, and the oil and gas extraction activities have persisted for
over a decade, albeit with a slowdown from 2014 to 2016 before production
increased and then peaked in 2019 (North Dakota Department of Mineral
Resources 2019). This brings us to the question of what we have learned from
this comparison of the booms in different eras.
Thomas, Smith, and Ortiz (2016) contend that if a social problem can
be predicted, it can be prevented. For the most part, the social impacts of
the rapid population growth and industrialization associated with a resource-based boom can be foreseen, and local and state government officials
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can act proactively to mitigate the worst aspects of these booms by leveraging
resources and participating in intergovernmental collaborations (Smith, Haggerty, Kay, and Coupal 2019). Research from over four decades has provided
us with a good understanding of the impact of rapid population changes in
sparsely populated rural communities and the interconnectedness of the social
problems that emerge during a boom. Based on those observations Ruddell
(2017) developed a list of fifteen steps that local governments can take to mitigate the crime-related and other social problems caused by a natural-resource
boom. Local government officials can tailor those strategies for the distinctive
conditions in their jurisdictions. Regardless of where and when a boom occurs,
however, attempts to reduce the social ills occurring in these places must be
broad-based, integrated, and start with the assumption that all resource-based
booms eventually bust.
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Chapter 11
Making Home in the Bakken Oil
Patch
William Caraher, Bret Weber, and Richard Rothaus
If not for the dated photographs, the 1958 Williston Report’s treatment of
housing could apply to the early twenty-first century Bakken boom. Both
1958 and the early twenty-first century witnessed the arrival of temporary
workers who impacted the region’s older communities even more than the rig
counts or the barrels of oil sent to market. In both eras, the influx of a rapidly
changing workforce produced high rents, limited housing options, and created
a sense of social disruption.
During the Bakken’s most recent boom, we led the North Dakota Man Camp
Project. Like the authors of the Williston Report, we brought a multidisciplinary
team to the Bakken oil patch (for a review of this project see Caraher, Weber,
Kourelis, and Rothaus 2017; Caraher and Weber 2017; Caraher, Weber, and
Rothaus 2016; Barkdull, Weber, and Geigle 2016). Our project focused on documenting the material and social lives of the workers living in the wide range
of workforce housing sites across the region. The North Dakota Man Camp
Project and the Williston Report both captured a moment in the dynamic space
of the Bakken. Indeed, the rapid pace of change and the resulting housing
crisis and social disruption appear to be a common feature to resource booms
around the world (Ruddell and Ray, this volume). Booms can create collisions
when they bring the needs and capital of the global center to rural peripheries
(Caraher 2016), and when “outside” workers arrive in the region and interact
with longer-term, more established residents. Despite these structural similarities, there are differences in terms of the scope of the two Bakken booms, each
involving distinct policy reactions and economic and political contexts. As a
result, we located the twenty-first century Bakken boom within its particular
historical context and framed our attention to workforce housing amid the
growing concern for housing in the late modern world (Madden and Marcuse
2016).
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This chapter provides a critique of the 1958 Report’s treatment of housing,
a consideration of the emergent perspectives on workforce housing in the
present, and an overview of our research of temporary workforce housing. It
concludes with a consideration of how economic booms and busts manifest
and accelerate changing ideals about domesticity and the political ramifications of these changes for community in the context of global capital.
Summary of the Williston Report with Special Attention to Housing
The 1958 Williston Report provides an invaluable snapshot of the 1950s oil
boom. It describes the scale of the boom, confronts the challenge of counting
and documenting a mobile and temporary workforce, and wrestles to measure
the impact of social change. In the absence of consistent and high-resolution
data, the authors of the Williston Report supplemented their study with interviews and more impressionistic readings of the situation. Our work follows
similar patterns.
The Williston Report is very much a report, and it approached aspects of
the 1950s oil boom largely on its own terms. There is little effort to locate
the 1950s Bakken boom within the history of the state, the region, or larger
conversations about extractive industries and the associated changes in the
mobility of the American workforce in the postwar era. As the authors note,
their report is a case study rather than a policy brief or an argument for understanding the broader causes and patterns of social change.
That being said, Campbell and his colleagues’ observations are not without
judgment. They assert that some of the housing in the Bakken, particularly
around Tioga was, indeed, “substandard,” including tar-paper shacks and structures rough enough to be thought of as “grain bins.” Photos from the 1950s
showed light-weight, closely-spaced buildings that could be moved two at a
time with a farm truck (p. 258–2). Interviews with one resident confirmed
their unsuitability, noting, “How can they expect a man to live in something
like that? I’ve come all the way from (a southern state) because of my job and
I’ve never had to live in anything like this before” (p. 258). These temporary
houses were not the only solution to the housing boom: communities like Ray
and Tioga also subdivided more substantial, existing structures to accommodate workers, and Williston and Tioga built new housing. Additionally, both
then and now, as is common in boom areas around the globe, some oil companies provided mobile housing units to accommodate their employees in the
oil patch, though this is generally done for more highly skilled workers and
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management, with the rest of the workforce largely left to find their own way
with limited options (Weaver 2010; Van Bueren 2002; Caraher 2016).
In the 1950s, the tight housing market caused by the boom motivated communities and developers to invest in housing, but, ironically, most of it was
expensive and high quality, built to attract individuals with higher incomes
who already enjoyed stable housing. As a result, new construction did little
to alleviate the housing challenges facing workers who only intended to stay
in the region temporarily or who did not enjoy high salaries or wages. Further aggravating the immediate situation, new construction motivated policy
makers to limit the extent and impact of temporary housing, which further
limited available choices for temporary residents. This dynamic has seemingly
recurred in each subsequent boom in the Bakken.
The authors of the Williston Report hinted at an analysis that considered
the social and political dynamics of housing, but, despite the changes taking
place across the region, they shied from considering housing to be a genuine
“social problem” (p. 257). Instead, there was a tendency to acquiesce. Quotes
from longer-term residents suggest a sense that something was wrong with
the workers who seemingly chose to live in “substandard” temporary workforce
housing. One Tioga resident commented that “I don’t see how anyone could
rent” the available housing, suggesting that there was something wrong with
the workers rather than the housing (p. 256). Workforce housing was primarily seen as an individual problem and the responsibility of the workers.
Rather than a social responsibility, temporary workforce housing became an
inconvenience for longer-term residents to endure. In this regard, the 1958
Report echoed many of the sentiments expressed to members of the North
Dakota Man Camp Project during our research. Housing remained “disturbing
to the researcher” (p. 254), but longtime residents only rarely articulated it as
a problem for the workers. Whether the discussion was about RVs or modular
crew camps, long-term residents tended to view them as necessary solutions,
or even evils, to tolerate and eventually banish, rather than seeing the housing
shortage as a social problem to be solved. The Williston Report demonstrates
what is probably obvious for all who have experienced booms: housing and the
resulting tensions between existing communities and new arrivals is a recurring, key dynamic of booms related to extractive industries.
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Historiography of Short-term Housing and Home
The Williston Report appeared at a transformative time for scholars considering
new forms of American housing in the post-war era, particularly in the American west, and the report anticipated a twenty-first century global housing
crisis emerging around the time of the Bakken boom. John Bickerstaff Jackson’s 1953 study of the “westward moving house” (Jackson 1953), and his late
1950s research on housing in the Four Corners area of the American southwest (Jackson 1960) recognized housing in the west as a distinct phenomenon
adapted both to the identity of the owner and to the economic needs of a region. More recent studies on temporary worker housing during World War II
(such as Foster 1980; Mitchell 2012), and on the rise of mobile homes and RVs
as expressions of the tension between mobility and stability in the American
suburbs (Jackson 1984; White 2001), likewise saw the middle of the twentieth
century as a period during which housing and concepts of domesticity came
to intersect with new materials, plans, and social roles (Berger 1961; Duncan
and Duncan 2004). Set against this backdrop, Campbell and his colleagues’
ambivalent attitude toward the housing problem in the 1950s Bakken likely
reflected the significant changes taking place within American attitudes toward the house and domesticity during the same decade (see Hayden 1984 for
the classic treatment of this period; Miller 2010).
Sixty years after the Williston Report, United Nations’ experts warned of a
global housing crisis largely driven by financial speculation (Johnstone 2017).
The intense commodification of housing has increased the mobility of global
capital in ways that have harmed the housing security of multiple populations.
There has been a dramatic expansion of ad hoc housing around urban areas
in the global south, worsened challenges associated with housing the growing
number of refugees and migrants in the global north, and—as is the case in
the Bakken—greater numbers of laborers engaged in precarious manufacturing jobs, construction projects, and other short-term ventures. Activists and
scholars alike recognize that the housing needs of workers, migrants, refugees,
and urban dwellers are a matter of social, economic, and environmental justice.
Recent critiques have made clear, for example, that the Williston Report’s prescient observation that the tendency of developers to invest in high cost and
high profit units at the expense of affordable housing, when multiplied across
the global stage, has contributed to the global housing crisis (for example,
Madden and Marcuse 2016).
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Indeed, for those interested in the housing-related challenges of the twenty-first century, the 1958 Williston Report is almost uncannily relevant, even if
it might strike the modern readers as calloused. For a start, the Report’s nonchalant assertion that in many cases housing problems represented more of
a “personal” problem than a larger social one, forecast the tendency of many
twenty-first century policy makers to turn a blind eye to the reality that
temporary housing represents a compromise negotiated across a dramatic
power imbalance. This imbalance separates workers and employers, shapes the
attitude of the Bakken counties’ longer-term residents, and colors prevailing
attitudes of society at large. Attitudes toward domesticity favor home ownership, but the material, economic, and environmental limits present in the
industrial wilderness of the Bakken, and the attitudes and policies promulgated by state and local communities, tend to marginalize temporary labor and
limit their housing options. Workers, migrants, other marginalized groups find
themselves in a social bind where status is tied to a preference for single-family
home ownership in an environment where that is largely not possible.
For their part, longtime residents often seek to alleviate the pressure of
global and national financial capital that directly impacts their lives (increased
housing costs, social disruption, etc.) by leveraging their access to local and
regional political and social capital at the expense of temporary workers (for
some of this see Olive, current volume). In this context and in this contest,
the temporary housing in the Bakken and the conditions that produced it
emerge as less than an exceptional response to an unexpected boom and more
of a grim model for housing the growing class of precarious workers in the
twenty-first century. In other words, the “personal” problem of housing in the
Williston Report masked deep issues that would come to the fore over the next
sixty years.
North Dakota Man Camp Project’s Approach to Housing in the Bakken
The NDMCP looked at workforce housing in the Bakken both directly and
as a lens on shifting ideals about work and home. We considered the lives of
temporary workers and longer-term residents, and how both negotiated the
practical realities of housing, home, and community. We looked at the material and social aspects of various forms of workforce housing, and how the
resulting constraints and opportunities shaped personal wellbeing amid the
intersection of the private and the political. Over the course of five years, we
developed a longitudinal sample of workforce housing sites in the Bakken that
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reflected a wide range of forms, practices, and experience in North Dakota’s
Williams and McKenzie counties. The resulting archive consists of nearly
10,000 photographs, dozens of hours of video, and interviews with camp residents, managers, owners, as well as local officials in the Bakken.
Neither the Williston Report nor our own work ever offered precise counts
of workers in relation to available housing. Both numbers were so rapidly fluctuating that such attempts were not practical, and such a count was simply
outside the scope of our research focus. However, in the process of disseminating our findings we were often pressed for such data. Some illustrative,
point-in-time estimates help to address this. In 2012, the North Dakota Petroleum Council estimated that the boom had created 65,000 jobs, with a
state population of just over 700,000. At that same time, the Department
of Commerce estimated the number of “available beds” in crew camps at just
15,119, suggesting that fewer than 25 percent of the new workers would have
been readily accommodated by temporary workforce housing. These figures
also neglect those who came to the Bakken looking for work and housing but
then left, usually due to the lack of affordable or available housing. Further, in
consideration of the tension between the workers and the longtime residents,
many of the camps dwarfed neighboring communities in terms of population.
In terms of population alone, several of the worker settlements would have
been counted among the state’s twenty largest cities.
Like the Williston Report, we observed workers living in substandard, overpriced, and cramped housing vulnerable to the vagaries of North Dakota’s
weather, and we recognized the range of housing options as well as the ways
workers modified their temporary accommodations to endure the seasons
and to enhance their domestic lives. But we also strove to be more nuanced in
capturing the changing conditions throughout the boom and the subsequent
slowdown, and to monitor the changes brought on by the increased inventory of permanent housing, the decline in employment opportunities in the
oil patch, and the policy-driven legal challenges to the provisional use permits
under which many temporary man camps functioned.
The eventual decline in the number of jobs we observed parallels the observations made in the Williston Report. For instance, Tioga saw an easing of
housing pressures with the completion of a gas plant and other regional projects in 1954 (p. 214). We saw similar outcomes in Tioga and, perhaps most
dramatically, in Watford City. The completion of major infrastructure projects
(especially roads and pipelines), and the increase in housing inventory, alleviated some of the pressure on workforce housing, and we worked to capture the
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ways that the end of the most intense phases of booms tend to reveal and even
highlight the underlying tensions and flows of capital that the earlier frenetic
pace, optimism, and opportunism tend to obscure.
The issues of housing and home in the Bakken oil patch must also be considered in relation to the reality that many of the workers who lived in temporary
housing were victims of the housing crisis and the Great Recession of 2008.
There were some parallels with the earlier, nationwide, 1952 recession, and the
acute, post-World War II housing shortage. But that is where the similarity
mostly ends. The earlier period was one where lifetime employment with
a single employer was relatively common. That was also the dawn of a burgeoning, suburban domesticity. In contrast, after 2008, many of the workers
who came to the Bakken continued to pay mortgages on distant homes in
other states, while others had left properties that were underwater, hoping to
start anew in the Bakken. These were workers who understood the likelihood
of job insecurity and multiple, shifting employers over the course of a career.
Indeed, many had weathered previous booms that shaped their attitudes toward housing and home. One woman, a veteran of the Alaska oil boom, warned
in an interview in the fall of 2016, “Don’t count on the oil field … when it’s good
it’s great, but when it tanks, it affects an entire community.”1 She described her
and her husband’s experience:
When the oil tanked up there, and the oil went away, I lost my job, his
overtime got cut. So our primary home … we couldn’t afford the big mortgage on it anymore, so that got foreclosed on, and we had another little
rental house that we sold at a huge loss.2
Near the end of the interview she wistfully hinted at the long-term nature of
booms in extractive industries with a courageous sense of humor: “My dad has
seen the oil field rise and fall a couple times, and he kinda tried to warn us, but,
you know, we said the oil field is so big, it’s going to last forever!”3
1

NDMCP Personal Interview FT 12_3 October 28, 2016. A note on citations: those in
footnotes indicate interviews conducted by the North Dakota Man Camp Project, the Field
Trip (FT) number during which the interview occurred, the randomly assigned number of
the interview, and the date when it was conducted. While we have worked to obfuscate the
identity of the interview subject, all individuals signed consent forms with the understanding
that anonymity was not guaranteed. Those forms are on file with the authors.
2

NDMCP Personal Interview FT 12_3 October 28, 2016.

3

NDMCP Personal Interview FT 12_3 October 28, 2016.
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Bakken observers have noted the hard reality that families exchanged the
stability of a house for a trailer, mobile home, or room in a prefabricated
man camp (see Briody 2017; Rao 2018). The juxtaposition of the subprime
mortgage crisis and the challenges associated with workforce housing in the
Bakken illustrate the changing nature of work and home in the twenty-first
century (e.g. Gold 2014).
Making Home in the North Dakota Oil Patch
The Williston Report and our research both describe workers dismayed about
the high cost and wretched quality of the housing available to them. We might
assume that workers in the 1950s, like those we spoke with, struggled to develop domestic norms, worked to transform temporary housing into homelike
spaces, and sought other ways to improve their situation. Regardless, our research focused on these dynamics to a much greater degree than did the 1958
Report. To facilitate that focus, we utilized a three-level typology to describe
the different forms of temporary workforce housing.
The NDMCP started its research at the end of the most hectic phase of the
oil boom during which the most ad hoc camps, which we categorized as informal Type 3 camps, emerged and dissipated across the region. These included
sites like the infamous Williston Walmart parking lot camp, local city parks,
and the sudden overcrowding of recreational camping sites across the region.
The temporary shelter created in Williston’s Concordia Lutheran church’s
basement by Rev. Jay Reinke (chronicled in the documentary The Overnighters
[Moss 2014]), represents a dramatic but not entirely unique variation on
the kinds of spontaneous settlements that appeared in the earliest days of
the boom (Briody 2017). These existed in the liminal space between official
and unofficial policies, the vagaries of law enforcement attitudes, changing
housing options, and local goodwill. The precarity of these camps seemed to
create a greater degree of interdependence and even an ephemeral sense of
community. But as administrative infrastructure and more formal forms of
temporary housing slowly developed during the early chaos of the boom, uncertainty tipped against these camps and their number and visibility slowly
dissipated.
More persistent than the Type 3 camps, Type 2 camps consisted largely of
RVs arranged in lots with electrical and water hookups. These camps presented
more conventional opportunities for homemaking and were both a major
source of housing for many workers and a particular focus of our research (see
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Caraher et al. 2016). Occupants enhanced and expanded their living spaces
through the construction of elaborate “mudrooms” which occasionally exceeded the size of the original units and could include bunks, living spaces, and
additional storage. There were also outdoor improvements on the small lots
including gardens and various features to delineate some semblance of private
space. This making of outdoor living spaces was a consequence of the cramped,
spatial limits of life in an RV; interestingly, the mudrooms also provided features of traditional suburban life. The construction of elaborate mudrooms
expanded the useful space of the RV units but also allowed residents to
demonstrate proficiency in building, and created an opportunity to formalize
and personalize the entrance to their units. The Type 2 camps had a blurred,
suburban look to them, with informal neighborhoods and some limited sense
of community. These camps typically had investors from outside the region
and local management who worked with residents and nearby communities
to create rules that governed the extent to which residents could modify their
units. Most importantly, despite the often ramshackle appearance of some of
these camps, they offered the closest alternative to late twentieth century U.S.
norms of domesticity.
Type 1 camps, often referred to as crew camps or lodges, offered modular,
mobile housing typically managed by national or even global logistics companies. These were sometimes fenced in with security gates and prohibitions
against alcohol, firearms, or guests. They generally accommodated workers
from larger companies that reserved blocks of rooms for time-specific projects.
Such workers tended to move through the region in shifts of three or four
weeks of relatively constant work, followed by one or two weeks off. In general,
these camps had more formal, on-site, management and security. While some
offered the convenience of meals, these camps generally offered only minimal
amenities akin to economy motels. They also restricted the opportunities to
customize spaces. Most residents lived at these facilities for a limited number
of weeks and then departed the camp for a week or two. Some took their paychecks and left for mini-vacations or cruises, while others returned home to
domestic dynamics strained by distance, work schedules outside of the norm
of a forty-hour work week, and chores and other family tensions that had been
waiting during their absence. Either way, when they returned to the camp,
they were generally lodged in different rooms, with virtually no opportunity
for customized spaces or any semblance of private domesticity. Our experience as temporary workers in the Bakken involved repeated stays in one of
these camps, which provided a practical alternative to tracking down scarce
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and overpriced hotel rooms. We rarely stayed for more than one night, and
we found them to be eminently convenient. However, the enforced, apolitical
existence with little to no sense of continuity or community meant that these
offered the least opportunity for human interaction. Type 1 camps offered the
most efficient, but the least human, way for temporary workers to be moved in
and out of the Bakken like replaceable parts.
Man Camps and the Policy Realm
The majority of policy makers seemed to share the view of E. Ward Koeser,
president of the Tioga city commission in Williams County, who regarded
“man-camps as being somewhat a necessary evil” (Klimasinska 2013). As such,
the state’s general policy response was to rely on existing code, impose minimalist safety standards, utilize ad hoc efforts to limit the spread and longevity
of man camps, and alter that course only when pressed. State policy makers
tended to focus on short-term, financial considerations.
Despite clear distinctions from other forms of lodging, the most directly
relevant policies connected either to motel and hotel regulations, or to mobile
home and RV parks, and focused almost exclusively on “fire, life, and safety.”4
The origin of policies governing temporary labor housing were coincident with
the state’s earlier booms, though they were largely driven by federal responses
to the development of mobile homes in the 1950s, and federal designations
created by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the
1970s, rather than more specific efforts to control or enhance housing during
the previous booms.
The major policy revisions during the twenty-first century boom clarified
the definition of temporary work camp housing and set five-year time limits
with the requirement that owners remove the housing and “all related abovegrade and below-grade infrastructure within one hundred twenty days after
the temporary work camp housing is vacated” (NDCC 54-21.3-02.8 and 5421.3-04.3). By 2014, many camps had already outlived the five-year limit,
and by September of that year, headlines in the Williston Herald announced,
“Companies facing millions in fines for temporary housing,” with twenty-nine
separate housing units approaching locally imposed expiration dates (Bell
2014; Barkdull et al. 2016).
Highly-impacted communities in the heart of the oil boom tried to regulate
man camp proliferation, especially in response to overwhelmed infrastructure.
4

NDMCP Personal Interview FT 10_8 August 1, 2015.
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For instance, local waste treatment facilities were only able to accommodate
so many new toilets flushing into the system. State officials noted marked
improvements in the ability of local governments to plan and control these developments, but, despite being awash in oil revenue, the state generally avoided
direct assistance, leaving local governmental entities mostly on their own. As
described by one long-term state official, “there was no state funding for any of
this. The counties and cities came up with their own money to put their own
inspection departments in place.”5 Communities such as Watford City, caught
in the crosshairs of some of the boom’s busiest activity and traffic, had no planning department through the first years of the boom. The speed with which
local entities were able to develop local ordinances and administrative staffing
and support for inspection and enforcement varied greatly. With generally
insufficient funding and policy support—and a lack of housing for newly
hired bureaucrats!—local and state officials developed new collaborations and
communicated with one another in novel ways to deal with the explosion of
temporary labor housing.
State officials, acutely aware of the challenges, largely had their hands tied
in terms of providing assistance. As noted by one official, “When this first hit
there were a lot of problems because a lot of cities and counties had no oversight and no local building codes.”6
The typology developed by the North Dakota Man Camp Project, juxtaposed
with the framework of policies regulating temporary workforce housing, suggests insufficient state support of local communities. The unfortunate results
included overcrowding, price-gouging, dismal living conditions, and attendant social problems that persist in North Dakota’s oil patch. In the face of
such realities, North Dakota Governor Jack Dalrymple announced with his
second biennial “no growth” budget that despite the state having “the nation’s
strongest economy,” government needed to “become more creative and more
efficient” (Smith 2014). Almost inexplicably, amid the rapid growth there were
calls for austerity, especially in relation to government oversight.
“What can you do?” is a familiar question uttered by both the longtime
and newer community residents and government officials when asked about
boom-related housing challenges. This oft-repeated question, once unpacked,
reveals assumptions nested within the larger cultural, socioeconomic, and political contexts of North Dakota’s oil patch that privilege market forces as the
best possible means of addressing human wellbeing (for example, Abromovitz
5
6
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2012). And yet, the growing power of global corporate capital increases the
difficulty of addressing local issues of social and economic justice when other
countervailing forces (such as the governor or the state legislature) cannot or
will not act (for example, Sewpaul 2013).
A series of constraints and influences shaped the availability and character
of housing during the twenty-first century Bakken boom. A growing apprehension about the informal Type 3 camps led to stricter enforcement of
existing ordinances governing casual sleeping in parks. The Williston Walmart,
for example, abandoned its support for an informal, chainwide policy that allowed travelers with RVs to stay overnight in their parking lots after public
pressure and a spate of police calls (Woods and Brooks 2012). Local camping
sites, for visitors to the Theodore Roosevelt National Park or Lake Sakakawea,
enforced maximum stays to manage the influx of workers using these sites for
housing (see Briody 2017).
Despite the contingency of these sites, it is clear that they played an important role in both housing and creating spaces for community among new
arrivals to the region. In 2012, we visited a small Type 3 camp that had accommodated a group of carpenters from Idaho working on a nearby construction
site along with some other new arrivals to the Bakken. This group arranged
their RVs and tents around a common space, socialized, shared meals and
chores, and even helped those who had not found work. As one resident put
it: “We’re like brothers, like a family.” Despite this sense of family, she also admitted, “the living conditions are terrible here. Like people are shitting behind,
in the trees, past the trees right there. There’s flies everywhere … It’s fricking terrible living conditions.”7 When another resident of the same camp was asked
how he survived living in a shelter belt while looking for work, he responded,
“Well that’s where the camaraderie thing comes in—every night we sit around
the fire and joke and carry on, do stuff. They’ve got these little air pistols and
they’re all the time shooting each other. A lot of these guys are young and … full
of it … But that’s what breaks the monotony, you know? Because we have each
other.”8 In our experience as researchers, the Type 3 camps had the greatest
sense of community, but the least comfortable living environment and very
little stability.
A few months later we returned to discover that the RVs and tents of the
camp had been removed, leaving behind only fresh tire tracks from a tractor
in the snow and a full cooler of beer. All indications suggested that law
7
8
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enforcement or a local landowner removed this camp without much advance
notice. By 2014, most cities in the oil patch had enacted, or were more actively
enforcing, ordinances limiting the number of RVs on private property within
city limits. Rev. Reinke’s shelter at Concordia Lutheran Church finally closed
when pressure from local residents forced the city to act (Briody 2017; Moss
2014).
Type 2 camps built to accommodate RVs in individual lots have continued to
house temporary workers in the region months and years after the apparent
bust. Despite their sometimes scrappy appearance, these camps attracted national investors with modest upfront costs, limited staffing expenses, and the
opportunity to charge high rents. Ideally, once built, these camps required only
limited maintenance, but frozen water and sewage pipes in the winter, the
need to add amenities like the internet to stave off competition or playgrounds
to address state requirements, and costly updates to sewage and water systems
(sometimes accompanied by lawsuits against the builders or previous owners)
all suggest that these camps may have had more ongoing costs than owners
had anticipated.
One camp owner on the eastern edge of the patch just off Route 2, who had
a background in finance and construction, told us that a group of “finance”
investors had asked him to get involved because of the trouble that they had
been experiencing with contractors. This was a common problem throughout
the state at the height of the boom due to the shortage of tradespeople, especially in relation to all the available work. He had arrived in 2012 near the peak
of the boom, but noted, “the park’s never made money … here’s what happened:
the park was built incorrectly to begin with.” As a result, “we’re working with
the state, we’re putting in new water lines throughout the whole park … we’re
in a litigation issue with the sub [contractor] …”9 The camp had fewer residents
during each of our subsequent visits. From a peak of nearly one hundred, by
April 2018, only two renters had been there through the winter. One had visible water connection problems.
Type 2 camps sprang up along the major thoroughfares and around the
major intersections in the Bakken. Like the 1950s boom, the course between
Route 2 and the city of Tioga, and then extending through the northern approach to Williston on Route 85, was a busy stretch for temporary workforce
housing. Distinct from the 1950s boom, in the more recent boom Watford City
also witnessed a significant influx of workers, accommodated through a halo
of RV parks extending along the city’s western and southern sides. Watford
9
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City hosted a variety of camp types ranging from the unique, massive indoor
RV park, which offered climate-controlled stalls for individual RVs, to a series
of smaller camps lining the slopes of the rolling landscape. In 2016, a tornado
ripped through one of these RV parks, demonstrating the fragility of these
light-weight aluminum and fiberglass boxes designed more for easy transport
than persistent, multi-season habitation.
In interviews with residents of these camps at the height of the boom, we
often heard about the sense of community and the freedom available in Type
2 camps, especially in contrast to the institutional-style Type 1 camps. One
camp owner described the Type 1 camps as “just the same thing over and
over … there’s no community about it. ’Cause you’re in there, it’s like this big
system. [laughs] You come in, you eat, they take everything from you, you
shower, you’re gone.”10 In contrast, another owner described his Type 2 camp
as promoting “families, dogs, kids. So, it’s temporary housing, but some of these
people bring their families for the summer, and [the families] go back for the
winter, but they’ll stay here.”11 The degree of community is debatable, though
fears about crime in these camps were, in our experience, greatly exaggerated.
The lived experience existed somewhere between the hysteria about crime and
the hyperbole about community (but see Berg-Burin, current volume; Ruddell
and Ray, current volume).
Many had what we playfully called by the neologism “Bakktimism,” which
referred to the persistent optimism expressed by residents of the Bakken. Despite the dangers and demands of the work, fluctuations in oil prices, the high
cost of rent, the dust and heat in the summer, the frozen pipes, snow, and cutting wind of the winter, and the mud of the springtime thaw, residents of Type
2 camps almost universally remained positive about their situation. Maya Rao
recently offered the Gramscian observation (Rao 2018) that this optimism
represents faith in the long-term power of capitalism and hard work to reward
short-term risk and discomfort. One particularly illustrative form of Bakktimism emerged in a conversation with a man who operated a salvage yard
that bought and sold RVs and RV parts. When asked if he might make North
Dakota his “permanent” home, he replied, “Well, I’m 62 years old, I’m going to
do my best to maybe put in another five years … I hope to ride it out, there’s a
millionaire dream here, there’s great possibilities.”12 He was living in one of the
10
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most marginal camps we ever visited, but his story was more common than
eccentric and captured a common sentiment.
Many camp owners shared this confidence. While some made back their
initial investments in the first year or so, the persistence of these camps
demonstrates an ongoing willingness, as the boom retreated, to operate the
camps with significantly lower rents and lower occupancy. However, the receding boom also led others to close their camps, usually because of changing
local policies or growing competition from hotels and apartments.
The range of optimism among owners and on-site managers also reflected
their varying commitments to the neighboring communities. Some were
deeply involved in local affairs and lived locally, while the majority lived outside
the region. One park owner who had moved to the Bakken from Oregon and
built his business a few miles south of Watford City stated:
We are North Dakotans. We are licensed. My corporation is licensed. My
cars are. We moved. My kids started businesses here. We’re part of the
community … [W]e broke an acre off here and an acre for my partner, and
this is our home … We vote. We’ve been to the planning meetings.13
Camp owners and, more importantly, managers, also expressed a wide range
of attitudes toward the conditions in their camps. Some, for example, took
pride in the cleanliness of their facilities, emphasized the family friendly atmosphere, and paid careful attention to infrastructure and upkeep. A manager of
a large RV park outside of Williston remarked,
It’s our community. It’s not an RV park. When you asked me what it is, it’s
Williston Fox Run. I did not say it’s an RV camp because that’s not what we
want here. If you notice, our lots for these RVs and trailers are quite large
so that they do have a little piece of home for a yard, for whatever they
need. Our lot sizes are 30 by 90 feet. You can go to other places and they
are 20 by 40. It’s almost three times the size.14
Other camps appeared to take a more laissez-faire approach with certain
camps garnering the reputation for drug use, prostitution, and other illegal
and undesirable activities.
13
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As policies toward RV parks changed at the municipal level, camp managers
tried to enforce the rules, but the dynamic character of the boom made solutions difficult. As a manager of a camp near Ross observed, “There was no one
here to train me on everything, so I’ve had to learn all myself.”15 Camp managers sought to address the rules, but there was only ever limited support or
enforcement from state and county workers overwhelmed by the increased
workload and the changing policy environment. Indeed, as late as 2011, according to the executive director of the county’s Job Development Authority,
“McKenzie County had no land use plan or planning and zoning.”16 And even
once policies were established, efforts to place inspectors in the field ran up
against the same challenges impacting healthcare workers, law enforcement,
educators, etc.: as counties developed the necessary social infrastructure to
ramp up enforcement, they ironically ran up against the housing shortage.
Specific rules and regulations, much less policies, remain murky on the
ground. Williston, for example, enacted ordinances limiting the size and function of mudrooms in RV parks within city limits. In 2012, a camp manager
said, “We do check [mudrooms] out and make sure they meet the fire code and
that they’re not built shoddily, so that if the wind comes up 80 mph, it’s not
going to blow away. That’s what we do.”17 A year later, they required that residents limit their mudrooms to twelve-by-eight feet.18 Another camp manager
claimed that mudrooms could be any size as long as they maintained a ten-foot
clearance between the buildings.19 In other words, just as a camp’s policies work
only as well as the ability of the manager to enforce them, this same thing
extends to the state, county, and city laws.
The fate of Type 1 camps during the receding boom was reported on a nearly
weekly basis in 2015 and 2016 as the city of Williston expanded its extraterritorial jurisdiction to include land on which several man camps operated. In
response to Williston’s requirement that all man camps close by September 1,
2017, Target Logistics, one of the largest man camp operators in the region,
sued the City of Williston to prevent having to shut down its large facility at
the northern edge of the city. Other Type 1 facilities around Williston and
Tioga unsuccessfully requested that their sites be rezoned as hotels. Most of
15
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these larger facilities have since closed. The actual physical removal of these
Type 1 man camps is a particularly significant aspect of temporary workforce
housing during a boom. The units themselves can be removed by a truck and
are sometimes sold individually to buyers who pay for removal and transportation. However, the land where they stood will require significant reclamation
work to approach pre-camp condition. Since most of the land was leased from
local farmers, there is significant tension between out-of-state investors, their
local managers, and the landowners. At a camp outside of Alexander, North
Dakota, a Type 1 camp removed their units, but left the farmer with electrical,
sewage, and water pipes below the ground and a thick level of gravel and dirt.
As the camp failed, the farmer stopped being paid and lamented that land
would never again be farmable. Elsewhere, a land owner took a camp owner to
court after he tried to sell 110 acres of the farmer’s land: “I gave them a longterm lease which I shouldn’t have done. Then I found out they were trying to
sell this 110 acres out from underneath me and I got pissed off and took them
to court … And [now] the only ones making money is the lawyers.”20 Temporary housing may have been a “necessary evil” to address the housing crisis, but
the failure to create more effective policies, the insufficient funding, and the
lack of enforcement has meant ill effects persisting long after the boom times.
Visions of Home after the Boom
Compared to 2012, housing and related infrastructure in the Bakken region
looked very different by 2018. Like in the 1950s, the Bakken boom introduced
a ring of new housing to Williston. By 2018, Watford City was surrounded with
subdivisions, a new high school, and a four-lane road routing traffic around
downtown. On the one hand, these new developments demonstrate that
Bakken communities continue to value permanent housing with the benefits
of increased tax revenue and a greater sense of community and stability. In
many ways, the interest of workers and the Bakken communities intersect in
their shared desire for a sense of home. On the other hand, it remains unclear
whether residents of these new homes and apartments will stay in Watford
City as the workforce needs of the Bakken oil patch ebb and flow with the price
of oil, the requirements of drilling and fracking oil wells, and the lure of opportunity elsewhere. The Bakken landscape changes daily by the ongoing removal
of Type 1 camps, the gravel scars on the landscape, and the obvious decline
in boom and bustle as oil companies shift resources in workforce and capital
20
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elsewhere. The role of outside capital in funding the boom, creating temporary
housing, and new development remains obvious as well. It remains to be seen
whether the post-boom landscape will inform future policies and serve as a
reminder of the speed of twenty-first century capital and the vagaries of home
in the global economy.
A new subdivision east of Watford City provides a hint. In the spring of 2018,
the driveways and front lawns were already filled with work trucks beneath
banners advertising units with four bedrooms and four baths. Rather than
family housing, this arrangement would accommodate the same temporary
workers as the man camps they replaced. Despite bucolic names suggesting
suburban domesticity, the frequent architectural references to shipping containers, including corrugated siding and narrow dimensions, do little to hide
the likely transient reality. Ironically, the struggles for domesticity represented
by decorated mudrooms and desperately planted gardens in the Type 2 camps
gave way to an implicit temporary character that shaped much of the “permanent” housing in the same region.
The NDMCP, the 1958 Report, and Other Contemporary Bakken Research
There are certainly commonalities between the housing related issues described
in the Williston Report and our own observations. Perhaps even more surprisingly, there are echoes from North Dakota’s earliest extractive industry boom
periods, namely the original agricultural booms that brought large numbers of
European immigrants who similarly struggled with the tension between recreating the domesticity they had known and the needs for temporary workforce
housing exemplified by the Bonanza farms. Like the Type 1 lodges of the boom
we studied, some of the “permanent” housing that was built during the late
1800s and early 1900s was packed up and shipped off to the next boom (as
was the case with the Sears kit houses from that period). Also, then as now,
there were abandonment processes as technological advances in agriculture
meant diminished workforce needs, leaving the elements to slowly erode the
physical remnants of communities.
More poignantly, our work is distinct from the Williston Report in its consideration of both a more global and historical context. After an initial attempt
to simply consider the role of man camps in relation to the current, short-lived
oil boom, we struggled to see what the camps might reveal about housing temporary workers in relation to extractive industry booms. Then, as we engaged
that work, we came to understand that the phenomenon we were studying
might be even more broadly generalizable. We came to see the impact of global

305

neoliberal policies, and the accompanying market for a “just-in-time” workforce. One result is that housing, to a greater degree than has previously been
the case, has become a disposable commodity, intentionally serving global
capital rather than individuals, families, or communities. One consequence of
that economic dynamic is the surrender of political capacity. While interview
respondents often concentrated on the tension between the longtime residents of the host communities and the workers living in temporary housing,
we came to see the manner by which both “sides” received only limited benefit
from the boom, especially in contrast to the great wealth transferred to outside investors, many of whom rarely or never set foot in North Dakota.
Our contribution to Bakken research is that we did not view the workers
(and their families!) as feral intruders. Instead, we demonstrate that both the
new workers and the longer-term residents were caught in a global struggle
outside their control. Instead of seeing mercenary workers in conflict with
“genuine,” “native” North Dakotans, we saw both groups struggling to exercise their limited agency to either hold on to, or to create and engage, a sense
of home and community amid the hectic, even chaotic environment of an oil
boom. The decision-making processes impacting their lives was determined
less by local and state policy makers, and more by neoliberal policies and the
influence of global capital.
Oil booms can simultaneously be a blessing and a curse. Having lost population for decades, many towns in western North Dakota had struggled to
keep grocery stores open, let alone schools or medical services. In contrast,
Brad Bekkedahl, a Williston City Commissioner declared, “This is a time of
opportunity. It’s a time of growth. And it’s a time of amazing prosperity and
wealth coming into our community” (Holeywell 2011). Others simultaneously lamented the challenges brought about by the market-fueled, locally
inflationary economy. Dennis Lindahl, a city councilman in Stanley noted that
“merchants are able to charge an increased rate. Folks in town sometimes get a
little upset from supporting the industry while not receiving benefits.”21 And
clearly, even for oil boom boosters like Bekkedahl, the market does not have all
the answers. In the fall of 2014, Bekkedahl, as a Republican candidate for state
senate, was supportive of a change in the state’s oil production tax to address
Williston’s projected need of more than $1 billion in infrastructure needs by
2020. But, of all the economic struggles and challenges, the nexus issue in the
oil patch continues to be housing—part of a global crisis that continues to be
framed primarily as a local problem.
21
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Chapter 12
Drinking, Drugs, and Long Waits:
Community Members’ Perceptions
of Living in a North Dakotan
Boomtown1
Karin L. Becker
Introduction
Unlike the previous oil boom cycles in North Dakota’s history, the bust did
not immediately follow the boom from 2008–14. It was more of a downturn.
While the slowdown has had obvious economic effects on the state’s economy,
the social effects on communities are not as clear cut. Residents living in the
oil-impacted areas of western North Dakota have witnessed firsthand the
changes in their community due to population growth, stresses and strains
on infrastructure, and use of community services. While numerous national
media outlets have devoted resources to cover the boom, they have relied
mainly on outsider reporting, where much of the material comes from budget
reports, unemployment figures, real estate costs, census data, and oil and gas
forecasts. Although these numbers paint a holistic picture of the economic
impacts, what is missing is the insider perspective featuring community members’ responses in their own words. For that reason, this chapter will look at
how community members have perceived the impacts of the oil boom on the
health of their community and how their perceptions align with other boomtown communities.
Community member feedback has been gathered in community health
needs assessments (CHNAs), which document people’s perceptions and concerns regarding community assets. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires
1

An earlier version of portions of this chapter appeared in “Help Wanted: Health Care
Workers and Mental Health Services: An Analysis of Six Years of Community Concerns from
North Dakota’s Oil Boom Residents,” Journal of Rural Studies 63 (2018): 15–23. Republished by
permission of Elsevier.
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every nonprofit hospital to conduct a CHNA once every three years, and this
assessment cycle provides a systematic data stream to compare and contrast
identified community concerns over the years. Part of the CHNA process is to
identify community needs, prioritize them, and then address them through
an annual implementation strategy. At the time of this writing, two cycles of
CHNAs have been conducted by critical access hospitals located in western
North Dakota. In this analysis, seven individual CHNA reports are compiled
and the aggregated data are examined to better understand local experiences.
Defining Oil Patch Communities and Assessment Cycles
The Bakken Formation lies under five counties in western North Dakota
(Dunn, McKenzie, Mountrail, Stark, and Williams). This resource-rich area is
known as the oil patch. Five critical access hospitals are located within it. Since
community impacts from the oil boom spill out to other counties, this analysis
also includes critical access hospitals located in Crosby (Divide County) and
Kenmare (Burke County).

Figure 12.1. Sites where CHNAs were performed (Crosby, Kenmare, Tioga,
Stanley, Williston, Watford City, and Dickinson) (image source: David Veller)
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The first round of CHNAs was conducted in oil-impacted counties between
2011 and 2013. This cycle coincides with the peak of the oil boom. The second
cycle of CHNAs was completed between 2014 and 2016. Now it is time to
look at how the prioritized needs have changed against the backdrop of oil’s
downturn. What community concerns are constant? Which have dissipated
as a result of the slowdown? What new concerns are emerging as the oil boom
moves from the discovery to the maintenance phase? The lingering effects of
the oil boom remain to be determined, and consulting qualitative data from
community members living in the boom area provides firsthand accounts
about the impacts in people’s own words.2
CHNA Overview
In order to qualify as a tax-exempt charitable organization, hospitals have long
been required to demonstrate a strong commitment to promoting the health
of their surrounding communities. Typically, the community benefit has come
in the form of charity care where the hospital provides free or reduced cost
care to patients who are unable to pay for it (IRS 1956). Due to concerns that
hospitals were not adequately contributing to improving their local communities, the ACA increased the community benefit reporting and mandated that
all nonprofit hospitals conduct a community health needs assessment or pay
an annual fine (IRS 2011).
The purpose of the assessment is to describe the health of the local community, identify needs or service gaps, prioritize concerns, and identify ways
to address them. Assessing community health is not new; hospitals have
been conducting assessments and identifying health service inequalities for
decades (IRS 1969). However, the ACA mandate has institutionalized the routine practice of conducting a CHNA and, as a result, has provided data that are
systematically reported and publicly available. The three-year cycle affords a
comparative analysis of needs identified at a certain time, needs that remain
over the course of the years, and new needs that emerge. With the second cycle
of CHNAs completed, we are able to benchmark needs over time. The backdrop
of the oil boom and subsequent downturn provide an exciting time to analyze
the community health concerns that were prioritized in the two assessment
cycles.

2

See the appendix at the end of the chapter for a list of CHNA reports.
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Methods to Conduct a CHNA
While the methods to conduct a CHNA are vague, the federal guidelines
stipulate that the assessment process involve broad community input, including participation from public health experts and those who interact with
medically underserved, low-income, and minority populations (IRS 2011). Although methods differ between assessments, as a whole, the goal of a CHNA
is to solicit community input related to health and healthcare. The CHNA
process used with North Dakota hospitals derives from National Center for
Rural Health Works and Catholic Health Association models. It is informed by
both primary data, related to community member interviews, focus groups,
and surveys, and secondary data, related to health behaviors, conditions, risks,
and outcomes.
The CHNA process is informed by a community-based participatory research
framework whereby the researchers enlist community members as co-participants in the research process. In this way, community members are invited to
identify not only community problems but also ways to address them. This act
of doing research with—not on—participants is a key characteristic of community-based participatory research and fosters rapport between researchers
and participants as they are both unified in a common goal to improve community health (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Ainsworth and Schmidtlein 2013).
Moreover, the resulting partnership between community members and academic, organizational, healthcare, and governmental representatives allows
for multiple perspectives and expertise to engage and develop solutions to
community health concerns (Schulz, Israel, and Lantz 2003).
CHNA Process

Seven out of thirty-six critical access hospitals in North Dakota are located in
communities within the oil patch (Crosby, Dickinson, Kenmare, Stanley, Tioga,
Watford City, and Williston). In each of these communities, one-on-one key
informant interviews were conducted in person or by phone with selected
members who were identified as having insights into the community’s health
needs. Generally, four to nine interviews were conducted in each community. Topics included community assets and challenges, general health of the
community, community concerns, and suggestions for improving the community’s health. Focus groups consisted of 11–25 community members with
representation from schools, faith-based organizations, social service agencies,
healthcare services, senior services, and businesses and economic agencies, as
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well as law enforcement and elected officials. The same questions posed in the
key informant interviews were asked during the focus group.
Content analysis of the responses from key informant interviews, focus
groups, and open-ended survey questions was conducted using a grounded
theory approach. Grounded theory provides order from the plethora of feedback by developing categories through an ongoing process of comparing units
of data. This constant comparative method allows for flexibility within the
categories; as the analysis continues, themes emerge and an analytical framework takes shape (Lindlof and Taylor 2011). For example, responses such as
“shortage of primary care physicians” and “not enough healthcare staff” or
“lack of specialists” or “need more docs” were grounded into the category of
“healthcare workforce shortage.”
Additionally, each community customized a survey that was available at local
businesses and health clinics. For broader distribution, an electronic version
of the survey was promoted in local media outlets and through social media.
The survey tool was designed to gather residents’ perceptions about community assets and concerns, understand the attitudes about the overall health of
the community and hear suggestions for improvement, and learn how local
healthcare services were used. Average survey response rates hovered around
10–15 percent of the county’s population, which is slightly lower than the 20
percent average rate for unsolicited surveys (Fink 2003). The survey was not
intended to be a scientific or statistically valid sampling of the population, but
another tool to gain qualitative data.
Sample Characteristics

The survey asked several demographic questions about gender, race, age,
education, employment status, marital status, and annual income. In both assessment cycles, the majority of respondents identified as Caucasian females,
with almost twice as many women completing surveys as men. The majority of
respondents were married, worked full time, had a technical degree or a bachelor’s degree, and were considered longtime residents, living in the community
for twenty or more years. Mean annual household income was reported between $100,000 and $149,000. There was a slight change in age between the
two cycles. The majority of respondents in the first CHNA cycle were 55–64
years of age, whereas the second CHNA cycle had younger participants, most
being 25–34 years of age. Relative to North Dakota state demographics, respondent characteristics were representative of demographics for oil patch
counties (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).
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Prioritization of Needs

Once the data were analyzed and synthesized, they were presented at a community meeting. After a discussion of the findings, community members were
asked to identify on a ballot what they perceived as the top five community
health needs. Prioritization criteria included a need’s burden on the community, its scope, its severity, or its urgency. The results were totaled and the most
frequently cited concerns were included as priority needs in the CHNA report.
This prioritized list fulfilled the mandate of the ACA, offered guidance for
what the hospital should address in its implementation strategy, and provided
an emerging picture of community-articulated concerns.
Oil Patch Concerns: Then and Now
While there was not a systematic documentation of concerns from North Dakota’s first oil boom, the effects of oil development as identified in the 1958
Williston Report reveal considerable community impacts. If a community-based
health needs assessment had been implemented during the 1951–4 timeframe
in Williston, the prioritized needs would likely have included transportation,
housing, and strains on social and public services. Table 12.1 summarizes
needs conveyed in The Williston Report.
TABLE 12.1.
SUMMARY OF PRIORITIZED NEEDS: 1951–4

Needs
1. Lack of transportation resources
2. Lack of housing
3. Lack of social services
4. Overcrowded schools
5. Strained communication resources

Transportation needs stemmed from increased wear and tear on the roads
from heavy truck traffic and increased traffic. Housing was deemed substandard and rents were high. Social services were taxed, both in welfare and state
employment services. Migrants who moved to Williston to capitalize on the
oil boom often got stranded there, which increased welfare case management,
including a rise in cases of child neglect. Also, increases in population ushered
in demand for workers and jobs. Other significant problems included strains
on public services such as schools and communication systems. Schools were
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overcrowded and facilities had to be expanded to accommodate more students.
Communication systems like the postal service were overburdened to accommodate the increase in commercial and residential mail (Campbell, current
volume).
To compare how the needs of the 2008–14 oil boom compare to those
described sixty years earlier, a methodical review of each community’s prioritized needs was conducted and individual needs were aggregated with an eye
to emerging trends in oil-impacted communities. An inventory of community
member concerns voiced in response to the 2008–14 oil boom provides a new
perspective on social impacts. Traffic safety and housing are needs shared
between then and now. However, the focus on healthcare and mental health
shortages, which are largely absent in the 1958 Report, received the most attention now.
In the recently conducted CHNAs, similar methodologies were used in both
assessment cycles, allowing for a valid comparison with the same seven critical access hospitals in the oil patch. This consistency in methods provides the
ability to examine the impact on communities and benchmark change over
time. Table 12.2 displays the significant needs that were most frequently
ranked as most prevalent, most persistent, and most substantial.
TABLE 12.2.
THE BAKKEN: ASSESSMENT CYCLES
CHNA Cycle 1: 2011–13
1. Healthcare workforce shortage
2. Mental health
(including excessive rates of drinking)
3. Access to needed
equipment/facilities
4. Traffic safety
5. Lack of affordable housing

CHNA Cycle 2: 2014–16
1. Mental health (including alcohol
and drug use and abuse)
2. Healthcare workforce shortage
3. Lack of child care
4. Lack of resources for agin
population
5. Rising costs of health insurance

Since the top two needs received significantly more votes than the others, the
focus of this analysis is on the top two prioritized concerns from each CHNA
cycle. At a glance, the prioritized needs have not changed significantly over
the span of the past two assessments, but a closer analysis of how the needs
are articulated reveals the nuances and impacts of the oil boom. Healthcare
workforce shortage and mental health remain the most pressing community
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concerns, with alternating order of importance, during the peak of the boom
as well as during the downturn. Yet the ways in which these concerns are expressed show granular details of community impact. To better understand the
circumstances characterizing the categories of healthcare workforce shortage
and mental health, specific responses are provided in community members’
own words and are then contextualized against the backdrop of the oil boom.
CHNA Cycle 1 (2011–13), First Prioritized Need: Healthcare Workforce Shortage
In the first assessment cycle, community member feedback indicated a variety
of concerns relating to access to healthcare providers, retention and recruitment of providers, and increased burden on emergency medical services.
Therefore, the category of healthcare workforce shortage encompasses these
needs.
In regards to healthcare availability, the influx of people led to more demand
for services. Patients experienced long waits and limited appointments: “There
are long waiting times to get in. We have the same number of providers, but
probably three times the population.”3 The increase in demand also lessened
rapport between providers and their patients; community members perceived
this tension as doctors were forced to see more patients and spend less time
with each: “My doc doesn’t have time to chat with me anymore.”
Additionally, the demand for healthcare backlogged appointments so patients either had to wait months or travel to alternate facilities if they couldn’t
afford to wait: “No appointments are available. An appointment just to get
seen is four to five weeks out. There’s no walk-in clinic or urgent care.” The extent of traveling for healthcare added to the stress and financial impact on
patients, in addition to delivering an economic hit on the community: “There’s
frustration over trying to get in to see a provider. It can be a 3–4 day wait, so
they go out of town.” For some community members, a visit to the doctor may
include expenses for gas, food, and lodging on top of medical bills.
Retention and Recruitment of Providers

The problem posed by the increase in demand for healthcare services was compounded by the challenges communities faced to retain and recruit providers.
High turnover among healthcare providers impacted access to services and
3

All unattributed quotations come from community members’ responses gathered during the
CHNA process.
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continuity of care: “The staff is overworked and there are not enough doctors
and nurses for the current population to receive a sustainable, high quality of
service.” Some of the smaller critical access hospitals had only one doctor on
staff. The increase in patients strained already limited resources: “We need a
second doctor to relieve the on-call burden resting on the sole doctor.” Some
medical professionals left to take advantage of the handsome pay the oil industry offered: “We don’t have the funds to pay our healthcare staff the wages
they need to compete with the oil field business. We need to pay the employees
that are willing to make this their home competitive wages so that we can
focus on keeping workers long term.” Others left town due to the extent of
change experienced in their community or their inability to afford the skyrocketing rent. During this time, Williston was listed as the most expensive
place to rent a home in the United States, with Dickinson positioned as fourth
most expensive (McCormick 2014).
Moreover, with the influx of population and the increased need for services,
hospitals had little time to focus on recruiting efforts: “Our community is
changing very rapidly with the oil industry. Healthcare employee recruitment
has not been able to keep up.” Rural healthcare recruiting is a consistent challenge; of the primary care physicians who practice in North Dakota, 75 percent
practice in urban areas (Center for Rural Health 2017). There are almost twice
as many patients per physician in large rural areas than urban areas, and more
than five times as many patients per physician in small/isolated rural areas
(see Trinity Kenmare Community Hospital 2016). Recruiting specialists is
even harder.
Nationally, the healthcare workforce shortage has been widely documented
in the United States (Hempell et al. 2016; Derksen and Whelan 2009; Florell
2009; Commonwealth Fund 2017). According to the National Rural Health
Association, demand for more healthcare professionals is expected to rise with
aging Baby Boomers (Burrows, Suh, and Hamann 2012). With over 20 percent
of Americans living in rural areas, yet served by less than 12 percent of the
nation’s physicians, healthcare workforce shortage is a formidable national
problem (Hempel et al. 2016). Rural economic income disparities, smaller
numbers of rural health professional training sites, and lower reimbursement
rates provide context to this problem (Hart, Salsberg, Phillips, and Lishner
2012).
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Emergency Services

A plurality of responses pertained to emergency services that are unique to the
oil boom. Typically, the nature of most ER calls prior to the oil boom related
to farming and ranching accidents, fires, and traffic accidents. However, the
nature and frequency of the calls has changed since the oil boom: “Trauma
here can be so diverse—crushed by rig, crushed by equipment, falling off rig,
stomped by cattle.” The diversity of calls also necessitates specialized training
to deal with the chemical and environmental hazards of oil extraction.
Oil work is physical and dangerous, with an increased risk for accidents because of the heavy machinery, hazardous chemicals, long hours, and inclement
weather conditions.
From 2009–13, usage of ER services in the Bakken quadrupled. Plus, the
increase in wait times to see a doctor prompted greater usage of the emergency
room: “It’s not uncommon to wait 4–8 hours to get seen in the ER. If the ambulance brings you in, you go to the top of the list, so people are calling 911 for
little things.” Overuse of the ER taxed personnel, where concerns of quality of
care were prevalent: “We need more full time emergency services personnel.
I feel that they are overworked. This may cause concerns in patient care, and
things may get missed that are clinically significant.”
It is important to note that many emergency medical services were provided
by volunteer squads. Although in the past volunteer EMS squads may have
been able to meet the community’s needs, the demand exceeded the supply.
Additionally, the amount of ER activity was taking its toll on the volunteers,
professionally and personally. Members of the volunteer squads may have
been granted leave time from work to attend to a call, but the increase in
calls hampered work productivity: “Some employers pay volunteers for when
they’re on a call, but not all employers do.” While communities have considered
paying their EMS volunteers a salary, it is often economically unfeasible: “We
need to look at professionally staffed EMS. It could take up to $1 million/year
to do that appropriately.”
Comments from EMS volunteer squad members convey the extent of exhaustion and personal strain:
• “The only way I can get away from the calls is if I leave town.”
• “We see daily traffic accidents.”
• “I am so, so tired.”
• “I don’t sleep well anymore.”
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CHNA Cycle 1 (2011–13), Second Prioritized Need: Mental Health, Including Excessive Rates of Drinking
The second most prioritized community concern during the first CHNA cycle
pertained to alcohol abuse and excessive rates of drinking. Embedded in this
need is a larger problem of addiction, related to both alcohol and drugs, and the
need for counseling and services. While this is classified as a behavioral issue, it
is often associated with underlying mental health issues.
One trend to emerge from the community member responses that cannot
be ignored is that of ascribing addiction and drug usage to “transients.” Almost
half of all CHNA comments related to this need referenced transients or oil
workers:
• “Addiction and substance abuse are becoming a bigger issue with a larger
volume of transient people.”
• “It’s the nature of oil rig work. Some guy’s working 140 hours and it’s hard
to stay awake so they’re reaching for prescription drugs to help stay
awake. Our company has had to get rid of multiple employees because
of alcohol issues.”
• “Substance abuse treatment is a need with the increase in transient
population.”
• “Addiction and substance abuse has gone up since the oil boom.”
• “Addiction and substance abuse is a major problem on reservation and oil
fields. We need an addiction counselor.”
• “Transient workers transport drugs.”
• “Surge in the abuse of bath salts, cocaine and meth.”
• “Everyone I talk to in town says there is an increase in drug use because of
transient workers and the growing workforce.”
This attribution aligns with an ethnocentric attitude where newcomers are
viewed as “outsiders.” As one oil boom resident said, “The people that come
here to work are not the cream of the crop” (personal communication, October
28, 2015). The construction of an “outsider” category differs from longtime
residents who are viewed as “locals”; the two groups are perceived to have
different values and views which shape their identities and interactions with
each other (Matarrita-Cascante et al. 2017). This classification creates an “us”
versus “them” dichotomy which works to divide the community and implicates
“transients” as being responsible for bringing the problems. The “newcomer”
and “longtimer” distinction is common in boomtown studies where fear of
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crime and drugs is indicative of social disruption experienced in boom communities (Freudenberg 1982). Yet this negative attitude is missing from the
1958 Report. While newcomers were called “riff raff” and “alien people,” there
was little overt antagonism exhibited toward them and they were generally
accepted into the community. Once the two groups interacted, their attitudes
and opinions of each other were overwhelmingly positive (Campbell, p. 253).
The changes in population may account for some of the differences in intergroup attitudes. With Williams County witnessing a 32 percent population
change from 2010–13 and neighboring McKenzie and Mountrail Counties
reporting 46 percent and 22 percent population changes respectively, the
number of newcomers arriving in the oil patch was overwhelming (U.S. Census
Bureau 2010). By comparison, in the 1950s, Williams County experienced a 27
percent population increase whereas Mountrail County reported a decline of
5.5 percent (Willis, p. 53). Rapid population growth can lead to a breakdown
in municipal services, intensifying economic costs to provide community services to new residents (Little 1977), and increases in crime, traffic, accidents,
and suicide (Kennedy and Mehra 1985; Seydlitz 1993). Previous researchers
looking at boomtown communities have concluded that they enter a period
of crisis and loss of traditional routines and attitudes, disrupting individuals’
mental health, worldview, and social networks (England and Albrecht 1984).
The population influx and resulting social disruption may have hindered community organizations’ and residents’ ability to reach out to new people.
Regardless of perceptual and population differences, addiction and drug use
are the symptoms of a larger mental health problem. The emphasis on mental
health aligns with boomtown phenomena and extraction scholarship stemming from research conducted in Colorado, Utah, Louisiana, West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and Canada. Rapid changes in population and development are
associated with mental health problems (Bacigalupi and Freudenburg 1983).
Research on energy boomtowns has shown that the incoming workforce accounts for a substantial portion of the service demand. Many accounts have
testified to the characteristics of the initial surge of oil boom workers: mainly
men, unskilled but resilient, coming to North Dakota to earn money to make a
better life for themselves (Rao 2014). Yet this workforce often lacked housing,
health insurance, and money management skills once payday came (Bohnenkamp et al. 2011).
In 2014, when oil was at $100 per barrel and cash flow was high, crime,
drugs and prostitution rings flourished (Horwitz 2014; Ruddell and Ray, current volume). The limited infrastructure of these small, rural, western prairie
towns and the harsh winter climate may have exacerbated the temptations. As
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one resident stated, “Once you bought a new truck, there isn’t much to spend
your money on out here except booze, drugs, and women” (personal communication, December 2, 2015). A report issued to the Center for Community
Vitality regarding Bakken oil counties stated, “Most rural communities do not
have experience with economic growth, so the real issue is learning how to
effectively deal with that growth” (Bohnenkamp et al. 2011, 22).
Entrepreneurs, drug cartels, and organized criminals flocked to western
North Dakota to try to capitalize on the emerging market (Valencia 2015).
With thousands of men away from home, holed up in remote places with cash
in their pockets, the Bakken was a ripe market for sex trafficking (Boyle 2015;
Berg Burin, current volume). A rise in narcotics and opiates, such as heroin
and methamphetamines, as well as human trafficking had the FBI worried (Valencia 2015). These circumstances provide context regarding the initial mental
health concern. Community participants echoed the nationwide concern over
the increased distribution and use of heroin. According to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (2015), heroin use in the United States has
increased among men and women of all age groups and income levels. It has
more than doubled among young adults in the 18–25 age bracket in the past
decade.
CHNA Cycle 2 (2014–16), First Prioritized Need: Mental Health, Including Alcohol
and Drugs among Youth
In the second CHNA cycle, the same focus on addiction emerged, but the concern centered on youths’ alcohol and drug use: “Youth mental health is the
most important because in my mind, it drives all the other issues. Unwell
youth make unwell adults.” Some community members attributed teen alcohol
and drug usage to broken homes, low self-esteem, new drug mixtures, and depression. A clear theme to emerge among community member comments is
the need for more mental health and substance abuse resources and funding:
“Mental health and substance abuse needs more resources to hire people. We
need early intervention and more dollars for kids.”
Of note was the fact that oil field workers or perceived “outsiders” were mentioned only once: “Mental abuse treatment services are needed here. At most
of the child protection meetings there [are] addiction issues and also with the
oil field workers that is a high rate.” This change in perception may suggest
that oil field workers are integrating into the community. Length of residence
has been associated with fear of outsiders and crime. In boom communities,
five years is generally the threshold for when outsiders are perceived as locals

322

(Freudenberg 1982). This second cycle of CHNAs marks a five-year timespan
from the peak of the oil boom and may indicate less division between outsider
and longtime residents.
Consistent with oil boom research, mental health problems and clinical caseloads often increase for non-oil boom workers (Bacigalupi and Freudenburg
1983). Age plays a significant factor when assessing quality of life in boomtowns (Finkle 2015). As reinforced by the community member comments
above, youths living in boomtowns are found to be more alienated, isolated,
and confused than other youth (Freudenburg 1979) whereas longtime residents often retreat as a result of experiencing loss of sense of community
(Cortese and Jones 1977). Further research by Freudenburg (1984) indicates
adolescents exhibit less satisfaction and greater alienation in post-boomtown
communities.
Now, although the oil boom has slowed and much of the workforce has left,
it is not necessarily the case that the problems have disappeared. The price of
drugs, like the price for oil, has decreased, making them more accessible. The
price for meth has dropped 75 percent from the height of the boom, down to
$800 per ounce (Monke 2016). “Methamphetamine use in North Dakota is
epidemic,” according to Stark County State’s Attorney Tom Henning; methamphetamine arrests increased 22 percent from 2012 to 2016 (Mook 2017). Use
of heroin and other opiates like fentanyl are causing overdoses and deaths, and
with so many people addicted to these drugs and unable to hold down a job,
there is a rise in burglaries, theft, and traffic violations (Mook 2017).
CHNA Cycle 2 (2014–16), Second Prioritized Need: Healthcare Workforce Shortage,
Including Access to Aftercare and Specialists
While healthcare workforce remained an oft-cited concern in the second
cycle of CHNAs, it was downgraded to the second prioritized need. The way
it was expressed in this period focused on a desire for extended care, in the
form of evening and weekend hours, and access to specialists: “We need access to healthcare on weekends without having to go to the ER.” Community
participants expressed concern over the times during which they were able
to see a medical provider outside of the emergency room: “I have gone to the
walk-in clinic in town at noon and been told they were not taking any more
patients for the day.” A clinic’s operating hours are similar to the hours worked
by an average working adult (for example, 8:00am to 5:00pm, Monday through
Friday), which can limit the ability of working adults and school children to
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access those healthcare providers: “Doctor will not make appointments after
3:00pm. Many people cannot take off work to go to the doctor. I work until 3:45
and need to have late day appointments.” Keeping a healthcare appointment
may mean taking time off work, which may pose financial and professional
consequences.
In terms of specialists, while demand exists, it may not be large enough to
warrant a fulltime provider of specialty services. Some specialists are available
on a rotating weekly or monthly basis, but that schedule may not be frequent
enough for some. Specific requests for specialists included pediatrics, OB-GYN,
dermatology, cancer care, and pain management.
What Has Changed in the Last Two CHNA Cycles?
Taking inventory of community member concerns voiced in response to the
2008–14 oil boom provides new perspective on social impacts. While the prevailing concerns from the most recent oil boom are focused on healthcare and
mental health, traffic safety and housing are needs that are shared between
then and now.
Healthcare Workforce Shortage

In both assessment cycles, the lack of healthcare workers impacted community
members’ ability to access healthcare. In the first cycle, this need centered on
service delivery, recruitment, and emergency services, whereas in the second
cycle, it was predominantly expressed as limited access to after-care and specialists. This change in articulation from service delivery and ER services to
aftercare and access to specialists highlights a healthcare need that is less acute.
With the drop in oil prices during the second assessment cycle, populations
declined and development slowed, which may have decreased the need for
healthcare providers and ER services.
Mental Health: Addictive Communities

Specific to North Dakota’s oil boom, previous research identified the themes
of social disruption (due to rapid population influx), loss of identity, and uncertainty and anxiety (Becker 2016). The emphasis on mental health services,
including alcohol and drug use and abuse and the need for treatment centers,
not only aligns with these themes but also supports the social disruption
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hypothesis. However, this need is unique to the recent oil booms. The 1958
Report claims there was not a remarkable increase in crime or immoral activity
and drunkenness was swiftly addressed (Campbell, p. 259; for a contrary
view, see Berg Burin, current volume).
As substance abuse was prioritized as a community concern in both assessment cycles, the underlying addictive theme carried over to other facets of
oil boom phenomena. North Dakota may be classified by what Freudenburg
(1992) calls an addictive economy, which is marked by continual boom and
bust cycles. North Dakota is vulnerable to this addictive tendency due to the
volatility of oil prices, the uncertainties of employment and development, and
the imprecise measures of oil forecasting.
While community members’ responses attest to the similarities in experience with community members from other extraction communities, the
extent of their disruption may be uniquely their own. Although this author
has previously questioned whether the oil boom has been a blessing or a curse
for western North Dakota communities (Becker 2016), Freudenburg (1984)
has argued that a better question to ask is to what degree communities experience negative change. This question assumes oil boom communities experience
adverse conditions and positions the oil boom as a curse. While no two communities experience energy development the same way, characteristics such as
population density, history with extractive industries, and type of extraction
may affect residents’ perceptions (Finkle 2015). In this regard, North Dakota
should fare pretty well as longtime residents may recall previous boom and
bust cycles.
In addition, there still may be a silver lining if we extend our scope and look
at the health of oil patch communities longitudinally. Boomtown research has
shown that a recovery phase occurs after the bust, where community members
adapt to their new community and experience enhanced levels of community
satisfaction and dimensions of wellbeing ten to fifteen years after the boom
(Brown, Dorins, and Krannich 2005; Smith, Krannich, and Hunter 2001). This
was the case at the tail end of the 1950s boom as it was reported that one
year post-boom, community conditions were stabilized and settled (Campbell,
current volume).
The prediction by some analysts that oil prices will remain stagnant over
the next few years may help North Dakota to transition into a recovery phase
(FIBO Group 2017). However, the recent rise in oil prices and production
has left Lynn Helms, the Director of North Dakota’s Department of Mineral Resources, tentatively optimistic (Hughlett 2018). In fact, the state may
be gearing up for another mini-boom, with the increase in oil production
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projected to be on pace to beat the 2014 record (Hughlett 2018; Flynn, current
volume). Either way, the uncertainty of the future can add to the overall anxiety and strain on mental health.
Implications
The CHNA’s design emphasis on qualitative data highlights the value of conducting key informant interviews and focus groups as a legitimate data source
to help take the pulse of the community. This methodological consideration has
special significance in rural areas where there is a dearth of healthcare research
(Hart et al. 2002). Moreover, gaining access to rural community members can
be difficult for researchers who are often perceived as outsiders and regarded
with skepticism (Becker 2015). Outsider bias runs strong in rural areas and is
especially acute in the medical profession, where residents prefer to interact
with long-established local residents rather than newcomers (Bushy 2006). As
Kathleen Norris writes in her book Dakota: A Spiritual Geography, “an expert
is someone who’s fifty miles from home” (1993, 55). This statement attests
to the tendency of locals to refuse to accept information that comes from the
“outside” world, including accounts published in national media.
Since this analysis stems from community members’ views and voices, the
hope is that not only will residents listen to the community health concerns,
but also accept and act upon them. The inclusion of local voices helps to lend
credibility to insider knowledge, and the alignment of their responses with
boomtown phenomena on a national scale validates their lived experiences.
Conclusion
The need for more healthcare workforce and mental health resources provides
a glimpse of the impacts that the oil boom has caused at the community level.
As a research tool, the systematic and cyclical CHNA data can provide meaningful and relevant data that aid in understanding lived experiences. One of
the unanticipated outcomes of the Affordable Care Act is that it has produced
a data set that adds a humanistic quality to the oil boom story. The prioritized list of community concerns can inform policy makers and stakeholders
about places where more resources are needed to target solutions aimed at
addressing the needs of North Dakota constituents. While we wait for future
CHNA cycles to occur, it is important to compare concerns and benchmark
change over time. This longitudinal research sheds light on how contemporary
energy development evolves with time and how the ebbs and flows of oil boom
activity affect community health.
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Chapter 13
Boomtown Bias: Reflections on the
Past, Present, and Future of Prostitution and Sex Trafficking in
North Dakota
Nikki Berg Burin

In American public memory, the phrase “boomtown” often brings to mind
images of the Old West—a time and place where small, rural communities
were transformed by significant and swift economic and demographic growth,
as well as by the social problems that accompanied such changes. Boomtown
narratives typically follow the same progression. There is a discovery of rich
natural resources, followed by a rapid influx of outsiders, especially men, and
particularly young, rowdy bachelors. Then there is the building of saloons, pool
halls, and brothels, followed by the mayhem of drinking, gambling, violence,
and fornication. In such narratives, these changes threaten the stability and
safety of otherwise wholesome communities. Among the most prominent villains in such stories are prostitutes who occasionally receive public sympathy,
but more often than not experience public condemnation. Also present in
boomtown narratives are the victims—typically innocent, chaste girls tricked
or forced into a life of vice.
This familiar trope of bachelors, prostitutes, immorality, and crime in boomtowns is not unique to the Old West, but rather transcends time and place.
Strikingly similar versions of this story made the rounds during North Dakota’s
agricultural boom at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth
century, as well as during the state’s oil boom in the early twenty-first century.
In both cases residents bemoaned the noticeable presence of bachelors, prostitutes, commercial sexual activity, and the trafficking of innocent girls in their
rapidly changing communities. And in both cases the state responded with
legislation to crack down on the perceived problems.
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Robert Campbell anticipated finding similar problems and discontent in
his study of the social impact of North Dakota’s oil boom in the 1950s. In his
chapter in the 1958 Williston Report, Campbell hypothesized that “various
kinds of social problems, such as increased crime, immorality, and low grade
housing, would arise” as a result of the influx of immigrants into North Dakota (p. 246). Yet upon conducting his research, Campbell found that “there
was a surprising absence of social problems” in the Williston area. According
to Campbell, “There were no indications available to the researchers that there
had been a notable increase in, or even the presence of, organized criminal or
immoral activity—gambling houses, theft rings, ‘protection’ or houses of prostitution.” While there were two “known prostitutes” in the area, he argued that
“in no sense were their activities organized, continuous, or flagrant” (Campbell,
p. 13 and p. 262).
Was 1950s Williston an anomaly among boomtowns? Perhaps, but it is
likely that there is more to the story than Campbell uncovered. There are at
least four problems with his analysis that collectively demonstrate the need for
more research on the topic. First, Campbell did not conduct an in-depth study
of commercial sex in boomtown Williston. It was one of several social problems
that he touched on in just one chapter of a lengthy report. As such, it is not
surprising that his analysis of this particular issue was limited to a handful of
surface level observations. Second, it seems that even his cursory analysis was
cut short by the influence of the boomtown trope described above. Campbell
expected to find rampant prostitution, and when he did not see it, he ceased
exploring. Third, his intentionally narrow scope of inquiry into prostitution
and unintentional boomtown bias caused Campbell to overlook relevant historical contexts. The anti-vice laws passed in the state legislature during the
Progressive Era, which stayed on the books until the late twentieth century,
worked to obscure but not necessarily eliminate the presence of prostitution
during the time when Campbell was writing. Fourth, Campbell did not have
access to the wealth of research on the commercial sex industry that exists
today. Given what we now know about the complex nature and intersections
of prostitution and sex trafficking, it is likely that Campbell’s conclusions were
curtailed by a limited analytical framework.
I do not attempt to fill the gaps in Campbell’s empirical research with this
essay, but instead offer a critical analysis of his observations on prostitution
in 1950s Williston so as to provide guidance about the kinds of questions and
methods that should be applied to an in-depth historical study of the topic. My
analysis has three parts: first, a brief overview of the Progressive Era anti-vice
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legislation that drove the commercial sex industry underground and perhaps
out of Campbell’s sight by the 1950s; second, a critique of the indicators he
provided as evidence for the lack of social problems during the oil boom—
all of which are flawed when applied to prostitution and sex trafficking; and
third, an overview of North Dakota’s legislative response to prostitution and
sex trafficking during the state’s twenty-first century oil boom, which reveals
the progress and stagnation of the state’s understanding of these issues and
offers insights into how one might go about a new study of boomtown prostitution and sex trafficking in 1950s North Dakota. In all three periods the
nuanced reality of the commercial sex industry and the complex experiences
of the people within it have been obscured by the persistent influence of the
boomtown trope.
Progressive Era Anti-Vice Laws
In its inaugural session in 1862, the Legislative Assembly of Dakota Territory
laid the foundation for the subsequent 150 years of prostitution and human
trafficking legislation in North Dakota. Lawmakers determined it was illegal
for any person to engage in “open lewdness or other notorious act of public
indecency … or maintain or keep a lewd house or place for the practice of fornication” (Dakota Territory Legislative Assembly 1862, ch. 9, sec. 126). Generally
speaking, lewdness was understood to be an indecent sexual act done openly
and with the possibility or intent of corrupting the community’s sexual morality. The sexual morality at risk of corruption was marital fidelity and the
chastity of single women, particularly single white women. The most obvious
sites for such corruption were so-called disorderly houses—brothels, saloons,
and gambling halls—which meant that such establishments were early targets
for legislators. In fact, by the second legislative session in the winter of 1862–3,
the legislative body adopted a new penal code that included a separate statute
condemning such businesses as seedbeds of lewdness and increasing the penalties for operating them in the communities of Dakota Territory (Dakota
Territory Legislative Assembly 1862–3, ch. 10, secs. 4–10). In other words,
while it was problematic for an individual to commit an act of lewdness, it
was a far more serious crime to promote and facilitate sexual immorality in a
public, commercial setting.
Lawmakers added another level of criminality related to the commercial sex
industry in 1865 when they passed Dakota Territory’s first anti-sex-trafficking
laws. The pair of laws criminalized the act of enticing any unmarried female
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“of previous chaste character” under the age of twenty-five into prostitution
and of abducting any female under the age of fifteen for the same purpose
(Dakota Territory Legislative Assembly 1864, penal code sec. 328–9). While
present-day North Dakotans might applaud territorial lawmakers for taking
an anti-trafficking stance at such an early date in the state’s history, a closer
look at the legislation reveals significant flaws. Only girls and single women
under the age of twenty-five were considered legitimate victims of sex trafficking. Married adult women and all women over the age of twenty-five were
excluded as potential victims, as well as all boys and men. Also excluded from
the ranks of potential victims were girls and women who were not of “previous
chaste character.” This exception is not surprising, given nineteenth-century
sexual scripts and gender prescriptions, which demanded female sexual purity,
but this fact makes it no less problematic in terms of practical consequences
for victims of sex trafficking. The law validated society’s bias against women
and girls who fell outside the boundaries of acceptable femininity and female
sexuality by choice or otherwise, and, as a result, it directed exploiters to vulnerable prey who would not be protected by the state.
The practice of narrowly defining sex trafficking victims within the law held
well beyond the territorial period. While compiling its laws for the first time
in 1895, the state of North Dakota amended the territorial trafficking statutes
and, in short, expanded by three years the age range of girls who could be trafficking victims in the eyes of the law, but reduced by five years the age range
for potential adult victims (North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1895, secs.
7165–6). Both changes reflect the white slavery panic of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, which sensationalized the kidnapping and seduction of those deemed innocents by society—chaste white girls and young
women. These were the victims in the commercial sex industry according to
turn-of-the-century North Dakotans and Americans more generally. Individuals who performed commercial sex acts for hire and who did not fall within
this narrowly defined category of sex trafficking victims were assumed to be
willful prostitutes who, whether truly autonomous or not, had no legal protection from or recourse against commercial sexual exploitation or trafficking.
The legal marginalization of women who performed commercial sex acts in
the state’s early years was reinforced when lawmakers passed a statute in 1901
regarding the slander of females. The law stated that it was illegal to expose
any female over the age of twelve who was “not a public prostitute” to “hatred,
contempt, or ridicule” by disparaging her virtue or chastity (North Dakota
Legislative Assembly 1901, ch. 175, sec. 1). While it true that individuals who
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performed commercial sex acts were not chaste, the law was not about sex
per se, but rather about a woman’s character. This statute made it clear that
in the eyes of the law prostitutes were sullied women and that no one could
disparage their virtue (physical or moral), for it was already compromised.
The combination of anti-sex-trafficking laws and the laws against slandering
women reveals that at the turn of the twentieth century the state of North
Dakota understood all women over the age of twenty who were involved in the
commercial sex industry to be willful prostitutes and that all prostitutes were
unworthy of protections from the state, at least in terms of slander and commercial sexual exploitation. “Hatred, contempt, and ridicule” of such women
was reasonable and legal. This was obviously problematic for adult trafficking
victims, but it was also problematic for autonomous sex workers, for women
who entered the life because of limited options or out of necessity, and, of
course, for those who were prevented by individuals, society, or circumstances
from leaving commercial sex work. Legislators’ creation of laws that protected
“virtuous” women and that degraded or allowed for the degradation of others
reinforced society’s bias and firmly planted it within the legal system. When
force and choice are the only publicly accepted means of entry into prostitution, it becomes easy for lawmakers and society to identify clear-cut villains
and victims. By creating laws based on this simplistic understanding of the
women and girls who performed commercial sex acts, legislators obscured the
various forces that brought individuals of diverse backgrounds into the life, as
well as the complex forms of victimization they experienced within it. Such
laws also made empowerment within the commercial sex industry much more
difficult for consensual sex workers to obtain.
As North Dakota moved into the twentieth century, the legislature continued the trend of protecting “legitimate” victims of sex trafficking and
enacted new laws overtly condemning those defined by the state as prostitutes. For instance, the 1895 statute on the abduction of girls for the purpose
of prostitution identified as victims only those who were taken from their parents or legal guardians. In 1903 the legislature amended the statute to include
“any friendless female under the age of eighteen years” (North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1903, ch. 149, sec. 7166). This suggests an increased awareness
among legislators of the vulnerabilities of homeless, abused, and abandoned
youth and was a positive step forward. In 1909 the state recognized that any
unmarried female of previously chaste character could potentially be inveigled
into a house of prostitution, not just those under the age of twenty (North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1909, ch. 88, sec. 8899). The legislature also passed
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a new statute that same year that made it unlawful to “detain any woman
against her will by force, threats, putting in bodily fear, or by any other means,
at a house of ill-fame, or any other place … for the purpose of prostitution”
(North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1909, ch. 89, sec. 1). In short, by 1909
the state broadened the definition of sex trafficking and expanded the pool of
potential victims.
Around the same time, however, legislators passed new vagrancy laws that
stigmatized and further marginalized prostitutes and many others. Up to this
point, prostitution was not explicitly identified as a crime in the North Dakota
Penal Code. Prostitutes could be arrested on charges of public lewdness or as
a public nuisance, but unlike those who facilitated prostitution or engaged
in human trafficking, prostitutes were not specifically named as criminals in
the statutes in the first forty-two years of Dakota Territory and North Dakota history. That changed in 1903 with the introduction of vagrancy laws.
The list of people who qualified as vagrants was long and included “common
night walkers; lewd, wanton and lascivious persons” (North Dakota Legislative
Assembly 1903, ch. 206, sec. 1). Given the limited opportunities for gainful
employment by homeless, runaway, and orphaned girls and single women
without familial or financial support and given the willingness of exploiters
to take advantage of others’ vulnerabilities, it is very likely that victims of
commercial sexual exploitation could be and were treated as criminals under
the vagrancy law. The “friendless female” clause in the statute criminalizing
the abduction of girls for the purpose of prostitution and the removal of age
limitations in the law criminalizing the deception of females into prostitution
would not offer protections for all women and girls reluctantly caught up in
the commercial sex industry. Abduction and seduction were not and still are
not necessary conditions for those who unwillingly enter the life. For many,
entry into commercial sex was and continues to be an issue of survival. What
drew them and “friendless females” of all ages to the commercial sex industry?
The need for food, shelter, and money. For these women and girls, North Dakota law made it clear there was to be little help or sympathy. Victims deemed
worthy of legal protections were those who were forced, coerced, or deceived.
Destitution and the lack of options were irrelevant when even a hint of choice
was detectable.
And what about the women who willfully chose prostitution—those who
envisioned economic independence, an opportunity for sexual freedom, or
a way to take control over their lives and bodies? For Progressive-era North
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Dakotans and Americans more generally these women were beyond the pale.
In 1909, nearly sixty years after the passage of Dakota Territory’s first law
regulating commercial sex, North Dakota defined and explicitly outlawed prostitution with its own law for the first time. A prostitute was defined as any
female who frequented or lived in houses of ill-fame or who was paid for sex
(North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1909, ch. 87, sec. 1). Arresting individuals
for prostitution when there were few alternative employment opportunities
for women only served to increase the social and economic vulnerability of
those who labored as prostitutes. Moreover, the 1909 law had little chance of
accomplishing lawmakers’ objective of stopping the spread of vice in North
Dakota, for not only did it fail to address the reasons why women and girls
participated in prostitution, but it was also put in place without a companion
law that addressed the demand for commercial sex.
Following suit with the rest of the country, early North Dakota lawmakers
condemned and punished the women performing commercial sex acts rather
than targeting the buyers who fueled the industry. Anti-prostitution activists like the purity reformers of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union
(WCTU) had long been critical of this sexual double standard and promoted
demand-reduction as a strategy for diminishing the commercial sex industry.1 However, from the state’s territorial period up through the end of the
Progressive Era, lawmakers did not embrace the WCTU’s preventative initiatives or its efforts to advance “one standard of morality for men and women”
(WCTU of North Dakota 1895). It wasn’t until 1919—a full decade after the
state criminalized prostitution—that lawmakers declared it illegal to “receive
any person into any place for the purpose of prostitution” (North Dakota
Legislative Assembly 1919, ch. 190, sec. 1).2 This was the state’s first law that
explicitly targeted buyers of commercial sex acts. Fears about the spread of
venereal disease during and after World War I led the legislature to declare the
passage of anti-prostitution laws an emergency “necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health and safety” (North Dakota Legislative
Assembly 1919, ch. 190, sec. 8).
1

This is not to say that buyers could patronize prostitutes without potential legal risks. In the
late nineteenth century they could be charged with lewdness or public indecency and at the
turn of the twentieth century habitual buyers could also be arrested on vagrancy charges.
2

The Legislature also broadened the definition of prostitute by changing the law’s gendered
language from “female” to “someone” and added individuals who had “indiscriminate sexual
intercourse without hire” (North Dakota Legislative Assembly 1919, ch. 190, sec. 2).
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As the early legislative history of North Dakota reveals, the driving impulse
of anti-vice laws in the territory and then state has been a desire to penalize
“deviant” women, to protect some—but not all—victims of commercial sexual
exploitation, and to punish some—but not all—exploiters. This approach was
adopted during the social, economic, and demographic upheavals of North Dakota’s agricultural boom in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
and fit well with the common trope of boomtown villains and victims, which
was part of public discourse at the time. The collection of early anti-vice laws
set the stage for those engaged in or on the periphery of the commercial sex
industry for decades to come, including Robert Campbell, who expected to find
a visible rise in the number of prostitutes and customers in the western part of
the state during the 1950s oil boom. By this time, though, the state’s anti-vice
legislation had been in place for over fifty years and had effectively driven the
business of commercial sex underground and generally out of plain sight. It’s
not surprising, therefore, that Campbell’s surface level study uncovered “no
indications” of “immoral activity” in the Williston area. Taking this historical
context into consideration, as well as what we now know about the commercial
sex industry, we can see that some of Campbell’s observations about the lack of
social problems during the oil boom—namely prostitution—are problematic.
Crime and Immorality During the 1950s Oil Boom
Campbell writes in the 1958 Report:
As soon as one hears that a particular place is a “boom” area, he is likely
to think of a general laxity of law enforcement or, at least, of a greater
incidence of loose spending for illegal and barely legal pleasures. Couple
that conception with the idea that there has been a considerable increase
in population composed largely of unmarried men in “rough” occupations
and the ingredients are complete for a common-sense prediction that
criminality and immorality will be greatly increased. (p. 259)
Campbell’s prediction was indeed common sense, for it reflected some
historical realities of past boomtown experiences around the country and beyond. The problem, however, is that there is far more nuance to the commercial
sex industry and prostitution specifically than such common sense predictions
capture. While Campbell acknowledged that there were likely “some exceptions to [this] generally useful theory,” he proceeded to outline five indicators
that explained “why some [crime and immorality] did not occur as well as why
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some did” (Campbell, p. 259). As we’ll see, these indicators do not provide
sufficient explanation or evidence for what appeared to Campbell to be a lack
of commercial sexual activity in the Williston area. Instead, his indicators serve
as an invitation for more research on the topic than Campbell was able or interested in conducting at the time.
Indicator 1

First, the assumption that a large proportion of the increased population
was composed of unmarried men was contrary to the facts. The bulk of
the oil field workers not only were married but had children. (Campbell,
p. 259)
As discussed earlier, a key component of the boomtown trope is the presence
of sexually charged, unattached bachelors driving the demand for commercial
sex. While a thriving bachelor culture often does support a thriving commercial sex industry, the lack of bachelors or, rather, the abundance of married
fathers, does not mean there is no demand for commercial sex in a community. As recent studies have shown, the buyers of commercial sex come from all
backgrounds and engage in the practice for a wide variety of reasons, including
not feeling comfortable asking their wives to perform certain sexual activities.3
In fact, in their 2017 report on buyers, a research team funded by the Women’s
Foundation of Minnesota found that the predominant buyers of commercial
sex in the state were married, middle-aged, white men (Martin, Melander,
Karnik, and Nakamura 2017). While the marital and parental status of new
or old residents in Williston during the 1950s oil boom is not irrelevant to a
study of prostitution, it is also not a reliable marker of increased morality or
immorality in the community.
Indicator 2

Second, there was a general provision of increased law enforcement facilities … Ray had employed a full-time policeman who was reported by
the citizens as being “tough” on violators of any sort but particularly on
speeders, speeding having been apparently the main problem. (Campbell,
p. 260)
3

For research on the buyers of commercial sex, see Bernstein (2001) and Durchslad and
Goswami (2008).
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Campbell’s implication is that the expansion of law enforcement kept
immoral crimes at bay. That may very well have been the case in terms of prostitution during the 1950s boom. The laws were certainly unfriendly to those
engaged in prostitution and the presence of extra officers to enforce those laws
might have given pimps, prostitutes, and buyers pause before engaging in the
trade in the Williston area. However, it is unclear whether officers of the law
had any particular incentive to look for and disrupt acts of prostitution. Even
if there wasn’t a special incentive, doing so would require extra work. Speeding
was a socially tolerable and visible crime that was committed and punished
with frequency. Prostitution, on the other hand, was covert and stigmatized,
which made it more difficult for law enforcement officers to locate and for researchers to quantify. Perhaps law enforcement knew what to look for in terms
of underground acts of commercial sex, went looking for it, and found few or
no cases of crimes being committed. Campbell suggests, though, that something else might have been going on. He noted that there were “two known
prostitutes in Williston, but in no sense were their activities organized, continuous, or flagrant” (p. 262). Without more evidence it is difficult to know
the extent to which the activities of these individuals were organized, but it
is fair to suggest that at this historical moment they couldn’t risk their own
well-being or livelihood with continuous or flagrant acts of commercial sex.
That Campbell describes these individuals as “known prostitutes” raises the
question of whether there was a communal acceptance of prostitution so long
as prostitutes kept to themselves and kept moving. If this kind of behavior was
acceptable and not pursued by law enforcement, it is probable that there were
more than two prostitutes making their way in and out of the region during
this time and even more buyers.
Indicator 3

Third, drunkenness was prevented from developing to the problem
proportions it might have reached by a combination of already existing
circumstances. (Campbell, p. 261)
Campbell points to various techniques to control drunkenness that Williston had in place prior to the boom. For example, law enforcement placed
extra officers in the areas of town where seasonal laborers resided so as to
make quick arrests for public intoxication, and tavern-owners often called
taxis for intoxicated patrons. While there is no reason to doubt these efforts
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helped control the rates or potential damage of drunkenness, they likely had
little effect on the commercial sex industry in the region. At this point in time
brothels were not operating in taverns (at least not openly) and drunkenness
is not a necessary element for the purchase of commercial sex.
Indicator 4

Fourth, a main source of drinking and gambling activity was available immediately outside the area, thus what might have been a problem within
the area was removed. An active gambling, drinking, dining and dancing
“club” just across the Montana state line attracted a large clientele from
the oil development area … (Campbell, p. 262)
Of all the indicators provided by Campbell as to why there was not a “notable increase in, or even the presence of … immoral activity” in the Williston
area, this may be the most problematic. More research is needed on the nature of the club mentioned by Campbell and its surrounding community, but
the fact that North Dakota residents crossed state lines to engage in certain
frowned-upon (if not illegal) activities raises the question whether procuring
commercial sex was also easier there. If so, this means that even if there were
no prostitutes in the Williston area (aside from the two who were known),
there were likely buyers. Since Campbell puts prostitution under the umbrella
term of immoral activities, the presence of buyers in the community must also
be identified as part of the problem even if their purchases were being made
elsewhere. Like many late nineteenth and early twentieth century North Dakota lawmakers, Campbell seems at risk of dismissing as inconsequential the
demand side of the issue.
Indicator 5

Finally, evidence is lacking that there was a greater inclination among migrants than among “natives” to participate in illegal and “fringe” types of
activity … (Campbell, p. 262)
With this statement Campbell challenged the accuracy of the boomtown
trope in which outsiders are typically blamed for the problems that often
arise in boom areas. Criminal or immoral activity is never exclusive to newcomers. The increased presence of a new population of people and especially
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unattached men might exacerbate or shine a light on existing problems, but the
new arrivals are not necessarily the cause of those problems. When it comes to
prostitution in the Williston Basin during the boom, it appears few people—
newcomers or longtime residents—were arrested for buying commercial sex.
Does this mean it wasn’t for sale there and so they went elsewhere? Does it
mean the residents and newcomers alike weren’t interested in commercial
sex? Does it mean that law enforcement looked the other way when it came to
buyers or perhaps to prostitution as a whole? Or does it mean that by this time
the longstanding laws and social norms had driven the practice so far underground that it ceased to be perceptible to the untrained eye? A combination of
some or all of the above is likely.
Campbell conducted his study at a time when prostitution and sex more generally were not discussed in public (at least not in small town North Dakota).
Prostitution was an underground activity in every sense of the word and had
been driven there as a result of the panic launched by the state’s first population boom at the end of the nineteenth century. Campbell understandably
expected to find an increase in prostitution during the 1950s oil boom, but
it appears that his analysis fell sway to the boomtown trope of brothels and
deviant women. When he did not see either in the form he expected, his analysis came to a close. What he didn’t account for was the influence of the laws
penalizing prostitution, which had long been on the books. His surface-level
observations may ultimately be proven correct, but for now they raise more
questions than they answer and, as such, they serve as a terrific springboard
for further research about prostitution during North Dakota’s oil boom in the
1950s. However, as the state’s twenty-first century oil boom reveals, such a
study must also include the topic of sex trafficking. This issue, which caused
much hand-wringing in the Progressive Era and informed many of the anti-vice laws for the first half of the twentieth century, was entirely absent in
Campbell’s analysis. Yet given the presence of sex trafficking and prostitution
in the state’s first and most recent booms, it was likely present in the 1950s
as well. While the Progressive Era residents, anti-vice activists, and lawmakers
engaged in a fair amount of sensationalism regarding so-called “white slavery,”
the recent boom in North Dakota’s Bakken region and the anti-trafficking
efforts (both promising and problematic) of activists and lawmakers provide
some guidance not only for tackling human trafficking, but also for tackling a
renewed study of prostitution and sex trafficking in Campbell’s Williston.
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Prostitution and Trafficking Laws During the Twenty-first Century Oil Boom
As news outlets around the state, the country, and even the world began reporting on the enormous boom in oil production and population in western
North Dakota in the first decades of the twenty-first century, they also began
to report on what appeared to be a simultaneous surge in prostitution, especially in areas surrounding the man camps near the Bakken oil fields. American
society had changed considerably since the time of Campbell’s report, with sex
and even prostitution being common parts of popular culture and discourse.
As such, it’s no surprise that the presence of the commercial sex industry
was more readily apparent to residents in the twenty-first century than in
mid-twentieth century. However, the response of the general public to the
seeming rise of commercial sex in their community harkened back to that of
their nineteenth century ancestors, for many residents complained about the
sordid influence of prostitutes on their communities. Such complaints were
soon followed by concerns about high rates of sex trafficking and the threat
of innocent girls being kidnapped by traffickers (Berg Burin 2016). As was the
case 120 years earlier, these concerns were not baseless. There was an increase
in prostitution and sex trafficking in the Bakken. Like their nineteenth century
ancestors, lawmakers responded to these developments.
By the time of North Dakota’s twenty-first century oil boom, human trafficking had long since been on the radar of national and global lawmakers.
The United Nations took over international anti-trafficking efforts from the
defunct League of Nations in 1949 with the Convention for the Suppression
of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others.
The UN’s Commission on the Status of Women had also been monitoring and
advocating for international action against sex trafficking and exploitation
within prostitution since the 1940s. This work was continued by the UN’s
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
during the 1960s and beyond. As awareness of modern day slavery spread
across the globe in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the UN
gathered in Palermo, Italy, in 2000 and passed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (a supplement to the 2000 Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime).4 As
the world’s “first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on
trafficking,” the protocol was intended to protect the human rights of victims
4

For a fulsome description of the United Nations’ efforts to address human trafficking in the
twentieth century, see Reanda (1991).
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of trafficking and help coordinate international efforts to combat the crime
(UNODC 2000). At the same time the United States passed its first federal
comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, which has been reauthorized four times (most recently in
2013) and which seeks to prevent severe forms of trafficking, protect victims,
and prosecute exploiters. The federal government also passed the Justice for
Victims of Trafficking Act in 2015, which strengthened the government’s assistance for victims, created a survivor-led U.S. Advisory Council on Human
Trafficking, and made buyers of commercial sex from trafficking victims culpable for trafficking offenses (United States Department of State 2018). In
addition, many local, national, and international NGOs were organized in the
late twentieth and early twenty-first century dedicated to combating human
trafficking. As a result of these developments, sex trafficking had become a hot
topic in news and entertainment media. While increased media attention led
to increased public awareness, much of the coverage included (and still does
include) sensationalized images and stories of scantily clad girls in chains. Such
images are reminiscent of the white slavery panic and perpetuate the false assumptions of a bygone era.
North Dakota residents and lawmakers were not blind to these developments and in the face of the demographic changes of the oil boom they were
compelled to take action. As it turned out, the Uniform Law Commission
(ULC, a nonprofit organization dating back to the nineteenth century, which
promotes consistency across states in various areas of law) created a Uniform
Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking in 2013. As the
ULC states, the model legislation “provides the three components necessary
for ending human trafficking: comprehensive criminal penalties; protections
for human-trafficking victims; and public awareness and prevention methods”
(Uniform Law Commission 2018). Through the persistent efforts of anti-trafficking advocates and supportive lawmakers, the North Dakota state legislature
adopted the ULC’s Uniform Act on trafficking in 2015 and, as a result, took its
strongest stance on human trafficking in 153 years of lawmaking (North Dakota Legislative Assembly 2005, ch. 117). The most significant changes from
the previous anti-trafficking legislation include the following provisions:
• The past sexual behavior of victims is not admissible in court.
• Minors who provide commercial sex for hire are presumed to be children
in need of protective services and are immune from prostitution charges.
(This is known as Safe Harbor legislation).
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• Adult trafficking victims have the opportunity to vacate and expunge convictions for crimes that they committed as a result of being a victim of
human trafficking.
• Victims are eligible for state-funded services.
• The Attorney General is authorized to make a grant or contract with
government units, tribal government units, and non-governmental organizations to expand and develop services for victims.
• Organizations and units that receive grants or make contracts with the
Attorney General must provide numbers and demographic information
for the purpose of data collection.
• Enhanced penalties will apply to people who purchase commercial sex
from a minor, from a known trafficking victim, and from all others, including the possibility of required participation in an offender education
program on the negative consequences of the commercial sex industry.
With its adoption of the Uniform Act on Human Trafficking, the North
Dakota Legislature took an important step forward in the fight against sex
trafficking. In addition to putting increased responsibility on exploiters—both
traffickers and buyers—the statutes set the foundation for data collection
so that the state can better understand and address the problem as it exists
in North Dakota. Moreover, by attaching a fiscal note to the legislation, legislators empowered organizations to proactively combat human trafficking.
The legislation would reek of insincerity without the provision of funds for
training legal system professionals and enhancing support services. By creating
the opportunity for survivors to vacate and expunge convictions for crimes
committed while a victim a trafficking, lawmakers revealed their increased
awareness of the various forms of manipulation and exploitation that victims
can endure in a trafficking situation. Finally, the legislation emphasizes the
lack of consent for minors providing sex for hire regardless of their personal,
criminal, and sexual history. The legislature reinforced this new approach to
minors in the commercial sex industry by changing the definition of prostitute
from “individual” to “adult” (North Dakota Legislative Assembly 2015, ch. 109,
sec. 12.1-29.02).
While these significant legal changes reflect a renewed and more critical
approach to combating sex trafficking in North Dakota, the state still has a
way to go in shedding its outdated and harmful “boomtown” approach to sex
trafficking and prostitution. For example, much like the state’s early anti-trafficking laws, the Uniform Law protects only certain victims of trafficking. Safe
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harbor provisions are for minors. Adult victims of trafficking must present evidence of force, fraud, or coercion to prove they are indeed victims of trafficking
and not consenting prostitutes who can still be charged as criminals under
the state’s prostitution laws. As victims of trauma and complex manipulation,
providing such evidence can be incredibly difficult. Even getting survivors to
recognize their victimization can be difficult. Moreover, while a sex trafficking
victim can apply to have prostitution charges vacated, this can be a grueling
and retraumatizing process for many individuals. Law enforcement officers
who have received training on sex trafficking are encouraged to take a victim-centered approach when encountering adults engaged in prostitution and
to use their discretion when deciding whether to charge them with a crime or
direct them to services. But the law still provides a narrow definition of legitimate victims, which has the effect of shaming and putting at risk those who
fall outside that definition.5
North Dakota state law continues to see the selling of commercial sex as a
black and white issue represented by the binary of criminal prostitutes and
trafficking victims. The reality, though, is that many adults engaged in the
labor of prostitution move back and forth along a spectrum between consent
and force, empowerment and oppression. This large gray area is something the
law does not yet fully recognize, much to the detriment of autonomous and
reluctant sex workers, as well as adult trafficking victims. By looking at the
issue through a human rights lens rather than that of criminal justice alone,
the legislature could enhance protections for all individuals who engage in
prostitution and reduce the rates of those who do so reluctantly or by force.
At the heart of a human rights approach to prostitution and sex trafficking is
attentiveness to the social, economic, and political conditions that contribute
to one’s vulnerability to commercial sexual exploitation.6 Legislators need to
address poverty, housing insecurity, affordable healthcare, and job opportunities in their communities. Many individuals in the life “choose” to engage in
that line of work out of economic necessity and a lack of viable alternatives.
Exploiters are also quick to capitalize on the vulnerabilities of those experiencing economic and housing insecurity by providing the basics of survival
5

It is also notable that the North Dakota legislature added a section to the Uniform Law on
Human Trafficking that prevents service providers from informing victims of their full reproductive healthcare choices, which can be seen as a form of state control over victims’ bodily
autonomy. See North Dakota Legislative Assembly (2015, ch. 109, sec. 12.1-41-20).
6

For a discussion of a human rights approach to human trafficking, see O’Connell Davidson
(2015) and Kempadoo (2015).
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and reaping the economic benefits of their victims’ unfree labor. Legislators
must also address discrimination on the basis of one’s race, sexual orientation,
and gender identity, for across the nation girls and women of color, as well as
individuals of all sexes who identify as LGBTQ+, are overrepresented among
sex trafficking victims and sex workers. Exploiters feed off the marginalization
of these groups. Legislators must also provide funding for mental health and
social services, including the child welfare system, substance abuse programs,
and domestic and sexual violence services. Victims of sex trafficking and
commercial sexual exploitation frequently come into the life already having
experienced violence, emotional abuse, or neglect.7 Legislators must also fund
education and support services within schools so as to prevent and detect trafficking and exploitation and, of course, to provide better opportunities in life
for all children. When education budgets are slashed, the vulnerabilities of atrisk youth increase. Legislators who take a human rights approach must also
address the humanity and rights of sex workers who have been and continue
to be dehumanized by the public, a portion of their customers, and the legal
system. Criminalizing their labor without sufficiently addressing the above
issues does nothing but put them at greater risk for exploitation and marginalization. If legislators are serious about increasing public safety and decreasing
sex trafficking and the negative effects of prostitution, they need to address
the conditions that create these problems and the human rights of all those
who perform commercial sex for hire, regardless of the reason.
A Human Rights Approach to Campbell’s Study
A human rights approach to prostitution and sex trafficking would not only
help legislators take meaningful steps to solve the problems associated with
these issues, but it would also help guide scholars who seek to uncover and
make sense of the history of sex trafficking and prostitution in North Dakota
and beyond. Campbell wrote at a time in which prostitution had been driven
underground by the laws of an earlier era. Those laws reinforced society’s
condemnation of false villains (all prostitutes) and disregard of many hidden
victims and exploiters all the way up through the twenty-first century. While
the state’s legislative history illuminates North Dakotans’ willingness to engage with social problems, as well as the advances the state has made on the
issues of sex trafficking and exploitation within prostitution, it also reveals the
7

For a discussion of the abuse and neglect many victims of sex trafficking experience before
being trafficked, see Lloyd (2011).
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historical and continued bias and blind spots of lawmakers, their constituents,
and even researchers.
The impact of late nineteenth-century anti-vice laws on prostitution during
Campbell’s time and his own expectations about what he would find in 1950s
boomtown Williston undoubtedly contributed to what he observed to be the
absence of prostitution. As the state’s first and most recent economic booms
reveal, prostitution and sex trafficking are present and always have been in the
state. Moreover, where there is one, the other can usually be found. A human
rights approach to these issues will allow new researchers to look back at the
1950s Williston area in Campbell’s study and ask questions that are better
suited for recovering the stories of people and activities relegated to the margins of society and history, no matter how few or many there are. A renewed
study will take the boomtown trope for what it is—a historical stereotype
with some truth and lots of fiction—and dig into the nuances of the complex
problems and people associated with prostitution and sex trafficking. Doing so
will bring the experiences, needs, and rights of victims, survivors, and autonomous sex workers into the light.
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Chapter 14
Conclusion: Reading The Williston
Report Sixty Years Later
Kyle Conway
In their chapter about the social effects of North Dakota’s most recent oil
boom, Rick Ruddell and Heather Ray warn that although studies such as the
1958 Williston Report “provide us with insight into the impacts of booms occurring in the past, we have to be careful consumers of that research” (p. 272).
The change communities undergo now is more intense than in the past, the
boom-bust cycle faster, and the effects more widely spread. Direct comparisons are useful, but they do not tell us everything.
There are other reasons to read the 1958 Report critically or even skeptically.
William Caraher, Bret Weber, and Richard Rothaus, for instance, identify aspects of housing that the authors of The Williston Report did not see. Longtime
residents appeared to suggest that “something was wrong with the workers
who seemingly chose to live in ‘substandard’ temporary workforce housing,”
and consequently, “Rather than a social responsibility, temporary workforce
housing became an inconvenience for longer-term residents to endure” (Caraher et al., p. 289). This blindspot was a result of the failure by the authors of
the 1958 Report to reflect critically on their categories of analysis. As Caraher
and his coauthors point out, they defined a social problem as “any situation
which is reported by people involved in it as undesirable and, therefore, about
which they express a negative opinion, possibly indicating a tendency to act
to change the situation” (Campbell, p. 254). In effect, they took as their only
point of reference the perspective of the people they surveyed or interviewed,
people who—understandably enough—were concerned primarily with their
own lives and the local effects of the boom. The closest they came to questioning this definition was to remark, “From this point of view a situation
may not be a problem to the participants despite the fact that the observer is
disturbed by it” (Campbell, p. 254). In other words, they saw the definition’s
shortcomings in reference only to their own personal frames. They did not ask
about systemic problems, nor did they examine structural causes and effects.
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Historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995) provides a useful framework for
describing this shortcoming. He speaks of “silences” or omissions that are introduced into the historical narrative at different places, in particular,
the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of
fact assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the
making of narrative); and the moment of retrospective significance (the
making of history in the final instance). (1995, 26)
The different silences build on each other: a gap in sources affects the way
historians assemble facts and then weave them into a story. Put another way,
the authors of the 1958 Report asked only about residents’ personal opinions
about housing but neglected the structural dimensions of housing, such as the
role of preexisting social networks embedded in a specific historical context,
in helping people find and maintain homes (fact creation). They then incorporated this selective set of facts into their report (fact assembly), leading them
to tell a story where inadequate housing was—to their surprise!—not the
problem they thought it would be (fact retrieval). Readers six decades later
encounter a history of relative harmony among new and longtime residents,
despite the occasional minor conflicts (retrospective significance). By identifying these silences, Caraher and his coauthors make them “speak”—that is,
they use them to reveal something about the original authors’ situation that
they themselves might not have recognized, namely their assumptions about
the individual, rather than social, causes and effects of social problems.
This is a useful exercise, one that Nikki Berg Burin undertakes in her chapter
about human trafficking in the Bakken. The 1958 authors write,
There were no indications available to the researchers that there had been
a notable increase in, or even the presence of, organized criminal or immoral activity—gambling houses, theft rings, “protection” or houses of
prostitution. There were two known prostitutes in Williston, but in no
sense were their activities organized, continuous or flagrant. (Campbell,
p. 262)
Berg Burin suggests, however, that the authors missed something—the
facts they assembled were incomplete because, she argues, when they did not
find what they expected to find, they stopped looking. They looked for public
examples of prostitution when they were more likely to be hidden from view,
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and they presumed that if the single men who flocked to Williston were not
buying sex, then no one was, neglecting the likelihood that married men might
buy sex, too.
Of course, this exercise is not free of ambiguity. Making silences speak is
not the same as finding new facts. Its value lies in the way it raises questions
about why silences exist in the first place—what forces, that is, work together
to produce and maintain them. That is the question the conclusion explores.
What did The Williston Report leave out, and what social or political forces
contributed to that exclusion? It considers two silences in particular: Native
Americans are absent from the text, as is almost any discussion of the environment. The conclusion ends by asking about future readers. If reading about an
oil boom sixty years after it took place can shed new light on the era in which
people wrote it, what will readers in 2078 think of this book?
Native Americans
Native Americans are completely absent from the 1958 Report. In some ways
this is surprising: part of the Fort Berthold Reservation, for instance, home to
the MHA Nation (the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara), is in Mountrail County
not far from Tioga, one of The Williston Report’s areas of focus. In other ways,
it is not surprising at all: The Williston Report is a product of its time, where
the dominant mythology was that of the frontier. In fact, the Report opens by
evoking that myth, framing (non-Native) residents’ presence as the result of
struggle by generations of settlers to tame the land:
Directly or indirectly, almost every resident had relied primarily upon the
thin cover of soil, upon the vagaries of a capricious weather and upon the
biological rhythm of plant and animal life for his livelihood and for his
welfare … Several generations in that place had brought about a pattern of
living, an adjustment of man to land which was established and mature.
(Wills et al., p. 7)
This myth is of a piece with the dominant narrative of the era. For instance,
the American Petroleum Institute, a trade association formed after the First
World War, produced a series of movies about oil exploration to supplement
the other “educational” materials it published (as mentioned by Talbot, p.
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151). One film, American Frontier (API 1953), was even about Williston.1 It
tells the heroic story of a self-described “wheat farmer and school teacher”
named Nils Halverson, who is willing to take risks in the name of progress.
Much like The Williston Report, it opens with the myth of the frontier, as its
title suggests. Over swelling music and images of empty highways blown over
with snow (Figure 14.1),2 the narrator says,
Not so long ago, this was frontier. Listen closely, and you’ll hear the old
ghost-echo of covered wagons, the phantom shadows of pioneers, fighting
for their lives against the wilderness. Lean men, hard as hickory, lonely
women, wearing their dreams like a bit of bright calico. They began with
nothing—with their bare hands and a bucket of hope, breaking the land
of freedom’s plow, planting towns with names as American as a banjo
tune: Fargo, Stampede, Blue Grass, Beaver Lodge, Lincoln Valley, Williston.
The plot revolves around the oilmen coming to Nils’s farm to persuade his
family to lease their mineral rights. Companies are exploring the area, but
nothing happens until one day when Nils comes home from teaching and his
wife says the oilmen are drilling a well on a neighbor’s farm. Curious, they go
to see it and talk to the man in charge of drilling. Staring out at the prairie, admiring the derrick putting in the well, the oilman says it will cost half a million
dollars, but with only a slim chance of success: “That’s the oil business, a real
gamble. One out of nine, with half a million riding on the play” (Figure 14.2).
“Pretty tough odds,” Nils says.
“Plenty a man willing to take it,” the oilman replies, “especially when there’s
a chance of profit.” He pulls an arrowhead out of his pocket.
“Indian arrowhead?” Nils asks.
“Yeah,” he says, “found it right over there, where we put the rig. It’s for luck—
we’re going to need it!” (Figure 14.3)

1

At least ostensibly. The very first sentence of the film, meant to situate the action for the
viewer, is nonsense: “The wind blows west from the Great Lakes.” Anyone who has lived in
Williston knows, first, that the wind comes from the west and blows toward the east, and,
second, that the closest Great Lake is 700 miles away.
2

American Frontier is in the public domain. All screenshots come from archive.org.
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Figure 14.1. “The old ghost-echo of covered wagons, the phantom shadows of
pioneers…” (source: American Frontier, API 1953)

Figure 14.2. “That’s the oil business, a real gamble. One out of nine, with half a
million riding on the play.” (source: American Frontier, API 1953)
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Figure 14.3. An arrowhead for good luck. (source: American Frontier, API 1953)

The arrowhead is the only indication of Native Americans in the film. Its
function in the plot, not to mention the broader social narrative shaping the
plot, is twofold: it relegates Native Americans to history, and it transforms their
historical presence into a token of luck, which ultimately serves the interests of
the oil business. The film, like The Williston Report, erases Native Americans at
the moments of fact creation and assembly (they are present only in the token
of the arrowhead), fact retrieval (except for this token, they are otherwise absent), and finally, if we take this film at face value, retrospective significance.
It is important, in that respect, to remember, as Sebastien Braun (2016, 95)
reminds us, that “frontiers exist as frontiers for outsiders, on the same land that
is home to locals.” Despite the absence of Native Americans in The Williston Report (and American Frontier), they were living in the Williston Basin during the
1950s oil boom, just as they live in the Bakken region now (see Rundquist and
Vandeberg, p. 77, and Olive, p. 164). Their perspective, absent in The Williston Report, is present in other places. For instance, during the fight against
the Dakota Access Pipeline in 2016, David Archambault (2016), chair of the
Standing Rock Sioux tribe, explained his opposition to the pipeline by placing
it in the context of other historical injustices committed against the people
he represented. One of these, the creation of the Garrison Dam to control the
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flow of the Missouri River in the 1950s, occurred at roughly the same time as
the 1950s boom. Archambault (2016, par. 8) explains that it “took our riverfront forests, fruit orchards and most fertile farmland,” and he shows how its
creation was part of an ongoing cycle of broken promises.
In this way, he helps fill in the gaps in The Williston Report, whose authors
started from a different set of epistemological assumptions. Where they
treated problems caused by oil as distinct from other problems, Archambault
did not, showing instead how the damming of the Missouri River and the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline were part of a broader pattern. Put
another way, The Williston Report seeks to explain social problems, such as they
were, as symptoms of the oil boom. Archambault, in contrast, explains both
the destruction caused by the Garrison Dam and the risks associated with oil
exploration as symptoms of the U.S. government’s failure to deal fairly with
Native Americans (Conway and Duguay 2019). For him, these events fall into
the same category, and his account of the Garrison Dam helps with the production of historical narrative (that is, the moment of fact retrieval) by making
it possible to reconstruct those facts about Native communities during the
1950s oil boom to which contemporary non-Native scholars do not have direct
access.
It also brings into sharp relief the different ways Native and settler communities organize their accounts of history. The authors of The Williston Report
treated problems caused by the oil boom as independent of other problems,
whose causes they saw as unrelated to oil. So did non-Native leaders during
the conflict over the Dakota Access Pipeline, in contrast to Archambault. That
compartmentalization was politically expedient in that it allowed North Dakota’s political leaders in 2016 to argue in favor of the pipeline and against
the protests (and protestors) (Conway and Duguay 2019). In a similar way,
it made it possible for the authors of The Williston Report not to ask about the
effect of the 1950s boom on Native communities, a decision that contributed—indirectly, at least—to the conditions in which the conflict over Dakota
Access took place six decades later.
The Environment
Another silence in The Williston Report concerns the environment. In fact, the
word environment appears in only one place, where it refers to the state’s economic environment (Kelley, p. 190), although ideas related to the physical
environment do appear in the authors’ descriptions of the impact of the boom
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on roads (Wills, p. 44–50). They also appear in their discussion of pipelines
(Wills, p. 50, and Talbot, p. 121) and flaring, or the burning of excess natural gas (Wills, p. 51), but again in the context of politics (in the case of
pipelines crossing state borders) or the economy (in the case of flaring).
Simply put, the authors of The Williston Report are not concerned with the
effect of the boom on the air people breathe or the water they drink. They
differ in this respect from the authors of the chapters that update the 1958
Report, some of whom do address these concerns, albeit in works not included
in this volume. Both William Caraher and Bret Weber in The Bakken: An Archaeology of an Industrial Landscape (2017) and Rick Ruddell in Oil, Gas, and Crime:
The Dark Side of the Boomtown (2017) address the pollution caused by oil development, related not just to fracking but also to flaring, wastewater, oil spills,
and the illegal dumping of toxic waste, as well as light and noise pollution, all
of which affect residents’ quality of life (Ruddell 2017, 108–11; Caraher and
Weber 2017, 21–2).
What accounts for this silence in the 1958 Report? Here, as above, the proximate cause is the authors’ reliance on their informants (who were concerned
with their immediate circumstances) to identify and define social problems.
Although the conservation movement in the United States had existed since
the nineteenth century, led by people like Henry David Thoreau and later John
Muir, concerns about conservation had not entered the public consciousness
to the degree they would even a few years later when Rachel Carson published
Silent Spring (1962). In other words, although this omission might appear
strange to contemporary eyes, environmental issues did not yet have the urgency they have since come to have. Atmospheric rates of the greenhouse gas
carbon dioxide (CO2), for instance, which had held more or less steady at about
280 parts per million (ppm) since biblical times, had risen, but only to 313
ppm in 1951 (IAC 2016; see Figure 14.4).3 Their rise since then has been more
dramatic, reaching nearly 400 ppm by 2014 and 407 ppm by 2018 (IAC 2016;
Harvey 2018).
To explain this silence in greater detail would require an exercise of intellectual archeology that is beyond the scope of the concluding chapter of an
edited volume. It would involve, for instance, digging down to the unspoken
3

Note that the turning point after which CO2 rates rose without falling again came in the
1780s, at the beginning of the geological epoch that Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer (2000,
17) describe as the Anthropocene, a term they choose to designate “the central role of mankind
in geology and ecology.” For them, the symbolic beginning of the Anthropocene is 1784, the
year James Watt invented the steam engine. Although change was still gradual at that point, it
seems well chosen nonetheless.
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Figure 14.4. Global rates of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration, Year
1–2014 (data source: IAC 2016)

assumptions shaping the decision by the 1958 authors to privilege informants’
notions of social problems: what were the social and intellectual conditions
that made their decision appear self-evident? How did those conditions affect
the moments of fact creation, assembly, and retrieval?
Still, the idea that environmental consequences are greater now is clear in
many places, not just rising CO2 levels. Pipelines are a concern because people
are acutely aware of the risks involved in transporting oil, after the explosions
of trains carrying Bakken oil in Lac Mégantic, Quebec, and Casselton, North
Dakota, in 2013. They are also a concern because of the threat they pose to
water supplies, as the protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline showed.
More broadly, the end of 2018 was marked by the publication of two reports,
one from the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP 2018), the other
from the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC
2018), that sounded the alarm about the risks of climate change and the need
for immediate action. They describe a cascading series of effects if CO2 emissions go unchecked: sea levels will rise and extreme weather events such as
hurricanes and wildfires will become more frequent, leading to greater rates
of poverty in affected areas and causing mass migration as people lose their
homes or seek homes that are more secure (see Dennis and Mooney 2018;
Watts 2018). Even North Dakotans, many of whom have resisted the idea that
climate change is happening or is human-caused, have begun to recognize that
it is indeed taking place and that it is affecting things they value, especially in
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agriculture (Baumgarten 2018). Some have even begun to speak against the oil
industry in North Dakota, especially in relation to the Dakota Access Pipeline
(Ruddell 2017, 111–13; Brorby 2017).
How Will People Read this Book Sixty Years from Now?
The nature of the social sciences is such that the authors of a book like The Williston Report—or Sixty Years of Boom and Bust—assume a certain amount of
authority with respect to their readers and the people they write about. They
claim to see things that the people they write about might not see, insight
they have gained through the tools they use—surveys, interviews, statistical
analysis, and so on, all designed to provide a broader perspective or ferret out
hidden patterns.
But their claim to authority does not go untested. The test they face is simple:
do their readers, including the people they write about, recognize the situations they have described? In other words, do their descriptions ring true? In
addition, as they describe what they have observed, they also make predictions
about the future, at least implicitly, in the trends they use to explain how the
current situation came to be. Those too can be tested as time passes and new
readers engage with their work.
In this respect, Robert Campbell makes a revealing comment at the end of
his chapter on social change in the Williston Basin. The authors of the 1958
Report saw themselves as being a bit like Cassandra, the figure from Greek mythology whose predictions about the future always fell on deaf ears:
One of the unfortunate aspects of a report of this sort is that some of
the predictions which are practically useful are not available early enough.
We could have predicted fairly accurately the amount of immediate decrease in Tioga’s population as we were conducting the fieldwork because
of our knowledge that particular individuals already knew the dates on
which they were to be transferred. Furthermore, we could have predicted
the decrease in activity because of the knowledge we obtained about the
relative number of employees needed in exploratory as compared to development activity in the oil fields. The predictions of this sort that we
expressed orally tended to be ridiculed as obviously wrong or as attempts
to devaluate the importance of the oil development to the state of North
Dakota. (Campbell, p. 268)
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Might the same be true of Sixty Years of Boom and Bust? This book has covered a wide range of topics—changes in physical geography, changes in politics
and the economy, and social changes—over a span of sixty years. The chapters
describing the 1950s boom covered a lot of ground, and those describing the
boom in the first decades of the 2000s covered more, addressing issues that
were not as salient in 1958, such as hospital access and drug use. At the same
time, this book shares blind spots with The Williston Report. Although some of
the 2018 authors write about Native Americans, for instance, they focus on
those aspects most relevant to the questions they are asking, such as Native
Americans’ role in governance (Olive, p. 164), without going further.
So, how will people read this book sixty years from now? What patterns
are likely to affect the social fabric of western North Dakota, and what, consequently, will become salient for future readers? In answer to the first question,
two patterns stand out, at least for the near future. The first relates to climate
change. The predictions by the Global Change Research Program (USGCRP
2018) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC 2018) are
dire, but few countries have succeeded in cutting their CO2 emissions. In fact,
despite the agreement reached in Paris in 2015 to limit emissions to prevent
global temperatures from rising by more than 1.5°C beyond pre-industrial
levels, global CO2 rates rose to record levels by 2018 (Storrow 2018). The pattern is one of missed goals. The demand for oil remains high because it makes
economic growth possible. It might not be the only energy source, but it is
more readily accessible than many others.
The second pattern relates to the contradictory logics shaping how people
interact with and relate to one another. One trend in the United States (and
elsewhere) is that of the development of diffuse political and social movements
with loosely related goals, made possible through online social networks that
allow people to affiliate with each other in ever-evolving ways. Another related,
occasionally conflicting trend is that of increased political polarization, as the
networks people join draw them away from those with whom they disagree.
Oil will continue to shape these logics directly, by bringing people together either in support of or in opposition to oil extraction, and indirectly, by shaping
the conditions in which they meet and the ways they understand their relationships to each.
It is risky, however, to make anything more than short-range predictions. The
authors of the 1958 Report could not have foreseen the controversies about
pipelines, for instance, because the scale of oil production in the first decade
of the 2000s was beyond anything they might have imagined. Here is where
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the question of salience matters. What will be salient for future readers will
depend on a social situation resulting from changes that the authors of this
book can only imagine. If society has split irreversibly into warring camps that
refuse to recognize each other’s claims to humanity, perhaps what will be clear
is our undue investment in tribal identities. If it has not, perhaps it will be our
ability to overcome the institutional forces that benefit from dividing people
into groups. Similarly, if global temperatures have risen more than 1.5°C above
pre-industrial levels, perhaps what will be clear is the depth of our naivety and
the height of our hubris. If they have not, perhaps it will be a collective sense
of determination that is not yet apparent in 2018. Tribalism and oil consumption are related, of course, as the competition for resources prompts people
to divide themselves into groups to gain advantage over their adversaries.
Those and other factors interact in complex ways. Thus, if this book has shown
anything, it is that to understand the impact of oil in North Dakota, we must
be attentive to the play between the global and the local, as western North
Dakota has become a nexus point in the global flows of oil, capital, people, and
ideas, through cycles of boom and bust over the past sixty years.
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Appendix A
Methodology Note
The information on which this report is based was compiled from the
results of a census of Williams and Mountrail Counties, from interviews with numerous officials, businessmen and local leaders, and from
a variety of publications and governmental records.
The census of population characteristics and of local opinions was
conducted during the summer of 1954 in the areas affected by the oil
development. Because of practical considerations, the affected area
was divided into the following parts, within which interviews were
conducted on a sample basis: Williston, Ray, Tioga, “Tioga Environs”
(a new residential area outside the town itself ), Stanley, and the rural
impact townships (the 22 townships which encompassed or adjoined
the field development). Interviews with adult members of the households—a total of 1,313 interviews—were conducted by the research
staff using standard schedules designed to obtain information about
the demographic, social, economic and political characteristics of the
inhabitants.
Samples were drawn on a random and stratified basis in the following proportions: Williston—25% of the platted areas; Ray—33% of
the residences; Tioga—50% of the residences; Tioga Environs—50% of
the residences; Stanley—33% of the platted areas; rural impact townships—25% of the farm areas. Although the remaining areas of the two
counties were excluded on the assumption that they were not directly
affected by oil development activity, they were surveyed informally by
mailed questionnaires in the farm areas (total of above 200) and by
personal inspection in the nonfarm population centers to check (and
demonstrate) the validity of the assumption.
All the available supplementary information (such as the U.S.
Census of Agriculture, records in local offices of state and federal agencies, various indices of population growth) indicates that the samples
were highly representative of the survey areas and that the projections
of population numbers and characteristics are accurate within a very
few percent. In every area which was sampled a double-check was
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made to determine that every household which belonged in the sample
was represented and that the number of households represented was
accurate on the basis of a total residence count.
Additional information on employment, gross sales or receipts,
gross weekly payroll, value of inventories, gross change in investment,
and proprietors’ estimates of the impact of oil upon their businesses
were obtained from 187 businesses in Williston and from 29 businesses
in Tioga, the two centers most directly affected by the oil development. Bank data relating to the general level of economic activity and
to financial transactions immediately related to oil development were
collected in Williston, Ray, Tioga and Stanley. Institutional data concerning the membership, policies, plans, and influence on and by the
oil development were obtained from the agents of 30 organizations and
institutions representative of the social structure of Williston.
No less important than the data obtained in formal interviews
involving the use of schedules were the impressions gained and the
observations made by the research staff as “participant observers,” as
residents in the area for three months. The staff was rewarded by an
apparently mutually satisfying relationship with local citizens which
made possible an almost perfect response to the population and
opinion census (only 7 refusals in the total 1,313) and a general willingness to discuss local problems and developments in almost every office
and store which staff members entered. The informal, “unstructured”
discussions over coffee, across counters and on the sidewalks were
what gave real content and meaning to the local “boom” and “bust”
psychology, to the excitement and to the anxiety attached to individual
oil wells and housing developments and business expansions.

Appendix B
Supplementary Table
1. WILLISTON: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
0–4
5–9
10–13
14
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–64
65 and over
TOTAL ALL AGES
No Data

Male
785
548
341
40
262
805
736
533
451
346
4936
89

Female
Male & Female
713		1498
598		1146
330		671
77		117
354		616
665		1470
718		1454
440		973
493		944
297		
643
4781		
9717
96		
185

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.			

2. WILLIAMS COUNTY: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
0–4
5–9
10–13
14
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–64
65 and over
TOTAL ALL AGES
No Data

Male
76
92
60
4
60
88
96
68
112
60
724
8

Female
Male & Female
52		128
80		172
28		88
4		8
48		108
52		140
76		172
64		132
64		176
40		
100
512		
1236
4		
12

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.			
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3. MOUNTRAIL COUNTY: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND
SEX
0–4
5–9
10–13
14
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–64
65 and over
TOTAL ALL AGES

Male
28
32
12
8
0
36
36
48
52
24
276

Female
Male & Female
48		76
20		52
24		36
4		12
16		16
56		92
16		52
20		68
24		76
24		
48
252		
528

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.			

4. TIOGA ENVIRONS: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
0–4
5–9
10–13
14
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–64
65 and over
TOTAL ALL AGES
No Data

Male
124
23
5
9
14
133
88
27
28
0
506
55

Female
Male & Female
129		253
41		64
14		19
0		9
19		33
125		258
51		139
18		45
10		38
0		
0
425		
931
18		
73

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.			
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5. TIOGA: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
0–4
5–9
10–13
14
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–64
65 and over
TOTAL ALL AGES
No Data

Male
92
108
56
14
60
130
142
134
50
39
897
72

Female
Male & Female
133		225
89		197
43		99
14		28
61		121
111		241
116		258
80		214
31		81
31		
70
711		
1608
2		
74

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.			

6. RAY: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX
0–4
5–9
10–13
14
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–64
65 and over
TOTAL ALL AGES
No Data

Male
166
98
49
7
55
151
132
49
46
50
816
13

Female
Male & Female
138		304
62		160
34		83
15		22
28		83
174		325
86		218
47		96
30		76
46		
96
663		
1479
3		
16

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.			
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7. STANLEY: TOTAL POPULATION—AGE AND SEX

0–4
5–9
10–13
14
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–64
65 and over
TOTAL ALL AGES
No Data

Male
125
89
39
22
55
142
117
67
82
45
822
39

Female
Male & Female
118		243
84		173
64		103
16		38
61		116
145		287
81		198
67		134
65		147
70		
115
823		
1645
52		
91

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.			
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8. MARITAL STATUS FOR THOSE 14 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER,
1954
Williston Ray Tioga Tioga Stanley Williams Mountrail
				
Environs
County
County
MALE:							
Married
2401
367
359 229
402
272
112
Single
672
108
185 76
144
200
80
Divorced/
separated
13
3
11
......
......
......
......
Widowed
140
9
19
......
23
16
12
No Data
36
16
67
49
......
8
......
TOTAL
3262
503
641 354
569
496
204
FEMALE:							
Married
2236
343
352 232
361
264
Single
575
49
60
9
100
60
Divorced/
separated
44
9
...... ......
3
......
Widowed
267
25
31
......
53
24
No Data
18
3
3
......
40
4
TOTAL
3140
429
446 241
557
352

108
32
4
16
......
160

MALE & FEMALE:							
Married
4637
710
711 461
763
536
220
Single
1247
157
245 85
244
260
112
Divorced/
separated
57
12
11
......
3
......
4
Widowed
407
34
50
......
76
40
28
No Data
54
19
70
49
40
12
......
TOTAL
6402
932
1087 595
1126
848
364
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.
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9. RELATION TO HEAD OF FAMILY, 1954
Williston Ray Tioga
Tioga Stanley Impact Areas:
				
Environs		
Williams &
						 Mountrail
Head
2672 394
404
267
466
460
Wife
2186 354
349
222
380
353
Son
2118 387
339
175
357
504
Daughter
2021 274
325
194
345
328
Lodger—
Hired Worker
205
52
142
60
61
12
Relatives
204
18
35
5
31
95
No Data
311
......
14
8
5
12
TOTAL
9717 1479 1608
931
1645
1764
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.					

10. INHABITANTS BY 1950 AND 1954 RESIDENCE
1950 Residence			
1954 Residence
Williston Ray Tioga Tioga Stanley Williams Mountrail
				
Environs
County
County
MALE:							
Same
2769
239
283
......
412
544
212
Within Area 203
31
79
39
70
31
8
Other ND
473
55
205
93
112
4
20
Contig. States 232
15
68
25
24
19
4
All Other
474
310
170
225
79
50
4
Total
4151
650
805
382
697
648
248
FEMALE:							
Same
2717
227
196
......
444
353
Within Area 240
30
75
23
89
43
Other ND
529
51
135
106
89
6
Contig. States 207
9
47
14
21
19
All Other
375
208
125
153
62
39
Total
4068
525
578
296
705
460

159
26
15
4
......
204

MALE & FEMALE: 							
Same
5486
466
479
......
856
897
371
Within Area 443
61
154
62
159
74
34
Other ND
1002
106
340
199
201
10
35
Contig. States 439
24
115
39
45
38
8
All Other
849
518
295
378
141
89
4
Total
8219
1175 1383
678
1402
1108
452
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.					
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11. LABOR FORCE STATUS—14 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER
WILLISTON
RAY
		
Male Female Total M F
Employed
2548 868 3416 424 59
Unemployed
57
25
82
3
6
TOTAL LABOR FORCE
2605 893 3498 427 65

T

IMPACT
STANLEY
COUNTIES		
M
F
T
M F
T

TIOGA &
ENVIR.
M
F T

483

612

20

9

4

492

Keeping House
8
2025 2033 ...... 326 326
In School
147 216 363
21 28 49
Unable to Work
155 98
253
21 7
28
Retired
145 ...... 145
29 ...... 29
Other
21
17
38
4
...... 4
No Data
44
28
72
1
3
4
TOTAL NOT IN LABOR FORCE
520 2384 2904 76 364 440
TOTAL IN AGE GROUP
3125 3277 6402 503 429 932

632

462 123

585

824 86 906

...... 4

6

11

17

616

20

636

468 128

596

841 94 935

0

423 423

...... 338

338

4

534 538

33

56

89

28

50

78

41

61 102

20

4

24

43

35

78

27

12 39

4

8

12

15

......

15

31

...... 31

20

...... 20

3

......

3

3

...... 3

4

4

13

5

18

31

3

81

495 576

530

137 610 747

697

515 1212 570 556

8

5

102 428

8

29

34

1126 978 704 1682

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.					
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12. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE—14 YEARS OF
AGE AND OVER
WILLISTON
RAY
		
Male Female Total M F

T

Employed
97.8 97.3 97.7 99.3 90.8 98.2
Unemployed
2.2 2.7 2.3
0.7 9.2 1.8
TOTAL LABOR FORCE
100 100 100 100 100 100
Keeping House
1.6 84.9 70.7 ...... 89.6 74.0
In School
28.2 9.1 12.5 27.6 7.6 11.1
Unable to Work
29.8 4.0 8.7
27.6 1.9 6.3
Retired
28.2 ...... 5.0
38.2 ...... 6.6
Other
4.0 0.4 1.3
5.3 ...... 1.0
No Data
8.1 1.2 2.5
1.3 0.9 1.0
TOTAL NOT IN LABOR FORCE
100 100 100 100 100 100

IMPACT
STANLEY
COUNTIES		
M F
T
M F
T

TIOGA &
ENVIR.
M F
T

99.4 100 99.4

98.8 95.7 98.2

98.0 90.9 97.0

0.6 ...... 0.6

1.2

2.0 9.1

100 100 100

100 100 100

100 100 100

...... 85.5 73.4

...... 78.9 63.7

2.2 87.6 72.0

40.8 11.3 15.4

30.9 11.6 14.8

31.1 10.0 13.8

24.7 0.8 4.2

42.4 8.2 14.8

20.0 2.0

4.9 1.6 2.1

12.1 ...... 2.8

22.2 ...... 4.1

24.7 ...... 3.5

3.0

2.2 ...... 0.4

4.9 0.8 1.4

12.1 1.3 3.3

22.2 0.4

100 100 100

100 100 100

100 100 100

4.3 1.8

...... 0.6

3.0

5.3

4.5

			
									
SOURCE: Projections from sample census.		
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13. INDUSTRY GROUP FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1954
			
Impact 		
			
Counties		
			
Williams &
Tioga and
Williston Ray
Mountrail Stanley
Tioga Environs
Agriculture
Mining and
Construction
Manufacturing,
Durable
Manufacturing,
Non-Durable
Transportation,
Communications,
Public Utilities
Trade
Finance,
Insurance,
Real Estate
Service
Public
Administration
No Data
TOTAL

239

58

524

30

72

611

237

60

186

498

21

......

......

......

......

89

......

......

5

......

513
929

46
83

16
20

57
147

66
130

130
581

5
31

......
4

16
88

9
72

165
138
3416

5
18
483

......
8
632

36
20
585

17
42
906

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.				

378
14. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY GROUP FOR
EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1954
			
Impact 		
			
Counties		
			
Williams &
Tioga and
Williston Ray
Mountrail Stanley
Tioga Environs
Agriculture
7.0
Mining and
Construction
17.9
Manufacturing,
Durable
0.6
Manufacturing,
Non-Durable
2.6
Transportation,
Communications,
Public Utilities
15.0
Trade
27.2
Finance, Insurance,
Real Estate
3.8
Service
17.0
Public
Administration
4.8
No Data
4.0
TOTAL
100.0

12.1

82.9

5.1

8.0

49.0

9.5

31.8

55.0

......

......

......

......

......

......

0.9

......

9.6
17.2

2.5
3.2

9.8
25.2

7.3
14.4

1.3
6.4

......
0.6

2.8
15.0

1.0
8.0

1.3
3.1
100.0

......
1.3
100.0

6.1
3.3
100.0

1.9
4.5
100.0

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.				
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15. OCCUPATION GROUP FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1954
			
Impact 		
			
Counties		
			
Williams &
Tioga and
Williston Ray
Mountrail Stanley
Tioga Environs
Professional
Farm
Managers
Clerical
Sales
Crafts
Operatives
Services
Farm Laborers
Other Laborers
No Data
TOTAL

260
205
533
383
335
447
348
328
27
294
256
3416

6
37
31
25
31
49
197
25
22
34
26
483

12
479
4
8
4
12
52
8
40
4
9
632

46
28
74
44
71
52
97
52
3
96
22
585

17
55
81
87
24
130
315
46
17
101
33
906

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.				

16. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATION GROUP FOR
EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1954
			
Impact 		
			
Counties		
			
Williams &
Tioga and
Williston Ray
Mountrail Stanley
Tioga Environs
Professional
Farm
Managers
Clerical
Sales
Crafts
Operatives
Services
Farm Laborers
Other Laborers
No Data
TOTAL

7.6
6.0
15.6
11.2
9.8
13.1
10.2
9.6
0.8
8.6
7.6
100.0

1.3
7.6
6.4
5.1
6.4
10.2
40.8
5.1
4.5
7.0
5.7
100.0

1.9
75.8
0.6
1.3
0.6
1.9
8.3
1.3
6.4
0.6
1.3
100.0

7.9
4.7
12.6
7.5
12.1
8.9
16.8
8.9
0.5
16.4
3.7
100.0

1.9
6.1
8.9
9.6
2.6
14.4
34.8
5.1
1.9
11.2
3.8
100.0

SOURCE: Projections from sample census.				
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